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Abstract 
Australian ports are crucial to the well-being of the national economy and the 
support of global trade. During 2015-16 Australian ports enabled 1.6 billion tonnes 
of two-way cargo throughput, representing AU$420 billion in value and 
approximately 15% by weight of global trade. A prolonged disruption to Australian 
port operations threatens multiple nations’ economies and related supply chains’ 
effectiveness. Port business continuity is important for these reasons, but few 
studies examine Australian port management within the context of operational 
vulnerabilities to evolving and unpredictable hazards, and port risk management 
effectiveness in treating the uncertainties and unknowns of high consequence 
disruptions. Conventional risk management focuses on known and quantifiable 
risks, but ports are increasingly challenged by a dynamic and turbulent risk 
environment associated with unknown, unpredictable hazards and increasingly 
severe natural disasters. More is required from port decision-makers than 
conventional risk management strategies and capabilities, and this thesis explores 
whether a capability gap exists, and what might be required to enable enhanced 
risk management capabilities. 
This thesis examines Australian port operational vulnerabilities from a systemic 
perspective, encompassing multi-layered networks of internal and external 
stakeholders including those within the port’s hinterland, and the interrelated and 
interdependent port users within Exclusive Economic Zone waters. The primary 
research question (PRQ) investigates the underlying risk management concepts 
and practices that might result in safe port outcomes for Australian intermodal 
shipping operations, namely, how does the port manage risks and consequences 
arising from low probability/high consequence disruptions? To investigate the PRQ 
in finer detail, three secondary research questions (SRQs) were developed, as 
follow:  
SRQ1: How do ports currently manage risks and unknown unknowns 
arising from disruptive events?  
SRQ2: What do ports need to change in their practices to become more 
resilient? and  
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SRQ3: How might ports operationalise resilience to best 
manage/overcome risks and unknown unknowns arising from disruptive 
events?  
The empirical research evaluates port risk management effectiveness, and 
preparedness to meet present and near-term future risks. The secondary research 
questions examine the state of port-centric resilience knowledge and its 
application, and what influences, drivers and impediments might affect the 
operationalisation and enhancement of Australian port resilience.  
A mixed methods research approach is taken in designing and analysing a web-
based survey of high level and authoritative Australian senior port managers. Of 
Australia’s 27 State government authorised port management organisations, 54 
senior managers holding CEO, Harbourmaster and head of department 
appointments returned 37 valid responses to 28 primarily closed-ended questions. 
The survey is limited to Australian port managers because this narrow research 
focuses upon the port’s importance and reliability within the national critical 
infrastructure system. Questions are logic-grouped across themes broadly 
encompassing management demographics, port hazards and vulnerabilities, risk 
management and business continuity, and operationalisation aspects of 
resilience. Quantitative data analysis is performed to undertake non-parametric 
tests and descriptive statistics, while qualitative data analysis addresses open-
ended survey questions. Data analysis findings confirm from self-reports that 
Australian port managers are capable when managing high consequences risks of 
a tangible nature – where physical evidence of both the hazard and the hazard 
outcomes are clear – but less so when a hazard involves uncertainties and 
unknowns emanating from technological or human threats. Importantly, some 
respondents acknowledge significant deficiencies within their business continuity 
preparations, while others report low levels of disruption management 
preparedness. The findings suggest that improvement to port risk management 
and disruption management capabilities is required before managers might 
effectively direct their attentions towards resilience enhancement.  
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Academically, the research provides a tentatively clearer understanding of the 
status of Australian port risk management and resilience, and an associated 
compendium of port risk management and resilience literature. Within a 
practitioner context, the research provides recommendations towards enhancing 
port risk management and resilience capabilities and contributes a theoretical 
basis for advancing management knowledge. Notional performance models are 
generated to provide potential means of assessing progress towards port risk 
management and resilience maturity.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Risk management helps the system prepare and plan for adverse events, 
whereas resilience management goes further by integrating the temporal 
capacity of a system to absorb and recover from adverse events, and then adapt 
(Linkov et al. 2014, p. 407).  
1.1. Research background 
Risk management, in general, is a well-covered topic with centuries of evolution 
(Bernstein 1998). However, the 21st Century brings new forms of hazards and 
disruption that impact across industry sectors, geographic boundaries and supply 
chain systems, with potential for unexpected and unforeseen consequences (Fiksel et 
al. 2015; WEF 2018). Risk, according to the Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience 
(AIDR 2018, n.p.) is defined as: 
The likelihood that a hazard will happen, its magnitude and its consequences. It 
relates to the probability of external and internal threats (such as natural 
hazards…) occurring in combination with the existence of individual 
vulnerabilities.  
From a logistics perspective, disruptions are regarded as ‘…unplanned and 
unanticipated events that disrupt the normal flow of goods and materials within a 
supply chain’ (Craighead et al. 2007, 132). Types of disruption include adverse natural 
events, shipping accidents, technology and communications breakdowns, socio-
political pressures, or deliberate harmful acts (Tang 2006a, 2006b; Waters 2011; Lam 
& Yip 2012). Innovative response and recovery techniques are increasingly required 
in responding to and recovering from new disruption causalities (Schiffino et al. 2017; 
WEF 2018). However, the impact of unexpected and unforeseen hazards is minimally 
addressed by the academic community including consideration of how port managers 
might respond to and treat disruptions that emerge from outside of their planned risk 
identification and treatment parameters. The primary objectives of this thesis are to 
gather clearer understandings of port managers’ disruption experiences, how they 
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managed past emergency situations, their risk expectations for the future, and how 
resilience might enhance their emergency management and business continuity 
capabilities.  
1.1.1. Port safety and safe ports 
Burns (2015) describes the world’s approximate 9,000 ports as strategic intermodal 
transhipment nodes, acting as crucial links between land and waterborne 
transportation to enable the two-way transfer of more than 10.6 billion tonnes of 
international maritime trade (UNCTAD 2017).  Ports are meant to provide safe havens 
for ships at the end of each voyage, along with the necessary facilities for loading and 
unloading cargoes (Burns 2015). A ‘haven’ is described by the Oxford Dictionary as a 
port or harbour that provides safety and shelter for ships. The provision of safe ports 
for ships is a crucial attribute within both risk management and commercial contexts, 
to the extent that shipowners and ship charterers enter into arrangements for the 
nomination of a safe port. A safe port has been characterised by a long-standing legal 
ruling that:  
A port will not be safe unless, in the relevant period of time, the particular ship 
can reach it, use it and return from it without, in the absence of some 
abnormal occurrence, being exposed to danger which cannot be avoided by 
good navigation and seamanship, it would probably meet all circumstances as 
a broad statement of the law1.  
Managing port risks against the threat of known types of disruption has long 
challenged those responsible for port safety. During the fifth and fourth centuries BC, 
high stone walls were constructed around the Athenian ports of Piraeus and Phalerum 
to protect wharves, storehouses, port assets, and road corridors against Persian 
                                                     
 
1 Safe Ports: Leeds Shipping Company Ltd v Société Francaise Bunge (The Eastern City) [1957] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 153, 158 
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attack (Burns 2015). The contemporary port risk environment requires barriers of far 
different types, with the emergence of unpredictable and unforeseen hazards lending 
new dimensions of uncertainty to port operations and networked stakeholders (Yang 
et al. 2014; Lam & Lassa 2017; Tucci 2017; WEF 2018). Within this research, 
uncertainty is regarded as a port manager’s limited knowledge about risk-related 
events, particularly when information concerning the risk environment might be 
unreliable or imprecise (Walker, Lempert, & Kwakkel 2013; Brooks et al. 2018). 
Questions about what determines a safe port and the charter party implications of 
this ‘safe port’ clause attract a large and growing body of literature (Chong 1992; Astle 
1996; Parkes 1998; Singh 2008; McKinnon 2009; Mandaraka-Sheppard 2014; Todd 
2015; Schoenbaum 2016; Girvin 2017). While many academic and legal researchers 
study what constitutes safe port characteristics and port safety outcomes for ship and 
cargo operations, few studies focus on how the functional risk management aspects 
of a safe port might be achieved. Or, more specific to this thesis, how Australian port 
managers manage the risks of high consequence hazards and uncertainties that 
threaten their ports. This research problem is regarded as a worthy area for research, 
with Van der Vegt et al. (2015, p. 2) inviting ‘…management scholars to take up the 
“grand challenge” of studying the role and functioning of organizations during adverse 
natural or social events’. 
1.1.2. Potential contributions to the knowledge 
This study aims to broaden theoretical and empirical risk management knowledge by 
investigating Australian port management effectiveness in managing risks, deep 
uncertainties and consequences arising from unplanned and unanticipated 
disruptions. The study explores how risk management effectiveness might be 
enhanced through operationalising resilience theory into practice against the impact 
and consequences of disruptive events and identifies some change management 
factors that either promote or impede resilience initiatives at Australian ports. 
Organisational competencies in managing a challenging risk environment while 
simultaneously providing reliable and effective services are attributes related to high 
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reliability organisations, or in relation to ports, to high reliability port networks 
(Wood, Dannatt & Marshall 2006; Bethod et al. 2016). High reliability theory is 
associated with resilience theory within the literature, whereby high reliability 
organisations are assessed in part by their commitment to resilience (Wood, Dannatt 
& Marshall 2006; Weick & Sutcliffe 2015; Berthod et al. 2017). 
Four decades ago, researchers were setting their research agendas to establish 
whether and how, for example, computer technology might be used to assist in port 
management and arguing that more attention should be directed towards low 
risk/high consequence port facility hazards (Price, Friedheim & Ross 1983). Port 
managers today have considerably broader risk and vulnerability issues than did their 
1980’s predecessors. Port business processes depend upon the availability and 
reliability of externally provided crucial goods and services, inclusive of the technology 
inputs that underpin transport, logistics and port operations effectiveness (Van den 
Berghe 2015; Ferretti & Schiavone 2016; Heilig & Voß 2017a, 2017b). Port 
dependencies upon external stakeholders suggest that port risk management and 
business continuity processes can no longer be studied in isolation – by association, 
crucial goods and services supplier vulnerabilities become port vulnerabilities. 
Contemporary risk management researchers provide important information about 
these networked interrelationships and dependencies between the port and its 
crucial hinterland goods and services suppliers (Wakeman 2013; John et al. 2015; Wei, 
Chen & Rose 2017). This research attempts to add to the knowledge by leveraging 
from these studies.  
1.2. Research context and importance of Australian port operations 
Ports conduct their complex intermodal shipping operations within a fast-moving, 
dynamic and tumultuous risk environment in which business-as-usual normality might 
quickly be replaced by emergency conditions. Rapid transition to emergency 
conditions is a characteristic, for example, of cyber-attacks against critical port 
operating and administration systems (Clark & Hakim 2017; Tucci 2017).  Increasingly, 
Australian ports as critical infrastructure elements must optimise their risk 
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management capabilities and emergency preparedness for planning, preventing, 
responding, recovering and learning from disruptions (Zio 2016). This is recognised by 
Australian government initiatives towards critical infrastructure protection, which 
encourage ports and other Australian critical infrastructure operators to strengthen 
their resilience capabilities and capacities (AG 2015; TISN 2015). 
During 2017, over 80% by volume (more than ten billion tonnes) of the world’s raw 
materials and manufactured goods passed through global ports. Seaborne trade 
growth is influenced in part by Australian trading partners such as China, Japan, the 
US and South Korea (Branch & Stopford 2013; DFAT 2017; UNCTAD 2017). Within a 
critical infrastructure context, ports are essential to the conduct of international 
business and the continued operations of global supply chains, the security of the 
Australian economy, and to the employment and economies of port centric regional 
communities and their industries (AG 2015; Burns 2015; Cavusgil et al. 2015; IA 2016). 
The publication Guide to Port Entry (Witherby 2018) lists 86 major Australian 
commercial ports and terminals, of which 70 are of appreciable value to global trade 
(Ports 2017). A study of one such port (Nicolaou, Buckland & Hammond 2017) 
estimates that in 2015-16 the Port of Port Hedland in Australia’s north west generated 
AU$18.5 billion in direct economic output for the Western Australian State economy, 
AU$30 billion to the Australian economy, and supported 86,240 full time jobs.  
Australian ports are managed, overseen and regulated by 27 port authorities and 
State government transportation departments (Ports 2017) and these management 
entities are responsible for matters of port safety and risk management under 
national and State Acts, regulations and industry codes of practice (AUSTLII Data Base 
2018). A map of Australian ports is shown in Figure 1-1 (Ports 2017), which also 
indicates the boundaries of the various Australian States. Australian ports come under 
the jurisdiction of State governments. Most ports are administered by port authorities 
acting as corporatised statutory authorities, however a perception exists that these 
port management organisations are not far removed from political and government 





Figure 1-1: Australia and its ports (Ports 2017). 
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According to Chen and Everett the continuing political oversight and control over 
Australian ports impedes port managers from acting quickly and flexibly to dynamic 
changes in their working environment. The literature provides little further evidence 
of how this political constraint might work to impede port risk management processes 
and procedures, or to compound an already complex risk environment. 
 
Australia is a large island continent that geographically encompasses diverse mineral 
and rural resources that shape the creation and growth of its ports, and multiple 
climate zones with individual climatic influences upon port operations (Parker et al. 
2009). Australia’s mainland and ocean territories are segmented into 55 development 
zones termed as regions, and these are shown in Figure 1-2 (RDA 2018). Some 
Australian geographic regions are larger than smaller European nations, and a recent 
port reform trend is for Australian port authorities to manage all ports within their 
geographic region, to form a system of networked ports (DoT-WA 2017).  
Conceptually, the broader academic literature tends to associate port regions and 
regionalisation with the relationships between a port and its hinterland stakeholders, 
coupled with port effects upon the regional economy and its industrial growth 
(Notteboom & Rodrigue 2005; Notteboom, Ducruet & De Langen 2009; Wilmsmeier, 
Monios & Rodrigue 2015). Throughout this research, however, reference to Australian 
regions indicates non-capital city zones formed by geographical, climatological and 
economic segmentation of national land areas (Parker et al. 2009; Eversole 2016). 
Regions mentioned in other literature cited within this research generally refer to 
port-centric hinterlands. Australian port managers confront varying types of regional 
risks, where for example port climate change adaption needs depend upon 
geographical location (Parker et al. 2009; Hodgkinson, Hobday & Pinkard 2014). Also, 
regional ports might be located more than 1,000 kilometres distant from their State 





Figure 1-2: Australian regions (RDA 2018).
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Geographical isolation from capital city external support requires Australian port 
managers to develop competent internal governance and capabilities for managing 
disruptive circumstances within an incident control function (AIIMS 2017; Wakeman 
et al. 2017).  Within a research context, little is known of Australian port managers’ 
capabilities for dealing locally with potential new hazards, their capabilities for 
emergency response and disaster recovery, or what resilience measures they might 
employ (Trucco & Petrenj 2017; Wei, Chen & Rose 2017). Recognition of that research 
gap has led to this investigation.  
1.3. Port hazards, risk management and organisational resilience 
Research discussion is immature about Australian port hazards, risk management and 
resilience capabilities, despite the potential harm that new and emerging risks might 
pose to ports, and Australian government concerns for critical infrastructure 
protection. These knowledge gap and risk environment pressures lend both 
importance and timeliness to this study. Hazards originate both within and external 
to port operations, and those potentially within port managers’ abilities to control 
give rise to human, technological and infrastructure risks (Thai & Chen 2011; 
MacKenzie 2012). Hazards beyond port managers’ abilities to control might result in 
unforeseen or unexpected disruption onsets and/or consequences, for example 
adverse natural events, shipping accidents, technology and communications 
breakdowns, socio-political pressures, or deliberate harmful acts (Tang 2006a, 2006b; 
Waters 2011; Lam & Yip 2012). Difficulties in establishing risk controls due to hazard 
uncertainties and unknowns might influence managers to develop alternative and 
non-traditional capacities for coping and responding to disruptions, and these 
processes and procedures are germane to systemic resilience (Welsh 2014; Coaffee & 
Clarke 2016).  
For Australian ports, uncertainty might arise from management inabilities to predict 
or foresee unknown elements of risk, creating what is termed ‘wicked problems’ 
(Smithson 2010; Gharehgozli et al. 2017). These wicked problem risks include adverse 
natural events of increasing severity (WEF 2018) with, for example, fewer Australian 
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tropical cyclones predicted but of greater intensity, stronger wind speeds and higher 
rainfall (BOM 2018). Conventional risk management techniques focus on known and 
quantifiable risks (ISO 31000:2018), however risk management to treat uncertain and 
unexpected adverse events involves a complex interrelationship between plans, 
processes and strategies to identify, assess, prepare, respond, manage and recover 
from disruptions (Srikanth & Venkataraman 2013; Bichou, Bell & Evans 2014; Booth 
2015; Hopkin 2017; Lam & Lassa 2017; Haimes 2018). Further, treating ‘wicked 
problems’ requires management to cope with disruption complexity and diversity 
while possessing only fragmented and incomplete knowledge (Head & Alford 2015). 
Head and Alford suggest that there is no single or best solution to identifying and 
managing ambiguous disruptions and their potential consequences, rather an 
effective response to such risks might be reactive, adaptive, collaborative, 
coordinated, and managed within leadership that reflects these qualities. Because the 
port risk environment is characterised by unknowns, uncertainties, unexpectedness 
and unpredictability (Chandler & Coaffee 2017; Haimes 2018), then this research 
assumes that contemporary port risk management requires more adaptive and 
innovative capabilities for managing risks than those enabled by conventional means. 
This assumption is supported from within the resilience-oriented literature (Gibson & 
Tarrant 2010; Chandler 2014; John et al. 2016).  
The literature provides a confusing range and imprecision of resilience definitions. 
Moteff (2012, p. 2) is one researcher who expresses a frustration with the definitional 
imprecision by stating: ‘there are almost as many definitions of resilience as there are 
people defining it’. The International Standards security and resilience standard (ISO 
22316: 2017, p. 1) for example, provides resilience knowledge and guidance that port 
managers can access, and defines organisational resilience as: 
The ability of an organization to absorb and adapt in a changing environment to 
enable it to deliver its objectives and to survive and prosper. More resilient 
organizations can anticipate and respond to threats and opportunities, arising 
from sudden or gradual changes in their internal and external context. 
11 
 
Enhancing resilience can be a strategic organizational goal and is the outcome 
of good business practice and effectively managing risk. 
This resilience standard is recent, and the time lag between its publication and when 
any widespread manifestation of its benefits will appear in the port workplace is yet 
to be tested. Two other standards associated with port resilience are ISO 31000:2018 
on Risk Management – Principles and Guidelines, and ISO 22301: 2012 on Business 
Continuity. Risk management and business continuity are associated with planning 
and preparation phases of disruption management capabilities, whereas the 
manifestation of resilience is more likely to appear during a disruption, or as described 
by Booth (2015), resilience refers to the enablement of further coping with abilities 
during crisis management.  
1.4. The research problem 
At a time of emerging and unforeseen hazards and uncertainties that threaten global 
critical infrastructure, this research investigates Australian port management abilities 
to manage high consequence disruptions from known and unknown causalities. By 
reconceptualising the port as a regional system of networked logistics and 
transportation clusters and operators, the research aims to provide new and deeper 
insights into port risk management capabilities, reliability, and resilience. The 
research problem is based upon how Australian ports manage risks and consequences 
arising from low probability/high consequence hazards, and the extent that their 
safety performance and freight task continuity relies upon resilience as a defence-in-
depth against unexpected and unforeseen disruptive events.  
Topicality and importance of these resilience aspects arise from Australian 
government initiatives to strengthen Australian critical infrastructure resilience levels 
(O’Donnell 2013; AG 2015; IA 2016). Further impetus arose in 2017 when disastrous 
cyber-attacks shut down components of the Port of Rotterdam, Maersk shipping, TNT, 
global banks and critical infrastructure including power stations for several days (Roth 
& Nakashima 2017). More generally, academics and practitioners are presently 
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engaged in quantifying and redefining resilience as practised within large and complex 
organisations (Hosseini, Barker & Ramirez-Marquez 2016). Whereas academia 
appears to be well advanced in exploring transportation and logistics resilience (see 
for example Mattsson & Jenelius 2015; Pitilakis et al. 2016; Shaw, Grainger & 
Achuthan 2017), few researchers address Australian port practitioners’ risk 
management and resilience capabilities. Instead, Australian port-centric resilience 
studies tend to take a climate change perspective (McEvoy & Mullett 2013; Cahoon 
et al. 2015; Yang et al. 2015). This explains why Australian port resilience research is 
small when compared with the volume of European and US port resilience studies 
(Rose & Wei 2013; Loh & Thai 2014; Pant et al. 2014; Trepte & Rice 2014; John et al. 
2016; Shaw, Grainger & Achuthan 2017; Vonck, Notteboom & Dooms 2017; Wei, Chen 
& Rose 2017).   
The intention of this thesis is to address gaps in the knowledge by conducting 
empirical research that: 
a) identifies Australian port characteristics and vulnerabilities to operational 
risks;  
b) identifies hazards that potentially threaten port business continuity;  
c) assesses port manager capabilities for responding to and managing these 
hazards;  
d) provides a clearer understanding of the terminology and practical 
employment of port resilience; 
e) explores what might enable or constrain Australian port resilience practices; 
and,  
f) investigates how ports might operationalise resilience to best 
manage/mitigate risks and unknown unknowns arising from emerging 
categories of low probability/high consequence disruptive events. 
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1.5. Research questions 
The primary research interest is to gain a clearer understanding of how effectively 
Australian port managers manage risk, and cope with disruptions in crisis 
management and business continuity endeavours. Empirical components of this 
research set out to determine what risk and resilience capabilities and capacities are 
evidenced by managerial self-reports. Research validity rests upon assumptions that 
the survey respondents as port senior decision-makers are attentive and 
knowledgeable about their risk management roles and responsibilities, and 
knowledgeable about resilience competencies. Accordingly, this thesis investigates 
the underlying risk management concepts and practices that might result in safe port 
outcomes for Australian intermodal shipping operations, and therefore the primary 
research question (PRQ) is: 
How does the port manage risks and consequences arising from low 
probability/high consequence disruptions? 
To investigate the PRQ in finer detail, three secondary research questions (SRQs) were 
developed, as follow: 
SRQ1: How do ports currently manage risks and unknown unknowns arising 
from disruptive events? 
SRQ2: What do ports need to change in their practices to become more 
resilient? and  
SRQ3: How might ports operationalise resilience to best manage/overcome 
risks and unknown unknowns arising from disruptive events? 
1.6. Significance of the study 
Although few studies address Australian port risk management and resilience, 
Australian government initiatives for critical infrastructure protection are strong 
motivation towards gaining a clearer understanding of port emergency management 
capabilities and processes, crisis management effectiveness, and resilience (AG 2011, 
2015, 2017; IA 2016; TISN 2016). This study is intended for a potential audience of 
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academics, practitioners and regulatory authorities, with the objective of broadening 
theoretical and empirical risk management knowledge. Potential contributions 
include: 
a) the use of Dynamic Capabilities theory in conjunction with systems and 
resilience theories, to explore how Australian ports might operationalise 
resilience to competitive advantage - an innovative and pragmatic approach 
that potentially provides a new methodology for gaining richer, deeper and 
more explanatory port management findings; 
b) compilation of an extensive literature review related to the generic port risk 
management environment, which may serve as a research basis for other 
researchers within the field of critical infrastructure protection, as well as an 
informative guide for practitioners; 
c) gathering information on new and emerging risks, and increasingly severe 
existing risks; 
d) an investigation of port manager attitudes, behaviour and competencies in 
relation to risk management and operationalising resilience; 
e)  assessment of Australian port risk management effectiveness; 
f) reconceptualising Australian port dependencies upon, and vulnerabilities 
arising from, crucial goods and services supply from land and sea; 
g) establishing sufficiently valid macro-findings to be applicable in other fields of 
transportation research; and  
h) providing knowledge that may be useful in assisting practitioners to expand 
their professional knowledge and awareness, and in enhancing their port 
preparedness towards future risks. 
1.7. Thesis organisation 
Figure 1-3 provides a graphical presentation of the Thesis structure to show the 
chapter interdependencies. The introductory chapter broadly explains the underlying 
circumstances leading to the research problem and provide a rationale for why the 
study is important. The literature and empirical research germane to the problem 
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being studied is summarised, and a logic framework constructed towards clarifying 
the research questions and aim of the study. The problem statement is explained, and 
the purpose of the study clarified. Chapter 1 also outlines the function of each 
succeeding chapter in developing the framework and focus of the thesis. Chapter 2 
identifies and evaluates the characteristics and importance of Australian ports and 
port management. These characteristics and port managers’ networked 
interrelationships and interdependencies with stakeholders render the port 
vulnerable to diverse hazards, which are discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Figure 1-3: Thesis chapter outline (Author). 
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Port risk management is investigated in Chapter 4, from top-down and bottom-up 
management perspectives. Chapter 5 compiles a port resilience framework to provide 
a clearer understanding of resilience within a port operations context. Further, the 
chapter provides a conceptual basis against which port conditions conducive to 
strengthening resilience might be measured, Chapter 5 proposes a notional resilience 
maturity measurement model based on the conceptual model provided by Gibson 
and Tarrant (2010).   
After gathering this information from existing theory, the thesis flows on to research 
methodology (Chapter 6), which explains the use of web-based, structured 
quantitative, and semi-structured qualitative survey questions in generating data to 
more completely answer the research questions. Chapter 6 presents the scientific 
methodology and the underlying logic in understanding the exploratory research 
problem. Chapter 7, the risk management data analysis and findings chapter, reviews 
the problem and associated issues, and is followed by Chapter 8 which assesses the 
challenging issue of how port managers might transform resilience theory into 
practice. Chapter 9 provides the thesis conclusions, and summarises the body of work 
inclusive of the literature review and the empirical research. Limitations of the study 











Chapter 2: Australian ports and port management  
2.1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 provided a brief overview of Australian ports’ immense contributions to the 
national economy and towards the effectiveness of global commerce. Prolonged 
interruptions to port business continuity carry significant potential for widespread 
financial losses, plus adverse implications for supply chains and industries relying on 
just-in-time deliveries of goods and materials by sea. Port managers have heavy 
responsibilities in maintaining continuity of their intermodal operations, beginning 
with clear understandings of where and how their ports become vulnerable to a 
dynamic and uncertain risk environment. The aim of Chapter 2 is to contribute 
knowledge to this area of research by examining Australian port roles, characteristics, 
capabilities, relationships and crucial enabling requirements for maintaining the two-
way flow of global trade. A clearer understanding of what constitutes a port and its 
nationally important intermodal operations is integral to subsequent chapters that 
examine the port risk environment and its hazard uncertainties, and how port 
managers might plan for, respond to, manage, and then recover from the impacts and 
consequences of actualised port hazards. Chapter 2 begins this process by discussing 
Australia’s major ports and port authorities within their regional, national and global 
contexts. 
2.2. Australian ports and risk management functions 
In 2015-16, Australian ports enabled exports of 1.446 billion tonnes and imports of 
150 million tonnes, representing AU$420B in two-way global trade (BITRE 2017). 
Australia’s ports handle approximately 15% by weight of global seaborne trade and 
accordingly, any prolonged disruption to these ports’ operations threatens multiple 
nations’ economies and related supply chains’ effectiveness. The scale and economic 
value of this seaborne trade illustrates the importance of Australian port managers’ 
risk management effectiveness. Effective risk management capabilities are the 
delegated operational and strategic responsibilities of port managers, whose port 
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authorities are tasked by governments with maritime safety, security and crisis 
management (Berle, Asbjørnslett & Rice 2011a). The peak body for Australian ports, 
port authorities and associated public and private entities is Ports Australia, and their 
map (Figure 2-1) is adapted to show the location of Australian ports, port authorities 
and State government departments with regulatory responsibilities for ports. 
Australian ports are managed by six State government departments, and twenty-one 
port authorities operating as corporatised public facilities. Decadal port reform 
processes and asset sales have seen some ports privatised in the form of long 
leasehold arrangements, but these privately-operated ports remain overseen by port 
authorities in a regulatory role (Everett 2007; De Langen & Haij 2014; Chen, Pateman 
& Sakalayen 2017). The Australian port privatisation process is prone to socio-political 
tensions, where the port authority remains responsible for privatised port operational 
safety and security, providing emergency response and recovery services, and 
regulating the two-way transit of dangerous and hazardous goods (Chen, Pateman & 
Sakalayen 2017). It is not known, post these privatisation and port reform processes, 
how well-resourced Australian port authorities might be in facilitating their risk 
management roles and functions. 
2.2.1. Port failure modes and vulnerabilities 
Australian ports have evolved in multiple ways depending upon their locations, 
purposes, trade patterns and demand, port ownership, ship sizes, national defence 
influences, and regional industry requirements (Alderton & Saieva 2013; Burns 2015; 
Sakalayen, Chen & Cahoon 2017). Supply chain managers might view ports as costly 
but essential intermodal transit points for their cargoes (Song & Panayides 2008); the 
local community might regard the port as a source of employment and business 
opportunities (Notteboom 2010) or even a source of environmental annoyance; while 
governments might view the port as an instrument for regional development and 




Figure 2-1: Major ports, port authorities and port-related State government departments (Adapted from Ports Australia 2017).  
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The primary purposes and operations of ports and port authorities are 
summarised by Burns (2015): 
Seaports are principally designed to provide shelter to oceangoing or inland 
ships, while effectively managing numerous dissimilar activities, human 
force, materials, and financial resources. Port authorities are in charge of 
harboring and securing ships, while ensuring smooth operations throughout 
ships’ anchorage, pilotage, berthing/unberthing, lightering, 
mooring/unmooring, loading/unloading operations (2015, pp 1-2).  
Ports evolve in individual ways because of their dissimilar activities and 
characteristics. Their evolution, management and governance are also shaped by 
whichever ownership and structural model applies to their port. The World Bank 
(PPIAF 2016) describes varying types of port management models, each of which 
demonstrates differing levels of port authority management involvement: 
a) fully port authority operated facilities (service port);  
b) tool port models wherein the port authority is vested by the State 
government with the port land and sea holdings, and leases out operations 
to services companies; 
c) a landlord port model where the port authority leases sites to operators 
who then provide requisite infrastructure and superstructure; or  
d) a fully privatised port for which the port authority is responsible for 
regulatory and administrative roles and functions.  
Port management roles, responsibilities, and levels of authority are influenced by 
the nature of port ownership, its structure and organisation (Burns 2015). These 
influences are rarely discussed within the context of managing operational risks. 
Burns (2015) argues that ports owned by governments and operated by port 
authorities are less vulnerable to risk consequences, one reason being that the 
government owner is a source of last resort for financial subsidies, grants and cash 
injections. A port managed by a government business agency might also tend 
towards low-risk, steady growth management strategies in line with what is 
described as a port authority mindset with bureaucratic tendencies (Everett 2007; 
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Chen & Everett 2014).  Alternatively, a fully privatised port might be more 
vulnerable to risk consequences, and in the case of a foreign port operator, an 
Australian port may be exposed to fresh sources of socio-political risk. Yet 
unknown are potential strategic and management oversight risks (if any) arising 
from foreign investment in Australian ports and port operations, for example the 
Northern Territory Government leasing of Port of Darwin facilities to a Chinese-
owned company for 99 years (Barnes et al. 2015).  
In general, little is known about how Australian port authorities might manage and 
respond to uncertainties arising from port infrastructure, facilities and operations 
increasingly being delivered into private sector control. Chen, Pateman and 
Sakalayen (2016) argue that when Australian port corporatisation and 
privatisation initiatives occur, then the port authority or relevant State 
government departments remain responsible for port regulatory governance and 
emergency management roles but lose some influence over how port business 
operations are conducted. This suggests that private sector port risk management 
interests and directions might not necessarily coincide with those of the port 
authority. Since 2010, an objective of Australian port reform processes was to 
make port management more efficient (Chen, Pateman & Sakalayen 2016). 
Various State port reform processes result in port authorities experiencing 
reduced control over port operations, while retaining compliance responsibilities 
for regulatory governance and emergency management, sometimes under 
bureaucratic and political interference (Chen & Everett 2014; Chen, Pateman & 
Sakalayen 2016). How these constraining factors might affect port risk 
management and resilience effectiveness remains to be explored. 
Port operational capabilities are shaped by its physical attributes (geography, 
infrastructure, superstructure and assets), human resources (port employees and 
contractors and external goods and services providers), management systems 
(plans, procedures and capabilities), and, the use of technology (information, 
communications, logistics, management systems, hardware and software) (Burns 
2015; John et al. 2015; Price & Hashemi 2016; Bichou 2018). A list of the port’s 
crucial enabling requirements is sourced from the literature and shown in Table 2-
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1 (Bridges 2004; Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack 2009; Lansdale 2012; Tsinker 2014; 
Price & Hashemi 2016; Bichou 2018).  
Port operational capabilities Crucial enabling requirements 
Safe ship navigation Berthing pockets and turning areas, 
breakwater/s, channels, charts, Harbourmaster 
oversight and directions, navaids, navigational 
safety system, pilotage, pilot launch &/or 
helicopter, towage, VTS.  
Infrastructure Dredged channels and seabed areas, dry docks 
and slipways, green areas, land, laydown and 
storage areas, paving, pipeline and conveyor 
corridors, road and rail connectivity, wharves.  
Superstructure and equipment Amenity blocks, boat ramps, cargo handling 
and ship/shore transfer equipment, cargo 
transport vehicles, cathodic protection system, 
conveyors, DGPS and RFID tracking systems, 
dry bulk silos, electrical distribution and 
substations, emergency power and lighting, 
fencing, fenders and pontoons, firefighting 
system,  fixed and mobile cranes, footpaths, 
fuel tank farm, hydro-meteorological 
monitoring system, ICT/intranet system, 
landside navigational markers and leads, 
lighting, marinas, marshalling yards, motor 
vehicles, offices and meeting rooms, oil and 
chemical spill equipment, pipelines, potable 
water system, radio and radar installations, 
recreational boating areas, road/rail traffic 
management system, roads, security system, 
sewage system, ship/boat lifter, small 
craft/launches, storm water system, 
surveillance system,  terminal operating 
systems, terminals, tug pens, VTS centre, 
warehouses, water and fuel lighters, weigh 
bridges, workshop and tools.  
External services and supply Agents, asset and machinery repair, aviation 
(fixed wing and rotary), banking and finance, 
bunkering, catering, chandleries, cleaning, 
consignees, customs, distribution, diving and 
underwater maintenance/repairs, dredging, 
electricity, fabrication, food, freezing and 
chilling storage, fuel, hospitality and housing, 
ICT, immigration services, insurance, 
investment, ISP, linesmen, livestock holding 
yards, logistics and transportations services, 
maintenance, manufacturing, medical and 
health, pilots, police and emergency services, 
port labour, providores, public transport, 
quarantine, shippers, road and rail 
transportation, stevedores, training, tug crews, 
waste removal, waste water, water treatment.  
Table 2-1: Port capabilities and crucial enabling requirements (Adapted from the literature).  
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A primary objective of port operational management is to maintain a reliable two-
way flow of freight and passengers through the port, while ensuring safe, secure 
and effective ship navigation, the safe and effective transfer of cargo from one 
means of transportation to another, and safe movement of passengers between 
ship and shore (Lansdale 2012; Stopford 2013; Burns 2015). At each stage of a ship 
visit the port is exposed to the risks of accidents with potentially severe 
consequences including loss of life, environmental pollution, and widespread 
damage to the ship, other vessels and to port infrastructure (Hsu 2015).  
The ship visit commences upon arrival at port, whereupon the Master is directed 
by the VTS officer (on behalf of the Harbourmaster) to proceed either to an 
anchorage area, normally within port limits, or to a pilot boarding position from 
which the ship is navigated to the requisite berth in port (IALA 2016; Lansdale 
2012). Port navigational services are assigned to the vessel which makes its way 
to the designated berth. Once the ship is secured to the berth and requisite 
ship/shore safety checks are complete, then the cargo loading or unloading 
operations commence. Cargo transfer equipment varies according to the type of 
cargo, and at a small port there might be only one wharf with multiple cargo 
handling capabilities and diverse equipment (Burns 2015; World Bank 2016). At 
larger ports multiple terminals specialise in single types of cargo handling, for 
example either dry or liquid bulk handling, break bulk or containers. When the 
cargo transfer to or from the ship is complete, then the ship departs the port and 
the port prepares for the next shipping operation.  
For managers to maintain the continuity of their port business, shipping and cargo 
operations should be protected both from foreseeable risks of knowable causes, 
and from low frequency/high impact disruptions whose causes may be yet 
unknown and unpredictable (Berle, Asbjørnslett & Rice 2011a). Port managers 
may not know or be able to predict the onset of what Gharehgozli et al. (2017) 
describe as ‘wicked problems’. However, these managers could identify and assess 
wicked problem consequences, whose impact upon port vulnerabilities would be 
sufficient to create failure modes and to halt shipping and cargo throughput 
(Berle, Rice & Asbjørnslett 2011a, 2011b). This process is termed a vulnerability 
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assessment, which leads to the understanding of what key functions and 
capabilities constitute weak links within port operations, what resources should 
be provided to protect these failure modes from harm, and what alternative or 
duplicated resources might enable port business to continue or expeditiously 
resume functionality following a disruptive event (Schnaubelt, Larson & Boyer 
2014). 
Green (2008a) defines vulnerability as exposure to a hazard, whereby the level of 
organisational vulnerability might vary inversely to organisational preparedness 
and mitigation. Vulnerability is arguably a dynamic risk factor when the 
organisation adjusts its functioning to manage expected and unexpected 
conditions, by means of changes in operational practices, training program 
effectiveness, environmental conditions, and the extent of organisational hazard 
mindfulness (Green 2008b; Weick & Sutcliffe 2015; Burnard, Bhamra & 
Tsinopoulos 2018). Port vulnerabilities to hazards vary from port to port due to 
the individual port characteristics as previously described, and because a port’s 
exposure to adverse natural events depends to some extent upon its geographic 
location. For example, a port in the southern half of Australia is minimally 
vulnerable to cyclones, because cyclones degrade into low pressure weather 
patterns as they move into cooler climate zones (BOM 2018; Bartlett & Singh 
2018).  
2.2.2. Linking risk management with vulnerability assessments 
A determinant of port risk includes the vulnerability of all crucial requirements at 
risk (Cardona et al. 2012; Zio 2016). Within a port vulnerability assessment, each 
of the crucial operational capabilities listed at Table 2-1 constitutes a point of 
vulnerability that port managers should address (Hsieh, Tai & Lee 2014; 
Schnaubelt, Larson & Boyer 2014; Pitilakis et al. 2016). Potentially each port has 
multiple and complex ‘crucial enabling requirements’ and resultant vulnerabilities 
requiring conventional risk management treatment, coupled with ongoing 
vulnerability assessments, controls and mitigation (Berle, Rice & Asbjørnslett 
2011a). Further, because Table 2-1 reveals that port business also relies upon 
crucial external services and supply for its business continuity, then a need arises 
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for collaborative as well as individual risk and vulnerability treatments. Friday et 
al. (2018) identify key components of collaborative risk management as 
information sharing, standardised risk management procedures, collaborative and 
coordinated decision-making, the sharing of risks and beneficial outcomes, with 
enactment through aligned risk management processes and performance 
systems. Little is known about the extent of collaborative risk management 
implementation across Australian port stakeholders. 
Vulnerability is described by Gallopin (2006) as a system’s potential towards a 
relatively permanent and profound transformation to another state if a 
sufficiently strong disruption arises from either internal or external origins.  The 
degree of change is relative to the system’s exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive 
capacity to the disruption (Gallopin 2006). Vulnerability, according to Haimes 
(2016, p. 493) represents the exposure to harm of a system’s ‘physical, technical, 
organisation and cultural’ states. In the case of the port, key operational 
vulnerabilities affecting business continuity include the safety of navigation in port 
waters, safeguarding the port’s land and sea infrastructure and superstructure, 
and ensuring the supply of crucial external goods and services (Alderton 2013; 
Bichou, Bell & Evans 2014; Burns 2015; John et al. 2015; Price & Hashemi 2016).  
Exposure is described as the extent and time that the system is influenced by the 
disruptive event, sensitivity as the potential degree by which the system might 
alter in response to the perturbation, and adaptive capacity as the ability to adjust, 
absorb and turn to advantage the harmful influences of the perturbation (Gallopin 
2006).  
The linkage between port vulnerabilities and risk management becomes an 
important consideration for port managers, not only because of the value of trade 
and port business, but because ports represent significant investments at risk to 
hazards. Australian LNG ports and terminals (for example Wheatstone, Gorgon, 
Dampier, Darwin and Gladstone) are expensive to construct. A small port might 
cost A$15 billion, whereas Australia’s Gorgon facility (the world’s most expensive 
LNG port project) cost A$52 billion (Songhurst 2014). A container terminal such as 
Australia’s Webb Dock facility is estimated to cost A$1.6 billion and retrofitting of 
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other Australian container terminals in line with technology and ship size advances 
is expected to incur high costs (Arup 2017; Culley 2017). Replacing or upgrading 
large container handling cranes and automated container carrying equipment 
influences high retrofitting costs, which are unavoidable because ports must adapt 
to shipping industry requirements to remain competitive (Konings 2008; Justice et 
al. 2016). 
2.2.3. Port transport and logistics vulnerabilities 
Contemporary ports are vulnerable to disruptions within multiple logistics and 
transportation processes, and levels of vulnerability might vary extensively from 
port to port, and between critical actors within a single port (Crist 2003; Berle, 
Asbjørnslett & Rice 2011; Liu et al. 2018). These port transportation and logistics 
vulnerabilities exist within designated port lands and waters, and across the 
networks of crucial goods and services providers (Crist 2003; Hsieh, Tai & Lee 
2014; Burns 2015). Port vulnerabilities increase under the influences of 
operational and geo-spatial changes that recast the freight task environment, the 
rapid pace of technology advances, urban encroachment on port boundaries, 
expansion of containerisation, supply chain operator requirements for increasing 
efficiencies, plus inter and intra port competition (Ducruet & Notteboom 2012). 
Competitive pressures increase port susceptibilities to business downturns, 
through regional road, rail and air freight agencies both supporting and competing 
with ports for intermodal cargo movement (Ng, Padilha & Pallis 2013). 
Conceptually, port failure after disruption might see business lost to either 
alternative freight agencies or to a competing port, to the port’s longer-term 
business detriment. Alternatively, a major failure of regional freight agencies that 
support port business might leave the port unable to operate. In summation, port 
vulnerabilities are influenced strongly by the risk management performance 
capabilities of the port-centric integrated road, rail, air and sea alliances 
(Notteboom & Winkelmans 2004; Berle 2012).  
Port vulnerabilities are addressed by multiple maritime and supply chain 
researchers (Berle, Rice & Asbjørnslett 2011a; Chhetri et al. 2015; Brasington & 
Park 2016; Pitilakis et al. 2016; ZIO 2016; Lantsman 2017; Liu et al. 2018) but port 
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vulnerabilities are rarely mentioned in community disaster response literature. 
This is a surprising omission when arguably, emergency aid logistics might best be 
transported by sea when regional transport systems are disrupted – this occurred 
following Cyclone Tracy, which devastated the Australian city and port of Darwin 
in 1975 (Scanlon 1996; Pettit & Beresford 2005). This omission may be due to a 
potential disconnect between the maritime emergency management and 
community disaster streams of research. This risk management disconnect is 
identified in Wakeman’s (2013) analysis of New York-New Jersey Port and regional 
emergency management capabilities following Hurricane Sandy.  
Conceptually, this section provides evidence that Australian ports exist within 
dynamic and complex operating environments, with vulnerability sensitivities to 
diverse risks both within these ports, and within their external networks of crucial 
goods and services providers. Port management preparedness to meet these 
systemic complexity challenges requires strong and informed risk management 
leadership (Hellingrath et al. 2015).  
2.3. Port stakeholder vulnerabilities 
From supply chain and national economy perspectives, the port is a sensitive 
logistic node due to the concentration of vital intermodal activities in the one 
location, effectively transforming the port into a maritime trade bottleneck 
(Trepte & Rice 2014; Kuo, Lin & Lu 2017). Port critical operations and services are 
enabled by logistics functions, intermodal transport, port land and sea operational 
resources, and the continued availability of critical assets and infrastructure (Burns 
2015). As the volume of seaborne trade continues to grow, global supply chains 
become increasingly vulnerable to disruptive shocks at sensitive logistic nodes 
(Breur et al. 2013).  
The end-to-end supply chain is comprised of multiple logistics networks whose 
nodal junctures (some critical) represent points through which cargo or 
passengers must pass, or where a crucial process or transportation change must 
occur (Blecker, Kersten & Gertz 2008). Examples of logistic nodes include factories, 
warehouses, container terminals, intermodal freight centres, passenger terminals, 
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and the port itself (Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack 2009). The port can be described as 
a complex regionalised system, which collectively comprises a critical services 
node that is integrated with and adds value to multiple supply chain port users 
(Robinson 2002; Panayides 2017). Port system reliability depends upon 
interconnectivity and interdependencies between critical infrastructure nodal 
clusters (Chen 2016). Critical nodes within transportation and logistics networks 
represent vulnerability points (bottlenecks) at which a disruption might bring the 
entire network, including the port, to a halt (Rodrigue & Notteboom 2017).  
Potential points of failure can be illustrated in the form of a diagram that illustrates 
the path of port business through critical nodes, where within this study, the port 
system extends across the hinterland, incorporating critical logistics, transport and 
infrastructural nodal clusters connected to the port by physical and virtual linkages 
(Heilig & Voß 2017b; Rodrigue & Notteboom 2017). These lines of connectivity link 
together the port’s supply chain components, which are shown in Figure 2-2 as 
critical nodes (black) and edge nodes (grey).  
 
Figure 2-2: A logistics network segment – example of critical nodes as potential bottlenecks 
(Author). 
This representation is a simplistic application of graph theory, which is receiving 
wider use in identifying complex network properties including clustering, 
connectivity and vulnerabilities (Phillips, Schwanghart & Heckman 2015; Chen 
2016). Figure 2-2 represents the energy flow across the port network, whereby an 
oil refinery receives crude oil from the port and then processes the crude oil into 
fuel products. Fuel makes its way through storage and distribution linkages to the 
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power station which then supplies the port. Interdependencies and 
interconnectivities between nodal clusters create efficiencies but individual 
vulnerabilities might lead to cascading network failure (Ouyang 2016).  
Chen (2016) discusses how each networked cluster relies on edge nodes for its 
provision of critical products, services and information, and the failure of edge 
nodes might result first in localised failure and then consequently, network failure. 
Effectively, external agency vulnerabilities and risk management shortfalls 
become port vulnerabilities. 
2.3.1. Port-centric cluster vulnerabilities  
Port risk management literature provides scant recognition of vulnerabilities and 
relationships at risk within the port-centric clusters of critical goods and services 
suppliers. Logistics, transportation and informational relationships might occur 
between port-centric cluster members in top-down/bottom-up, horizontal and 
circular patterns as indicated in Figure 2-3 which is based upon nodal relationship 
studies by Narkhede, Patil and Inamdar (2014), and Quéro and Dupont (2017).  
 
Figure 2-3: Supply flow connectivities representing potential vulnerability loci between the 
port’s networked stakeholders (Adapted from Narkhede, Patil and Inamdar, (2014; and Quéro 
and Dupont, 2017). 
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Cluster analysis within socio-ecological systems is argued to be a useful method 
by which networked critical connectivities and vulnerability profiles are identified 
and assessed (Kok et al. 2015). Ports might have numerous cluster relationships. 
Donahue and Moore (2012) describe ports as complex organisations with network 
structures composed of many interconnected public and private sector actors. 
These actor interactions during a disruption event contribute to cluster 
vulnerability if rapid adverse changes cascade from actor to actor across the 
operational task environment. If a domino-like process of port-centric industry 
failure occurs across port-centric supply networks, then the resilient port must be 
able to sustain some level of damage and yet continue operating (Carvalho, 
Lamkin & Perez 2012). Port-centric cluster vulnerabilities arise when the port’s 
holistic risk management strategies become (or are initially) fragmented because 
of various critical stakeholder self-interests that may or may not coincide (Bichou 
& Gray 2005). Opportunities for collaborative and connective port actor risk 
management behaviour might only occur within short term and flexible 
opportunistic alliances, during which the degree of information sharing may be 
limited (Peterson, Wysocki & Harsh 2001; Wysocki, Peterson & Harsh 2006).  
Port-centric cluster networks and their vulnerabilities are rarely studied within an 
Australian context. Singh, Chhetri and Padhaye (2016) explore port-centric 
logistics and transportation clusters in case studies related to container ports 
Melbourne, Botany Bay and Brisbane. They observe that cluster membership is 
dominated by road freight transport participants and estimate that, from 2006 
government statistics, a total of 719 port-centric firms provide critical goods and 
services to Melbourne, Brisbane and Botany Bay, with a combined income of A$93 
billion. The scale of business undertaken by these firms indicates their large and 
important roles in supporting port operations, whereby underlying network risks 
to intra-cluster performance might also harm port performance (Chen 2016; John 
et al. 2016; Ongkowijoyo & Doloi 2018).  Arguably, as a port’s external stakeholder 
numbers increase, so too does port vulnerability. This is an outcome of larger 
organisational network size, greater number of interconnections and cross-
sectoral interdependencies, and increased systemic complexity (Choy et al. 2007; 
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Lovrić, Blainey & Preston 2017). In the case of Australian ports that export crude 
oil and gas, port external risk vulnerabilities might also include offshore and 
subsea industry participants and the associated infrastructure connecting the port 
to offshore oil and gas fields (Hayes 2014; Renn 2014; Abdussamie et al. 2018).  
A need exists to collaborate in and coordinate risk management efforts across 
organisations and sectors during a disaster (Abbas, Norris & Parry 2018; Friday et 
al. 2018). When an emergency event escalates and involves more organisations, a 
number of these additional entities will be unaccustomed to emergency 
management processes, thereby making emergency management coordination, 
collaboration and response increasingly difficult but more necessary (Owen et al. 
2016; Abbas, Norris & Parry 2018). Network risk management collaboration 
impediments might include generally uncoordinated behaviour, constrained 
interactions and communication, and minimal risk treatment cooperation which 
add complexity, uncertainty and increased vulnerability to a port’s risk 
management preparedness (Fenwick, Breville & Brunsdon 2009; Abbas, Norris & 
Parry 2018). Port stakeholders may be reluctant to enter enduring organisational 
risk management relationships with the port (Waters 2011) and when having 
ability to partially or fully control a risk, may not accept responsibility or feel 
compelled to manage or communicate these risks to the benefit of an external 
organisation (Handley-Schachler & Navare 2010; Hopkin 2017).  
Additionally, actors may be disinclined to accept legal or financial liabilities for 
implementing risk management solutions that may benefit others. Nonetheless, 
cluster network actors and other ports might assist port emergency responses 
through contributing additional external management resources and personnel 
support (Hiles 2011; Rose, Wei & Paul 2017). Australian nation-wide port 
cooperation and assistance is notably present during the management of oil spill 
emergency events and exercises, primarily the result of a formal framework 
established by government across diverse public and private sector organisations 
(AMSA 2017; Miller & Quinn 2017). 
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2.3.2. Port stakeholder uncertainties  
Ports operate under high levels of uncertainty related to complexities and 
ambiguities arising within the interrelationships and interdependencies between 
multiple independently motivated stakeholders (John et al. 2015). A US study 
(Southworth et al. 2014) finds that ports experience unique challenges to their risk 
management effectiveness due to complex physical, transactional, and 
institutional interconnections and interdependencies with their networked 
stakeholders. Southworth et al. (2014) argue that overcoming these impediments 
requires coordination of stakeholder risk management efforts across multiple 
logistics and transportation operations and their enabling service providers.  
On one hand, stakeholder interdependencies are perceived to potentially 
exacerbate disruption consequences through the network ripple effect of hazard 
impacts (Ivanov, Sokolov & Dolgui 2014; Dolgui, Ivanov & Sokolov 2017). On the 
other hand, stakeholder interdependencies in the form of coordinated, 
cooperative and collaborative risk management responses contribute to making a 
port system more robust and resilient (Hambridge, Howitt & Giles 2017; Wan et 
al. 2017; Whelan 2017). This perceived value in coordinating stakeholder risk 
management efforts (Southworth et al. 2014) is reiterated by Friday et al. (2018) 
who describe relational risk management arrangements as a synergistic interfirm 
process of collaborative risk management (CRM). Friday et al. (p. 238) conduct a 
literature review encompassing 101 peer-reviewed articles that were published 
over 21 years, and propose a strategic relationship definition from current 
relational view theory that might also align with port stakeholder risk 
management relationships: 
Collaborative risk management is an interactive process based on mutual 
commitment between firms with a common objective to join effort and 
mitigate supply chain risks and related disruptions through co-development 
of strategic relational capabilities and sharing of resources. 
Lacking collaborative risk management processes and procedures, individual 
stakeholders might then follow different and possibly conflicting business 
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continuity and disaster recovery aims, methodologies and estimates of recovery 
times (Hamilton 2011; Hiles 2011; Losada, Scapada & O’Hanley 2012; Wakeman 
2013). Accordingly, collaborative risk management across a large network of port-
centric stakeholders is a potentially daunting challenge, one alternatively 
described by Hamilton (2011) as multilateral continuity planning. Hamilton warns 
that individual self-interests usually run counter to collaborative business 
continuity planning, and because port managers are unaware of how underlying 
stakeholder self-interests might manifest, then potential exists for risk 
management uncertainties to expand. 
From a system behavioural context, human response under stress, complexity and 
ambiguity is described as unpredictable and uncertain (Kyoto University 2009). In 
this regard, Van der Vorst and Beulens (2002) argue that port organisational 
uncertainty has four primary origins. This uncertainty arises from diverse port 
actor objectives associated with commercial self-interests, indistinct knowledge 
concerning the port’s operational environment, the unpredictability of likely actor 
behaviour in the event of severe stress or disruption, and unclear lines of port 
network controllability and leadership. Additionally, if a disruptive event forces the 
closure of a port, then the extent of the disruption damage, the failure duration, 
and the likely disruption effects on port stakeholders add to an already uncertain 
situation.  
Uncertainty-driven pressures potentially affecting port stakeholders are related to 
an increasing rate of globalisation, the rapid pace of technical innovations, 
difficulty in ensuring unimpeded informational flow, the post 9/11 need for 
enhanced security measures, and the increasing complexity of networked 
agencies (Mason-Jones & Towill 1998; Cova & Conger 2004). Maritime 
transportation uncertainty might manifest itself in the supply chain value stream 
in the form of port disruptions, thereby increasing costs, creating delays, and 
adversely impacting supply chain effectiveness and efficiency (Mason-Jones & 
Towill 1998; Choy et al. 2007; Sanchez-Rodrigues 2009). Operational uncertainty 
arising within the port community of actors involves subjective factors and 
random variables that may be difficult to measure and analyse under any 
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situational model (Ayyub & Klir 2006). This uncertainty might increase in situations 
when an event affecting one actor might impart major effects on others within the 
same tightly coupled network.  
The existence of unknowns, unexpected events and uncertainties provide 
dimensions of risk that are intrinsic to tightly coupled complex systems (Weick & 
Sutcliffe 2015; Haimes 2008). Tight coupling arises from organisational 
interconnectedness, and the term implies relational criticality between networked 
stakeholders (Hartwich 2012).  An example of tight coupling and relational 
criticality is the relationship between fuel providers and towage service operators, 
where without fuel the port is without tugs and may not be able to operate until 
fuel supplies return (Lowinger, Cwilich & Buldyrev 2016). Tightly-coupled and 
interactively-complex organisational relationships are argued by Perrow (2011) to 
be at greater risk to disruptive events than less integrated organisations. An 
extension of this argument might be that Australian port managers should 
consider making their organisations less integrated with their stakeholders, 
however, the concept of minimising interactively-complex organisational 
relationships within the port supply chain to reduce risk is not a practicable 
solution. Instead, port managers must endeavour to better understand their 
internal and external areas of vulnerability and develop risk management profiles 
to match. This establishes a need for the next stage of research exploration, in 
investigating the port risk environment for hazards that might exploit port 
vulnerabilities. 
2.4. Summary 
Chapter 2 provided an examination of Australian port operations and multiple 
factors that contribute to failure modes and vulnerabilities. Failure modes and 
vulnerabilities subject to disruption carry potential to impact upon port business 
continuity, leading to constraints or a halt in port business. Australian ports are 
highly valuable national critical infrastructure, comprising regionalised complex 
systems of interrelated and interdependent logistics, resource and transportation 
actors. The literature reveals that the extended nature of the port’s own supply 
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chain and its external stakeholders renders it increasingly vulnerable to 
uncertainties and disruptions. These disruptions might either impact the port 
directly, or by ripple effect through the consequences of failure involving second 
or third parties of crucial importance to port operations. The following chapter 
extends this exploration of port vulnerabilities, risk identification and assessment, 
by examining the characteristics of hazards that might be encountered within the 
port risk environment. 
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Chapter 3: The port risk environment  
3.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter identified Australian port characteristics and their 
importance as national and regional critical infrastructure. Discussion included 
how ports have become more operationally complex with increasing reliance upon 
technology, specialised equipment and infrastructure, and dependencies upon 
their networks of critical goods and services suppliers. Having identified major port 
vulnerability factors in Chapter 2, this chapter now demonstrates how ports have 
become progressively at greater risk to emerging and increasingly severe low 
probability/high consequences disruptions. Port managers may never resolve this 
challenge, which might instead only be managed and mitigated. This is because 
port risks are of a dynamic nature, often with multi-hazard/multi-risk implications 
(Kappes et al. 2012; Fleming, Zschau & Gasparini 2014; Lam & Lassa 2017). The 
port risk management task is made increasingly complex by the proliferating and 
evolving nature of global risks (WEF 2018). The changing nature of port risks is 
demonstrated by port exposure to increasingly severe adverse natural events and 
changing climate patterns (Lam & Lassa 2017). Port hazards are explored firstly 
from a global perspective, and then with reference to how similar hazards might 
challenge Australian port operations. The literature is examined for risk 
management techniques that port managers might employ in identifying and 
preparing for these hazards. Chapter 3 begins with an overview of the port risk 
environment, followed by a clarification of port risk management terminology. 
3.2. Port hazards and risk 
The Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience glossary (AIDR 2018, n.p.) describes 
a hazard as: 
A potentially damaging physical event, natural phenomenon or human 
activity that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property 
damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption or 
environmental damage.  
The relationship between hazard and risk is descried (AIDR 2018, n.p.) as follows: 
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“Risk” refers to the likelihood that a hazard will happen, its magnitude and 
its consequences. It relates to the probability of external and internal threats 
(such as natural hazards…) occurring in combination with the existence of 
individual vulnerabilities.  
Ports are identified as high-risk places within the transportation chain (Berle, Rice 
& Asbjørnslett 2011a, 2011b; Southworth et al. 2014; Stažnik, Babić & Bajor 2017). 
Hazards and emerging risks that challenge port managers increasingly change and 
are becoming harder to predict, however the adverse consequences are likely to 
share some commonalities with port risks in general (Beasley & Frigo 2010). Ports 
are exposed to numerous hazards at any one time, hence port risk managers might 
adopt a multi-hazard and multi-risk mindset, rather than treating each hazard and 
corresponding risk as a single risk management factor (Kappes et al. 2012; Fleming, 
Zschau & Gasparini 2014). Multiple risks might combine, for example strong 
winds/heavy rain plus flooding/sea rise from a tidal surge. Alternatively, a 
triggering event of one causality might initiate multiple other risk events and 
outcomes. Consequences of a multi-hazard event are demonstrated by the 2011 
Japanese east coast earthquake, which translated into tsunami waves, devastation 
along the affected coastline and hinterland, consequential seawater pollution, loss 
of all local utilities and services, damage to a nuclear power station cooling system 
and core meltdown, and eventual regional land, air and sea radiation 
contamination (Wang, Kato & Shibasaki 2013). 
Coupled with multiple sources of risk to which complex port operations are 
customarily exposed, new and emerging hazards plus increasingly severe natural 
events (WEF 2018) test the effectiveness of risk management strategies and 
processes. As described by the Australian Government (AG 2017, p. 7) 
‘…disruption to our most critical ports could have wide-reaching impacts on the 
economy’. Localised port disruption consequences could result in injuries, 
illnesses, fatalities, infrastructure and asset harm, environmental pollution, direct 
and indirect economic losses, unemployment and plant shutdowns (Rose 2009; 
Rose & Wei 2013; Southworth et al. 2014). Externally, port failure is likely to 
impact on other industries through interconnectedness between critical 
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infrastructure, whereby failure passes by a ripple effect from network to network 
(Hartwich 2012). Efforts to better understand the risk environment and to 
minimise port failure and reduce downtime can benefit the national economy. For 
example, Australia’s major resource export ports are primarily located in the north 
Australian cyclone belt, and cyclone-related loss of trade from major resources 
export ports could cost the national economy as much as AU$3 billion in one year 
(Ng. et al. 2013a; Cahoon et al. 2015, 2016). As a first step in understanding this 
port risk environment, it becomes constructive to understand risk terminology. 
3.3. Exploring the terminology 
Few studies have been conducted on the extent of Australian port management 
knowledge of and familiarity with risk management terms, or the level of risk 
management qualifications held by senior port executives. Delogu (2016) suggests 
that confusion between the terms hazard, danger, threat and risk arises because 
these terms are synonyms, as described in the Oxford Dictionary of English 
(Simpson 2018).  
3.3.1. The concept of hazard 
In narrower terms than the previously quoted AIDR (2018) definition of hazard at 
Section 3.2., Manuele (2013, p. 237) describes a hazard as ‘… any activity or 
technology that produces risk’ and in the context of adverse risk, a hazard exists 
as ‘the potential source of harm’. Green (2008b) defines hazard impact as an 
interrelationship between hazard power, its effects, and organisational 
vulnerability to the hazard. Green (2008b) notes that differences between an 
adverse event’s impact and its consequences are blurred, however, an impact is 
relatively short-lived and localised. By comparison the consequences of a 
disruption might be experienced for a prolonged period within a single system or 
as it cascades across other interrelated systems (Hartwich 2012). The impact of an 
adverse event might be difficult to treat, however the severity of consequences 
from a port disruption might depend upon how effectively port managers cope 
with the disruption impact (Green 2008b).  
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Whereas a hazard and a threat both challenge port managers in the form of 
adverse risk, with commonalities in origin and outcomes, they differ in important 
aspects. The hazard represents the risk in a dormant state, whereas the threat 
represents an actualisation of the risk (Green 2008a). For example, a flammable 
ship’s cargo represents a fire hazard, whereas the burning substance threatens the 
port’s adjoining infrastructure and operations. Green (2008b) further describes a 
threat as being the operationalisation of vulnerability to a hazard, coupled with 
expectations of how the hazard might impact the organisation. As port managers 
must rely on their subjective expectations for gauging hazard consequences, risk 
management becomes associated with uncertainty. 
3.3.2. The concept of traditional risk management, and beyond 
Port managers practising traditional risk management approaches engage in risk 
identification and assessment workshops, from which expectations of risks might 
be identified through qualitative brainstorming processes or quantitative analyses 
of a known risk environment (Srikanth & Venkataraman 2013; Haimes 2016). 
According to Aven (2016), scientific research into risk assessment and risk 
management that began some 40 years ago provides the foundation for present 
risk management processes and procedures. By comparison with today’s evolved 
scientific perspective of what constitutes risk, the early foundational scientific 
perspectives of risk constitute a quite narrow world view of risk assessment and 
of how risk might be managed (Tang & Musa 2011; Flage & Aven 2015; Aven 2016). 
Early researchers ascribe risk with the traits of simplicity, singularity, surety and 
clarity, for example their probabilistic definitions include: ‘risk is a measure of the 
probability and severity of harm… (and) a thing is safe if its risks are judged to be 
acceptable’ (Lowrance 1976, p. 8) and ’…risk is the probability of an adverse 
outcome’ (Graham & Weiner 1995, p. 30).  
Traditional risk management as a probabilistic concept is more closely identified 
with the known properties and outcomes of risk than with uncertainties (Perera & 
Higgins 2013). As previously discussed in Section 2.3 from a port vulnerability 
context, uncertainties relate to known outcomes (consequences) but unknown 
probabilities, and in recent times risk uncertainties have become associated with 
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emerging risks (Flage & Aven 2015). Emerging risks (IRGC 2011, p. 4) are 
considered to arise within three categories: 
a. Risks with uncertain impacts, with uncertainty resulting from 
advancing science and technological innovation; 
b. Risks with systemic impacts, stemming from technological systems 
with multiple interactions and systemic dependencies; and  
c. Risks with unexpected impacts, where new risks emerge from the 
use of established technologies in evolving environments or 
contexts. 
The consideration of risk uncertainties, unknowns and unexpectedness lead this 
thesis towards a categorisation of risk characteristics that are attributed to 
Rumsfeld (2002, p. 47): 
There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know 
there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things 
we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don't 
know we don't know. 
With scientific and management acceptance of risk uncertainty characteristics 
(ISO 31000:2018) the port risk management literature has come to reflect the first 
two characteristics (known knowns, known unknowns). Within this thesis port 
failure modes discussed include stakeholder vulnerabilities (Section 2.3.) which, 
while presumably known to the stakeholders, may not be known to port 
managers. Hence, for port managers a further category of unknown knowns is 
argued to exist, and the scope of unknown knowns might be broadened by 
managers discarding cognitively unlikely scenarios within risk identification 
workshops as described by Srikanth and Venkataraman (2013) and Haimes (2016). 
The scientific recognition of emerging risks and associated levels of uncertainties 
introduces to port managers a further risk category of ‘unknown unknowns’ 
whose unidentified or unidentifiable risk characteristics might include 
unforeseeability, unexpectedness, uncertainty, unfamiliarity, or sudden change 
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and/or increased severity in the properties of an existing risk (Bralver & Borge 
2010; Kim 2012; Flage & Aven 2015). 
3.3.3. Deep uncertainty 
The standard for risk management, ISO 31000:2018, departs from the customary 
practice of defining risk as a function of a hazard’s predicted probability multiplied 
by expected consequences (Altiok 2011), and instead associates a hazard with the 
effect of uncertainty upon an organisation’s objectives. Port operational risks are 
associated with ‘known unknowns’ whereby a port manager knows, for example, 
that the cyclone season is due to begin (a ‘known’), but unknowns include whether 
a major cyclone will eventuate during the season, whether one will impact the 
port, or what scale of damage might result. Deeper uncertainty arises with new 
and emerging unforeseen risks, whose indeterminate characteristics involve 
‘unknown unknowns’ and this deeper uncertainty (Aven & Krohn 2014; Aven 
2017) exposes port managers to cognitive biases and deficiencies in their 
probability judgements (Wucker 2018). Cognitive biases and deficiencies related 
to probability judgement concepts and port risk-related uncertainties might arise 
if managers are unaware of, or have overlooked, previously unknown and 
unexpected emerging risks (Faulkner, Feduzi & Runde 2017).  
If deep uncertainty arises because the characteristics of new and unexpected 
hazards might only be conjectural (Faulkner, Feduzi & Runde 2017; WEF 2018), 
then port managers are exposed to non-reducible physical variabilities of the risk 
environment (aleatory uncertainty). Alternatively, deep uncertainty that results 
from management overlooking, or only acquiring partial risk knowledge (epistemic 
uncertainty) can be addressed to reduce this level of risk exposure (Borgonovo 
2017; Borgonovo et al. 2018). Epistemic uncertainty, which relates to missing 
information (Walker, Marchau & Swanson 2010) constrains a port manager’s 
ability to fully understand the scope and severity of risk, even if the manager 
suspects that crucial information is missing from risk deliberations. If left 
unchecked, epistemic uncertainty hampers port risk identification, prediction, and 
risk treatment. Reasons for ignoring missing information might include port senior 
management being unwilling to explore possibilities for some low probability risks, 
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nor expending time and money on risk incertitude – an outcome that is sometimes 
termed subjective uncertainty (Paté-Cornell 1996; Ayyub 2014; Han, Mittal & 
Zhang 2017).  
Epistemic uncertainty and ambiguity might also arise due to port managers not 
being fully cognisant of their internal and external organisational risk 
environments, possibly through management inability to understand or 
deconstruct layers of complexity within the cause-effect phenomenon, or through 
managers making incorrect assumptions or predictions of what constitutes risk 
(Renn 2011). From an epistemic discussion of port risk terminology, the research 
now examines the port organisational risk environment and its primary attributes. 
3.3.4. Organisational risk environment 
The organisational risk environment is comprised of preventable risks (failure in 
processes or human error), strategic risks (the competitive trade-off between risk 
and reward), and external risks beyond the organisation’s capability to influence 
or control (Kaplan & Mikes 2012). Preventable and strategic risks are potentially 
controllable by conventional risk management techniques, whereas uncontrolled 
and unexpected external risks require adaptive organisational responses and 
innovative operating capability (Kaplan & Mikes 2012). For port managers this 
means that while conventional risk management processes are applicable to 
known preventable and strategic risks, the introduction of unknowns and 
uncertainties to the risk management problem demands either adaptation of 
existing risk treatments, or capabilities at a higher level than conventional 
responses should unforeseen and unexpected disruptions occur.   
The organisational risk environment is dynamic, with new and emerging risks 
presenting differing risk management challenges to those of the past, and existing 
risks altering in terms of their frequencies and severity (Hopkin 2017; WEF 2018 
Within port strategic planning tasks, a requirement arises to periodically review 
risk treatments so that they remain sufficiently flexible, adaptive and up to date 
to contend with inevitable changes within the port’s internal and external 
operating environments (Hopkin 2017; Bichou 2018). Port managers might 
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struggle to maintain operational proficiencies as rapid technology changes occur 
within core processes, thereby increasing the port’s exposure to hazards affecting 
that technology application (Neureuther & Kenyon 2009; Loh & Thai 2012; Bichou, 
Bell & Evans 2014). Increasing numbers and changing demographics of port 
stakeholders (Geerlings, Kuipers & Zuidwijk 2018) mean that interactions and 
interdependencies between the port and its hinterland cluster stakeholders create 
new mutual uncertainties and vulnerabilities (Tan, Lam & Zhang 2015; Singh, 
Chhetri & Padhaye 2016; Hopkin 2017). Additionally, like other organisations 
linked with global supply chains, ports are increasingly challenged by socio-
political interventions and changing legislative compliance requirements (Hopkin 
2017; Bak 2018). These indications of changing port risk patterns raise important 
questions regarding whether port managers understand these alterations in the 
nature, frequency and potential severity of risks, and if so, what strategic and 
tactical management changes Australian port managers might make in response. 
Associated questions include the potential roles of resilience in addressing port 
risk and vulnerability changes, and to what extent port managers might resist 
changes to their existing risk management processes and capabilities to avoid an 
inconsistent risk governance culture, to contain costs, or for other reasons. 
Additionally, with these perceptions of changing patterns of port risk, the 
discussion broadens to explore what changes new and emerging hazards might 
bring to port disruption consequences. 
3.3.5. Relationships between port hazards and disruption consequences 
Reason (2008) analyses a series of primarily ship-oriented port disruptions, and 
observes that three main factors contribute to accidents in ports: 
a) ports possess inherently dangerous hazards such as rocks, shoals, tidal 
currents and fixed and moving objects that contribute towards ship 
accidents; 
b) unsafe acts or less than adequate personnel performance create 
circumstances where accidents become more likely; and,  
c) a port’s exposure to hazards becomes magnified if risk management 
deficiencies exist, as manifested by dysfunctional safety culture, lack of 
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training or motivational forces, and unchecked erroneous human 
behaviour.  
Contemporary port hazards differ from those in the past, for example the port’s 
increasing reliance upon technology, socio-political hazards inclusive of activist 
groups, and increasingly severe natural events. However, the holistic nature of 
port hazards and disruption outcomes remains unchanged from those of a general 
nature described by Lowrance (1976). According to Lowrance these fall within the 
scope of:    
a) new hazards of increasing scale and duration;  
b) problems about which managers know little;  
c) poorly understood aspects of weather-related hazards;  
d) unknown side effects and unintended consequences of everyday activities 
and processes;  
e) hazards with irreversible consequences; and,  
f) widespread uses of technology without fully understanding resultant 
hazard vulnerabilities and consequences.  
Global port hazards and disruption characteristics are drawn from the literature 
as shown in Table 3-1. The port hazard and vulnerability literature discovered by 
this study is more prolific within the categories of adverse natural events 
(geological and hydro-meteorological), technical and technological failures, and 
environmental issues. Keim (2015) investigates the occurrence of natural disasters 
during 1964-2013 and finds that these comprised 83% of all global disasters during 
the period, and that the number of natural disasters is increasing. Hydro-
meteorological disasters headed this hazard category, with floods and drought 
causing most damage and losses (Keim 2015). The consequences of hazards such 
as these might be exacerbated by new vulnerabilities arising because of the 
evolution of port operational practices and the introduction of technological 






Disruption characteristics  References 
Operational Port equipment failures, infrastructure 
failures, cargo spillage, ship accident 
Burns, 2015 
John et al. 2015 
Organisational Port congestion, labour unrest John et al. 2015 
Geological Earthquakes, earth slippage, 
landslides, tsunamis, volcanic ash 
plumes 
Blaikie et al. 2014 
Joyce et al. 2014 




Avalanches, bush fires, climate 
variations, cyclones, dust storms, 
droughts, floods, hail, lightning, sand 
storms, storm surge, strong seas, super 
storms, thermal extremes, thunder-
storms, stronger natural hazards, 
urban drought  
Blaikie et al. 2014 
Gaile and Willmott, 2005 
Ammann, Dannenmann and 
Vulliet, 2006 




Biological Epidemics, pest attacks, viruses, 
invasive species, bio-weapons, marine 
toxins 





Chemical, industrial, nuclear, oil spill, 
radiological, power outages, hazardous 
materials, fire-prone construction 
materials, telecommunications failure, 
satellite communications failure, GPS 
failure, RFID failure, emergency 
communications failure, cyber security 
Gallaire, 1998 
Rubin, 1998  
Mayhorn and McLaughlin, 
2014 
Smith and Katz, 2013 
John et al. 2015 
WEF, 2018 
Security Arson, chemicals and biological 
accidents, criminality, road and rail 
accidents, sabotage, terrorism, social 
disruption 
Rubin, 1998 
Mayhorn and McLaughlin, 
2014 
John et al. 2015 
WEF, 2018 
Financial Cost overspend, fraud, theft, record 
keeping and storage safety, financial 
instability, banking transaction failure, 
financial information constraints,  
Shiller, 2009 




Change in political decisions, 
community opposition, strikes, 
protests, radicalism, seabed boundary 
disputes, ocean resource disputes, 
radicalisation of disaffected persons. 
Paton, Kelly and Doherty, 
2006 
Guild, 2009 
Dauvergne and LeBaron, 
2014 
Graham and Kaye, 2015 
Anton, 2017 
Boin et al. 2017 
Environmental  Cargo contaminants, dust, 
underground seepage, regulatory 
compliance, reputational, climate 
change 
Grech et al. 2013 
Smith and Katz, 2013 
Nyborg et al. 2016 
Becker et al. 2018 
Sierra et al. 2017 
Kellman, Mercer & Gaillard, 
2017 
Security Infrastructure and facilities incursions, 
information and data theft 
Atlas, 2013 
Table 3-1: Port hazards. 
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An issue in evaluating new vulnerabilities is that port risk management literature 
provides little guidance on compounding factors that might exacerbate the 
consequences of hazards, or of port managers’ awareness and inclusion of this 
issue in their vulnerability identification and assessment processes. For example, 
the 2004 Aceh earthquake resulted in a tsunami that caused sea level oscillations 
of up to plus or minus one metre during a 72 hours period at Western Australian 
major resources export ports (Short 2006). Western Australian resources export 
ports employ Dynamic Under Keel Clearance (DUKC) software to calculate 
individual ship sailing draughts (Curtis 2017). The net clearance between a deep 
draught vessel’s keel and the seabed is normally based upon PIANC guidelines 
(Gourley 2007), and net under keel clearance is suggested by PIANC (2014, p. 33) 
to be ‘at least 0.5 m, but could be increased to 1.0 m where the consequences of 
touching the bottom is large (e.g. for channels with rocky bottoms)’. However, 
unexpected sea level oscillations, for example from a tsunami, might negate this 
planned net clearance between a ship’s keels and the seabed.  
Port risk management literature also provides scant guidance on whether path 
dependencies might influence port risk attitudes and management willingness to 
explore new areas of vulnerability. If path dependent processes and procedures 
are effective under circumstances of organisational stability, then the question 
arises of whether the organisation might lack sufficient agility and flexibility in 
meeting disruptive change and particularly, sudden disruptive change. 
3.3.6. Sudden disruptive changes and path dependency 
Winn et al. (2011) describe sudden disruptive changes as low probability/high 
consequence events that ‘…may range from short, extreme events to sustained 
long-term impacts’ with immediate direct or indirect consequences, and with 
‘…potential to exceed thresholds and tipping points’. Examples of sudden 
disruptive change include earthquakes, tsunamis, severe weather events, financial 
shocks, wars, and catastrophic cyber-attack (Rosenoer & Scherlis 2007; Winn et al. 
2011). The importance of sudden disruptive changes in comparison with other 
longer-term risk onsets, is that port risk managers may experience difficulties in 
responding to sudden disruptive events if they are resistant to change or 
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adherents of management path dependency (Everett 2003a; Zschau & Fleming 
2014).  
Path dependency is described as ‘the tendency of persistence and self-
reinforcement of paths and, by implication, the difficulty of changing a path once 
chosen (Wiering Liefferink & Crabbé 2017, p. 3). Barnett et al. (2015) argue from 
a climate change context that changes away from path dependency are required 
to make Australian public and private sectors more adaptable in managing risk. 
They maintain that path-dependent institutions adapt more slowly to change than 
the speed at which actual conditions are altering. Zhang, Ng and Becker (2017) 
also argue from a climate change context that port path dependencies constrain 
the building of resilience levels. 
A path-dependent organisation could discover that reliance upon existing risk 
management practices is insufficient to cope with a sudden onset disruption. In 
such circumstances the organisation might no longer manage as before and must 
find new ways for coping with changing operational circumstances. Effectively, the 
organisation has been transposed past its critical threshold of change (Wilson 
2012; Barnet et al. 2015). A sudden disruption and changing circumstances might 
occur if risk managers overlook or ignore early warning signs of a disruption, 
whereupon a time lag is created between disruption impact and management’s 
disruption response (Booth 2015). Management becomes committed to an initial 
normal course of action, but if the nature of the disruption subsequently alters or 
initiates other consequences (IRGC 2011), then a second ineffectual time lapse 
eventuates until management regroups and alters their response - two disruptive-
led sudden changes to port operations within a short space of time.  
Sudden change also requires managers to work faster, thereby losing sight of 
strategic issues, overlooking vital information, and narrowly focussing on intuitive 
rather than rational responses (Booth 2015). Cyber-threats provide an example of 
path-dependent port managers being unable to manage hazard consequences, 
and then requiring reactive measures to regain organisational stability. 
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Beaumont (2017) argues that port operators, despite their high level of ICT 
dependency, are prone to overlook or ignore the need for cyber-security 
vulnerability assessments and disruption preparedness. Beaumont (2017) 
describes this behaviour as a fundamental lack of awareness of the level of threat 
and preparedness measures. A denial of service attack upon port systems and 
technology dependent infrastructure and equipment could result in a halt in port 
operations for an indeterminate period, from days to weeks. A State actor might 
launch such an attack upon another nation’s critical infrastructure in political 
retaliation, as with the reported Russian State-sponsored attacks on Australian 
public and private sector computer systems following US, UK and French attacks 
on Syrian military assets (Borys 2018). 
The inherent problem of path-dependent port risk management is conceptualised 
by visualising the port as a stochastic system with potential alternative responses 
to a denial of service attack. A ‘ball and cup’ regime shift analogy (Nolting & Abbot 
2016) represents what happens when port risk management capabilities become 
overwhelmed by the disruption as shown in Figure 3-1. If port managers were well 
prepared over time to meet such an attack, then proactive defences and effective 
risk management processes against denial of service attacks might permit 
retention of existing status or allow a controlled positive shift in organisational 
capabilities and adaptiveness to an alternative but still acceptable operational 
status. Otherwise, a sudden disruption might cause the port to quickly reach a 
tipping point where management loses control over events. Figuratively the port 
is then transposed across an operational threshold until (perhaps days or weeks 
later) it eventually achieves stability within new operating circumstances as shown 
in Figure 3-1. If port managers find these new circumstances undesirable, then 
much work is required to regain stable operational capabilities. In planning and 
strategising to cope against potential hazards, port managers must identify and 




Figure 3-1: A hypothetical organisation subjected to denial of security attack, and potential 
transition to new operating circumstances (Adapted from Gunderson, 2000). 
3.3.7. Port risk identification and evaluation 
Risk analysis is a means of making sense of and coping with the organisational 
internal and external risk environment, and for reducing risk complexity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity (Modarres 2016). Through risk analysis, hazards and 
their characteristics are identified, quantified, ranked and assessed, following 
which the organisational risk managers establish appropriate risk treatments to 
control, mitigate or transfer these risks (Bichou, Bell & Evans 2014; Modarres 
2016). In the case of Australian port authorities, risk analyses take place within 
annual brainstorming sessions (Srikanth & Venkataraman 2013). Organisational 
risks may run into the hundreds, and each selected risk must be assessed and given 
a unique identifier, allocated mitigation treatment, and provided with a 
responsible person (often a department head) to monitor and manage that risk 
(Mutton 2012). The risk register is usually constructed upon a software program 
that facilitates regular revision of risk updates, incident occurrences, mitigation 
efforts, and data input to the port authority auditing processes (Mutton 2012).  
Management treatments of potential hazards are shaped by their levels of risk 
management learnings and a derived risk-centric knowledge base, organisational 
resources, objectives and risk tolerances (Scott et al. 2013; Aven 2016). Tolerance 
for some port risks might be lower than others, while some low probability risks 
might be neglected altogether (Sunstein 2002; Scott et al. 2013). For example, nil 
tolerance might be held for hazards that threaten life or personnel safety, whereas 
seismic hazards might be disregarded from within a normally earthquake free 
region.  Managers might also disregard or overlook very low probability hazards 
as a non-credible threat, or perhaps under-invest in risk treatment, rather than 
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address problems that might manifest under specific circumstances (Sunstein 
2002; Jonkeren & Rietveld 2016). Alternatively, risk managers might over-react to 
a low probability hazard due to what Sunstein and Zeckhauser (2011) describe as 
‘action bias’ to risks with emotive consequences, for example gunman attacks.  
Port risk managers must make judgements on whether and how to treat hazards 
and vulnerabilities based on evidence and value-based considerations (Aven 
2016). If a port manager lacks the necessary knowledge and skills then he/she will 
be hampered in undertaking evidence-based analysis of hazards and 
vulnerabilities, and in assessing how this information correlates with wider 
information from other sources to potentially affect risk outcomes. The 
identification and evaluation of hazards might then be undertaken upon a value-
based pathway and the important integration of facts, possibilities and values 
excluded from the decision-making process (Hansson & Aven 2014; Aven 2016). 
Value-based judgements on hazards and vulnerabilities rely on experience, 
however the port manager may not possess the requisite experience to exercise 
sound judgement, or, a specific category of risk has either not been experienced 
by the managers or may constitute a new, unforeseen and problematic risk 
(Gharehgozli et al. 2017). Subjective values-based risk management decisions 
might variously lead to organisational inaction, under reaction, or over reaction 
and hence the importance of adequate training and qualification to conduct 
evidence-based evaluation of risks and vulnerabilities. A suggested outline for port 
risk decision-making processes is shown at Figure 3-2. 
 




In striking a balance between underacting and overreacting to low probability 
hazards, Manuele (2003) argues that a theoretically ideal situation exists when all 
known risks from hazards are reduced to an acceptable level. Even if known port 
risks are reduced to their lowest practicable level, a sense of uncertainty might 
ultimately prevail, because potential remains for unknown and unexpected 
organisational risks to exist (Weick & Sutcliffe 2015). Low probability/high 
consequence risks as an Australian port management concern are central to this 
study’s research problem. 
3.3.8. Port risk management leadership and governance 
Port leadership, governance and organisational management capabilities are 
crucial capabilities in enabling effective organisational risk management and 
abilities to maintain business continuity during crises (Tarrant 2010; Mauelshagen 
2012). However, assessing the qualities of holistic port leadership and organisation 
culture is a difficult process due to the complex interactions, interdependencies 
and collaboration between the many parties and networks that are necessary to 
fulfil key port roles, capabilities and functions. The port system is a multi-layered 
and complex organisation, comprising networks of logistics, macro and micro 
economic, supply chain, industry cluster, public and private sector, transportation, 
and infrastructure/asset interests (Burns 2015). This holistic port system appears 
to operate without directions from a central governance and leadership source, 
and Burns (2015) makes a clear argument that today’s complex and turbulent port 
operating environment requires managers who can provide effective leadership 
and governance direction, and who can provide innovative, flexible and adaptable 
responses to operational, risk management and emergency response challenges.  
Individual ports support many supply chains that engage with multiple goods and 
service providers, and when these providers interact with the port system, 
overlapping networks of roles and alliances are created (Sporleder 2006; Heaver 
2009). The port’s regionally extended and complex system might incorporate 
many industry clusters and perhaps hundreds of stakeholders (Chacon et al. 2012; 
Vonck & Notteboom 2016). This systemic complexity and multiple sources of 
vulnerability lends importance to port risk managers developing analytic risk 
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management, collaboration and communication skills of a high order (Pallis & 
Kladaki 2016), and in this context, education becomes increasingly important in 
augmenting risk management capabilities for port managers (Hopkin 2017).  
Port leadership in stakeholder risk communications and collaboration is an 
important risk minimisation factor. Risk communications and collaboration across 
port stakeholder networks are impeded by public and private sector 
organisational level silo behaviour, and within other sectors the failure to share 
information has even led to loss of life (Allen, Karanasios & Norman 2014; Mikes 
& Migdal 2014; Karlsson et al. 2017). Inter-organisational lack of information 
sharing is also argued to impede the formation of systemic resilience (Fenwick, 
Seville & Brunsdon 2009; Li et al. 2017; Shaw, Grainger & Achuthan 2017). Silo 
behaviour is exemplified by limited connectivity between actors and agencies and 
results in uncoordinated behaviour, minimal communication, and only nominal 
cooperation. This characteristic is described as occurring within organisations, 
between organisations, and between disciplines (Fenwick, Seville & Brunsdon 
2009). Silo behaviour raises the risk of organisational dysfunction, and behavioural 
influences include individual, organisational or geographical parochialism, and 
self-interest tensions between multiple businesses and professions (Schein 1996; 
Guelke 2005; Mikes & Migdal 2014). As with organisations in general, port actor 
silos and a divergence of stakeholder interests impact on the effective 
performance of risk management, business continuity and resilience (Christopher 
2010; Straube, Nagel & Rief 2010; Waters 2011).  
3.4. Understanding risk at Australian ports 
Risk, according to ISO31000:2009, is defined in terms of the effect of uncertainty 
on objectives. Uncertainty is a central concept within the annual World Economic 
Forum report on global risks (WEF 2018, pp 6-7) which notes that organisations 
are increasingly and systemically challenged by:  
Proliferating indications of uncertainty, instability and fragility…(and)…that 
risks can crystallize with disorientating speed. In a world of complex and 
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interconnected systems, feedback loops, threshold effects and cascading 
disruptions can lead to sudden and dramatic breakdowns).    
The WEF report is based on surveys and round table discussions on potential 
forthcoming risks, and concludes that societal, political, environmental, 
technological and economic hazards are the most likely forms of impending risk. 
A summary of the ten most likely risks to challenge global organisations, plus the 
top ten risks assessed for their likely impact (WEF 2018) are shown in Table 3-2. 
Order of  
likelihood 
Most likely disruption types Disruptions with most impact 
1 Extreme weather events Weapons of mass destruction 
2 Natural disasters Extreme weather events 
3 Cyber-attacks Natural disasters 
4 Data theft or fraud Failure of climate change mitigation 
and adaptation 
5 Failure of climate change mitigation 
and adaptation 
Water crises 
6 Large scale involuntary migration Cyber-attacks 
7 Man-made environmental disasters Food crises 
8 Terrorist attack Biodiversity loss and ecosystem 
collapse 
9 Illicit trade Large scale involuntary migration 
10 Asset bubbles in a major economy Spread of infectious disease 
Table 3-2: Predicted global risks (Adapted from WEF 2018). 
Some disruptions from this list are considered to have potential relevance to 
critical infrastructure inclusive of ports and provide a basis for further port risk 
management research. The WEF (2018) guidance identifies contemporary hazards 
and risks that represent appropriate and relevant touchstones for investigating 
how vulnerable the ports consider themselves to be from each threat, their 
expectations of the hazards occurring in the future, and how effectively the 
impacts and consequences of these disruptions might have been managed in the 
past. 
3.4.1. Port risk environment  
The effectiveness of port management understandings of the risk environment, 
and potential consequences of disruption categories to port operations likely 
depends upon whether their evaluation is based upon an evidence or values-
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based approach (Aven 2016). Renn (2014) argues that few risk decision-makers 
clearly understand their risk environment, within the context of:  
a) technological risks that are new and emergent hazards arising from frontier 
practical science advances and processes;  
b) crystallising risks that arise from introduced technologies and processes, 
but whose risks are recently recognised; and,  
c) aggravated risks familiar to risk managers but whose likelihoods and/or 
impacts worsen over time.  
An International Risk Governance Council (IRGC 2011) study suggests that 
organisational uncertainties and lack of clarity about the risk environment relate 
to the evolution of risks, which indicates that port managers who rely on 
experience when making risk management judgements may be technically 
disadvantaged. It is unclear to what extent Australian port managers understand 
the nature of evolving risk characteristics, when IRGC (2011) and WEF (2018) 
studies suggest that the global risk environment is altering because of:  
a) scientific advances and technological innovation, and because these risks 
are new, managers are uncertain of what adverse outcomes might arise; 
b) systemic consequences and uncertainties, compounded because of 
multiple interrelationships and interdependencies across the system; and  
c) unexpected and unwanted outcomes from use of technologies, which arise 
due to a changing operational environment or external influence. 
Informed discussion on port risk management capabilities and abilities requires 
fresh insights into how port managers prepare for threats emerging from a 
dynamic risk environment, with specific focus on 21st Century risks that Boin (2004, 
p. 167) describes as ‘unwanted, unexpected, unprecedented, and almost 
unmanageable’. If port managers lack a clear understanding of their risk 
environment, then their subjective probabilities assigned to risk assessments are 
flawed if these indicate a stronger level of knowledge than what is possessed 
(Aven 2016). Gaining an understanding of Australian port managers’ risk 
interpretation skills lends context to this thesis discussion. 
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Emergence of new risks and the metamorphosis (aggravation) of existing risks into 
greater risks with unexpected consequences require innovative, more powerful 
risk identification capabilities (Renn 2014, 2017). Accordingly, organisational 
decision-makers must become competent in managing adverse changes from 
multiple sources, a competency necessarily acquired through experience, learning 
and research (Wachinger et al. 2012). Without such competency, port managers 
might react and respond to a situation at hand without sufficient consideration 
towards a problem’s initial causal factors or point/s of origin (Geary, Childerhouse 
& Towill 2002).  
3.5. Hazards experienced at Australian ports 
Australian port hazards appear to differ little from their global counterparts, 
except in relation to their geographical setting. Northern Australian ports are 
vulnerable to cyclones, flooding, high temperatures and tropical disease (Kelly-
Hope, Purdie & Kay 2004; Maunsell 2008; Russell et al. 2009; Ng et al. 2013a). East 
coast ports experience intense low-pressure storms and consequential flash 
flooding, high waves, storm surge and gale force winds (Mills et al. 2010; Johnson 
et al. 2015. Southern ports experience drought and both high and low 
temperature extremes (McEvoy et al. 2013). Capital city ports and ports in large 
regional centres experience urban encroachment pressures and compete with the 
community for road and rail use (Stanley & Hensher 2009; Kilgariff 2017). Urban 
encroachment (Kilgariff 2017) led to the Port of Sydney losing its general cargo 
infrastructure and operations to waterfront housing and non-maritime business 
premises.  
According to Gharehgozli et al. (2017) port geographical locations place them at 
risk to disruptive adverse weather events, whether these be short-term adverse 
events, or the long-term sea rise effects attributed to climate change. Severe 
weather events include heat conditions, cyclones, flooding, bushfires, 
thunderstorms and tornadoes, water crises, storm surges and coastal erosion, and 
more recently, the onset of thunderstorm asthma syndrome which led to health 
issues and deaths in Melbourne (Schmidt-Thome 2006; Berle, Asbjørnslett, & Rice 
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2011; BOM 2017). Gharehgozli et al. (2017) describe these adverse weather 
events as ‘wicked problems’ which as discussed in Section 1.3 can be difficult to 
treat due to their complexity, open-ended and intractable natures. Further, 
recognition of hazards and risks within a wicked problem context appears to be 
rarely addressed by bureaucratic decision makers inclusive of port managers, 
either within the port’s internal risk management processes, or within a wider, 
networked external stakeholder context (Roberts 2000; Head & Alford 2015; 
Gharehgozli et al. 2017). Individual hazards with relevance to Australian ports are 
now discussed in more detail, with relation to whether the hazards arise within 
the port, or externally as shown in Figure 3-3. 
 
Figure 3-3: Origins of selected port hazards (Author). 
3.5.1. External port hazards 
Global trade throughput becomes more vulnerable to threats as it slows to pass 
through the port’s land/sea interface (Bueno-Solano & Cedillo-Campos 2014; 
Stažnik, Babić & Bajor 2017). Ports experience multiple risks arising from within 
their managed areas and activities, and from outside designated port boundaries. 
External port hazards are largely beyond port management control; however, a 
full vulnerability assessment process requires port risk managers to develop 
understandings of their external risk environment, inclusive of stakeholder 
dependencies, connectivities and external actor vulnerabilities (Linkov & Palma-
Oliveira 2016).  
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The impact of some external hazards may exceed port infrastructure design 
capabilities, or be beyond port management abilities to cope, either from the 
impact of one major hazard or the simultaneous effects of several small and 
seemingly unconnected hazards (Linkov & Palma-Oliveira 2016; Solecki, Pelling & 
Garschagen 2017). Port managers must either absorb the external risk shock and 
system degradation as best possible, or experience port operational failure and 
then undertake eventual reorganisation and recovery (Trump et al. 2016). The 
discussion begins with an investigation of external port hazards inclusive of 
adverse natural events.  
3.5.1.1. Adverse natural events 
Unlike other types of hazards, adverse natural events are argued to be becoming 
fewer, and increasingly severe in their consequences (WEF 2018). Adverse natural 
events can result in complex outcomes, as demonstrated by the 2011 Japanese 
tsunami and Fukushima nuclear power station meltdown, and consequent port 
radiation contamination (Wang, Cato & Shibasaki 2013). Severe weather events 
increasingly affect US ports (Gajjar, McLeod & Wakeman 2013). Superstorm Sandy 
impacted the US east coast in 2012, with 87 deaths and disruption to major ports 
and their supply chains (Burleson 2012; Wagner, Chhetri & Sturm 2014). Sandy 
was classified as a category one storm, which is relatively minor when compared 
with the category 4 and 5 cyclones that regularly impact on Australian ports.  
An increasing number and severity of floods threaten Australian port 
infrastructure and shipping operations (Tracey 2011; Keim 2015). Cyclone Debbie 
floods in 2017 closed the Port of Brisbane, Port Alma and Bundaberg and heavily 
impacted Queensland ports’ critical supporting infrastructure, their road and rail 
connectivity to their hinterlands, and crucial goods and services suppliers’ assets 
and superstructure (Reynolds 2017). Severe natural events such as Queensland 
floods are described by the World Economic Forum as increasingly likely. 
Australian severe natural events from 2004-2017 (BOM 2017; CSIRO 2017) are 






Figure 3-4: Geographic distribution of adverse natural events (Author, from BOM 2018 meteorological statistics).
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3.5.1.2. Risk analyses for adverse natural events 
Port risk assessment approaches for adverse natural events should make use of 
historical data, sometimes gathered over ten years, to fully evaluate the hazard 
and consequent port vulnerability. Port managers who conduct risk assessment 
should consider the potential range of losses including economic losses and 
conduct predictive modelling to better understand the data and improve the risk 
assessment process (Aven 2015; Dokic et al. 2016). Risk assessment (addressed 
more fully at Subsection 4.6.5.) incorporates the essential processes of risk 
identification and analysis, followed by risk treatment (Aven 2015). A simplified 
risk analysis model for adverse weather events is sourced from the literature and 
shown in Figure 3-5 to demonstrate some analysis features and decision support 
considerations involved in the risk assessment process.  
 
Figure 3-5: Risk analysis model (Adapted from Aven 2015, and Dokic et al. 2016). 
While risk analysis for a lightning hazard is a seemingly simple process, a greater 
task arises in addressing the broader and more complex issues involving the 
potential failure of crucial external services providers (Loh & Thai 2014). 
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3.5.1.3. Crucial goods and services failure 
The literature provides little guidance on how much regard port decision-makers 
apply to risks affecting their crucial external services and other port system sub-
elements located outside port limits. The absence of this information provides a 
further layer of uncertainty to port risk analysis deliberations. Both the port and 
its external supporting networks of crucial goods and services suppliers are 
collectively exposed to known, unknown and unexpected sources of risk 
(Christopher & Holweg 2011). Whereas port managers might plan for and prepare 
to meet disruptions that might occur at the port, the port remains hostage to the 
vulnerabilities and uncertainties affecting its supporting networks (Power 2004).    
This requires port managers to engage in external stakeholder risk management 
collaboration towards informational, planning and resource sharing purposes, 
within a regional and sometimes national context (Power 2004; Ponomarov & 
Holcomb 2009; Sloan 2009; Sakalayen, Chen & Cahoon 2017). According to Sloan 
(2009), implementing effective external stakeholder collaboration processes is a 
formidable and complex task, but important to port vulnerability because these 
crucial external goods and services suppliers comprise potential failure nodes for 
port operations (John et al. 2016).  
3.5.1.4. Climate change 
Climate change is well-researched from port and coastal community natural 
disaster perspectives (Gurning, Cahoon & Sambodho 2010; Nursey-Bray et al. 
2012; Kong et al. 2012; Ng et al. 2013; Becker et al. 2015; Chhetri et al. 2015; 
Wakeman, Miller & Python 2015; Messner 2016). However, the rate of climate 
change onset to port operations is not a widely considered or well understood 
factor. Risks to port operations might manifest in the form of either subtle change 
with gradually worsening outcomes, or the impact of sudden change, for example 
the rapid onset of severe or catastrophic weather (Fritelli 2005). In the normal 
course of port operations, subtle adverse change might involve criminality or the 
development of a hostile or corrupt business environment (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck 
& Eden 2002). In the context of climate change, ports might experience subtle 
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increases in climate-related risks over the next century (sea level rise and more 
severe storm events) with impacts varying from low to extreme (Maunsell 2007; 
Garnaut 2008).  
There is little evidence that climate change threats figure greatly within Australian 
port risk assessments, possibly due to the slow nature of climate change - for 
example annual sea level rises of less than four millimetres per year (Garnaut 
2008) likely represent a minimal threat within existing port manager tenures. 
However, US port studies indicate that an annual sea level rise of four millimetres 
per year represents a rate that requires early and costly elevation and protection 
of port infrastructure and fixed facilities (Becker et al. 2016; Becker, Hippe & 
Mclean 2017). Studies advocating that Australian ports should conduct climate 
vulnerability assessments and develop adaptation plans include Mullett and 
McEvoy (2011), Stenek et al. (2011), Ng et al. (2013a), and Becker et al. (2018). 
Australian port practitioners appear to be either unaware of the climate change 
discourse and recommendations or are disregarding climate change as a potential 
risk. However, Pachauri and Meyer (2014) argue that the impact of climate change 
is difficult for lay persons to detect - identification of an impact might require 
statistical testing, and the full consequences might take decades to fully unfold. It 
remains unclear whether port managers are motivated to introduce new 
mitigation measures in response to climate change, rather than maintaining 
existing natural disaster risk control and management measures. 
3.5.1.5. Cyber-threats and port technology 
Ports are increasingly reliant upon information and communications technology 
(ICT) in enabling connectivity, competitive advantage, effectiveness and 
efficiencies (Christopher 2011). Port ICT system usage includes electronic aids for 
operations and administration, security, navigation, record keeping, and real-time 
monitoring of systems. Other ICT usage incorporates weather stations, customer 
records, personnel management, communications within the port community, 
ship loading and unloading, materials handling and transportation, container 
movements, rail and crane operations. These factors are crucial to port operations 
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(Bichou, Bell & Evans 2014; Burns 2015; Bichou 2018) and should be addressed 
when evaluating port operational vulnerabilities (Coaffee & Clarke 2017). 
European research suggests that few ports conduct cyber-security vulnerability 
assessments (Beaumont 2017; Meyer-Larsen & Müller 2018) and the literature 
provides little information on these assessments within an Australian port context. 
Ports likely have difficulty in coping with the rapid pace, complexities and hazards 
of technological change, digital innovation and associated risks of cyber-threats 
(Colarik 2006; Christou 2017; Nylén & Holmström 2015). This rapid pace of 
technological change and broadened hazard environment progresses faster than 
cyber-security abilities to respond, for example cyber threats mutate and assume 
new forms within just weeks (Ng 2017; Pleasance & Campbell 2017). The 
constantly changing forms and unexpectedness of cyber-attack upon global 
organisations constrain organisational abilities to perform normal tasks (Booth 
(2015). This ongoing contest between cyber-threat and cyber-security is 
exemplified by the WannaCry ransomware global cyber-attacks in May 2017, 
which were enabled by an infection vector called EternalBlue that was itself spread 
in April 2017 (Millar, Marshall & Cardon 2017). Organisations quickly implemented 
countermeasures to WannaCry, but between May and July 2017, two follow-on 
variations of WannaCry called Petya and Goldeneye were released with major 
impact on critical infrastructure including global ports (Ng 2017). Maersk port 
operations were impacted from 27 June to 10 July 2017 and incurred losses of 
US$300 million, showing how even global port leaders are underprepared to meet 
cyber-threats (Caldwell 2017; Dingledey 2017). Port resilience against the cyber-
threat, according to Dingledey (2017) requires increased threat awareness and 
planning, staff training in security protocols, coupled with contingency and 
scenario planning, coupled with exercises and information sharing between 
organisations. 
Port ICT challenges also include managing vulnerabilities to routine failures, 
human error, physical security, managing and keeping abreast of rapid advances 
in technology, protecting systems from the vagaries of weather, and the integrity 
of electrical supply (Lewis 2002; Onyeji, Bazilian & Bronk 2014). Essential port 
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operational services that are enabled by software systems become susceptible to 
unauthorised access, cyber-attack, user errors, and application code violations as 
shown in Table 3-3.   
Port information and communications technology systems at risk of disruption 
Port management Ship booking systems 
Planning and scheduling Road and rail traffic control systems 
Ship and stockpile planning and scheduling Ship loading systems 
Demand planning Radio frequency identification 
Customer relation management Cloud computing 
VTS systems CCTV management 
Automated alarm systems (for land and sea) Weather warning systems 
Tsunami warning system Swipe card access services 
Telecommunications systems Internet and intranet services 
Table 3-3: A cross-section of port software at risk (Adapted from Ellison et al. 2010; Burns 2015). 
The Australian Cyber Security Centre Report (2017) warns that organisations such 
as ports with extensive networks of critical goods and services suppliers are at risk 
of cyber-threats from incursions into third party ICT systems, which then transfer 
to the port systems. There is little evidence of Australian port managers being 
aware of this transactional technological risk. 
3.5.1.6. Illegal immigration - consequences to port operations 
Primarily the north-western Australian ports (Darwin, Derby Port Hedland and 
Broome) have experienced the consequences of involuntary migration with 
unannounced vessel arrivals and consequential port security and quarantine 
issues associated with ‘boat people’ immigrants (Phillips 2014). These vessel 
arrivals in Australian waters peaked during the financial year 2012-13 with 403 
vessels carrying 25,596 passengers and crew (Phillips 2014). Uncontrolled and 
unexpected movement of vessels in port waters constitutes a safety problem for 
port vessel traffic management officers, particularly when these illicit arrivals 
interact with large, deep draught vessels that are restricted in their abilities to 
manoeuvre (IALA 2016). 
3.5.2. Hazards arising from either external or internal origins 
Some hazards might result from either internal or external risk causalities or 
contributing factors arising from within the port’s internal processes and 
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procedures, or from external sources (Linkov & Palma-Oliveira 2017). An example 
is provided by logistics operations involving dangerous and hazardous goods. 
3.5.2.1. Dangerous and hazardous goods 
Australian port authorities, logistics entities and transport operators are 
responsible under State and national government Acts and Regulations for the 
safe handling, movement and storage of dangerous and hazardous goods (D&HG) 
within the port (AS:3846-2005). Cargoes within this category demonstrate 
explosive, flammable, toxic, infectious, spontaneously combustible, water 
reactive, corrosive, radio-active or pollutant properties (ADG 2017), for example 
crude oil, diesel and petroleum fuel, LNG, anhydrous ammonia, ammonium 
nitrate, and oxidising agents (House 2005). Cargo property uncertainties arise 
when: 
a) liquid leaks or fumes involving unknown commodities emit from within 
cargo containers or packaging; 
b) D&HG are stored in containers without declaration on the manifest; and  
c) in the case of bulk heavy metals, dust release or seawater pollution occur 
during transportation or intermodal transfer (Bacchioni 2008; Alyami et al. 
2014).  
Further uncertainties and security risks related to containerised D&HG cargoes 
include smuggling, theft, or the possibility of non-manifested material intended 
for terrorism purposes (Bergin & Bateman 2005). Worst case containerised cargo 
scenarios include toxic or radiological devices that, upon initiation, would severely 
contaminate a large area through toxic, biological or radioactive release for short 
or long-term durations (Stern 1999; Cohen 2005). A single container incident 
offers potential for multiple risk consequences, for example shipping container 
accidents successively involving fire, explosion, and the release of toxic fumes or 
a hazardous liquid leak (Khan & Abbasi 1998; Pinto & Talley 2006). Much has been 
written about the accidental or deliberate use of ammonium nitrate as an 
explosive. Ammonium nitrate is extensively used for explosive purposes within the 
Australian mining resources industry, and explosive grade ammonium nitrate is 
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often mixed with dieseline just before use to create ammonium-nitrate-fuel-oil 
mix, abbreviated to ANFO (Zygmunt & Buczkowski 2007). This relatively common 
commodity is transported along port road, rail and sea corridors thereby posing a 
widely shared risk for multiple port-centric actors (Cassini 1998; Verm & Verta 
2007; Ellis 2011). 
3.5.2.2. Deliberate or unintentional human behaviour 
Disruptions arising from human factors and behaviour are widely reported in the 
literature (Holmes 2002; Elias 2010; Fabiano et al. 2010; Wise, Hopkin & Garland 
2010; Kaplan & Mikes 2012; Christopher 2015; Toscano 2016; Stranks 2016; Loh 
et al. 2017). Australian illegal substance abuse is reportedly increasing with an 
estimated 15.6% of Australians ($3.1 million) unlawfully using illicit and 
pharmaceutical drugs, primarily meth/amphetamines and pain-killers/opiates 
(AIHW 2017). This Australian study is based on 23,772 responses across a 
stratified, multistage random investigation encompassing paper, online and 
telephone surveys. Within the wider population, users are primarily young adults 
(Johnston et al. 2004; Stevenson 2004; Duff 2005; Frone 2006) with a growing 
trend for the misuse of prescription drugs (Lee & Ross 2011; Nicholas, Lee & Roche 
2011). The hazards of working with dangerous and hazardous goods might be 
compounded by increased levels of workplace drug taking (WEF 2018). Research 
indicates that port workers using drugs might carry highly contagious infectious 
diseases through needle sharing, plus pose a risk to other workers while working 
under the influence of drugs (Cesar-Vaz et al. 2016). From a port workplace safety 
perspective, workers who are either intoxicated or affected by drugs must not be 
allowed near hazardous cargoes (House 2005).  
Drug usage within the Australian workforce is predominantly by personnel aged 
between 20-49 (Pidd, Shtangey & Roche2008; AIHW 2017) however, and possibly 
related to workplace confidentiality restrictions, little is found in the literature 
about port employee drug taking. Australian drug users are predominantly male, 
employed, and arrange their drug habits to minimise detection by workplace 
safety screening processes, which increasingly reveal positive results for 
amphetamines (Duff 2005; Roche et al. 2008; Marques et al. 2014). Risk outcomes 
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from drug-taking (Duff 2005) include memory loss, depression, concentration loss, 
blackouts, moodiness and loss of concentration – underlying why workers either 
intoxicated or affected by drugs must not be allowed near hazardous cargoes 
(House 2005).  
3.5.2.3. Security breaches 
The Australian Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Act as amended in 2016 
(MTOFSA 2003) requires Australian port authorities and all port and terminal 
operators to undertake maritime security functions related to intentional unlawful 
acts. This includes ensuring the safety of personnel, ships, infrastructure, cargo, 
plant and assets, and the IT integrity aspects of port and terminal operations. 
Additional port security concerns relate to adverse events or activities that 
threaten life, port operational capabilities, information and communications 
technology systems, cargo theft, data theft, criminality, vandalism, and sabotage 
(Manuj & Mentzer 2008; John et al. 2018). Rapid advances in the port use of digital 
technology also exposes the port to multiple aspects of cyber-crime (Accenture 
2015). Vigilance is required against employee corruption by organised crime 
groups (Lantsman 2017) where trusted insiders at Australian ports might assist in 
smuggling activities or cargo theft.  Criminal, terrorism or cyber-attacks that might 
arise from either within a port, or from external sources are described by Ekwell 
(2009, p. iii) as ‘antagonistic threats against the transportation network’.  
Increasingly, ICT technology advances make electronic business faster and provide 
companies with the ability and agility to create temporary and often anonymous 
online strategic alliances. The downside of these alliances is increased systemic 
complexity and uncertainty arising from: 
a) real and virtual hinterland port stakeholder networks expansion;  
b) a blurring of boundaries between what processes are physical and what 
are not; 
c) not knowing where a company supporting the port is located; and  
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d) port support actors become increasingly further interrelated, 
interdependent and resultantly more vulnerable to ‘domino effect’ risk 
(Waidringer 1999; Tan, Lam & Zhang 2015).  
Port physical security vulnerabilities are exacerbated by the port’s typical location 
near metropolitan areas, uncontrolled and unprotected access by water, presence 
of dangerous and hazardous cargoes, and onsite storage of hydrocarbon products 
(Burns 2015; Christopher 2015). Diverse security challenges include social activist 
incursions and threats to operations; vandalism and sabotage; activist or criminal 
use of drone surveillance aircraft; organised crime penetration of the workforce; 
workplace violence; illegal substances and/or alcohol use by personnel onsite; 
and, people smuggling (Christopher 2015).  
3.5.2.4. Financial issues 
Australian port financial stress might arise as either a causal factor or a 
consequence related to cost overspend, fraud, theft, unsecure record keeping and 
storage safety, financial instability, banking transaction failure or business 
downturn (Shiller 2009; Pallis & De Langen 2010; John et al. 2015). Port authorities 
are not immune to employees’ wrongful financial behaviour, for example 
corporate fraud (Lees 2017; Rintoul 2017). Flanagan (2008) notes that financial 
stress also arises from State government controls over port authority financial 
affairs, whereby Board independence might be influenced by Ministerial powers 
to appoint or dismiss government business agency directors and senior managers, 
to control strategic directions, and to shape corporate intent (Flanagan 2008; 
Whincop 2016). The relevant government department interacts with the port 
authority, for example as a regulator and adviser, and these interactions also 
empower the responsible Minister with governance powers beyond those 
contained in the Corporations Act (Whincop 2016).  
Ministerial influence extends to the approval and control over how much port 
authorities might budget towards operational or capital expenditure, and what 
proportion of profits are paid to State revenue in the form of a dividend. This 
means that 75 - 95% of port authority annual profits might be passed to the port’s 
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State government owner, with higher dividends required when State budgets 
experience financial stress (see for example, Western Australia State Budget 2017-
18). These influences clearly reduce port authorities’ ability to spend more on 
infrastructure replacement and maintenance. 
3.5.2.5. Environmental issues 
Australian port managers are required by their State governments to maintain 
environmental management plans, environmental management systems, and to 
conduct environmental monitoring processes. These formal plans are generally 
framed in accordance with ISO 14001:2015 Environmental Management Systems. 
Australian port compliance with these plans is mandated under its Environmental 
Protection Licences and its own master planning guidelines (Ports 2013). 
Environmental hazards associated with port operations include the transportation 
of dangerous and hazardous goods with potential risks including land, air and sea 
pollution, harm to the surrounding community, and harm to the health of port 
workers (Costa et al. 2017). Non-compliance with environmental regulations or 
codes of practice, or serious environmental pollution incident, can result in a 
regulatory authority directive to cease relevant port operations. 
Port developments and some ongoing operational maintenance activities (for 
example dredging and sandblasting of wharf piles) require environmental 
assessments and impact statements. Port development projects are subject to 
socio-political risks ranging from community environmental concerns to more 
active interventions of anti-development groups and activists who might illegally 
enter port premises in efforts to halt port operations (Evans 2010; Connor 2012). 
Port-related environmental concerns include air pollution from ships, stevedoring, 
truck and rail motor exhausts, ballast water discharges, fuel and oil runoff into the 
water, cargo spillage or leakage, storm water runoff into the ocean, and, the 
storage and transport of industrial and ship domestic waste (Lam & Notteboom 
2014; Burns 2015). Port environmental hazardous events include detection of 
marine invasive species (Bax et al. 2003); oil spills (Anderson, Melville & Jolley 
2008; Hook et al. 2016); harmful effects of chemical oil dispersants (Hook et al. 
53 
 
2016); chemical spills (Storie 2014); impact on port of toxic fumes, smoke and 
runoff into sea from landfill fires and recycling depots (Fattal 2016); and, heavy 
metals contamination (Jones et al. 2005).  
Flint et al. (2015) describe risks associated with ocean water quality at port areas:  
a) agricultural and industrial run-off following heavy rains; 
b) port, urban and coastal development storm water run-off; 
c) vessel movements in port, dumping of rubbish, discharge of ballast water 
and anti-fouling paint chemicals; 
d) seabed and plumes associated with maintenance and capital dredging, and 
rainwater or washdown runoff from wharf/loading facilities; 
e) discharges, either managed emissions or incidents; 
f) marine debris brought by tide or current from elsewhere; and, 
g) commercial fishing, recreational fishing and boating, and shore-based 
recreation. 
3.5.2.6. Infrastructure and/or superstructure failure 
From a National Ports Strategy perspective (IA 2011, p. 6) ‘…ports and associated 
infrastructure are of the utmost economic and social importance to Australia’. In 
general, ports are regarded as particularly risk prone because of their 
infrastructure compactness, the typically extended replacement time and expense 
involved in replacing damaged equipment, the lack of redundancy should essential 
navigational channels become blocked, and hazards to life, environment and 
infrastructure associated with the throughput of dangerous and hazardous goods 
(Bichou, Bell & Evans 2007; Burns 2015; Bichou 2018). Some port risk studies refer 
to infrastructure and superstructure as if these are interchangeable terms. 
However, superstructure, plant and equipment are more complex and likely have 
a shorter life than infrastructure, and hence become potentially more susceptible 
to failure (Tsinker 2004, 2014; Bichou, Bell & Evans 2007; Burns 2015; Bichou 
2018).  
Additional to internal port infrastructure risks, ports are exposed to vulnerabilities 
affecting external infrastructure providers. While ports themselves constitute 
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compact centres of infrastructure (wharves, roads, rail, channels and support 
systems) the port infrastructure interdependencies with external agencies create 
external risk management considerations towards the continued availability of 
electricity, rail, road, water, fuel, ICT, health, airport, council and other critical 
infrastructure providers (AG 2011; AG 2017). The Australian government 
encourages public/private sector critical infrastructure providers to adopt 
organisational resilience as a key component of their risk management strategies 
(AG 2015; IA 2016).  
Little is known about the effectiveness of Australian port critical infrastructure risk 
management and resilience interdependencies, for example the degree of 
infrastructure provider motivation, resources or opportunity to maintain or 
improve their risk management and resilience practices (Kwan & Balasubramanian 
2003).  
3.5.3. Internal hazards 
Hazards arising from internal sources are possibly best understood by port 
managers, and in the case of organisations in general, evidence suggests that the 
majority have crisis management plans with a core element of preparedness 
towards internal risk consequences (Johansen, Aggerholm & Frandsen 2011). Port 
managers possibly find that risk assessments and risk level monitoring are easier 
to conduct when the hazards under investigation relate to their own port’s 
internal operations (Loh & Thai 2014). 
3.5.3.1. Operational port accidents  
Accident analysis is broadly employed as a measure of port vulnerability to hazards 
(Darbra & Casal 2004; Grech, Horberry & Koester 2008; Lu & Tsai 2008; Yip 2008; 
Chlomoudis, Pallis & Tzannatos 2017). Within this context, Darbra and Casal (2004) 
review 471 major accidents across the ports of 95 countries from the United 
Kingdom’s Major Hazard Incident Data Service data base (MHIDAS 2002). Major 
port-related accidents discovered by Darbra and Casal (2004) primarily related to 




a) transportation of goods in trucks, trains and ships; 
b) cargo loading and unloading operations; 
c) storage and process plant activities; 
d) ship navigation in port – groundings, heavy impact with port infrastructure, 
and ship-ship collisions.  
These accident causalities are revisited by Casal (2017) who finds that fire and 
explosive hazards continue to be of major concern to port risk evaluations, and 
that air and water pollution are likely secondary outcomes of such accidents. Casal 
(2017) argues that an initial step in establishing present organisational 
effectiveness in coping with disruption requires a historical analysis of previous 
risk management performance. From such an analysis, Casal (2017) discusses how 
the effects of an initial accident in port (even minor) might cascade across port 
infrastructure and activities to create further hazard scenarios, with worsened 
consequences. This ‘domino effect’ risk is exacerbated by the proliferation of 
dangerous and hazardous materials passing through port, either while being 
transported, handled or stored (Loh & Thai 2015; Fu, Wang & Yan 2016; Casal 
2017). Port technology evolution has achieved such a high degree of automation 
across infrastructure, equipment and systems that in the event of information and 
communications technology (ICT) failure, port managers have utmost difficulty in 
adapting through manual interventions (Kramek 2013; Burns 2015; Beaumont 
2017). ICT failure at a container terminal is a particularly daunting prospect 
because corruption and loss of the data base would result in inability to readily 
identify containers for release from storage; manual identification of containers 
could possibly take weeks during which port congestion occurs (Beaumont 2017). 
Kramek (2013) highlights a requirement for port managers to undertake cyber-
security assessments, produce cybersecurity response plans and to allocate funds 
towards ICT failure management. However, Beaumont (2017) assesses the 
literature related primarily to US and European ports and finds little evidence that 
port managers have taken up the Kramek (2013) recommendations. Brasingon and 
Park (2016) note that Australian ports have so far been minimally affected by 
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cyber-threats, however the level of port interactions with other industry ICT 
systems provides a degree of vulnerability from attacks affecting third parties. 
New insurance products are being established to cover ‘crisis management 
forensics, security specialists, information and communication asset rectification 
costs, cyber business interruption costs and cyber extortion cover’ (Brasington & 
Park 2016, p. 24). 
3.5.3.2. VTS systems vulnerabilities 
Vessel traffic services (VYS) support ship navigation operations through a complex 
matrix of reliable voice communications, automated information services, 
accurate navigational charts, real time tidal and meteorological information, 
hydrographical survey data, radar, CCTV, telephone, telex, facsimile, automated 
data transfer systems, and online recording and reporting systems (IALA 2016). 
Human inputs to port shipping operations require vessel traffic services officers 
overseeing navigational directions and communications with all vessel 
movements, monitoring of developing traffic situations, emergency management 
in accordance with Harbourmaster directions, and coordinating emergency 
communications (IALA 2016). If a crisis occurs while vessel movements are in 
progress, then reliance upon effective ICT systems assumes greater importance, 
with ship-shore risk management and safety communications becoming events-
focused and reactive in managing evolving and uncertain circumstances (Seeger 
2006; Glik 2007). Port operations are vulnerable to failure if VTS operators are 
deficient in monitoring, identifying and assessing risks associated with ship traffic, 
or are unclear about their assigned risk response actions (Jones & Preston 2010; 
Coombs 2015). VTS malfunction is also linked to the potential for cyber-threats 
and ICT system failures, as vessel traffic management and information services are 
provided from within the port’s wider ICT system (Heilig & Voß 2017b). 
Intentional or unintentional VTS failures can result through signal jamming, and if 
both ship and shore systems fail, then the outcomes can be serious. For example, 
the entire ship navigation is highly reliant upon the continued availability of the 
global positioning system (GPS) and if GPS inputs fail then the electronic chart 
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display and information system (ECDIS) will cease operating, multiple alarms will 
actuate or other linked navigation and communications systems, and ship 
navigations teams will risk loss of situational awareness and navigational safety 
(Grant et al. 2009). Tugs also rely on GPS for the same navigational system 
purposes, and the port authority VTS system is used for plotting ship movements, 
identifying vessels by use of the VHF automated identification system, and for 
safety communications purposes (Grant et al. 2009). GPS and VTS failures as two 
linked vulnerabilities constitute important hazards to ship and port user safety. 
3.6. Summary 
Australian port managers are challenged by hazards arising from within a dynamic 
and turbulent risk environment, and some hazards materialise in the form of new, 
unforeseen and unprecedented emerging risks. A closer understanding of risk-
related terminology and clearer knowledge of the known types of port hazards 
and vulnerabilities are foundational to exploring port vulnerabilities and 
preparedness in meeting these hazards. The literature suggests that ports are 
increasingly vulnerable to extreme hydro-meteorological events, cyber-attacks, 
deliberate or unintentional human acts, and data theft or fraud. Port management 
effectiveness in treating risks from multiple sources is crucial, not only for the 
benefit of port users, but because the nation’s industries and national economic 
prosperity rely heavily on ports maintaining their business continuity. Port 
managers must cope with multi-layered and multi-hazard risk environment 
challenges; however, little is known about Australian port managers’ risk 
management capabilities, or of their training and competencies for making 
evidence-based judgements on risk. Risk management strategies and practices 
employed by port decision-makers in maintaining business continuity are 




Chapter 4: Port risk management strategies and practices   
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters provided an overview of Australian ports, the contexts in 
which they operate, and some categories of hazards that challenge port 
operational business continuity. However, this conceptualisation of the port and 
port hazards is unlikely to remain static. Ports and their operating processes, 
practices and crucial requirements are rapidly evolving and becoming increasingly 
complex, thereby expanding the risk environment. Externally, new hazards arise 
in the form of new, unpredictable and increasingly severe hazards of both natural 
and human causality. Port managers are at a decision-making crossroad, where 
they need to question the adequacy and effectiveness of their existing risk 
management strategies and capabilities against future risks.  
The Australian Government (AG 2016) takes an increased interest in safeguarding 
national critical infrastructure systems (inclusive of ports) from disruption. 
However, Australian port risk management capabilities are an underexplored (if 
not unexplored) field of research. Consequently, little is known about how these 
ports manage risks and consequences associated with low probability/high 
consequence disruptions. Accordingly, Chapter 4 investigates the literature for 
evidence of port-oriented risk management knowledge, management capabilities 
and performance, and port operational business continuity performance. A 
capabilities-based vulnerability analysis model (originally a military concept) is 
examined for its notional suitability in identifying and assessing port systemic 
vulnerabilities (Schnaubelt, Larson and Boyer 2014). Further, a port risk maturity 
model is conceptualised as a performance and management capability 
measurement scale (Tarrant & Gibson 2010). Chapter 4 begins by tracing the 
origins of present day port risk management practices and processes. 
4.2. Evolution of port risk management practices 
The introduction of formal risk management practices to port operations can be 
traced to the mid-19th century (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2014) when port safety, 
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design and environmental guidelines were introduced by PIANC, the Permanent 
International Association of Navigation Congresses (Van Der Burgt 1994). Formal 
risk management education began with the US Insurance Institute offering 
certification studies (Fraser & Simkins 2010). Formalisation of port risk 
management strategies, processes and techniques was furthered with publication 
of 21st century international risk management standards, including ISO 
31000:2018 Risk management -- Principles and guidelines. ISO 31000:2018 is 
recommended by the Australian Government for departmental and business 
agency use, along with its companion document ISO/IEC Guide 73:2009, a risk 
management vocabulary (Knight 2009). Australian State Governments provide 
insurance cover for their non-privatised ports, and in reducing State exposure to 
risk, provide these State business agencies with risk management guidance and 
encouragement to adhere to ISO 31000:2018 methodologies and concepts (QLD 
2017). The Australian government also encourages corporatised government 
business agencies (inclusive of ports) to adopt the resilience concepts within ISO 
22316 Security and resilience - Organizational resilience - Principles and attributes. 
The number of port-centric risk management and resilience standards extends far 
beyond ISO 31000:2018 and ISO 22316:2017 with primary supporting documents 
plus families of standards to encompass specific areas of operation, for example, 
IT security and environmental protection (ISO 2018). The number and variety of 
standards with applicability to port operations presents a complex challenge for 
port managers to understand what standards are crucial, and what might be 
occasionally useful. With the number of existing standards, plus multiple others 
under development for the management of risk, resilience and business 
continuity, port managers have more than thirty documents to consider as a basis 
for founding their strategies, plans, policies and routines (ISO 2018). Risk 
management and resilience learning is an essential component of port or other 
public-sector agency change processes, and decision-makers need to establish 
which core standards will suffice for organisational strategic and operational 
needs.  Ports need to avoid management cognitive overland, where too much 
information might challenge port management’s ‘absorptive capacity, i.e. its 
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ability to recognize the value of external information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
productive ends (Piening 2013, p. 239). Alternatively, and from a social science 
perspective, Australian port authorities are predisposed towards a bureaucratic 
style of management (Everett 2007; Chen & Everett 2014) and a possibility exists 
that port managers could be reluctant to engage in new learnings and change. 
Aversion to change is a factor that could lead to port management reliance on a 
defined, long-established and narrow span of disruption management capabilities 
(Piening 2013). This possibility is a potential constraint to management critical 
thinking about the port’s risks and vulnerabilities and runs counter to resilience 
concepts. Change in port risk management evolution is driven by port authority 
Boards of Directors in a top-down exercise of the control relationship between 
corporate governance and risk management (Robinson, Francis & Hurley 2013). 
Board governance and risk management understandings in turn are shaped by the 
international standards, plus the influences of professional guidance 
organisations, which for Australian ports include the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors (AICD 2016). Knight (2010, p. 16) for example, describes the 
role of corporate governance in furthering risk management as: ‘the glue which 
holds the organisation together in pursuit of its objectives, while risk management 
provides the resilience’. 
4.3. Port governance, risk control and corporate objectives 
The linkages between port governance, risk, controls and corporate objectives 
vary from port to port in complex multiple aspects. Reasons for this variance relate 
to non-alignment of stakeholder self-interests, differing needs and interests, and 
elements of uncertainty and ignorance associated with the complexity of 
whichever risks affect each port (De Marchi 2015). Contemporary risk governance 
towards complex risks, according to De Marchi (2015, p. 162) requires managers 
and academics to recognise that such complexities exist, and to realise that risk 
complexities can be neither ‘be fully understood nor managed with traditional risk 
assessment tools’. This section explores the literature to gain an overview of risk 
management from a port corporate objective perspective.  
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4.3.1. Internal and external risk governance 
To optimise port business continuity outcomes, port risk managers should 
consider both internal and external risk governance (ISO 31000:2018). Ports have 
an opportunity to control their internal risks, but less ability for external 
organisations. External organisations of interest to ports include regional 
networks of stakeholders who provide the port with crucial goods, services, and 
other transport and logistics needs. The management of port systemic risks and 
vulnerabilities requires coordination and collaboration of effort across the 
networked port sectors, a process that requires robust risk governance mindsets 
and behaviour (IRGC 2015). Further, continuous monitoring of the port’s internal 
and external risk environments assists in providing early warning of disruptions 
(IRGC 2015). Where risk governance instabilities exist, potential arises for adverse 
human intervention, for example terrorist, sabotage, criminality, activist or cyber-
threat activities which are an increasing feature of 21st Century risk environments 
(Rubin 1998; John & Nwaoha 2016; WEF 2018; AG 2017). Risks of human causality 
add to a port’s systemic operational complexities, vulnerabilities and 
uncertainties, and substantiate this thesis’ focus upon a requirement for 
increasing port resilience (Coaffee & Clarke 2017). 
4.3.2. Risk and uncertainty 
Elements of port risk management uncertainty might arise from management 
ignorance of risk environment variables, cause and effect relationships, potential 
courses of action to take, and unknown potential consequences (Hillson 2005; 
Renn & Klinke 2015). Port lack of knowledge or information concerning risk might 
be described as aleatory ignorance (known unknowns), whereas uncertainties 
involve epistemic ignorance (unknown unknowns) or, as described by Hillson 
(2005, p. 5): ‘… risk is measurable uncertainty; uncertainty is unmeasurable risk’. 
In minimising uncertainty, an organisation might begin by aligning its risk 
management, corporate governance and strategy processes (Bromiley et al. 
2015). Risk governance as a corporate process is necessarily guided by a cohesive 
framework for managing risks, uncertainty and complexity (Renn 2014). In past 
years, risk governance was based upon managers’ experience with various 
62 
 
categories of risk (Mokhtari et al. 2012), which is a values-based rather than 
evidence-based perspective (Aven 2016) and which might have overlooked or 
ignored some categories of risk. An evidence based approach requires deeper 
knowledge of risks than port management intuitive or experience-led 
brainstorming sessions, as described in the port risk literature (Srikanth & 
Venkataraman 2013; Bichou, Bell & Evans 2014; Burns 2015).  
Despite the physical and behavioural differences between ports, all are challenged 
by four primary categories of risk (Robinson, Francis & Hurley 2013; Hopkin 2017): 
a) risks with negative consequences (pure risks);  
b) uncertainties and unknowns (control risks);  
c) legislative, regulatory or code of practice requirements for hazard 
management (compliance risks); and, 
d) opportunities where potential consequences might result in either 
negative, status quo or positive outcomes (speculative risks). 
From a port intermodal operations context, risk management’s importance is 
attached to the three primary risk categories of pure risks, control risks, and 
compliance risks. Opportune risks, a fourth category, are regarded as less 
important to this thesis as they relate to potential benefits from risk-taking, which 
is peripheral to this research problem. In meeting these three important risk 
categories, port risk governance systems must encompass strategic and tactical 
planning, decision-making, and risk treatments aligned with the objective of 
achieving strategic and operational objectives (ISO 31000:2018; Lark 2015). 
According to Lark (2015), successful risk management implementation requires 
senior management to gain commitment to the risk management process from all 
personnel, in all departments, at all levels within the organisation. Corporate 
governance is conceptualised as a system of coordinated activities and 
accountabilities for regulating and overseeing enterprise-wide conduct, in which 
risk management becomes a key controlling mechanism in achieving corporate 
objectives (Dahms 2008; Lark 2015; du Plessis, Hargovan & Harris 2018).  
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4.3.3. Port risk governance  
The function of port risk governance effectiveness is rarely investigated, despite 
the decisive role of risk governance in managing high consequence risks with 
potential to develop into system-wide critical infrastructure crises (Aven 2011). 
Organisations might base their risk governance and risk management processes 
on diverse approaches as described by Knight (2010) and Butterfield (2017): 
a. traditional risk management (silo-based treatment of risk with little 
knowledge or consideration for whole-of-organisation risks);  
b. enterprise risk management (a strategic, holistic risk approach to internal 
and external assets, resources and activities); or,  
c. a superficial ‘tick and flick’ compliance-oriented approach just sufficiently 
detailed to satisfy auditors and regulators. 
Risk governance establishes the direction and oversight requirements for all port 
risk management activities and is a process that begins at Board and senior 
executive level. A port risk governance framework is an integral subset of the 
port’s wider corporate governance processes, and its objectives are to identify the 
resources to be used in managing risks, and to assist in effective decision-making 
and the establishment of risk management objectives (BS 31100:2011). 
Gaining a specific understanding of Australian port capabilities and abilities to 
manage high consequence risks requires a multi-disciplinary investigation into 
technical, sociological and natural port hazards (Renn 2017), and establishing 
whether risk governance and risk management shortfalls exist against these broad 
hazard categories. Technical, sociological and natural hazards require individual 
risk management approaches, some of which might be incompatible with others 
(Renn 2017).   The International Risk Governance Council (Florin & Bürkler 2017) 
provides a risk governance definition that reconciles so far as possible the 
limitations of a multi-disciplinary approach in exploring port risk. The IRGC (Florin 
& Bürkler 2017, pp 5-6) definition of risk governance is:   
The identification, assessment, management, evaluation and 
communication of risks in the context of plural values and distributed 
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authority. It includes all important actors involved, considering their rules, 
conventions and processes. It is thus concerned with how relevant risk 
information is collected, analysed, understood and communicated, and how 
management decisions are taken and communicated.  
This definition and the guidelines provided by the IRGC are important yardsticks 
for port Directors and senior managers in aligning risk governance within their 
overall corporate governance structure. Responsibilities for understanding and 
managing risks are vested firmly with an Australian port’s Board of Directors, and 
the Directors are tasked with ensuring that port risks are managed and governed 
competently and effectively (AICD 2016). Whereas the Board might delegate 
accountability and authority for managing risks to managers, Directors cannot 
delegate their risk management responsibilities (Corporations Act 2001; Graham 
& Kaye 2015). Board responsibility includes resolving high level risk management 
conflicts, for example risk avoidance versus increasing profitability, establishing 
risk management priorities or validities, or authorising risk management budget 
funds (Schiller & Prpich 2014). Exercising such responsibilities requires a full and 
clear understanding of the port organisation and its risk vulnerabilities, a concept 
that mirrors the IRGC (2017) risk governance framework approach. 
Risk governance frameworks are drafted by an organisation’s Board and senior 
managers in response to two risk influences – compliance towards legislation, 
codes of practice or regulations, and, decision-making in response to perceived 
hazards, uncertainties and unknowns (Dahms 2008). Accordingly, while each 
port’s risk governance framework might be unique, all should provide an effective 
control environment towards achieving corporate objectives, within acceptable 
risk limits (Dahms 2008). Corporate governance requires accountability and 
responsibility - Boards assign top down accountabilities and responsibilities to port 
risk managers who then perform bottom up risk management functions (Crowther 
& Seifi 2010; Robinson, Francis and Hurley 2013). 
Port authority Board members sit on internal governance committees variously 
titled as: risk and audit committee, risk oversight committee, audit committee, or 
risk committee (Lam 2014). Risk management is a critical oversight responsibility 
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for Board members, inherent with their obligation to maintain adequate risk 
management systems under s912A(1)(h) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Austlii 
2018). Directors must remain cognisant of the nature and extent of risks that 
might challenge the port, and be confident that management is competent, 
capable and effective in their risk management roles (AICD 2016). These 
governance obligations require an understanding of how and why a port becomes 
vulnerable to the changing risk environment. 
4.3.4. Vulnerability identification and assessment 
As discussed in Chapter 2, port managers are challenged by new and emerging 
uncertainties, complexities and ambiguities that test vulnerabilities at each level 
of a port’s operations (Gray 2017; Lam & Lassa 2017; Renn 2017). Seaport 
operational vulnerabilities are addressed in the literature but primarily from 
narrow approaches. For example, McEvoy et al. (2013) and Chhetri et al. (2015) 
take climate change approaches, while Pitilakis et al. (2016) investigates port 
vulnerability from a natural hazards perspective. Neither of these researchers 
provides a modelling framework that is applicable to port operational risk 
identification and vulnerability assessment. The military and security research 
fields provide examples of vulnerability modelling and simulation, primarily of a 
sophisticated quantitative format (Johansson & Hassel 2010; Wagner & Neshat 
2010; Yang & Qu 2016; John et al. 2016, 2018). A semi-quantitative vulnerability 
assessment framework for practitioner use is proposed by Schnaubelt, Larson and 
Boyer (2014) from their work with military strategists. This framework appears to 
be readily adaptable and applicable to seaport vulnerability identification and 
assessment, and user-friendly for port managers with minimal access to 
sophisticated mathematical knowledge or software.  
The Vulnerability Assessment Model (VAM) proposed by Schnaubelt, Larson and 
Boyer (2014) begins with identifying what actors, assets, resources and 
infrastructure are crucial to the port operations task. The second step is to identify 
crucial system requirements to maintain these primary support capabilities, and 
these crucial requirements form potential failure points (vulnerabilities) that need 
protection. Next, the process assesses:  
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a) which levels of vulnerability should be prioritised (for example, the top 10);  
b) what risk management mitigation and response efforts should be allocated 
and where;  
c) what business continuity strategies and plans should be implemented;  
d) how these disruption response and management processes should be 
directed, and 
e) how to design methods and capabilities for rapidly re-organising, 
modifying or adapting risk management processes as the situation 
demands (Schnaubelt, Larson & Boyer 2014).  
From the literature, port capabilities critical to operational and logistics continuity 
consist of human resources, assets and infrastructure located within the port 
domain, which Trepte and Rice (2012) describe as the port’s inner land and water 
area functional capabilities. Secondary capabilities (collectively integral to the 
port’s effective logistical and transportation performance) are provided by the 
port’s regional landside and waterside stakeholders and their port-centric assets, 
infrastructure and labour. Testing whether a port capability is critical to 
performance involves simulating what happens when that capability or its 
enabling requirement/s are removed – for example, if port cargo machinery 
requires mains electrical power and a disruption leads to power grid failure, then 
in the absence of alternative power supply, port cargo operations necessarily halt. 
Port resilience against this situation might involve having a standby emergency 
generator of sufficient capacity to replace mains supply for a given period. This 
Vulnerability Assessment Model approach appears to provide an evidence-based 
methodology (Aven 2016) for port vulnerability and assessment that strengthens 
the predominant values-based ‘brainstorming’ approach reportedly used by many 
port authorities within the past decade (Srikanth & Venkataraman 2013). Port 
decision-makers should gain the clearest understanding they can of the port risk 
environment and port vulnerabilities to hazards when formulating strategies and 
plans for controlling risk (ISO 31000:2009).  
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4.4. Understanding the port and port risk management practices 
This section explores Australian port managers’ understanding of their risk 
environment, their experience from past disruptions, and their knowledge of what 
categories of risks might manifest in the short-term future.  Before a Board and 
their management team can design a risk management system, they must clearly 
and fully understand their organisation, its key dependencies and crucial 
requirements from both internal and external perspectives (ISO 31000:2018). 
They must also understand and be knowledgeable about risk and risk 
management (Hopkin 2017). Tarrant (2010) argues that effective risk treatment 
and effective disruption responses requires emergency team managers to be 
adequately knowledgeable and have all necessary resources quickly available. The 
management team should also be knowledgeable and practiced with the port’s 
risk management policies, plans and operational priorities. Effective 
organisational risk management requires emergency response proficiencies, risk 
awareness and understanding, a sense of purpose and commitment to the task, 
personal and systemic capabilities, and a willingness to learn (Hopkin 2017). 
Accordingly, port business continuity strategies and crises response plans should 
reflect accurate knowledge and understanding about all inputs and resources 
crucial to operational serviceability (Harrington 2015). Essential knowledge for risk 
management decision-making encompasses the port and its resources, its 
interrelated and interdependent actors and agencies, crucial support services, and 
the land/sea interrelationships and interdependencies between logistics and 
transportation processes. To maintain port business continuity in the event of 
disruption, managers must understand what alternatives are available in the event 
of losing the ability to use normal operating premises, and/or main supplies of 
electrical power, ICT services, road and rail transport, fuel, towage, pilotage, 
banking, potable water, waste removal, warehousing and storage (Bichou, Bell & 
Evans 2014; Burns 2015). Guidance for port disruption preparedness is typically 
contained in Australian State government emergency management plans (for 
example, TEMP 2015). A common requirement of these emergency preparedness 
and response plans is for responders to be practised in facilitating ‘business as 
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usual’ practices for as long as possible when disruption is imminent, and when 
required, to be capable of swiftly transitioning to their emergency management 
roles.  
Zio (2016) argues that the quality and effectiveness of critical infrastructure risk 
management depends upon the strength of manager knowledge and experience. 
Additionally, Eggleston (2012, p. 85) argues that ‘… a healthy risk management 
environment is one where all members of an organisation are fully aware of the 
risks, controls and tasks for which they are accountable’. In practice, however, 
Eggleston (2012, p. 85) observes that non-compliance, inconsistencies, and 
indifference towards risk management stem from ‘…a lack of awareness, 
complacency, or no one person or group having responsibility or being 
accountable for their part in the process’.  
The purpose of a top-down mandate and senior executive support for risk 
management (ISO 31000:2018) is intended to counter such mindset and 
behavioural shortfalls, but evidence from the literature suggests that this outcome 
is not always provided. For example, Tampubolon’s (2012, p. 9) findings from a 
survey of Indonesian port managers’ risk attitudes, awareness, and priorities 
(these survey findings utilise the abbreviation RM for ‘risk management’): 
‘RM assessments only takes more time, money and energy’; ‘there are many 
other business activities that require more attention’; ‘RM approaches are 
not part of my job-desk, someone else was assigned for that’; ‘my hands are 
tight-up (sic) cannot do more.’ 
Tampubolon (2012) findings that Indonesian port managers were unenthusiastic 
about administering risk management and safety functions are replicated to a 
lesser extent within the Kolář and Puckett (2011) survey of Australian, European 
Union and Canadian port authorities. Kolář and Puckett (2011) surveyed senior 
executives overseeing five large Australian container ports, using a survey 
questionnaire employing closed-ended Likert scale questions about management 
systems and governance. They find that two of five Australian senior port 
managers responding to their survey disagreed that port authorities should be 
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made responsible for port regulations, safety and security. These responses come 
despite Australian State government legislation requiring port authority Boards 
and management to undertake, as a primary responsibility, the organisational 
functions of risk and crises management – an example is provided in the Western 
Australia Department of Transport publication, Port Authority Boards: Director's 
Handbook (DoT-WA 2018). This finding (Kolář & Puckett 2011) suggests some 
evidence that senior port managers serving at two of Australia’s twenty-seven 
port management have a less than total commitment to port authority risk 
governance. Port crisis management and business continuity are dependent upon 
strong risk management leadership and sound risk governance, and with 
weakened leadership commitment, a port might experience risk management 
failure (Clark 2016; Glendon, Clarke & McKenna 2016; Hillson & Murray-Webster 
2017; Hopkin 2017). 
4.4.1. Risk management failures 
Extensive literature explains why risk management effectiveness is important, but 
less is known about why and how port risk management deficiencies might occur. 
Generic risk management failure is well researched with potential applicability to 
ports, and researcher findings are generally similar. For example, Stulz (2008) 
refers to enterprise communication failures in risk exposure knowledge sharing 
while Shefrin (2016a, 2016b) argues that risk management failures arise from a 
risk-taking organisation culture, errant human behaviour and mindsets, or through 
managers ignoring apparently inconceivable low probability risks. Bouvard and 
Lee (2016) contribute further causalities of risk management failure in terms of 
risk mismeasurement, ignorance, communications shortfalls, inadequate 
monitoring, risk management deficiencies, and employment of inappropriate risk 
metrics. Risk management failure according to Stulz (2008) originates from either 
one, or a combination of causes, including: 
a) incorrectly chosen risk metrics;  
b) incorrectly perceived ‘known’ risks;  
c) overlooked ‘known’ risks;  
d) deficiencies in internal risk information transfers; and,  
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e) risk register deficiencies in ongoing monitoring and management of risk. 
Common features of these risk management failure studies include overlooking 
risks, incorrectly measuring risk, ignorance of crucial risk-related information, and 
risk management process deficiencies. Similarly, Leveson (2017) argues from a 
systems theory perspective that increasing levels of organisational complexity and 
resultant vulnerabilities constrain managers’ ability to conceptualise their entire 
risk environment. Further, Renn (2017) suggests that risk identification is clouded 
by uncertainties and ambiguities, increasing organisational interconnectedness, 
and the fast pace of risk environment change – factors which in combination might 
exploit the previously described limitations of traditional risk management tools, 
and human inabilities to correctly interpret risk (Stulz 2008; Bouvard & Lee 2016). 
Leveson (2017) describes systemic complexities that might constrain risk decision-
makers’ abilities to identify and assess risks: 
a) multi-layered and multi-sector interactions between many networked 
actors;  
b) dynamic complexities arising as the system changes over time and adjusts 
to internal and external influences; and  
c) complex non-linear interactions where risk outcomes seemingly have no 
obvious or logical relationship between cause and effect.  
In the context of new and emerging risks, vulnerabilities arise when risk managers 
employ outdated risk mitigation towards new systems and technologies (Leveson 
2017). Managers experience problems in mastering new technologies, coping with 
software failures, recovering from erroneous management decision-making, and 
in reshaping organisational culture to meet new risk mitigation and resilience 
challenges (Leveson 2017). Risk management failures also result from seemingly 
unjustifiable risk management costs, for example when a business case cannot be 
made for justifying expenditure upon inconceivable, low probability and high 
mitigation risks which are then ignored. An example is provided by the Fukishima 
nuclear power station melt-down, from which Tisdall (2013) reported on 
probabilistic risk assessment failures demonstrated by the power station 
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managers and their regulators. Tisdall (2013, np) records that managers upon 
reviewing their mistaken judgements observed that they should:  
Examine all the possibilities, no matter how small they are, and don’t think 
any single counter-measure is fool proof. Think about all different kinds of 
small counter-measures, not just one big solution. There’s not one single 
answer. We made a lot of excuses to ourselves… Looking back, seals on the 
doors, one little thing, could have saved everything. 
Port susceptibility to risk management failure or a limited ability to cope with 
disruption might arise from similar governance and leadership causalities as those 
which led to serious disasters. Examples of notable risk management failures 
include the Three Mile nuclear accident, Bhopal gas leak, Challenger space shuttle 
explosion, Deepwater Horizon oil spill, Hurricane Katrina storms and flooding, and 
the Fukishima-Daiichi nuclear meltdown (Westrum 2006; Stulz 2008; Chernov & 
Sornette 2016). The global risk environment is altering, and new and emerging 
risks and compliance requirements will likely challenge port risk managers beyond 
their present levels of competence (Rubin 1998, 2004; WEF 2018). How port 
managers might respond to these dynamic risk environment challenges is 
unknown, as is whether their intended responses will correspond with the risk 
management and resilience competency findings within these literature review 
chapters. 
Port risk management failure might also have its origins within the organisational 
tolerance to risk, if the Board of Directors sets their tolerance to risk at an 
unjustifiably high level, which Stulz (2008) categorises as a risk management trade-
off between costs, innovative abilities and flexibility. If risks exist below a port’s 
risk tolerance threshold and are ignored for this reason, then the port’s risk 
monitoring may be challenged by what Stolz (p. 66) describes as the emergence of 
‘unobserved pockets of risk’. 
4.5. Port tolerance and attitude to risk  
Risk governance requires Board and senior management risk decision-makers to 
establish their organisation’s attitude to risk, or risk tolerance profile and the 
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criteria by which risks will be identified and treated. Risk tolerance (or ‘attitude’) 
is described in the Orange Book as the amount of risk that an organisation is 
prepared to accept, tolerate, or be exposed to at any point in time (Treasury, 2004, 
p. 49), or as alternatively described, ‘the organization’s or stakeholders’ readiness 
to bear the risk after risk treatment in order to achieve its objectives’ (ISO Guide 
73:2009, definition 3.7.1.3). In deciding how to treat a risk, port managers will 
likely decide whether the risk consequences exceed the risk threshold set within 
the organisational risk tolerance, and the probability of the risk event occurring. 
Port decision-making on how to treat a risk are based on determinations towards 
risk as paraphrased from Van Grinsven (2009): 
a) accepting the risk on the understanding that either, internal controls are 
sufficient to mitigate the impact and consequences to an acceptable level, 
or that the probability of occurrence is deemed to be so low that the risk 
is ignored; 
b) avoiding the risk through due diligence, alternative practices, or 
eliminating areas of risk that are not essential to corporate objectives; 
c) transferring the risk, either to an alternative services provider or through 
insurance – noting that if risk transfer still leaves a port authority 
responsible for managing risk consequences, then this alternative loses 
validity; or 
d) mitigating the risk, which is a common outcome.  
Australian port authority risk tolerance is conceptualised as being conservative in 
nature, with evidence that these generally corporatised government trading 
agencies have bureaucratic management styles (Everett 2003b). So much so, 
according to Everett (2003a, 2003b) that port authorities’ top-down traditional 
bureaucratic management frameworks result in cumbersome and rigid 
governance, operational and flexibility outcomes. A bureaucratic style of 
management has long been characterised as unsuited to coping with dynamic risk 
situations (Stacey 1993) because structurally, bureaucratic management styles 
follow strict Newtonian lines of cause and effect, predictability, and inflexibility. 
Rosenhead (1998) describes traditional bureaucratic thinking processes as 
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corporate ‘tunnel-vision’, while Burns and Stalker (1994) characterise bureaucratic 
management culture as being mechanistic, vertically controlled Weberian 
bureaucracy that operates within narrow and vertically integrated informational 
silos, wherein communications are processed at several levels before filtering 
upward to the executive level. In the port context a management silo is formed 
when the managers take only a narrow view of the organisation and matters 
affecting only their department and their functional areas (Mentzer 2001). 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2017, p. 72) argue that centralised bureaucracies in a 
Weberian configuration need to move away from their rigid structures and path 
dependencies and become ‘…more flexible, fast-moving, (and) performance-
oriented’ if they are to effectively manage contemporary rapidly-changing social, 
business and society environments. Port managers may be constrained in their 
abilities to be more flexible and react faster to rapidly changing situations because 
of staff shortages in specific areas. Christopher (2016) advises that if port 
managers are unable to keep pace with the changing risk environment, or require 
specialist expertise not held in-house, then external advisors, agencies or 
resources might be sourced on a needs basis. This thesis aims to test whether the 
outsourcing of risk management duties might raise potential difficulties in 
establishing and maintaining effective lines of control, communication and 
commitment with these non-employees.  
The outsourcing of port staff duties also raises the possibility of behavioural bias 
occurring (Montibeller & Winterfeldt 2015) with non-employees struggling to 
understand the port risk environment and port risk governance processes 
(cognitive bias), and as non-employees either demonstrating lack of judgement in 
risk-related decision-making, or, not being fully committed to the port’s risk 
management culture (motivational bias). Further behavioural bias issues in 
relation to a port bureaucratic mindset are discussed in the following section. 
4.5.1. Behavioural bias and risk myopia  
Organisations operating under a bureaucratic style of management aim for 
behavioural consistency with organisational goals and objectives (Kirsch 1997) and 
in addition to constraints in adjusting to fast changing risk situations (Stacey 1993) 
74 
 
a bureaucratic style of management becomes exposed to behavioural bias (Hrnjic, 
Reeb & Yeung 2015). Managerial myopia in relation to risk is a behavioural bias 
towards short term events rather than those occurring further into the future, and 
in the context of a rapidly changing risk environment, risk myopia and 
organisational tunnel-vision might constrain management abilities to identify new 
sources of risk (Booth 2015; Hrnjic, Reeb & Yeung 2015). 
Contemporary hazards with low probability but extremely adverse risk 
consequences are difficult to predict due to their complex, unforeseeable and 
ambiguous nature and their often-rapid onset - for example: earthquakes, 
tsunamis, terrorist attacks, cyber-attack, technology failure, extreme weather 
events, economic and political turbulence, and human error (Weick & Sutcliffe 
2007; Kobayashi 2013; Fiksel et al. 2015). Proactive decision-making regarding 
such hazards is impeded by a lack of knowledge, or management denial that low 
probability/high consequence categories of disruption will eventuate (Pate-
Cornell 2012). Risk managers might subjectively regard unpredictable and 
unforeseen risks as deviations from their organisation’s normal state of 
operational stability, and with a low probability of occurrence nebulous hazards 
become ignored (Aven 2015; Fiksel et al. 2015). 
Criteria that further compound an organisation’s inability to effectively manage 
risk include unanticipated complexity and behavioural factors at system level.  The 
port-centric system creates a regionally dispersed operating environment whose 
actors may be unable to detect initial signs of unexpected system disruption or 
failure early enough to take decisive and effective countermeasures, and this 
coordination and visibility issue also constrains the effectiveness of multi-agency 
disruption responses (Haimes 2016; Salmon et al. 2011). Effectively, port risk 
management might be constrained by intentional or involuntary risk myopia. 
4.6. Port risk management framework 
Port risk management is practiced either formally or informally under many names 
and approaches (Lam 2014) and typically, port risk within the port governance 
context is regarded as adverse risk as opposed to private sector interest in both 
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adverse and opportune risks. When the Board directs management to implement 
‘top down’ risk management instructions, the managers subsequently refer to a 
risk management framework in their ‘bottom-up’ engagement in risk 
management practice (ISO 31000:2018). A risk management framework 
constitutes a blueprint for managing risks, outlining what strategies, plans, 
processes and techniques are to be used (ISO 31000:2018). This framework should 
reflect best risk management practices but should not drill down into the risk 
processes to detail how risk treatment is performed. For example, COSO (2004) 
identifies an effective risk management framework as one constructed to: 
a) minimise the possibility of gaps or shortcuts arising within the 
organisation’s risk management practices and processes; 
b) provide a more rigorous, even and consistent application of these risk 
management practices and processes across the organisation; 
c) facilitate the formal inclusion and integration of risk management within 
all operational programs and management processes; and  
d) provide a proforma structure for managing new and emerging unexpected 
risks within an increasingly complex and turbulent risk environment. 
Different levels of risk management exist within a port organisation because port 
authority operations are supported by multiple processes that are overseen by 
differing management levels within separate departments. Each management 
group has different perspectives on risk as it affects them, and individual managers 
are necessarily mindful of varying types of risks (BS 31100:2011). Strategic 
directions for risk are set by the Board of Directors and senior managers, the 
strategic directions are converted into plans, programs and processes by middle 
management, and operational risk management and disruption management 
processes are implemented by these middle level managers and frontline 
employees (BS 31100:2011; Loh & Thai 2015). The differing risk management 
processes that occur at varying levels within the port organisation are typically 
reflected in its risk management framework (Loh & Thai 2015). 
Australian State governments provide guidelines for departmental risk 
management frameworks, but port authorities as corporatised business agencies 
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operate outside the direct control of their State government, and do not have to 
comply with State government directions. Instead the port authorities are 
encouraged by State governments to implement a framework that is consistent 
with the AS/NZS ISO 31000:2018 Risk Management Principles and Guidelines. 
Standardised risk management methodologies and approaches within these 
guidelines are typically constructed around a P (Plan), D (Do), C (Check) and A (Act) 
framework (Reason 2016). The predecessor to this standard was AS 4360:2004 
which was published in 1995 as the first global standard in formalising and 
standardising risk management practices (Knight 2002). ISO 31000:2018 
recognises that risk needs to be managed either in the aggregate across the 
organisation, or within specific areas of ‘strategies and decisions, operations, 
processes, functions, projects, products, services and assets’ (ISO 31000:2018, p. 
1). The standard addresses how risk and risk management affect an organisation’s 
objectives, which in this study, relates to port operations and specifically, the 
port’s ongoing objective to maintain continuity of its two-way intermodal 
transfers of cargo and passengers.  
Port managers have access to multiple standards, codes and practices that assist 
them in compiling and implementing strategies, policies, plans and procedures to 
achieve their core operational objectives. Kouns and Minoli (2010) list seven 
international risk management standards that apply to information technology 
security alone, and a possibility exists that having too many guidelines might 
create confusion, and difficulty may arise in establishing what managers need to 
know, versus that which is ‘nice to know’. Other examples of risk management 
frameworks are contained in: 
a) AS/NZS 4360:2004 Australian and New Zealand Risk Management 
Standard;  
b) COSO (2013), Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework;  
c) The Orange Book – ‘Management of Risk: Principles and Concepts’ – HM 
Treasury (2004) (UK); and,  
d) Integrated Risk Management Framework (Canadian Treasury Board, 2000).  
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The UK Orange Book and the Canadian Integrated Risk Management Framework 
are written for government departments and agencies, whereas the other three 
are written for generic organisations. Drafting of a risk management framework 
requires cognisance of multiple factors, including relevant legislation, codes of 
practice and regulations, and the organisation’s risk policy created by the Board of 
Directors and senior managers (Dahms 2008). Australian port organisations have 
no fixed requirement for which risk management framework to adopt, although 
State governments encourage their government business agencies to adhere to 
ISO 31000:2018. As shown in Table 4-1, the ISO 31000:2018 risk management 
framework has shortfalls in areas that are addressed by other standards, codes 
and practices.  These other risk management frameworks also have varying areas 
of weakness (Hopkin 2017), and so the remainder of this chapter explores port risk 
management strategies, plans and techniques against an ISO 31000:2018 
framework.  










Risk management required at all levels 
(strategic, tactical and operational) 
     
Clearly articulated risk management policy      
Specific risks cannot be addressed in isolation      
Top down mandate for risk management      
Risk management at all levels, in all processes      
Reduce risk reliance on silo management      
Risk focus on events (loss)      
Risk focus on effects (positive or negative)      
Acknowledges subjectivity, limitations      
Addresses information technology security      
Clear lines of accountability      
Reliance on internal risk controls and audits      
Understand the business      
Need for effective risk communications      
Ongoing review and continual improvement of 
risk management framework 
     
Provides framework template/s       
Emphasis towards public sector risk      
Table 4-1: A comparison of integrated risk management frameworks under five international 
risk management systems (Author). 
A simple risk management framework is compiled from ISO 31000:2018 and is 
shown in Figure 4-1 to demonstrate how risk is addressed at differing levels of the 




Figure 4-1: A conceptual port risk management framework (Adapted from ISO 31000:2018). 
The framework begins with a top-down review of risks and a setting of risk 
management directions, tolerance and policies. These top-level decisions are 
translated into accountabilities, implementation plans and the establishment of 
requisite budget and resources to integrate and apply the chosen risk 
management practices and techniques into all facets of port operations (Giannakis 
& Papadopoulos 2016; Hopkin 2017). Risk management frameworks provide a 
methodology for identifying and assessing multiple risk exposures and for 
implementing and managing these risk exposures within an integrated  
framework rather than employing a silo risk management approach (Harrington, 
Niehaus & Risko 2011). This aspect of treating risk is discussed in the following 
section. 
4.6.1. Integrated risk management/Enterprise risk management processes 
Enterprise risk management is described by the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO 2004, p. 4) as:  
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A process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other 
personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to 
identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risks to be 
within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of entity objectives. 
Like traditional risk management, enterprise risk management (ERM) also has its 
critics. Power (2007, 2009) argues that ERM flaws include setting a single 
enterprise-wide level of risk tolerance whereas different departments might have 
differing exposure and appetite for risk. Power suggest that ERM flaws might be 
rectified by incorporating aspects of business continuity management within the 
organisation’s risk management approaches, because business continuity 
management has similar aims to ERM but more focused techniques in keeping 
operations functioning in the event of disaster.  
Critics such as Power (2009) and Hubbard (2009) argue that quantitative risk 
management processes, for example Monte Carlo simulations or other 
quantitative risk management software solutions, are potentially more effective 
than traditional or ERM processes on their own. However, not all Australian port 
authorities are large enough or financially capable of employing a full time Chief 
Risk Officer who is qualified and capable of performing quantitative risk analyses. 
Further, the benefits of ERM are only maximised if the port’s risk governance and 
commitment to risk management are adequate and effective (Sadgrove 2016). 
The objective of ERM is to increase an organisation’s capability for proactively and 
strategically managing multiple risks on an integrated and holistic basis 
(Liebenberg & Hoyt 2003; Sobel & Reding 2004; Anderson 2006; Lam 2014). ERM 
processes share attributes of traditional risk management but ERM differs in 
amalgamating all risk management processes within a common framework, rather 
than silo-based treatment of individual risks treated in isolation by each 
department (Gatzert & Martin 2015). The value of ERM to port managers is 
outlined by Fraser and Simkins (2010) who describe ERM as a process that: 
a) identifies potential hazard events that threaten the entity;  
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b) enables managers to operationalise and strategise risk within the entity’s 
risk tolerance; and,  
c) provides assurance that risk management outcomes will optimise the 
overall effectiveness and efficiencies of entity objectives. 
With ERM, organisational risks are identified, assessed and monitored in a holistic 
manner, and risks are evaluated for both their individual and adverse interactive 
effects upon business continuity (Brustbauer 2016). Risks are prioritised so that 
maximum risk treatment effort is accorded to risks with greatest adverse impact 
upon corporate objectives. The term ‘enterprise’ describes either real or virtual 
systems, for example the port’s regional network of goods and services providers 
(real), and the (virtual) cloud computing and ICT systems (Roberts 2006; Haimes 
et al. 2015). Ports are complex enterprises consisting of multiple actors and their 
communications platforms, plus external stakeholders and their 
interdependencies with the port (Mostashari et al. 2011). Traditional risk 
management processes are potentially challenged by the port’s levels of 
complexity and its exposure to the uncertainties, unexpectedness and unknowns 
of the logistics and transportation risk environment (Weick & Sutcliffe 2015; de 
Martino et al. 2013).  
Brooks, Fraser and Simkins (2010) suggest that an organisation aiming to cope 
effectively against uncertain and unexpected sources of disruption requires risk 
management defence-in-depth through: 
a) visualising the increasingly complex critical infrastructure system that 
provides crucial regional support to the port;   
b) recognising regional hazards and risk dispersion across the port’s 
hinterland and foreland areas;  
c) recognising the identities of crucial goods and services suppliers; and, 
d)  identifying and assessing risks challenging these crucial goods and services 
suppliers. 
ERM is better placed than traditional risk management for understanding which 
port actors are vulnerable to systemic hazards, how individual actors and clusters 
of actors within the port community might respond to disruptive events, and how 
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port actor failure might affect the wider pool of stakeholders reliant upon port 
business continuity (Becker, Fischer & Matson 2013). Conceptualisation of the 
interactive, multi-directional and repetitive processes of enterprise risk 
management (Hopkins 2012) is aided by reference to a 3D integrated enterprise 
risk management framework model provided by the US CPA peak body (COSO 
2004) as shown in Figure 4-2. The top surface of the cube represents four 
categories of objectives (strategic, operational, reporting and compliance); the 
front of the cube shows seven steps in treating risks from the internal environment 
(the same process holds true for treating external risks); and, the right side of the 
cube shows the organisation broken down into its integral units.  
This COSO integrated enterprise risk management framework is described as the 
foremost global risk management standard (Tekathen & Dechow 2013; Hayne & 
Free 2014; Decaux 2015). However, Australian port managers are encouraged by 
their State government owners to utilise the ISO 31000:2018 risk management 
framework. A comparison of COSO ERM with ISO 31000:2018 ERM reveals that:    
a. COSO ERM is much longer than ISO 31000;  
b. COSO ERM consists of 120 principles versus 15 for ISO 31000;  
c. COSO ERM was written by the accounting profession 
predominantly for the accounting profession, whereas ISO 31000 
was written by multiple risk professionals for generic risk 
practitioners;  
d. COSO ERM overlooks the importance of external stakeholders to 
the organisational business continuity task; and,  
e. COSO ERM appears to be more focused on the auditor perspective 




Figure 4-2: The enterprise risk management three-dimensional matrix (COSO, 2004, p. 23). 
Australian port authorities are small to medium sized enterprises, with few 
employing more than 200 staff and in total these port authorities employ less than 
3,000 full time employees (Ports 2016). The cost, resources, commitment and 
capabilities required to adopt, implement and comply with the COSO ERM system 
might be beyond port authority means, whereas the ISO 31000:2018 standard is 
simpler to use and less expensive to implement and audit (Dias 2017).  
4.6.2. Traditional as opposed to enterprise risk management  
Port risk management approaches, like those of organisations in general, have 
altered over the years to become more sophisticated, more widely focused, and 
more adaptive to rapidly changing circumstances (Fraser & Simkins 2016; Hopkin 
2017). One marked change involves the transition from traditional silo-approach 
techniques to holistic enterprise risk management (Hopkin 2017). This 
development was influenced by realisations that silo approaches impede 
integration and coordination of risk management effort across the organisation 
(Hoyt & Liebenberg 2011). The changing nature of the risk environment has 
resulted in a wider range of port vulnerabilities to unconventional risks, and in 
addressing these vulnerabilities, holistic efforts are better suited for 
understanding and coping with complex and emerging risks (Rosenthal, Boin, & 
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Comfort 2001; Hopkin 2017; Renn 2017). Holistic risk management approaches 
have become necessary because of capability gaps in silo risk management 
approaches (Bugalla & Narvaez 2014; Paté-Cornell & Cox 2014) involving:  
a) risk treatment efforts becoming duplicated;  
b) underestimating the type and consequences of potential risks; 
c) limiting the scope of risk assessments (particularly concerning low 
probability/extreme consequence events);  
d) overlooking near-misses; 
e) reduced recognition of the full effects of risk impact and consequences 
upon the organisation; 
f) interactions between critical risks not being recognised;  
g) crucial risk information not being shared, with ramifications for risks that 
affect multiple departments; and 
h) senior management difficulties in conceptualising the organisation’s 
aggregate key risks. 
Traditional risk management is a highly disaggregated form of risk management, 
one in which the various categories of organisational risk are individually managed 
in separate risk silos (Fraser & Simkin 2011). Managers endeavour to understand 
the behaviour of each risk under nominal organisational oversight, and with 
minimal consideration for how a specific risk might affect other departments or 
the wider organisation (Fraser & Simkin 2011; Hopkin 2017). Managing risks in 
individual silos might make sense to some port departments, where for example 
the finance department could specialise in and become a centre of excellence for 
managing financial risks, while staff outside of the ICT department may not have 
sufficient expertise to manage cyber-risks (Bugalla & Narvaez 2014). However, 
within these management silos, staff become focused upon recognising and 
preparing for known risks, rather than low probability risks characterised by 
uncertainties, ambiguities and complexity (Chapman, Ward & Harwood 2006). 
There is still a role for silo risk management, when a focused and phased 
examination of disruption sources in a silo approach becomes useful for port 
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managers when they wish to identify operational vulnerabilities to specific risks 
and allocate appropriate risk treatments (Kleindorfer & Saad 2005). 
Integrated and coordinated risk management efforts are key benefits of enterprise 
risk management frameworks, which have potential for higher quality of systemic 
risk governance and control that traditional risk management approaches (ISO 
31000:2018; Fraser & Simkins 2016; Hopkin 2017). Ports have evolved from being 
singe intermodal actors to crucial elements of global supply chains (Robinson 
2002; Wilmsmeier, Monios & Pérez 2013). Port integrations into landside logistics 
and transportation networks results in ports becoming individual complex 
adaptive systems within supply chain systems of systems (Cetin & Cerit 2010a, 
2010b; Vonck & Notteboom 2016). Managing risk as a port system with crucial 
hinterland interrelationships and interdependencies is a greater challenge than 
managing risk as an individual entity, and seemingly a task beyond the capacity of 
traditional risk management.  Yet Fraser and Simkin (2016) find from surveys 
within a US context that only 25% of large organisations report having enterprise-
wide risk management capabilities in place. Studies that explore Australian port 
risk management capabilities from a systemic perspective appear to be negligible, 
except for research that addresses seaport climate change hazards (McEvoy et al. 
2015; Cahoon et al. 2016; Becker et al. 2018). 
Critical infrastructure, inclusive of ports, is necessarily a system of systems, 
comprised of many actors and multiple layers of interconnected and 
interdependent networks, mutually reliant on system members for continuity in 
their supply of goods and services (Pye & Warren 2007; IA 2016; AG 2017). Critical 
infrastructure network interrelationships and interdependencies render all 
participants of such a system vulnerable to hazards affecting one or more of their 
network members, through the cascading nature of disruptions (Hartwich 2012). 
The port shares fundamental attributes of network risk with other organisations 
within the critical infrastructure networks: complexity in risk causes and 
consequences; uncertainty involving organisational ignorance, interrelationship 
variability, and random variables; and, ambiguity regarding organisational 
interpretation of risk/s and normative behaviour (Renn 2008). Coping with 
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complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity is possibly a step beyond the capabilities of 
traditional risk management and its linear cause and effect approach (Smith & 
Irwin 2006). 
Treating network risks is a potential problem for port authority bureaucratic 
management styles (Everett 2003; Pollit & Bouckaert 2017) because an uncertain 
and dynamic risk environment requires the exercise of flexible, adaptive and 
innovative management capabilities (Taneja et al. 2010). Traditional risk 
management suffers from inflexibility, whereby managers tend to ‘…recycle old 
solutions to new problems’ (Moynihan 2008, p. 351). Consequently, port 
managers might look for more than what traditional risk management offers. An 
increasingly used, more versatile alternative to traditional risk management is the 
enterprise risk management approach (Fraser & Simkins 2010).  
4.6.3. Risk management documentation 
Port risk management practice is initiated by the Board in the form of a port risk 
management policy. Hopkin (2017) describes this initial step as crucial because it 
sets risk management within the required context and demonstrates Board and 
senior executive advocacy and commitment to enterprise-wide risk management 
strategies and processes.  
Hopkin (2017) describes how the risk management documentation of each 
organisation will vary in relation to risk tolerance, the level of risk treatment 
required, and the complexity of the task. Additionally, the risk management 
documentation will reflect the Board mandate and follow a risk management 
framework in listing accountabilities, responsibilities, strategies, policies, 
procedures, plans and processes (Hopkin 2017). Other factors and practices 
detailed with a risk management strategy include organisation, risk prioritisation 
and monitoring, training and exercises, and budgeting towards allocation of risk 
management resources. Risk management documentation, processes and 
procedures must also address regulatory compliance needs 
86 
 
4.6.4. Normative risk management  
Australian Government entities (including port authorities) must comply with the 
Australian National Disaster Resilience Framework (AG 2011), and this national 
emergency framework follows a normative risk management strategy of 
prevention, preparedness, response and recovery – a comprehensive disruption 
response mechanism termed PPRR (Cronstedt 2002; Rogers 2011). PPRR is 
employed as a foundational basis for constructing State-wide and local resilience 
capabilities (Cavallo 2014; Jenkins 2015). PPRR attributes are described by 
Linnenluecke and Griffiths (2013, p. 389) as: 
Disaster risk detection and preparedness planning including the 
identification, forecasting, mitigation, and avoidance of disaster situations 
(and) the analysis of community vulnerability (plus) strategies for effective 
emergency management and disaster response, and the mitigation of risk 
and losses. 
National and international commercial, government and community 
organisations, inclusive of port managers, employ the PPRR risk management 
processes (Sujanto et al. 2008; Rogers 2011). PPRR is acknowledged to be a sound 
reactive risk management tool but reportedly its processes require modification 
to become more complete and proactive (Cronstedt 2002; Rogers 2011). Rogers 
(2011) indicates that PPRR processes benefit business continuity through their 
flexibility, innovation and adaption strategies; however, PPRR pays scant regard 
towards hazard awareness or monitoring for the onset of major hazards (Rogers 
2011). These capability gaps lead to inability for early recognition of an incipient 
adverse event (organisational mindfulness) which is a key platform of 
organisational resilience (Weick & Sutcliffe 2015).  
PPRR is unsuited to systemic risk management (Rogers 2011; McLaughlin & Fearon 
2013) involving requirements for collaboration and coordination with the port’s 
external system of interrelated and interdependent actors and agencies 
(Notteboom & Rodrigue 2005; De Martino, Morvillo & Marasco 2010). For 
example, some port-centric actors might choose not to act at all in response to a 
disruption, and rather adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach towards rapidly changing 
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events (McLaughlin & Fearon 2013). Maintaining risk management visibility over 
such a system is a daunting task, for example when attempting to identify which 
actors are actively involved at any one time and crucial to current port operations. 
Impediments such as these constrain a comprehensive port disruption response 
along PPRR lines (Rogers 2011), and further, port emergency response managers 
are required by legislation to defer to their local emergency management 
organisation when an incident controller is appointed by the State government to 
manage an emergency (OEM 2005; AG 2018).  
For Australian ports, other than for undertaking their roles in the national 
emergency framework, there is little evidence to gauge the extent that PPRR 
concepts are otherwise employed, or the effectiveness of port PPRR response 
capabilities in managing disruptions. This lends importance to empirical 
investigation of port effectiveness in managing major hazards and associated 
disruption consequences, which is an objective of this thesis. 
4.6.5. Risk assessment techniques and technology 
ISO 31010:2009 Risk Management - Risk Assessment Techniques (a companion 
standard to ISO 31000) advises that risk assessments can be performed by 
qualitative, semi quantitative or quantitative techniques, or a combination of 
these techniques. Probity requirements for risk assessment, according to ISO 
31010, are that the technique/s used for risk assessment should be justifiable, 
appropriate to context, productive of results that enhance risk understandings, 
and as with good research methods, should be ‘traceable, repeatable and 
verifiable’ (ISO 31010:2009, p. 18). 
Researchers undertake scientific investigations of organisational risk management 
processes and techniques, and report on risk management techniques employed 
by organisations inclusive of ports. This aspect of port risk management is what 
underpins evidence-based risk identification and assessment (Aven 2016). The 
complementary component to evidence-based risk identification and assessment 
is a value-based process that relies upon management risk experiences and 
judgement (Aven 2016). Value-based processes rely upon qualitative and semi-
qualitative techniques include brainstorming, mind-mapping, hazard matrices, risk 
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matrices, risk graphs, Delphi concept, scenario analysis and SWOT analysis (Berg 
2010). Quantitative evidence-based risk management techniques are increasingly 
used in academic risk management investigations, for example Gurning (2011) and 
John et al. (2016) employ Bayesian techniques in better understanding the 
uncertainties of maritime risk assessments. Bayesian techniques include Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo simulation as used by Hubbard (2009) in practitioner risk 
consultancy, and Paté-Cornell et al. (2017) in a critical infrastructure cyber-risk 
assessment. John et al. (2014) employ an integrated fuzzy set theory risk 
assessment of port operations, and later propose (2015) wider use of fuzzy set 
theory coupled with evidential reasoning (Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence) in 
investigations of seaport risk management and decision-making under conditions 
of uncertainty. From a practitioner perspective, port managers may not have the 
specialist training and skills to engage in the statistical evaluation of risks, however 
in addition to port managers’ access to Excel-based statistical capabilities, multiple 
user-friendly software packages and associated training are commercially 
available to assist port managers in their risk management and monitoring roles 
(Weeserik & Spruit 2018). 
Patterson (2015) notes that the rapid evolution in risk management technology 
provides managers with increased capabilities to identify, process and manage 
risk-oriented data. Computer-based technology is also described as decision 
support systems and in the case of risk management, decision support systems 
assist in providing interactive information gathering and provision, thereby 
assisting decision-making procedures (Power 2007; Beroggi & Wallace 2012; 
Hollnagel, Leveson & Woods 2012). Risk management software is increasingly user 
friendly and flexible (Thoits 2009; Hopkin 2017), however difficulty arises for port 
risk managers when modelling port safety for auditing, competitive, or predictive 
purposes. This is because the literature contains largely mathematical models 
against which a port might be benchmarked, and mathematical modelling (for 
example John et al., 2015 and use of fuzzy set theory) is more likely to be within 
the specialist risk manager province than with mainstream port managers.  
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An evaluation of Australian port authorities’ organisation charts shown on their 
web sites indicates that few qualified chief risk officers (CRO) or equivalent 
managers work for the ports. Where a CRO is employed at a port authority, 
possibilities arise for the use of in-house software-based risk analysis and 
management packages to assist in:  
a) compiling information on internal and external risk-oriented events and 
activities;  
b) provide high level oversight of organisational risk status;  
c) maintaining real time overview and awareness of factors affecting 
operations; 
d) risk analyses; 
e) measurement of organisational hazards and risk against desired objectives; 
f) prepare general or specific reports on demand; and  
g) maintaining risk, incident, and compliance registers (Thoits 2009).  
Board level risk decision-making can be assisted by CRO advice and use of the CRO 
to funnel Board risk management advocacy is another way to garner organisation-
wide commitment to risk management (Weeserik & Spruit 2018). In organisations 
without a CRO, the Board might delegate the senior management risk 
management responsibilities to either the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial 
Officer or Chief Operations Officer (Weeserik & Spruit 2018). What is not known 
is the extent to which these other senior port executives are qualified in risk 
management knowledge and skills, either from formal education or in-house 
training, and how risk education or its absence might affect port risk management 
capabilities and capacities. On-the-job experience and workplace training is 
necessary for the full development of port management skills, but further 
competency would likely result from a formal education foundation to provide 
technical skills (Manuti et al. 2015) is necessary for the full development of port 
management skills, but further competency would likely result from a formal 
education foundation to provide technical skills (Manuti et al. 2015). 
Thoits (2009) surveys predominantly US organisations across multiple industries 
to obtain information on what tools these organisations employ to manage risk. 
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Of 651 respondents, 27% developed their own solutions internally, using 
commonly available desktop software including Microsoft Excel, Word, 
PowerPoint and Access; Lotus Notes; and Microsoft SharePoint (Thoits 2009). Five 
percent implemented custom developed software either in-house or from 
externally developed projects, while twenty percent employed specialised 
software to address specific functions within their risk management programs. A 
review of online product descriptions for risk management software indicates that 
multiple specialised software packages are constructed around either ISO 31000: 
2009 or COSO enterprise risk management frameworks. These can be expensive, 
with an annual fee plus establishment costs, but port managers also have access 
to open-source risk management software that is provided free of purchase and 
annual costs.  
It is unclear how applicable or relevant risk decision support systems might be to 
Australian port business continuity, whether port management teams have the 
expertise to employ quantitative risk management techniques, or whether 
quantitative techniques and software are of practical use in assisting port 
managers to cope with risk. 
4.6.6. Risk mindfulness 
Recent disaster and stressor events (for example terrorism, severe weather 
events, or financial crises) might be expected to have heightened the risk 
awareness of managers in individual port organisations. However, Beasley and 
Frigo (2010) observe that while the risk environment for global enterprises is 
expanding and becoming increasingly complex, risk managers appear to be 
reluctant or unmindful of the need to proactively change, adapt and add rigour to 
their risk management strategies to match these times and circumstances. The 
rationale for ports to monitor the risk environment is to gain early warning of 
developing or imminent hazards. Early warning provides increased potential for 
maintaining port business continuity, or in the event of a hazard impacting the 
port, to be prepared for restoring operational capabilities within tolerable 
downtime and acceptable cost parameters (Petterson & Schulman 2016).  
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This real-time risk environment monitoring and ability for early recognition of an 
incipient adverse event are what Weick and Sutcliffe (2015) describe as 
organisational ‘mindfulness’. Mindful managers learn to recognise and react early 
to adverse events, enact proactive risk management responses and if required, 
adapt to dynamically changing circumstances (Parker 2010; Weick & Sutcliffe 
2015). Disruption preparedness requires the prior establishment of crucial 
information and communications infrastructure, coupled with established 
information pathways for collaboration and coordination with public and private 
sector critical infrastructure stakeholders (Wakeman 2013; Wagner, Chhetri & 
Sturm 2014). 
Within an Australian port context, managers’ expectations of future risks against 
other reliable sources of risk expectations might provide an indication of port 
organisational risk awareness. An understanding of port ‘mindfulness’ to future 
risks would benefit from communications detailing what proactive preparations 
are being made to treat these expected risks, and an analysis of what 
preparedness gaps might exist.  
4.6.7. Risk management communication and reporting 
Risk management communications and reporting are complex tasks. Crucial 
functions include transmission of strategies, policies and plans to employees to 
ensure consistency in risk management approaches, evolving a sound and 
effective risk culture, establishing a common risk vocabulary, developing lines of 
coordination and collaboration within and without the port, and the services, 
hardware and systems that enable the communications and reporting capabilities 
(ISO31000:2009; ISO31010:2009; Haraguchi, Lall & Watanabe 2016; Hopkins 
2017). Board responsibilities include ensuring that processes are in place for all 
employees to understand their risk management roles, responsibilities and 
accountabilities (ISO 31000:2018). Additionally, senior executives have 
compliance responsibilities for reporting to legal, regulatory and governance 
agencies both during and following a port disruption. 
Port risk management communications involve the transmission of information to 
all employees, external stakeholders and regulatory authorities including local 
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emergency response agencies (Hopkin 2017). Without effective internal risk 
management communications, organisational risk management practices are 
liable to develop in a fragmented fashion (silo management) with managers from 
different departments planning for and managing differing types of risk with 
varying levels of priority, plus minimal levels of collaboration, communication and 
coordination (Lam 2014; Hopkin 2017). Organisational and functional silos can 
result in unnecessary organisational complexity and inflexibility, duplication of 
effort, lack of visibility, poor integration and wasted resources, with potential to 
hamper risk management effectiveness (Harner 2010; Fraser & Simkins 2010).  
Should the port experience an unexpected and rapidly impacting disruption, then 
risk management performance is likely to be adversely affected by time pressures 
and uncertainty. Deficiencies in communication services, and unclear lines of 
communication within and external to the port are likely to impede decision 
making and collaborative responses (Houghton et al. 2006). Cross-agency 
communications and collaboration capabilities within public and private sector 
networks are essential to enabling crucial information flows where best needed 
during a disruption (Smythe 2013; Crowther 2014; Kolomiyets 2017). The port’s 
external risk management communications and reporting channels encompass 
multiple networked actors with disparate self-interests and conflicting attitudes 
and establishing network communications is an important component in 
establishing network sustainability (Bichou & Gray 2005; Cahoon, Pateman & Chen 
2013). 
Establishing relevant regional communication networks begins with identifying 
critical infrastructure and emergency response agencies and framing relationship 
parameters - for example governance measures, rights and responsibilities, and 
confidentiality agreements (Carr 2016; Hunt & Greaves 2017; Kolomiyets 2017). 
Port risk management communications and reporting relies upon the continued 
availability of internet and intranet services, electrical power, 
telecommunications, navigational AIS systems, and VHF and UHF radio systems 
(Burns 2015). These systems and services are essential in exercising coordination, 
command and control activities in managing risk, in addition to recording key 
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aspects of response actions (Lansdale 2012). The port’s ICT system is crucial to risk 
management support. Recording, monitoring and reporting processes are 
performed either within a generic information system, within a standalone 
software system, or a web or Cloud-based component of the port’s integrated 
information management system (Kolomiyets 2017). Managers require access to 
risk management records to fulfil their roles and accountabilities and to share 
knowledge, a process supported by the port’s generic information system 
(Chapman 2011). A risk information and document management system, 
according to Kolomiyets (2017) progressively enables risk management recording, 
monitoring, assessment, learning and dissemination of knowledge. Also, an 
effective risk information and document system contributes to the compilation 
and updating of port contingency plans. 
4.7. Business continuity and disruption response and recovery 
A capable port risk management framework requires avoidance of silo-based 
approaches to risk management, and instead the port should ensure that its 
business continuity management becomes closely linked with effective risk 
management and resilience processes and activities (Sheffi 2005; Banasiewicz 
2015; Graham & Kaye 2015; Sahebjamnia, Torabi & Mansouri 2017). The port 
objective in developing business continuity capabilities is to lessen the 
consequences of disruption primarily through maintaining port system 
interdependencies, and in establishing alternative premises, services and 
resources sufficient to retain or quickly recover operational capabilities (Hiles 
2011; Pettit & Lewis 2017). Business continuity as a short-term recovery measure, 
and disruption response and recovery as a longer-term measure, constitute the 
primary contingency responses of many organisations (Sahebjamnia, Torabi & 
Mansouri 2015). Resilience emerges within this business continuity and disruption 
recovery context in knowing when business continuity measures should be halted, 
and recovery operations commence (Sahebjamnia, Torabi & Mansouri 2015). 
Whereas a risk management framework provides managers with knowledge and 
techniques for reducing risk, business continuity planning provides capabilities for 
operationalising those techniques aimed towards anticipating and reducing risk 
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(disruption risk reduction). Port business continuity activities include identifying 
hazards, assessing the risks, identifying and assessing vulnerabilities, mitigating 
the risks and increasing organisational preparedness to meet these risks (ISO 
22301:2012; UNISDR 2015). The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2015–2030 (UNISDR 2015) provides guidance of relevance to port managers in 
managing new and emerging risks, in reducing existing risks and for strengthening 
resilience. Much of this guidance relates to planning and preparations towards 
minimising port vulnerabilities to hazards, disruption preparedness, in relation to 
responding, managing and recovering from emergencies, and compilation of 
effective emergency response plans, capabilities, training and resources (Aitsi-
Selmi et al. 2015; Haddock, Bullock & Coppola 2017). Aitsi-Selmi et al. (2015, p. 
164) reflect that ‘it is often not the hazard that determines a disaster, but the 
vulnerability, exposure, and ability of the population to anticipate, respond to, and 
recover from its effects’. Within a port disruption management context, this 
concept suggests that risk and resilience management cognisance and 
preparedness are largely the determinants of hazard consequences and business 
continuity prospects. 
Critical infrastructure disruption recovery is aided by the extent and effectiveness 
of business continuity planning preparedness, and particularly so where a high 
level of technology dependencies exists (St-Germain et al. 2014). The importance 
of business continuity to port managers relates to how well potential hazards and 
their consequences are identified, and how well a strategic and planning 
framework and enabling resources are developed to prepare the port to manage 
the impacts of a diverse range of hazards (Graham & Kaye 2015).  Little is known 
about Australian port capabilities in these areas. 
In general, business continuity planning is based upon risk identification and 
assessments, vulnerability analyses, and the identification of core resources and 
capabilities required to maintain or return operations to serviceability within an 
acceptable time scale (Wallace & Webber 2017). The planning also involves 
identification of alternative systems, services and suppliers if disruption denies 
port managers access to their normal range of crucial business resources (Hiles 
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2011). Allied with these business continuity concepts are disruption responses, 
emergency management and recovery planning processes (Sahebjamnia, Torabi & 
Mansouri 2015). These aspects of business continuity preparedness require 
compilation and testing of a response plan, which is known variously as an 
emergency plan, contingency plan, disaster recovery plan, or disruption response 
plan (Sadgrove 2017). A disruption response plan should be tested at regular 
intervals, and Sadgrove (2017) suggests that occasionally a spontaneous exercise 
should be held on a weekend to ensure that the plan still works in the absence of 
key personnel. An alternate premises emergency centre should also be fully tested 
to ensure that it can support critical aspects of port operations at a pre-planned 
minimally acceptable level of effectiveness (Graham & Kaye 2015). Business 
continuity planning should also establish the longest tolerable period of 
operational downtime and reflect a communications protocol for communicating 
key disruption-related information to internal and external stakeholders 
(Sadgrove 2017). Performance testing through drills and exercises is improved by 
comparison with benchmark levels of proficiency, and Sadgrove (2017) suggests 
the use of a risk maturity model for this purpose. 
4.8. Maturity models and performance management and measurement 
An early form of maturity model is described by Crosby (1980) as a quality 
management maturity grid that depicted progressive levels of quality 
management understanding and implementation of quality improvements. The 
concept was then applied towards information systems research, from where the 
maturity modelling concept has evolved and spread into wider academic and 
practitioner uses. Maturity modelling facilitates either self-auditing or third-party 
reviews, and the use of quantitative and/or qualitative analyses. A risk 
management maturity model (RM3) is described by Bititci et al. (2015, p. 3065) as 
a means of identifying an organisation’s degree of:  
Formality, sophistication and embeddedness of practices from ad hoc to 
optimising… (and to) …position current practices of an organisation against 
the maturity scale (i.e. from ad hoc to optimising).   
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Potential questions to be asked by port Board members of the CEO are ‘how well 
prepared are we for managing risk’ and ‘how does our risk preparedness compare 
with other organisations?’ Evidence-based answers to these questions require a 
readily understood system of measurement and comparison, which is the purpose 
of a risk management maturity model. Risk management performance 
measurement can also be conducted by subjective judgement (value-based) 
means, however judgements made in consequence of past experiences may not 
be truly indicative of what might occur with future risk events (Thekdi & Aven 
2016).    
Performance measurement systems are increasingly the subject of port-oriented 
literature (Pallis et al. 2011; Woo et al. 2012; Langenus & Dooms 2015) so that 
several management and measurement framework models exist. For example, the 
balanced scorecard (Bourne et al. 2003; Bititci et al. 2012); the Strategic 
Measurement Analysis and Reporting Technique (Cross & Lynch 1989; Bititci 
2015); and, the Integrated Performance Measurement System Reference Model 
(Bititci, Carrie & McDevitt 1997; Bitici 2015). Performance measurement might 
also be assessed through meeting progress objectives, for example those 
contained in the risk management framework within ISO 31000:2009. The 
literature provides little indication of how Australian port managers assess their 
risk management performance, capabilities and effectiveness in comparison with 
other ports. Instead. a proposed descriptive risk management maturity model at 
Figure 4-3 summarises the discussions of this chapter and provides a basis for 
assessing the effectiveness of self-reported port risk management capabilities to 
be acquired from the empirical research.  Maturity models as shown in Figure 4-3 
provide a useful technique for measuring and evaluating organisational risk 






Figure 4-3: Characteristics of a port risk management maturity model (Adapted from Chapman 2011; Arrow 2012; Andrews 2017; Kolomiyets 2017). 
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In overview, risk management maturity models are performance measurement 
systems (also known as Performance Measurement and Management systems) 
intended to assist organisations in formulating, implementing and measuring the 
effectiveness of corporate objectives, strategic plans and overall performance 
(Wettstein & Kueng 2002; Gunasekaran & Kobu 2007; Bititci et al. 2012). Maturity 
modelling techniques also provide port managers with means to assess their 
progress in developing risk management capabilities, evaluate their risk 
management strengths and weaknesses, and assist them in formulating targets 
towards higher levels of capability (Chapman 2011; Jia et al. 2013).  
4.9. Summary 
Chapter 4 discussed the evolution of port risk management and reviewed risk 
management compliance requirements, the status of risk management 
frameworks and processes, and the state of research associated with port 
managers’ abilities in managing risk. The chapter revealed that Australian port 
managers have access to a diverse range of guides, techniques and approaches to 
assist them in their vulnerability modelling, risk management capabilities, and 
compliance responsibilities. This chapter also revealed multiple sources of 
information and a risk management maturity model to assist managers in 
reviewing or auditing port risk management practices.  
A sound risk management foundation is primarily suited to managing normative 
port hazards and their consequences (for example at risk management maturity 
level 5). These involve known hazards and risk probabilities. However, in managing 
new, emerging, unknown and unexpected port hazards with uncertain 
consequences, Australian port managers require additional abilities for more 
innovative, flexible and adaptive disruption responses in maintaining business 
continuity. Attainment of these additional enhanced abilities requires Australian 
ports to establish and promote organisational resilience capabilities and 
responses, using risk management and continuity processes and procedures as 
foundational means to this end. The degree of inability to cope using conventional 
risk management tools and techniques is dependent upon the degree of 
knowledge and certainty held by port managers – as the port risk environemnt 
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becomes increasingly influenced by uncertainty and new, previously unknown 
risks evolve, then risk management coping abilities and effectiveness declines, as 
shown in figure 4-4. Coping refers to port management abilities, approaches and 
systems to effectively understand, identify, anticipate, control and manage 
expected and unexpected risks and uncertainty (Van der Vegt et al. 2015; John et 
al. 2016; Renn 2017). 
  
Figure 4-4: Port risk management effectiveness model to summarise Chapter 4 (Author). 
Accordingly, Chapter 5 now searches the literature for what is known about 
resilience and assesses how it might be employed in enhancing Australian port 
preparedness and performance against complex and unforeseen disruptions. 
Chapter 5 aims to determine what drivers, resources and governance attributes 
might be required to operationalise organisational resilience into more effective 
risk management practices. 
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Chapter 5 - Operationalising port resilience 
5.1. Introduction 
Preceding chapters investigated how risk management might be employed in 
optimising business continuity across the port’s internal and external operating 
environments. These chapters provided a clearer understanding of how 
managers strengthen and protect their port/s against the impact of known and 
conceivable risks within a stable risk environment (Blades 2017). Findings from 
these chapters demonstrate how port risk management capabilities and 
capacities are increasingly challenged by the potential for new, unforeseen and 
unpredictable global risks (WEF 2018). These uncertainties bring port risk 
managers to a type of stasis, where conventional risk management processes 
alone appear to be inadequate for treating an increasingly uncertain and 
unpredictable risk environment.  
McManus et al. (2007) advocate the employment of resilience management as 
an alternative investment towards organisational performance and the well-
being of its community of stakeholders. Similarly, the Australian Government 
(AG 2016) encourages critical infrastructure operators, including port 
managers, to build their levels of resilience as a critical supplementary 
capability for conventional risk management. This evolutionary improvement 
process reflects a global organisational and academic interest in resilience 
within diverse applications, for example disaster preparedness and 
contingency management, complex systems, and resilience management 
(Carralli et al. 2010; Cavallo 2014; Weick & Sutcliffe 2015; Adini et al. 2017; 
Doerfel & Prezelj 2017; Kim & Park 2018). 
Chapter 5 investigates the state of organisational resilience knowledge and 
examines a notional performance measurement and management model for 
operationalising, managing and measuring the indicators of port operational 
resilience. Operationalising resilience towards managing the port’s internal 
uncertainties and unpredictabilities (Bach et al. 2013) is only part protection 
for port operations. Port managers need to assess their vulnerabilities to failure 
 101 
 
of the port’s external critical infrastructure partners, each with their own set of 
internal failure modes and hazards (Carralli 2006; Hughes & Healy 2014). 
Chapter 5 begins by examining why port managers should adopt a heightened 
resilience focus.  
5.2. An overview of resilience, and resilience capabilities 
Resilience theory researchers appear unable to decide whether resilience is 
either ‘a measure, a feature, a philosophy or a capability… (or whether 
resilience is) a tangible or an intangible capability’ (Bhamra, Dani & Burnard 
2011, p. 5389). This level of ambiguity lends importance to further research 
that aims to provide a clearer understanding of organisational resilience, and 
how organisational resilience might be employed to manage the uncertainties 
and ambiguities of the global risk environment. 
Unexpected and unforeseen adverse events arising from this risk environment 
are sometimes referred to as ‘wicked problems’ or ‘Black Swan’ events due to 
the increasingly unpredictable nature of the risk environment, and the levels of 
complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity that arise when a wicked problem 
emerges (Conklin 2006; Smithson 2010; Paté-Cornell 2012; Flage & Aven 2015; 
Gharehgozli et al. 2017). Whereas existing risk management capabilities and 
capacities remain effective in treating known and foreseeable risks, these 
probabilistic approaches must be complemented by resilience capabilities to 
address unknown, unanticipated, and otherwise unmanageable new and 
emerging risks (Linkov et al. 2014; WEF 2018). 
Multiple resilience strategies and management systems exist as a start point 
for organisations wanting to enhance their levels of resilience. For example, ISO 
22316:2017 Security and resilience - Organizational resilience - Principles and 
attributes, offers a definition (2017, p. v): 
Organizational resilience is the ability of an organization to absorb and 
adapt in a changing environment to enable it to deliver its objectives and 
to survive and prosper. 
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Despite attempts to formalise resilience in standards (ISO 22316:2017; BS 
65000: 2014) and the rise of multiple organisational resilience indicators 
(Seville 2008; Blades 2017) there remains a conceptual problem in quantifying 
organisational resilience, and in establishing how managers might achieve 
requisite resilience capabilities. Resilience is not a stable organisational or 
management attribute, rather, Chandler (2014) describes resilience as a 
dynamic form or style of interactive adaptation to changing circumstances. 
Within this context, a dynamic risk management response to an emergent 
hazard evolves as a complex adaptive process, in which managers proactively 
respond, adapt and reshape their organisational disruption management 
inputs (Chandler 2014).  
Whereas known and stable risk conditions permit risk management more by 
conventional means and response by rote, complexity and uncertainty requires 
risk governance more attuned to resilience thinking, problem solving and self-
organising, with expertise based on knowledge and experience (Walker & Salt 
2012; Chandler 2014). Caralli et al. (2010) argue that low-resilience 
organisations should rethink their customary risk management processes and 
implement organisational resilience against unexpected high consequences 
risk. A management organisational resilience focus requires a clear 
understanding of what is important to maintaining identity and continuity of 
operations, an acceptance of change, empowerment of managers for flexible 
and considered decision-making, and organisational ability for ongoing 
adaption to changing circumstances (Walker & Salt 2012). Academic resources 
might enable managers to think within a resilience context, but only a manager 
deeply immersed in managing a disruption can decide what needs to be done 
in exercising resilience for each disruptive circumstance (Chandler 2014).  
5.2.1. Organisational resilience 
Resilience concepts evolved from ecology theory (Holling 1973) and are 
increasingly employed within natural and social science research, for example 
to address climate change and disaster management (Davidson et al. 2016). 
Broad platforms of resilience are engineering resilience in which a structure or 
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system is designed to operate and remain within predetermined parameters, 
and socio-ecological resilience in which a system normally operates within a set 
of parameters but if disturbed sufficiently to overcome its inherent resilience 
(Figure 5-1), it will be displaced from this state and into another (Holling 2001; 
Holling & Gundersen 2002). Engineering resilience is measured within the 
context of how rapidly a system or organisation can return from disruption to 
its previous state of equilibrium (Tilman & Downing 1994; Hollnagel 2014) and 
is characterised by efficiency, consistency and predictability (Briske, Illius & 
Anderies 2017). Socio-ecological resilience is alternatively characterised by 
persistence, change and unpredictability from a non-equilibrium theory 
perspective (Briske, Illius & Anderies 2017). 
 
Figure 5-1: Resilience states R1-R4 showing states of transformation (Adapted from 
Gunderson, 2000 and, Walker & Salt, 2006). 
McManus et al. (2008, p. 81) argue that organisational resilience might be 
manifested in both day-to-day operations and during emergency response and 
recovery, and that enablement of resilience requires ‘…situation awareness, 
management of keystone vulnerabilities, and adaptive capacity.’ The model at 
Figure 5-1 employs a ball and basin analogy (Gunderson 2000) which is 
modified by the researcher to capture this continuum relationship between an 
organisation’s awareness, adaptiveness, transformation and resilience 
performance.  
A ball and basin analogy for organisational states has long been used to 
advance both scientific and management theory (Briske et al. 2006; Brand 
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2009). The level of organisational resilience is overcome when the scale of 
disruption is sufficient to displace the organisation (shown as a ball) over its 
stability threshold, and into another basin of stability (Gunderson 2000; Walker 
& Salt 2006). Specifically, resilience phase R1 in the model portrays an adaptive 
organisation, able to maintain its resilience and the stability within assigned 
operational parameters. At phase R2 the organisation has become less resilient 
and therefore more vulnerable to disruptive forces affecting its stability. At this 
phase of untenable operational circumstances, a mindful and resilient 
organisation might innovate to actively control its transformation to a 
fundamentally new state of business continuity stability (Walker & Salt 2006). 
Otherwise, sufficient disturbance will displace the organisation across the R2 
transformation threshold into a new basin of attraction (R3), and, should the 
organisation be still unable to effectively manage the disruption, then upon 
eventual recovery the organisation undergoes a regime shift to a new reality 
(R4).  
From a social science perspective resilience is an unobservable construct; it 
cannot be physically measured, rather its presence is inferred from outcomes 
to adverse events that demonstrate organisational or individual positive ability 
to absorb or adapt to negatively altered circumstances (Cosco et al. 2016; ISO 
22316:2017). The international standard ISO 22316:2017 discusses ‘enhancing’ 
resilience which infers that resilience is always present even if unobservable in 
its varying weaker or stronger forms. Cosco et al. (2016) describe this varying 
flux of resilience as movement along a resilience continuum, rather than an 
abstract reactive or proactive quality that either is or isn’t.  
Despite an emerging concept that resilience can be beneficially applied to day-
to-day problem solving (Alesi 2008; Brown, Seville & Vargo 2017), resilience 
researchers regard resilience as something that might not always be present 
and investigate how to ‘embed’ resilience into the topic of their research: for 
example, Inglis et al. (2014) – adapting to climate change; Bond et al. (2015) – 
environmental impact assessments; O’Connell et al. (2016) – sustainable 
development.  The Oxford Dictionary of English (2010) regards the word 
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‘embed’ as meaning to implant an idea or feeling within a specific context so 
that this idea becomes ingrained. When Bond et al. (2015) discuss the concept 
of embedding resilience into environmental impact assessments, they propose 
to translate theoretical resilience deliberations into practice to overcome the 
adverse effects of ambiguity, uncertainty and ignorance in scientific decision 
making. In this sense, embedding resilience into an organisation or its practices 
is analogous to operationalisation, which is described within the social sciences 
as reconceptualising an abstract concept so that it assumes sufficient tangible 
meaning to be translated into more directly observable and measurable 
practice (Jupp 2006). An objective of this thesis is to explore how resilience 
theory might be operationalised at Australian ports, but first, resilience is 
explored for how it is perceived within wider contexts. 
5.2.2. Resilience from large scale studies 
Few studies explore residence within an Australian context, and to the best of 
the researcher’s knowledge, Australian port resilience is a new field of 
organisational management research. An example of organisational resilience 
research is provided by a UK business intelligence research organisation linked 
to The Economist newspaper. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU 2015) 
international survey questioned 411 senior executives from primarily medium 
size enterprises, asking for their opinions on the relevance of resilience to their 
enterprises. This is a large sample number focused on a question of relevance 
to this thesis, and therefore of interest.  Whereas 88% of these executives 
agreed that resilience is a priority in management considerations, only 29% of 
the 411 enterprises had resilience embedded within their systems and 44% had 
intentions to progress with enhancing their levels of resilience. Responses are 




Figure 5-2: Resilience governance attributes of 411 international enterprises (Adapted from 
EIU 2015). 
A core principal of ISO 22316:2017 that is aligned with operationalising 
resilience is the requirement to gain enterprise-wide commitment to, and 
understanding of the resilience processes, however of the 411 respondents to 
the EIU (2015) survey, 275 reported that resilience is inconsistently applied 
across their organisations. The survey covered an aspect of importance to this 
thesis, namely, what factors are most important in embedding resilience into 
an organisation. Six of the factors addressed by the EIU question appeared to 
be of relevance to port organisations: 
a) understanding customer needs; 
b) providing staff training and increasing skill levels; 
c) providing effective leadership; 
d) effective corporate governance; 
e) information security needs; and 
f) operational processes related to environmental issues. 
The survey responses to these question components were assessed to gauge 
their suitability for use in the empirical research of this thesis. SPSS software 
was used for this assessment, and factor analysis reveals that for the EIU (2015) 
survey respondents, the influence of customer requirements most strongly 
influenced the implementation of organisation resilience capabilities within the 
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organisations. The three other factors that most strongly influenced 
organisations to enhance their resilience effectiveness were: 
a) providing staff training and increasing skill levels; 
b) providing effective leadership; and 
c) effective corporate governance. 
These four factors are utilised within the investigation of resilience factors 
within this thesis. Interestingly, 13% of the 411 international EIU survey 
respondents professed that the reason why they were influenced to embed 
resilience within their risk management processes was because resilience is ‘a 
necessary evil – driven by regulation / a "must do it" (EIU 2015, p. 6). The EIU 
survey was further relevant to the research problem of this thesis, in listing 
respondents’ opinions on what constitute the most likely sources of risk to arise 
over the next three years. Market competition and macro-economic 
uncertainty were the greatest perceived concerns.  
5.2.3. Resilience within a critical infrastructure context 
The Australian Government approach to encouraging critical infrastructure 
resilience involves establishing focused web sites, the formation of 
public/private partnerships, and formulating plans and strategies to guide and 
promote resilience principles for the critical infrastructure sectors (AG 2010, 
2015, 2016, 2017; IA 2016; TISN 2016). The Australian Government Resilience 
Strategy (AG 2010) was followed by the implementation plan - Australian 
Government Resilience Strategy: Plan (AG 2015, p. 1) whose core policy 
objectives encourage:   
Critical infrastructure owners and operators to be effective in managing 
reasonably foreseeable risks to the continuity of their operations, 
through a mature, risk-based approach. The second objective is for 
critical infrastructure owners and operators to be effective in managing 
unforeseen risks to the continuity of their operations through an 
organisational resilience approach. 
Specifically, the Australian government (2008) argues that senior critical 
infrastructure managers should insert resilience into their governance systems 
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by aligning resilience governance concepts with enterprise risk management, 
business continuity and strategic planning processes. The Australian 
government resilience strategy envisaged a Trusted Information Sharing 
Network working group, whose members include representatives from 
academia, business, peak bodies and government (TISN 2016). A TISN sub-
group provides guidance and resources to assist the owners and operators of 
critical infrastructure in their resilience governance approaches.  
Australian and US governments encourage critical infrastructure resilience to 
become a shared responsibility between the public and private sectors, 
whereby governments act to coordinate and promote the development of 
operator level resilience (Dunn, Cavelty & Suter 2009; Trucco & Petrenj 2017). 
Australian national and State governments encourage critical infrastructure 
public and private organisations (including port authorities) to enhance their 
resilience levels in recognition that traditional corporate strategies might not 
protect their entities from unexpected and unforeseen events (AG 2013). The 
Australian government, for example, regards an organisation’s resilience as its 
ability for adaptation and evolution to unexpected changing circumstances and 
unforeseen sudden shocks, coupled with organisational capabilities for change 
in meeting longer term challenges (AG 2016). Factors contributing to 
organisational resilience are summarised within the next section. 
5.2.4. An overview of resilience concepts 
This section provides an overview of the major components of organisational 
resilience, and an indication of how the context in which resilience is viewed 
might influence academic and practitioner perspectives of the concept. 
According to Linnenlueke (2017), and depending upon the context in which 
resilience is viewed, resilience can be perceived as: 
a) a way of rectifying internal deficiencies or shortfalls (internal audit 
context);  
b) methods for mitigating against risks, and reconfiguring redundancy and 
agility processes (risk avoidance context); 
c) a process of learning and bouncing back/forward (recovery context); or 
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d) a method for evaluating the post-disruption state (outcomes context). 
Two primary contexts are engineering resilience – maintaining the organisation 
in an efficient stable state (Cretney 2014; Hollnagel 2014) and ecological 
resilience -  organisational ability to absorb disruption until changing variables 
and processes necessitate a shift in system state (Cretney 2014; Briske, Illius & 
Anderies 2017). The context setting is also important in conceptualising 
resilience from either an internal or an external perspective, or holistically from 
both perspectives as when clearly and fully understanding the organisation and 
its key dependencies and requirements (ISO 31000:2018). Resilience is also a 
multi-layered concept (Obrist, Pfeiffer & Henley 2010) and so conceptualisation 
may be performed at strategical, operational, or theoretical levels, and, within 
the context of technical, organisational, social, and economic dimensions of 
resilience (Bruneau et al. 2003).  
ISO 22316:2017 emphasises that there is no ‘gold standard’ for conceptualising 
resilience, only that an organisation can be regarded as more or less resilient 
overall. Additionally, the organisation might be more resilient in some areas 
and less resilient in others. An organisation’s abilities to absorb, adapt and 
change in responding to disruption according to Kaim, Rana and Rizvi (2012, p. 
23) requires modifications to ‘…objectives, policies, and standard routines (to 
challenge) …deep-rooted assumptions and norms (while taking opportunity of) 
…radically different solutions to problems and dramatic jumps in 
improvement’.  
Resilience is a coping mechanism, a higher form of risk management 
(Dahlstrom et al. 2009) based on training and learning process from which 
managers gain ability to recognise and react early to adverse unexpected and 
unforeseen disruptions, enact proactive risk management responses and if 
required, quickly adapt to dynamically changing circumstances (Parker 2010; 
McCrae 2014; Weick & Sutcliffe 2015; Woods 2017). A worst-case scenario 
from a low resilience perspective, is that managers cannot cope with rapidly 
changing adverse circumstances and their organisational operations are halted 
(Dakos et al. 2015). ‘Coping’ literature follows a similar conceptual path to that 
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of resilience, with both describing attributes and strategies employed against 
adverse circumstances to deliver outcomes in line with objectives (Harland et 
al. 2005). At times the two lines of study converge, so that resilience is defined 
by Greene and Conrad (2002, p. 37) as: ‘…the capability of individuals to cope 
successfully in the face of significant change, adversity, or risk’. The 
consideration of resilience as an individual manager coping mechanism is 
evocative of the psychological approach within positive organisational 
behaviour theory (POB) involving ‘…positive traits, states, and behaviors of 
employees in organisations’ (Bakker & Schaufeli 2008, p. 148). The 
empowerment of POB and autonomy within an organisation, senior 
management support, and encouragement towards an innovation culture 
(Bakker & Schaufeli 2008) are key resilience factors promoted within the 
Australian government resilience strategy (AG 2011). According to Gibson and 
Tarrant (2010) resilience evolves from sound and effective risk management 
and business continuity practices. An evolutionary pathway for developing port 
organisational resilience is proposed and justified later within this chapter.   
Resilience requires high level emergency management and business continuity 
behaviour in responding to and recovering from disruptions. Emergency 
management responses alone are unlikely to provide sufficient response to 
manage the disruptive impacts of a crisis. An organisational emergency is likely 
to affect only a section or component of the organisation or its operations, 
whereas a crisis affects the whole of the organisation and the disruptive 
consequences might potentially lead to a restructuring of the entire 
organisational functions (Judek & Edjossan-Sossou 2017). 
During normal business operations, management resilience behaviour might 
be tested during drills, exercises and simulation however these training 
methods can only prepare managers part of the way for coping with real-life 
crisis situations. Industry managers might learn more of resilience from the 
aviation industry, for example the crew crisis management conducted onboard 
United Airlines Flight 232 in 1989. The aircraft suffered a catastrophic engine 
malfunction at the tail, which ruptured hydraulic control lines following which 
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all conventional flight operations became impossible (Dekker et al. 2016). The 
flight crew had only the power of the two remaining engines which they 
employed in innovative ways by ‘thinking outside the box’, ‘taking a system way 
beyond what it was designed to do’, and ‘making use of an adverse design 
quality such as pitching moments with power changes’ (Dekker et al. 2016, p. 
307). While noting that 42 simulator attempts to replicate the United Airlines 
232 landing were unsuccessful, Dekker et al. (2016) endorse the use of 
simulation training for its ability to take managers beyond their comfort zones, 
causing them to modify their normal responses and behaviour, learning to be 
more adaptive and flexible in unexpected and unusual circumstances, and to 
be more capable of resilience behaviour during disruptive circumstances. 
5.3. Organisational resilience and dynamic capabilities theory 
Resilience and its opposite state of vulnerability are difficult states to measure 
because both are theoretical concepts (Hinkel 2011; Schipper & Langston 
2015). Conceptually, resilience is an intangible organisational asset (Hall 1992) 
that has the capability to positively influence the outcomes of risk 
management, whereas vulnerability is an intangible liability that exposes the 
organisation to future hazards. As a theoretical concept, resilience is an 
intangible resource and a latent capability that becomes manifested when 
organisations respond to adverse challenges and rapid change (Hall 1993). 
Resilience responses might occur with events affecting either a component of 
the organisation’s practices or the whole organisation (McManus et al. 2008). 
With relevance to this thesis, Hall (1993) categorises an organisation’s 
intangible resources as functional and cultural capabilities. Functional 
competencies arise from staff knowledge, skills and experience, whereas 
cultural capabilities are manifested by the whole organisation in response to 
adverse challenges and change.  
An organisation’s internal resources and capabilities are closely linked with its 
long term strategic direction and performance effectiveness (Grant 2016). If 
conditions change to alter the organisation’s strategic direction, and 
particularly if these changes are detrimental to organisational performance, 
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then managerial cognition and ability to reposition internal resources and 
capabilities become crucial factors in contending with strategic change and 
organisational transformation (Helfat & Peteraf 2015). ‘Managerial cognition 
refers to managerial beliefs and mental models that serve as a basis for decision 
making’ (Adner & Helfat 2003, p. 1021). Abilities to demonstrate organisational 
flexibility and resilience in maintaining business continuity contribute to this 
managerial cognitive capability (Lengnick-Hall, Beck & Lengnick-Hall 2011; 
Helfat & Peteraf 2015; Teece 2018). Resilience provides an organisation with 
competitive advantage when challenged by turbulent change, and in this 
respect resilience forms part of the micro-foundations of dynamic capabilities 
that assist in strategic change and organisational reconfiguration (Adner & 
Helfat 2003; Sheffi 2007, 2017). Organisational micro-foundations comprise 
the constituent elements and interactions that facilitate individual managers’ 
roles in building and maintaining organisational capabilities (Barney & Felin 
2013; Helfat & Peteraf 2015). 
Whereas the literature provides some answers as to what organisational 
resilience and its values to the organisation might be, there is less evidence 
from a business model perspective of how an organisation might operationalise 
resilience at the required level, what motivates it to do so, how existing 
resources and capabilities are realigned, and what new capabilities are needed. 
To narrow this evidence gap, the researcher explored organisational theories 
for a suitable model to explain how managerial risk management cognition and 
abilities might transform towards a functional and cultural resilience 
capabilities mindset. Essentially, the researcher sought to establish a 
theoretical lens to learn how an organisation might employ resilience to move 
towards best organisational practice, and when challenged by adversity and 
rapid change, how the organisation might build competitive advantage through 
reconfigured capabilities and competencies. This type of problem resonates 
with the Dynamic Capabilities concepts of value creation and capture (Teece 
2017). Multiple theoretical models might be chosen, for example operational 
capabilities theory and systems theory. 
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The literature suggests that a strong conceptual thread provides connections 
between dynamic capabilities theory, operational capabilities theory, and 
socio-ecological systems theory in formulating organisational strategy and 
competencies, particularly in the context of rapid and often turbulent 
organisational change (Teece 2018). Dynamic capabilities theory represents an 
organisational ability ‘to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competences to address rapidly changing environments’ (Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen 1997, p. 516). Systems theory provides a framework to enable a holistic 
perspective of the organisation and its dependencies, and the multiple internal 
and external components that contribute to resilience competencies (Teece 
2018). A third connective link is provided by operational capability theory, 
which according to Wu, Melnyk and Flynn (2010, p. 725) involves organisation-
specific capabilities that are generated by: ‘sets of skills, processes and routines 
developed within the management system, that are regularly used in solving 
its problems through configuring its operational resources.’ This thesis 
proposes the use of a dynamic capabilities model as a theoretical lens for 
explaining some key challenges in operationalising resilience within critical 
infrastructure organisations, and specifically, Australian ports. A further aim is 
to provide a pragmatic and more understandable management-oriented 
perspective of how organisational resilience processes are facilitated. 
5.3.1. Organisational resilience in a dynamic capabilities context  
Teece (2018) argues that both dynamic capabilities and systems theories 
contribute to a holistic understanding of how organisations might effectively 
respond to challenges and change in their operational environment.  Dynamic 
capabilities theory particularly lends itself to studies involving middle 
management’s bottom-up innovation in transforming new knowledge or 
methodology into regular use (Teece 2018). In parallel, operational capabilities 
theory also relates to operational innovation, in arguing that large scale 
transformational changes require the organisational acquisition and 
implementation of new knowledge, skills, practices and routines (Wu, Melnyk 
& Flynn 2010). Dynamic capabilities theory (Teece, Pisano & Shuen 1997) has 
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much in common with resilience concepts (for example, flexibility, complexity, 
innovation, adaptiveness, improvisation, transformation, learning, coping with 
threats and sudden change, managing uncertainty, systemic change, 
situational awareness, dynamic processes, governance and leadership (Teece, 
Pisano & Shuen 1997; Teece 2007; Teece 2017; Teece 2018). An explanatory 
Dynamic Capabilities perspective of organisational resilience, and potential 
areas for research are shown by a proposed model in Figure 5-3. 
For organisations that become challenged by fast-changing environments, 
Teece (2018, p. 4) argues that managers ‘need to develop organizational 
flexibility and resilience, which is very much in line with the dynamic 
capabilities view’. From a resilience purist perspective, flexibility is an element 
of resilience capabilities and abilities (Bhamra, Dani & Burnard 2011; Lengnick-
Hall, Beck & Lengnick-Hall 2011). The application of Dynamic Capabilities 
theory to the operalisation of organisational resilience within the model 
proposed at Figure 5-2 encompasses the successive dynamic processes that 
challenge senior managers. Managers must initially identify the dynamic 
capability catalysts that precipitate organisational shift towards an enhanced 
resilience state. This enables the managers to devise and instigate 
transformational processes to operationalise resilience towards this enhanced 
resilience state.  
Enabling procedures such as these encompass the development of operational 
skills, processes and routines for coping with unexpected change, uncertain 
and volatile conditions, rapid technological change, contingencies, crises, and 
socio-political events (Wu, Melnyk & Flynn 2010; Wilden & Gudergan 2015). 
Empirical research is needed to gain an increased understanding of what 
catalysts might prompt organisations to engage in this transformational 
resilience change, what organisational strategies can be employed in 
transforming and enhancing resilience capabilities, and the identification of 






Figure 5-2: Dynamic capabilities model for transforming and reconfiguring organisational resilience (Adapted from Teece 2017). 
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To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, dynamic capabilities theory is rarely 
used to identify how organisations might transform their existing operational 
structure and resources in response to adverse challenges and change, by 
employing resilience concepts to enable operational transformation and 
reconfiguration. Nair et al. (2014) propose the use of a dynamic capability 
framework to examine how enterprise risk management expertise is critical to 
effective organisational performance and survival within a turbulent environment. 
Ponomarov (2012) employs dynamic capabilities concepts in identifying and 
defining what constitutes supply chain resilience. Manfield (2016) examines from 
a dynamic capabilities perspective what provides the conceptual foundations for 
a resilience-based approach to organisations managing prolonged periods of 
disruptions. Kurtz and Varvakis (2016) explore the similarities and 
complementarities between dynamic capabilities theory and resilience theory and 
recommend that the theories should be integrated in small to medium enterprise 
strategies to better manage the consequences of disruptions. Bhamra (2018) 
proposes a PHD research project at Loughborough University in the UK to examine 
how the strategic aspects of dynamic capabilities might increase the resilience of 
manufacturing organisations and their supply networks. Except for the Nair et al. 
(2014) risk management contribution, these other research works examine the 
intersection of dynamic capabilities and resilience concepts, but only in the 
contexts of reviewing complementary aspects of dynamic capabilities theory and 
resilience theory, and what potential synergies might result from integrating the 
two concepts. Researchers are yet to explore through a dynamic capabilities 
theoretical lens how an organisation’s intangible resilience capabilities, 
competencies and microfoundations prepare the organisation to more effectively 
manage the dynamic risk environment.  
An investigation of transformational resilience change requires a measurement 
methodology that assigns numerical values to (Bahadur, Wilkinson & Tanner 
2015). Organisational core capabilities in a resilience context are regarded as 
managerial systems, technical systems, skills and knowledge, and the governance 
of organisational behaviour and objectives (Leonard-Barton 1998). While the 
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intangibility of resilience makes transformational processes difficult to examine, 
indicators might provide this capability by proxy, through detecting representative 
activities (Levine 2014; Schipper & Langston 2015).    
5.4. Organisational resilience indicators 
Resilience indicators are quantitative or qualitative metrics used in identifying 
what is needed to build, enhance or maintain organisational resilience, and might 
take the form of resilience indicators, indices or scorecards (Doorn 2015; Cutter 
2016). Despite the existence of multiple resilience indicator systems, there 
appears to be no academic convergence on what constitutes a resilience 
framework, by which organisations can ascertain their progress towards being 
resilient, or to provide warning of slippage in maintaining a resilient state (Béné 
2013; Constas & Barrett 2013; Winderl 2014; Schipper & Langston 2015).  An 
objective of this literature review is to build a port-centric resilience maturity 
model by using organisational resilience framework measurement principles and 
indicators from within the literature. Key areas of measurement under 
consideration for this process include system management, complexity, and the 
relationships that exist between resilience and vulnerability concepts (Constas, 
Frankenberger & Hoddinott 2014). 
Indicators are integral components in the design of a resilience framework 
(Schipper & Langston 2015). Within a resilience framework, indicators provide 
dynamic, contextual and composite data for measuring progress in enhancing 
resilience, or slippage in resilience capabilities and effectiveness (Francis & Bekera 
2014; Schipper & Langston 2015; Pitilakis et al. 2016). Care must be taken in 
drafting these indicators, because differing definitions, emphasis and 
operationalisation of resilience might lead to inaccurate, imprecise or skewed 
resilience performance measures (Doorn 2015). Further, judgement must be used 
to compile sufficient numbers of indicators across the range of organisational 
resilience attributes, because in isolation or small groupings some indicators may 
not appear relevant to resilience or be too small a group to enable trends or 
framework themes to be identified (Schipper & Langston 2015). 
 118 
 
5.4.1. Conceptualising appropriate indicators of port resilience 
A problem arises in determining appropriate indicators to identify the value of 
what contributes to functional and cultural attributes of resilience, particularly 
made difficult because there is little convergence within the literature on a precise 
resilience definition (Bhamra, Dani & Burnard 2011). Also, predictive indicators of 
resilience are likely to be subjective in nature because the effectiveness of 
organisational resilience is only likely to become apparent when an adverse 
situation or change occurs. 
Researchers employ indicators consisting of ‘inputs, processes, outcomes and 
outputs’ become ‘proxies’ for operationalising resilience theoretical constructs 
into organisational practice (Levine 2014; Schipper & Langston 2015, p. 12). The 
types of indicator depend upon the context of the research problem and indicator 
purpose, for example, a set of indicators to specifically measure climate change 
resilience might differ in characteristics and number of indicators when compared 
with those to measure cyber-threat resilience (Schipper & Langston 2015). In the 
event of complex resilience situations with interacting and compounding risks, 
mathematical or software evaluations of multiple indicators might be required to 
assess organisational risks that cannot be measured using one indicator alone 
(Saisana & Cartwright 2007; Hollnagel 2017). 
In the context of academic research and for practitioner relevance, organisational 
resilience indicators are simplified measurements of performance in optimising 
business continuity against high consequence hazards (Rose 2017). Specifically, 
Rose (2017) argues that compilation of resilience indicators should reflect: 
a) all categories of major threats; 
b) all resilience dimensions affecting operations management in achieving 
business continuity; 
c) identifying factors that either facilitate or impede resilience 
enhancement; 
d) factor weightings; and  
e) evaluation of areas in which resilience might be improved.   
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The Rose (2017) proposals for selecting resilience indicators cannot be fully met, 
since not all categories of major threats will be known by management.  However, 
the suggested approach is a logical progression from hazard identification to 
vulnerability assessment, preparing the most effective responses to meet the 
threats, and for continual improvement. These proposals are not indicators, 
rather, they are processes to assist in identifying and compiling resilience 
indicators. A further proposition for compiling resilience indicators is to adopt a 
top-down methodological approach (Cutter 2016), an approach suggested by the 
Australian Government’s on-line self-administered resilience ‘health check’ (AG 
2016). This health check employs a resilience scorecard with generic critical 
infrastructure resilience indicators as shown in Table 5-1. The Likert-type 
scorecard requires respondents’ opinions on compliance within three categories 
of resilience - leadership and culture, networks and partnerships, and change 
readiness (AG 2016). Enablement factors used to assess each resilience category 
are listed beneath the respective sub-headings. 
Indicators of organisational resilience  
Leadership & culture Networks & partnerships Change readiness 
Strong leadership  Effective partnerships Unity of purpose 
Employee engagement Leveraging knowledge Proactive posture 
Situational awareness Breaking silos Planned strategies 
Decision making Internal resources Stress testing plans 
Innovation & creativity   
Table 5-1: Indicators of organisational resilience (Adapted from AG 2016). 
Table 5-1 lists 13 enablement factors across three categories of resilience 
management, with a total of 74 resilience indicators associated with these three 
categories. For example, ‘internal resources’ within the category of Networks and 
Partnerships has three indicators of effectiveness (AG 2016, p. 2): 
a) IR1 - The organisation can rapidly scale up or reallocate other business 
resources (such as finance, premises, plant, equipment, supplies) if 
required; 
b) IR2 - The organisation’s structures, systems and processes are designed to 
maximise operational flexibility; and 
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c) IR3 – The organisation has strong liquidity and cash flow position and can 
absorb the impact of modifying operations to respond to challenge or 
adverse event. 
These Australian Government resilience indicators primarily address an 
organisation’s high-level governance, collaboration and strategic management 
capabilities for withstanding high consequence disruptive shocks. The health 
check emphasis (AG 2016) on retaining a stable operational situation (robustness) 
is suggestive of engineering resilience concepts, which focus on retaining an 
original configuration or operational status quo (Tilman & Downing 1994; 
Hollnagel 2014). Also, the Australian Government indicators of organisational 
resilience focus upon management behaviour in managing known probabilities of 
risk, rather than identifying indicators to measure organisational agility, 
adaptiveness and transformation capabilities in response to deep uncertainties 
(ISO 22316:2017). 
Socio-ecological systems should manage the unpredictabilities and uncertainties 
of the contemporary risk environment less by being robust, and more by adopting 
adaptiveness and transformative abilities (BS 65000:2014; IS ISO22316:2017; 
Teece, Peteraf & Leih 2016). Of the 74 resilience scorecard indicators listed in the 
AG (2016) resilience health scorecard, one indicator specifically addresses the 
technical dimension of resilience in querying the availability of physical system 
premises, plant, equipment and supplies (AG 2016, IR1). One indicator, IR3, 
specifically addresses the economic dimension of resilience, in querying whether 
the organisation has strong liquidity and cash flow position and can absorb the 
impact of modifying operations to respond to challenge or adverse event. 
Otherwise, the scorecard focuses upon governance and leadership aspects of 
organisational resilience. 
Researchers argue that four dimensions of resilience should be considered when 
evaluating resilience effectiveness, namely technical, organisational, economic 
and social dimensions (Ouyang & Dueñas-Osorio 2014; Labaka, Hernantes & 
Sarriegi 2016). These dimensions are discussed further within the next section. The 
resilience definition provided by ISO22316:2017 refers to the organisation’s 
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capacity to absorb and adapt to the vagaries of a changing environment, which is 
a socio-ecological perspective of resilience (Folke 2016; Folke et al. 2016). The 
Australian Government (AG 2016) resilience indicators are not completely 
reflective of the adaptive and transformational aspects of socio-ecological 
resilience. However, the AG (2016) scorecard does provide a useful number of 
factors for investigation within this research and provides a list of enabling actions 
to overcome potential impediments and constraints against resilience.  
Measuring resilience effectiveness within a major crisis context is another 
consideration, and due to the front-line hazardous nature of real-life situations, 
analysis is likely to be a retrospective task. Simulation of a successful crisis 
recovery situation might also be difficult to replicate. For example, as discussed 
separately, the flight crew of United Airlines Flight 232 in 1989 managed to fly and 
land a very damaged aircraft by unique means, but 42 other equally trained and 
experienced flight crews were subsequently unable to replicate this feat in aircraft 
flight simulators (Dekker et al. 2016). Crises management strategies and 
capabilities might be tested, or management training conducted, by means of 
crises scenario enactments or simulations (Judek & Edjossan-Sossou 2017). 
However, even scenarios based on real-life crisis situations might not effectively 
replicate the suddenness and unexpectedness of a crisis, extreme time pressures 
for reactions, stress and anxiety, inability to apply known responses and resources, 
and multiple other pressures (Judek & Edjossan-Sossou 2017). Other than 
enactments and simulations, organisational resilience might be estimated through 
the survey-based deployment of resilience indicators (Hosseini, Barker & Ramirez-
Marquez 2016). 
5.4.2. Employing indicators for testing organisational resilience 
Cutter (2015) argues that it is not feasible to devise a comprehensive set of 
resilience indicators to measure all facets of resilience for all organisations, 
because of differing organisational objectives, differing structures and 
dependencies and varying categories of hazards to manage. Instead, resilience 
indicators must be modified to best fit the case under study. Composite indicators 
can be designed to test both risk management and resilience in what Cutter (2015, 
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p. 7) describes as risk being ‘…overlain by a resilience layer in order to assess the 
intersection of risk with resilience’. Resilience assessment tools can be designed 
for multiple contexts, for example top-down or bottom-up approaches, local or 
global settings, or focused upon operational, technical, economic and social 
dimensions of resilience (Ouyang & Dueñas-Osorio 2014; Cutter 2015; Labaka, 
Hernantes & Sarriegi 2016). 
McManus et al.  (2007) investigate organisational resilience from an operational 
perspective to derive a set of 15 resilience indicators.  These indicators refer to 
resilience categories of situation awareness, management of keystone 
vulnerabilities, and adaptive capacity. Five indicators are developed for each 
resilience category. Stephenson, Vargo and Seville (2010) identify an additional 
eight resilience indicators and Table 5-2 provides a composite list of the 
McManus/Stephenson resilience indicators, shaded grey to indicate where 
Stephenson, Vargo and Saville (2010) added their contributions. Stephenson, 
Vargo and Seville (2010) and McManus et al. (2007) take a top-down and bottom-
up approach to compiling resilience performance indicators for organisations 
operating within an enterprise risk management framework (ISO 31000:2018; 
Robinson, Francis & Hurley 2013).  


















Exercises Communications and 
relationships 
Network perspective  
Connectivity 
awareness 
Internal resources Strategic vision  
Insurance External resources Information and 
knowledge 
 
Recovery priorities Connectivity Leadership and 
management 
 




Robust processes for  
identifying and  
analysing  
vulnerabilities 
Innovation and  
Creativity 
 








Table 5-2: Indicators of organisational resilience (Adapted from McManus et al., 2007; 
Stephenson, Vargo and Seville, 2010). 
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Stephenson, Vargo and Seville (2010) employ components of the Table 5-2 list of 
resilience indicators to measure the resilience of 68 organisations within multiple 
industries in Auckland, New Zealand. A web-based survey with 249 respondents 
used a four-point Likert scale format for its questions, with responses ranging from 
‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. The responses were coded into percentages 
and averaged across each organisation where multiple managers responded to the 
survey. Responses were then graded within six score boundaries: 0-41% (very poor 
resilience), 42-50% (poor resilience), 51-59% (unsatisfactory resilience), 60-78% 
(satisfactory resilience), 79-87% (good resilience), and 88-100% (excellent 
resilience). 
Most respondent organisations scored between 60-78% across the categories of 
performance, which the researchers argue to be a good score, one that is 
indicative of organisational support and commitment to resilience, adaptiveness 
and situational awareness. However, 35% of the organisations scored from very 
poor to unsatisfactory in managing keystone vulnerabilities, and no organisation 
scored higher than satisfactory in vulnerability management. Keystone 
vulnerabilities refer to components within the organisation that, if affected by a 
major disruption or extended severe stress, might lead to organisational collapse 
(McManus et al. 2008). While not a conclusion of their study, Stephenson, Vargo 
and Seville (2010) show that the surveyed New Zealand organisations report being 
better equipped to manage conceptual issues (resilience ethos, situational 
awareness and adaptive capacity) than the practicalities of managing keystone 
vulnerabilities. Vulnerability identification, analysis and management should be 
regarded as an inseparable component of risk management (Aven 2007; 
ISO31000:2009; Hopkin 2017), where vulnerability reflects the organisational 
susceptibility to hazards, and risk is a function of vulnerability and potential hazard 
consequences (Khazai et al. 2015). The New Zealand organisational difficulties in 
managing vulnerabilities (Stephenson, Vargo & Seville 2010) indicate that rather 
than endeavouring to improve their levels of resilience, these organisations might 
gain shorter term and more useful benefit by improving their underlying risk 
management capabilities and capacities. 
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Following this line of risk management contextual thinking, the resilience 
indicators listed in Table 5-2 might also be regarded as composite risk/resilience 
indicators that are weighted in numbers towards resilience (Beccari 2016; Wolke 
2017). The Table 5-2 indicators appear to be best suited for measuring day-to-day 
resilience, where managers either engage in organisational learning or devise 
unique and innovative solutions to complex but relatively minor problems (Lyles 
2014). It is unclear whether these resilience indicators are a predictive tool for 
gauging likely resilient behaviour, whether the indicators are restricted in 
usefulness to measuring past resilient behaviour, or whether the indicators are 
intended to measure organisational functionality and culture for conditions likely 
to promote resilience behaviour and thinking. However, aspects of the indicator 
scales developed by the Australian Government (AG 2016), McManus (2007) and 
Stephenson (2010a) become useful in conceptualising a port resilience 
framework. 
The Stephenson, Vargo and Seville (2010) resilience indicator measurement tool 
was redeployed by Brown, Seville and Vargo (2017) with minor amendments to 
the Likert scale (increased to an 8-point scale), modified vulnerability 
management of ‘external resources’ to ‘effective partnerships’, and addition of 
several further questions to some resilience indicators. Two hundred and nineteen 
critical infrastructure employee surveys were returned, including 36 from road, 
rail and port employees. The objective in the 2017 study, which was well analysed 
in detail, was to assess resilience strengths and weaknesses in selected New 
Zealand critical infrastructure organisations. Major findings of the study were that 
effective partnerships with external organisations were the strongest contributor 
to individual organisation resilience, and that the two highest perceived risks to 
respondent organisations were reputation damage and regulatory change. Lowest 
scoring resilience indicators involved reluctance to break down silo management 
practices, and reluctance to conduct emergency and business continuity exercises 
and drills. While the Brown, Seville and Vargo (2017) study employed generally the 
same resilience indicators compiled and used by Stephenson, Vargo and Seville 
(2010), a more detailed application and analysis of the indicators as a 
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benchmarking tool proved the worthiness of the indicator framework and 
approach. Concepts from the McManus/Stephenson measurement tool are 
adapted for the design of this thesis empirical research. 
In summation, resilience assessments utilise indicators of resilience when 
evaluating organisational capacities or potential for responding to specific 
hazards, for example those indicators relating to coping and adapting capacities 
(Norris et al. 2008; Wu, Melnyk & Flynn 2010; Wilden & Gudergan 2015; Parsons 
& Morley 2017). An improved understanding of resilience strengths and 
weaknesses provides a measure of organisational resilience maturity, and a guide 
for where resilience capacity building might be most beneficial (Parsons & Morley 
2017). Post-incident guidance towards resilience capacity building includes 
learning, adaptation and transformation, which for a mindful organisation (Weick 
& Sutcliffe 2015) provide valuable strategic feedback learning (Folke et al. 2016; 
Berkes 2017; Parsons & Morley 2017). This continual improvement feedback loop 
enhances organisational resilience planning, preparation, response and recovery 
processes which are now explored from a port perspective.  
5.5. Port resilience 
Previous sections provided a general understanding of resilience, and its 
applicability to organisations challenged by crises. Resilience is promoted by the 
Australian government as a way of safeguarding critical infrastructure inclusive of 
ports (AG 2015), and the discussion turns now to an exploration of resilience 
within a port context. Before 2010, the literature rarely mentions port resilience, 
as noted by Vilco, Ritala and Hallikis (2012) and McEvoy et al. (2013). This situation 
seemingly altered due to the emergence of port-centric climate change research 
(Becker et al. 2015; Chhetri et al. 2015; Yang et al. 2015; Cahoon et al. 2016; Zhang, 
Ng & Becker 2017; Gharehgozli et al. 2017). Port resilience is further researched 
within the literature from multiple perspectives, including natural disasters 
(Shafieezadeh & Burden 2014), path dependencies (Ramos 2017), risk governance 
and disaster reduction (Wakeman et al. 2017), and cyber-threats (Meyer-Larsen & 
Müller 2018). This thesis engages in a broad exploration of port resilience from a 
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holistic organisational perspective that centres upon the stability of intermodal 
operations.  
Resilience within a port’s organisational context refers to how individual managers 
and the collective organisation respond to intermodal operations disruption and 
return their port operations to a stable state. Port resilience comprises a capability 
to be innovative in managing small scale emergency events within components of 
the port’s operations, plus an ability to draw upon risk management capabilities 
and capacities at a superior level to manage unexpected and unforeseen major 
disruptions. McManus et al. (2008) describe this dual role aspect of resilience as 
having organisational abilities for resilient day-to-day operations, plus a resilient 
response and recovery capability in reserve to deal with crises situations. 
Ports must manage a risk environment where new and unforeseen risks emerge 
and existing risks (for example storm events) become more severe (WEF 2018). 
Consequently, not all port risks can be identified and assessed, and conventional 
business continuity plans and emergency responses may be ill-suited as risk 
response and management solutions (Blades 2017). Instead, port decision-makers 
must develop resilience abilities to provide innovative responses and adaptive 
measures to recover effectively and expediently (Walker & Salt 2012; Blades 
2017). When resilience becomes a mature process, port risk management 
effectiveness is enhanced beyond what conventional risk management might 
achieve on its own (Vonck, Notteboom & Dooms 2017; Wei, Chen & Rose 2017). 
Port resilience is conceptually founded upon the principles of organisational 
resilience, which, according to Davidson et al. (2016, p. 26) is largely patterned 
around systems theory measures of ‘…adaptability, transformability, self-
organization, and learning’ - all of which have their place in a resilience framework.  
5.6. Port resilience framework  
Resilience frameworks and indicator measurement tools were discussed in Section 
5.3 and a generic framework model for risk management (ISO 31000:2018) was 
reviewed in Chapter 4 and modified to reflect the port risk environment. The 
resilience standard ISO 22316:2017 also presents a resilience framework but not 
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to the same degree of detail as that contained in ISO 31000:2018. A resilience 
framework differs from a risk management framework because a major shortfall 
of the enterprise risk management framework (ISO 31000:2018) is that its use is 
confined to known and foreseeable hazards with determinable levels of severity 
(Fiksel et al. 2015). Resilience aims to deal with unforeseeable and unexpected 
hazards and their consequences (Weick & Sutcliff 2015). 
Port enterprise risk management takes a reductionist perspective of risks and 
treats each risk as an individual case (Inan, Beydoun & Opper 2016; Hopkin 2017). 
The risk management framework capability gap widens when risk managers 
overlook potentially worsened outcomes from interactions between multiple 
simultaneous risks, and when the port’s crucial goods and services suppliers are 
also impacted (BS 65000:2014; Fiksel et al. 2015; Robinson & Shewitz 2017; 
Haimes 2018). The need for a port resilience framework ‘add-on’ arises to close 
this risk management capability gap in the following dimensions of disruption 
management effectiveness: 
a) Technical resilience: the port’s physical capabilities, resources and 
capacities in support of disruption management; 
b) Organisational resilience: the port’s ability to adapt and evolve in line with 
changing external influences including market dynamics, to respond to 
short term shocks from natural or intentional causalities, and 
transformational capabilities for meeting long term challenges; 
c) Economic resilience: the port’s capacity to recover from or manage the 
adverse consequences of external economic shocks, or to have financial 
resources sufficient to cover the costs of crisis management and recovery; 
and 
d) Social resilience: the port-centric system’s adaptive and learning capacity 
to self-organise and maintain system function in support of port operations 
in response to regional change or disruption (Lindbom et al. 2014; Ouyang 
& Dueñas-Osorio 2014; Shaw, Scully & Hart 2014; AG 2016; Labaka, 
Hernantes & Sarriegi 2016). 
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A systems-based understanding of port systemic resilience is characterised by the 
degree of change that the system might sustain while maintaining form and 
structure, its ability to self-organise, and its ability to learn from and adapt to a 
disruptive event (Cumming et al. 2005). This understanding begins by examining 
how port emergency management and business continuity processes contribute 
towards the attainment of resilience.  
5.7. Links between emergency management response and resilience 
Australian port emergency response is managed along the lines of the Australasian 
Inter-Service Incident Management System (Lansdale 2012; Worboys 2015; Hayes 
& Owen 2017). Owen and Hayes (2017) describe the incident management 
process as a layered emergency management system involving managers at 
strategic, tactical and operational levels. Their findings are adapted and 
conceptually associated with corresponding layers of resilience management 
behaviour as shown in Table 5-3. Within a resilience context, superior 
performance at each of these three levels of management appears to be what 
differentiates resilient performance from conventional risk management 
behaviour. 
Senior port managers within an emergency operations centre engage in 
coordination and control activities to proactively manage response personnel and 
physical resources, and in reaching safe, timely and optimal outcomes (Worboys 
2015; Hayes & Owen 2017). However, senior managers decision-making may 
generally occur remote from the front line of emergency management, and Owen 
and Hayes (2014) argue that emergency events do not necessarily play by the 
rules. If senior decision-makers direct response activities without full information 
or ability to observe rapidly changing circumstances, then elements of uncertainty 
and complexity might result in emergency response team members working in 
unsafe and unstable conditions (Hayes & Owen 2017). Under such conditions, 
team member abilities to improvise, adapt and innovate in providing effective 
responses to extreme circumstances become crucial front line operational 







Resilience Behaviour Reference 




oversight.   
Resilience governance, 
leadership, direction 
and overall control, 
resolution of conflicts 
and crisis management 
effectiveness. 
Alpaslan, Green and 
Mitroff, 2009 
AS/NZS ISO 31000:2018 
Tarrant, 2010 
Owen and Hayes, 2014 
Bhandari, Owen and 
Trist, 2015 
Tactical Incident response, 
containment, 
coordination and 
provision of resources, 
monitoring and record 
keeping,  
Combining the most 




plans and processes to 
contain and mitigate 
the situation, and cope 
with rapid change. 
Adaptive and flexible 
decision-making and 
responsibility for all 
incident management 
activities and utilisation 
of resources. 
Responsibilities for 
directing teams and 
units to carry out 
emergency response 
activities to meet 
incident control goals 
and objectives. 




Owen and Hayes, 2014 
Bhandari, Owen and 
Trist, 2015 
Hayes and Owen, 2017 
 
Operational Frontline response 
teams, focused on 





efficiencies in carrying 
out directed responses 
to disruptive situations. 
Bhandari, Owen and 
Trist, 2015 
Haddock, Bullock and 
Coppola, 2017 
Hayes and Owen, 2017 
Table 5-3: A conceptual organisational structure for resilient incident management (Adapted 
from Owen & Hayes 2017). 
Port security intelligence is provided by the Attorney General’s office through the 
Australian Government’s Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN), a security-
oriented organisation formed in response to the 9/11 and Bali bombing terrorist 
attacks (Sheehan 2013). Critical infrastructure sectors including ports (as elements 
of the TISN transport sector) are assisted in their resilience understandings by an 
advisory group (Sheehan 2013) whose role is to: 
Provide strategic thinking on organisational resilience, and help develop 
guidance and advice on tools and other initiatives that will support the 
owners and operators of critical infrastructure to adopt an organisational 
resilience approach (2013, p. 15). 
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Port managers who are members of the Transport Sector Group participate in 
resilience-oriented exercises, conferences, briefings and education on matters 
including best practice guidance, emergency planning, disaster response and 
recovery, and information sharing with other sector groups (Sheehan 2013). This 
provides opportunities for resilience knowledge to be transferred to respective 
port management organisations and instilled across the layers of management. 
5.7.1. Governance and leadership 
Port corporate governance is a system for assigning and coordinating activities and 
accountabilities for regulating and overseeing enterprise-wide conduct, and the 
sub-element of risk governance is an important control mechanism in achieving 
corporate objectives (Dahms 2008; Lark 2015; du Plessis, Hargovan & Harris 2018). 
Port risk governance systems are unlikely to cope with every type of adverse 
situation, and the literature is indecisive about an optimal model of risk 
governance (Christensen, Lægreid & Rykkja 2016). Researchers do largely agree 
that important characteristics of resilience-oriented risk governance are acquired 
abilities to engage in collaborative learning, change management, innovation and 
adaptation in circumstances of deep uncertainty and complexity (Chaffin, Gosnell 
& Cosens 2014; Scolobig et al. 2015; Berkes 2017). Tension arises between port 
corporate governance involving risk and resilience because risk management 
involves consistency and predictability, whereas resilience is managed with a freer 
hand and outcomes are likely to be variable and unpredictable (Lebel et al. 2006; 
Ebbeson 2010).  
The Australian Government encourages critical infrastructure managers to 
become more resilient (AG 2015), but there is little guidance for port managers to 
understand and manage the complexities of this process.  Complexities arise when 
port managers modify an existing risk management system for managing business 
as usual and begin to ‘add-on’ resilience capabilities to this stable risk governance 
system (Duit et al. 2010). The successful integration of resilience into port 
corporate governance requires an ability to manage the inherent tension between 
managing stability and uncertainty (Duit et al. 2010; Farjoun 2010) and this 
process requires well-informed, committed and strong organisational leadership. 
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The implementation and enactment of systemic resilience behaviour by port 
actors requires a holistic understanding of disruptive risk causalities, and how 
disruptions might affect port operation capabilities (Fisher 2011, 2013). Key risk 
managers need to understand what indications of stress or disruption are 
meaningful in terms of potential tipping point vulnerabilities, and which of these 
indications can be discounted (Fisher 2011, 2013). Fisher further argues that 
capable leadership is required to coordinate individual capabilities and capacities 
to respond, manage, recover, and possibly adapt to an altered state of operations 
following disruption. However, despite the beneficial effects of good governance 
and sound leadership in avoiding piecemeal responses to uncertainty, if disruptive 
forces exceed port resilience capabilities or abilities to adapt, then port operations 
might ultimately fail, and the leadership emphasis then transmutes to the 
transformative recovery of systems and processes (Janssen, Anderies & Ostrum 
2007). 
With diverse challenges emerging from a dynamic risk environment, resilience 
change offers benefits to port managers. Van der Vegt et al. (2015) argue that 
while conventional command-and-control organisation structures might perform 
effectively in a stable operating environment, they are less likely to cope with an 
adverse and rapidly changing operational environment. Organisations with a more 
flexible organisation structure and a resilience-oriented culture might adapt better 
through: 
a) decentralised decision-making capabilities;  
b) deferment to expertise and interconnected teamwork in crisis 
management, rather than to hierarchical position holders; and  
c) empowerment of innovative and adaptive behaviour in dealing with the 
uncertainty of ‘wicked problems’ (McManus et al. 2008; Herrick & Pratt 
2012; Andersson & Tornberg 2018; Tanner et al. 2018). 
Ports may not have a commitment to resilience, and their governance culture 
might place impediments in the way of resilience. As discussed in Section 2.3, 
evidence exists that Australian port authority management styles lean towards 
government bureaucracy behaviour (Everett 2007) that manifests in mechanistic 
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management processes and cumbersome and rigid governance, operational and 
flexibility outcomes. Other researchers note that organisational resilience 
capabilities are impeded if not curtailed by formalistic tightly controlled leadership 
styles (McManus et al. 2008; Van der Vegt et al. 2015). Sakalayen (2017) finds 
evidence that some Australian regional port managers demonstrate capability 
shortfalls in the management areas of flexibility, governance, long term planning, 
leadership initiatives and innovation. Shortfalls of this nature potentially lead to 
the formation of a robust but brittle state of disruption preparedness, in which the 
port confronts disruptive shocks by persisting with fixed risk management 
strategies, plans and response capabilities (resistance) rather than adaptive and 
transformative resilience mindsets and behaviour (Welsh 2014).  
5.7.2. A conceptual port resilience implementation framework 
A port resilience implementation framework should present a blueprint for the 
application of resilience concepts into port management practices, inclusive of 
strategies, plans, processes and techniques to be used in attaining the required 
level of capabilities and capacities (ISO 22316:2017). This type of framework is 
focused upon operationalising resilience and while reflecting best risk 
management practices, should not drill down into the detailed processes by which 
resilience is enacted. That is the task of a second type of framework, which is a 
management guideline for organisational resilience responses to disruptions 
(Burnard & Bhamra 2011). A third type of resilience framework measures the 
effectiveness of organisational resilience (Hughes & Healey 2014). A conceptual 
port resilience implementation framework (Figure 5-3) is constructed from the 
preceding resilience discussion, plus concepts outlined in ISO 22316:2017. 
The decision to focus upon resilience as a further means of safeguarding the port’s 
operations needs to be justified, through resilience learnings, knowledge and 
subsequent analyses of the benefits that higher levels of resilience might bring to 
the port organisation. Subsequently, a management case is likely to be made to 
the Board for endorsement and top-down advocacy of organisational common 
observance of resilience concepts and associated port policies and directives. In a 
similar way to the risk management framework described at Section 4.6, 
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implementation of the resilience framework is performed by middle management 
from a bottom-up approach. The first steps require port managers to examine and 
record their port afresh from internal and external resilience contexts, and to 
analyse the levels and locations of resilience competencies within the port system 
(Häring et al. 2017).  
 
Figure 5-3: Conceptual port resilience implementation framework (Adapted from ISO 
22316:2017 concepts). 
Further steps in implementing higher levels of resilience (Häring et al. 2017) 
involve a review of what internal and external core system factors and enabling 
requirements might be integral to port operations, and what redundancies or 
alternatives to these system factors, properties and resources might be called 
upon in disruptive circumstances. As with the risk management framework (S 4.6), 
hazard and vulnerability identification and assessment are required. Additionally, 
for resilience, the port managers must attempt to conceptualise what unforeseen 
and unexpected disruptions might occur, and where/how the port operations 
might be vulnerable. This hazards and vulnerabilities process is expanded to 
surmise what might occur and be required in response should two or more hazards 
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and/or vulnerabilities combine or interact. Potential consequences of disruption 
must be examined to conceptualise what systems, plants and processes might fail 
and what the consequences of these failures might mean to operations (Häring et 
al. 2017). Administratively, the formal resilience implementation process and its 
associated communications, recording and reporting requirements are supported 
by strategies, plans and policies.   
Resilience document control is rarely mentioned in the resilience literature; 
however, documentation appears to have an important role in the management 
of all critical infrastructure resilience programs and resilience documentation 
control could provide an interesting field of post-doctoral investigation. 
Documentation must be raised and managed for multiple factors of resilience 
(Labaka-Zubieta 2013), inclusive of the internal and external aspects of technical, 
organisational, financial and societal dimensions. Plans, policies and budgets must 
encompass all port departments and ensure that relevant crises management 
plans and resources are available when and where needed. Communication, 
collaboration and compliance with external organisations must be managed, 
particularly where external organisations are the nominated hazard managers for 
adverse events in port (AG 2011; Labaka-Zubieta 2013). The compilation of 
information within the documentation system should also include listings of 
internal and external resources that can be called upon during crisis management 
(Note 6). Documentation control should also incorporate the internal and external 
processes for resilience reporting, communications and situational monitoring. 
With the increasing prevalence of cyber-threats, data storage integrity becomes 
an important resilience management consideration. 
Thereafter the conceptual resilience implementation framework follows similar 
closed-loop processes as the risk management framework outlined at Section 4.6. 
These resilience processes encompass the implementation of: 
a) resilience governance and policies,  
b) the wider enabling requirements of the resilience framework, and 
c) port resilience management processes. 
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The process moves to processes of monitoring and review of all aspects of 
resilience practices, and learnings from resilience experiences. The final objective 
of the implementation framework is to establish means of continual improvement 
and management ongoing participation in resilience-related activities. Some 
aspects of this conceptual resilience framework are intended to be tested within 
the empirical research, however a full testing is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The framework relies extensively upon port resources to fulfil resilience 
requirements, and this section is fleshed out with a short discussion about the type 
of resources that might be integral to implementing a heightened level of 
resilience. Much contained within this conceptual framework forms part of an 
extensive body of organisational resilience literature. 
5.7.3. Port resources management 
Resources required for building and maintaining port resilience differ from what 
is needed for conventional risk management (ISO 31000:2018; ISO 31010: 2009). 
Resilience is associated more with unpredictability, a factor affecting port 
managers who are unable to specify what or when new and unforeseen risks might 
emerge to harm their operations (WEF 2018). Wildavsky (1997) lists resources in 
support of resilience as the sourcing of sufficient knowledge, communications, 
financial and organisational capabilities and capacities to perform whatever is 
required, whenever it is needed.  
Port managers need to justify any new expenditure in resources, cost, time and 
effort to their Board and accordingly, operationalisation of resilience likely 
requires a cost benefit analysis. In an era of extensive port reform and State 
budget deficits forcing State governments to draw heavily upon port revenues, 
some ports might be unable to justify expenditure upon building resilience. 
Resilience expenditure might be substantial, and the Australian government (AG 
2016) identifies some expensive prerequisites for operationalising resilience. 
These include strong liquidity and cash flow position, premises, plant, equipment, 
supplies, structures, systems and processes, operational flexibility capabilities and 
competencies sufficient for managing the impact of adverse events. However, 
some of these resources coincide with those required in the conduct of enterprise 
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risk management (Belluz, Fraser & Simkins 2014) and may already exist in port 
management practices and stores inventories. Collaboration with external 
organisations enables port managers to initiate resources sharing networks with 
the objectives of increasing capabilities and capacities, while reducing individual 
organisational costs, and developing commonalities in disruption management 
resources (Haraguchi, Lall & Watanabe 2016).  
In relation to port resilience and resource sharing between stakeholders, Heaver 
(2009, p. 8) observes that ‘the most important driver of the willingness of 
members of the port community to work together is the existence of external 
threats’. Personnel are an important resource in port risk management. Resilience 
practices such as cross training and multi-skilling as many personnel as possible, 
and ability to call upon experienced contract labour, assists an organization to 
become more operationally resilient to personnel absences, as might occur with 
pandemics (Carralli 2006; McDonald et al. 2018). In addition, vulnerability analyses 
should be conducted for both internal and external potential points of failure, and 
when engaging with external goods and services providers, a port should establish 
emergency management relationships, collaboration, communications, 
redundancies and resources sharing (AG 2016). External communication and 
collaboration involves shared exercises and dissemination of lessons learned, plus 
maintenance of exercise and actual disruption records.  
Resilience learnings and knowledge are an important port resource when 
resilience capabilities are needed. For example, port operations are dependent 
upon the timely availability of external resources, and simple acquired knowledge 
such as current checklists of names, roles and contact details of external 
stakeholders becomes critical when external assistance is required (AG 2016).  
Pelling (2011) characterises resilience learnings in three categories, the first of 
which involves managers learning to cope with adversity and improving their 
organisational processes. The second category of resilience learning is associated 
with adaptation to adversity and changing processes to meet corporate objectives. 
The third type of learning is characterised as transformational, for example in 
relation to when a port’s operational environment is altered, and in response the 
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port’s goals and objectives must correspondingly be changed. This third type of 
learning involves recognising when a port is approaching or is passing a ‘tipping 
point’ where the port is transposed from a stable set of operating circumstances 
to another state through natural or human-caused disruption (explained further 
in S 5.2.1). In this disruptive situation, management is required to manage, 
recover, and adapt or transform to an altered state of operations (Nelson, Adger 
& Brown 2007; Fisher 2011). An essential form of resilience learning involves 
methods for developing situational awareness, which requires port managers to 
develop a clear understanding and knowledge of their port’s internal and external 
operating environments, sufficient to anticipate when circumstances are changing 
(Farjoun 2010; Weick & Sutcliffe 2015).  
Generic resilience frameworks (BS 6500:2014; ISO 22316:2017) provide scant 
guidance on how to operationalise resilience theory into port management 
practice. A further gap in the knowledge exists with little known about Australian 
port managers’ risk and resilience learnings and qualifications, and consequently 
whether their levels of knowledge are sufficient to operationalise resilience theory 
into practice. Accordingly, empirical research is required to better understand port 
performance measurement and management systems in relation to risks. 
Assisting port managers to better understand resilience, and their organisational 
progress resilience towards higher levels of resilience, might be accomplished with 
the availability of resilience capability maturity models, which are now discussed. 
5.8. Establishing a port resilience maturity model 
There appears to be little guidance for port managers who wish to understand the 
processes involved in building resilience within their organisation, and what needs 
to be planned for in the contexts of time, cost and resources. The ISO 2316:2017 
resilience standard provides port managers with information that, when coupled 
with learnings and guidance from elsewhere, might be translated into a fit for 
purpose resilience capability maturity model, shaped to reflect individual port 
characteristics and circumstances. The purposes of a maturity model include 
assisting organisations to manage within the subject area, and to measure their 
organisational progress in improving or maintaining levels of competency (Bititci 
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et al. 2015). With the emergence of literature that focuses upon organisational 
resilience indicators including those of ports (Brown, Seville & Vargo 2017), a 
proposed port resilience management maturity model appears to be timely.  
Maturity models are closely associated with resilience frameworks like the 
conceptual resilience implementation framework discussed in the previous 
section. A focused resilience framework might provide similar information and 
processes to those within a resilience maturity model, and a detailed maturity 
model likely carries an embedded resilience framework (Caralli, Knight & 
Montgomery 2012). A maturity model helps to identify any resilience shortfalls, 
establish performance attainment targets, and assess potential vulnerabilities to 
disruption (Cockram & Van Den Heuvel 2012; Miklosik 2015). Additionally, 
maturity models outline performance management system requirements, 
indicate targets for resilience performance and capabilities, and are a basis for 
review/audit of present circumstances (Melnyk et al. 2014).   
A format for a port resilience maturity model is suggested by the risk management 
standard (ISO 31000:2018) as discussed in Chapter 4 and the importance of using 
a capability maturity model is because such models might: 
a) be employed in multi-dimensional contexts; 
b) measure conditions conducive to enabling resilience from successive 
stages between minimal preparedness to optimal performance;  
c) provide a strategic plan for progressively building port resilience (Crawford 
2006; Gibson & Tarrant 2010; Bititci et al. 2012); and 
d) be relatively simple to adapt for both academic and practitioner purposes 
(Chapman 2011). 
Maturity model performance measurement and management systems reportedly 
arose from early information systems management research by Nolan and Gibson 
(1974).  Conceptually, capability maturity models typically consist of four scales to 
describe maturity progress that encompass initiation, expansion, formalisation 
and maturity stages of implementation. When translated into a contemporary 
port resilience format, this equates to: 
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a) operationalisation of resilience theory into practice, and initiation of the 
resilience-building process;  
b) Board mandate (expansion of the resilience process across the 
organisation); 
c) emergent capabilities and leadership (formalisation of port resilience 
strategies, plans and concepts); and  
d) advanced and effective resilience capabilities and capacities (maturity 
level).  
Gibson and Tarrant (2010) outline an evolutionary progression of resilience 
attributes, performance capabilities, characteristics and indicators for depicting 
maturity levels of resilience. These are adapted towards a proposed port resilience 
implementation maturity model (Figure 5-4) that that forms a blueprint for 
building port resilience. This model provides benchmarks to indicate the port’s 
present resilience level and status, and indicates what attributes and capabilities 
are required in further building or enhancing levels of resilience (Carralli, Knight & 
Montgomery 2012). A capability level is achieved when port managers achieve a 
nominated milestone and can perform specified activities at a consistent and 
predictable level of competence (Bititci et al. 2015; Proença et al. 2017).  
This port resilience maturity model provides an organisational pathway from an 
unprepared state of low resilience through successively more systematic and 
better managed states to a set of advanced and effective resilience capabilities 
(Wendler 2012). The commencement of the model (Level 1) reflects a port’s 
organisational compliance with ISO 31000:2018 since resilience is constructed 
upon and enhances traditional risk management tools and capabilities (Van der 
Vegt et al. 2015). Sequential steps provide a means of assessing the port’s 
ascending levels of potential organizational resilience, to assist managers in 




Figure 5-4: Port resilience maturity model (Adapted from 




The model also provides guidance for what enhancing actions and supporting tools 
might potentially lead to resilience improvement (Wendel 2014). Resilience 
indicators, enhancing actions and supporting tools that are employed in this model 
are suggested by: 
a) Labaka-Zubieta (2013) – resilience plans and policies; 
b) Berkes (2017) – socio-ecological resilience qualities and collaboration;  
c) BS 6500:2014 and ISO2316: 2017 – generic resilience indicators and 
factors; 
d) Häring et al. (2017) – resilience management processes; 
e) Southwick et al. (2017) – leadership;  
f) OECD (2017) – innovative risk governance; and 
g) Oliva & Lazzeretti (2017) – port adaptation to disruption.  
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge this is the first time that a port resilience 
implementation blueprint has been attempted in the literature. The proposed port 
resilience implementation maturity model was materially adapted from the 
literature to reflect the port resilience context. The layout and development of the 
resilience maturity model was based on that used in Section 4.8, the proposed risk 
maturity model. In Figure 5-4, the y-axis scale for port resilience effectiveness was 
modified from groupings that were suggested by Brown, Seville and Vargo (2017) 
in their survey of New Zealand organisational resilience effectiveness. 
Conceptually, the resilience maturity model may be of use to academics and 
practitioners in advancing critical infrastructure resilience concepts and placing 
these concepts in use.  
5.9. Summary 
Australian ports are integral elements of the strategically and economically 
important national critical infrastructure system, and Australian government 
initiatives actively encourage critical infrastructure managers to enhance their 
organisational levels of resilience. Little is known about resilience as practiced by 
Australian port managers, and research into this topic appears to be timely. 
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Chapter 5 extensively investigated the state of organisational resilience 
knowledge and its relevance to ports, and identified gaps in the knowledge 
concerning what influences, drivers and impediments might affect the 
operationalisation and enhancement of Australian port resilience. A New Zealand 
study for example, found that some critical infrastructure managers are reluctant 
to break down silo management practices, and are unwilling to conduct 
emergency and business continuity exercises and drills (Brown, Seville & Vargo 
2017). Chapter 5 also indicated where further research might lead to clearer 
resilience understandings for both academics and practitioners.  
Indicators of organisational resilience were sourced from the literature and 
applied to the port situation. The resultant discussion outlines fundamental 
resilience information regarding the associations between enterprise risk 
management, emergency management, business continuity and resilience. 
Resilience was found to be a valuable port management adjunct to conventional 
risk management and business continuity techniques, enabling managers to 
absorb and manage new, emerging, complex and unpredictable risks to port 
operations. The literature suggests that resilience effectiveness towards new, 
unpredictable and unexpected risks relies upon adaptive and innovative 
management interactions with an unfolding and changing risk environment. There 
is little resilience education to provide specific guidance for what managers should 
do for every type of disruption, rather academia provides guidance towards how 
managers might evolve resilience capabilities and become empowered to exercise 
ad hoc solutions to unconventional hazards. 
Further contributions are made towards building resilience within the port’s 
operational business continuity strategies, methods and processes through the 
drafting of a resilience implementation framework. The framework was compiled 
from the literature, plus guidance from international standards BS 65000:2014 and 
ISO 22316:2017 - Security and resilience. This framework (shown in Sub-section 
5.5.4) also assisted in the compilation of a proposed resilience maturity model by 
which port managers might establish how far their resilience practices have 
 143 
 
evolved, and what next steps are required to further improve their resilience 
competencies. 
The proposed resilience maturity model that suggests guidelines for implementing 
port resilience was adapted from existing resilience models and is conceptually a 
‘follow-on’ to the ISO 31000:2018 risk management framework. Information 
identified in compiling the resilience maturity model assisted in forming survey 
questions for the empirical components of this study. The following Chapter 6 
presents the quantitative and qualitative methodology employed in addressing 
the research problem. 
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Chapter 6: Research methodology 
6.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapters provided foundational knowledge towards the research 
problem and investigated the literature for information that sheds more light 
upon the investigation.  The literature review described the port and port 
operations characteristics, port hazards and vulnerabilities, the tenets of 
conventional risk management, and principles of organisational resilience and 
how it might relate to ports. However, the literature review revealed that there 
has been minimal discussion about Australian port risk management abilities to 
cope with high consequence disruptions and how effectively managers might 
maintain business continuity. Resilience studies related to Australian ports largely 
overlook operational resilience, and managers’ roles and capabilities in 
operationalising resilience at their ports.   
Chapter 6 describes the research methodology to be employed in answering the 
research questions. Specifically, it identifies the type of empirical study and its 
participants, its procedures, and the chosen data analysis approach (Rudestan & 
Newton 2015). Data analysis techniques are discussed, and research 
administration including ethical considerations and research quality controls is 
summarised. The chapter describes the methodological approach taken in 
reaching a clearer understanding of Australian port risk management and 
resilience effectiveness. It begins by outlining the research objectives. 
6.2. Research objectives 
Research methodology is defined as: ‘…the philosophical stance or worldview that 
underlies and informs the style of research. It could be termed the philosophy of 
methods’ (Jupp 2006, p. 175). Research methodology refers to the general 
strategy and logic framework upon which research and research design is 
constructed, and in this chapter the chosen methodology is explained in sufficient 
detail so that the research outcomes might be evaluated and/or replicated 
(Bryman 2015). Objectives in formulating research methodology (Garg & Kothari 
2014; Christensen, Johnson & Turner 2015) are to:  
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a) systematically investigate and formulate the research problem;  
b) explain the approach and theoretical stance taken and why others are 
excluded;  
c) establish what constitutes the survey population and sample; and,  
d) to establish how data collection and analysis is to be undertaken. 
The primary objective of this thesis is to establish a clearer understanding of how 
the dynamics of disruptive change are managed within the contemporary 
Australian port’s risk management capabilities and processes (Haraguchi & Kim 
2014; Haraguchi, Lall & Watanabe 2016; Davidson et al. 2016). Specific thesis 
objectives are to: 
a) investigate demographics of the Australian port senior management 
population;  
b) explore port risk management and resilience mindsets and competencies; 
c) identify distinguishing characteristics of the port risk environment (past 
and predicted); 
d) explore opportunities for resilience changes that might transform and 
reconfigure port disruption management capabilities and capacities to 
higher levels; and, 
e) examine how resilience concepts might be further operationalised at 
Australian ports. 
The research questions as discussed in Chapter 1 were drafted to provide a clearer 
understanding of what processes and mechanisms of port resilience are required 
to counter unexpected disruptions. For convenience, the research questions are 
provided below: 
PRQ: How does the port as a crucial networked component of the complex 
critical infrastructure system manage the risks and outcomes of regional 
disruptions? 
SRQ1: How do ports currently manage risks and unknown unknowns arising 
from disruptive events? 
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SRQ2: What do ports need to change in their practices to become more 
resilient? and  
SRQ3: How might ports operationalise resilience to best manage/overcome 
risks and unknown unknowns arising from disruptive events? 
The literature review found few examples of research, theory and guidance that is 
directly relevant to Australian port resilience, despite the Australian government’s 
determination of ports’ importance as both critical infrastructure (AG 2015), and 
their crucial associations with supply chain risk management (Christopher 2016; 
Polemi & Papastergiou 2017). This thesis contributes to the knowledge by 
undertaking survey and data analysis involving senior port managers across 
Australia’s 21 port authorities and 6 State government marine authorities (Ports 
2017). Australian ports are important components of Australia’s critical 
infrastructure (AG 2010) which leads the thesis towards a systems method 
approach, because resilience is a holistic property of critical infrastructure systems 
(Gopalakrishnan & Peeta 2010). Disruption management and recovery cannot 
accurately be conceptualised in terms of any one organisation, one network or 
even one system, because each critical infrastructure sector is reliant upon and 
interdependent of others (Hsieh, Tai & Lee 2014). From a resilience operalisation 
perspective, these resilience and systems theory approaches are further aligned 
with dynamic capabilities theory to provide increased insights into how Australian 
ports might build their levels of resilience (Teece 2018).  
In alignment with the thesis objectives, this research design is conceptualised as 
being: 
a) exploratory in formulating new theories and in contributing to the pool of 
critical infrastructure resilience knowledge;  
b) explanatory in establishing new evidence of present and past port-
systemic resilience attributes; and,  
c) generalisable in contributing new knowledge towards improving or 
modifying port critical infrastructure resilience to future disruptions. 
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As will be discussed further, data for this study will be gathered from selected 
research participants by a cross-sectional process, over a length of time approved 
by the University of Tasmania’s Ethics Committee.  
6.3. Research population and sample size 
An important preliminary research step is to identify the target population, from 
which survey research draws on a sample to generate generalisations about 
attitudes and behaviour back to the population (Christensen, Johnson & Turner 
2015). In this research, the population consists of port-centric senior executives 
with risk management decision-making roles and responsibilities. 
6.3.1. Australian port management pool 
The Australian port management population itself is small. From a port authority 
context there are 21 authorities and corporations, and six State government 
departments that are tasked with oversight of Australian ports. Examination of 
port authority web sites provides an indication of management size from their 
organisation charts. Each is overseen by a CEO, with between seven and nine 
senior managers managing departments or sections of the business. Government 
instrumentalities may be smaller, since their role is more focused on regulatory 
matters, safety and risk management. The Victorian Ports Corporation, for 
example, has a CEO plus senior executive team of three, while Flinders Ports (a 
privately-owned port operator in South Australia) has a General Manager and four 
senior managers (information was derived from respective web sites). 
A sampling quandary arose from the small population of senior managers who are 
the decision-makers for their respective port organisations, with only some 
permitted to be spokespersons for their respective organisations (Lewis 2017). 
The population frame became a potential maximum of 54 managers, a figure 
derived from 27 organisations with up to two managers with delegated authority 
by their Board to act as corporate spokespersons for external queries, inclusive of 
survey responses (Gray 2017; Lewis 2017). 
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6.3.2. Port management population characteristics 
Sampling in this research involved selecting sets of managers from the wider port 
executive population with decision-making responsibilities for risk and resilience 
management. This process is termed purposive sampling, and this involves a 
relatively small number of respondents to gather as much information in depth as 
possible about a phenomenon. Purposive sampling (Christensen, Johnson & 
Turner 2015, p. 509) occurs when the researcher: ‘…specifies the characteristics 
of the population of interest and then locates individuals who have those 
characteristics’. An alternative is probability sampling which seeks breadth of 
information from many respondents to gain representativeness of the entire 
population (Teddlie & Yu 2007; Patton 2015).  
Purposive (judgement) sampling was employed in this research because of the 
researcher’s judgement that: 
a) the sample candidates are inherently homogenous in their fields of 
occupation, job descriptions, work experiences and regulatory structures;  
b) they all rely on similar port-centric regional support systems; and,  
c) all are challenged by similar new and emerging low probability/high 
consequence risks.  
The invited senior managers are decision-makers within Australian ports, and in 
another type of investigation might be chosen as Delphi research ‘experts’ capable 
of providing accurate information within their narrow field of practice (Thellesen 
et al. 2015). The study population included high level, authoritative professionals 
of CEO and senior management levels, who are accustomed to acting as 
spokespersons for their port-centric organisation. Their senior executive positions 
coupled with experience (time in senior management roles) were indicative of 
their abilities to understand concepts enunciated within the survey. Participation 
of senior decision-making managers was also intended to optimise data 
dependability in answer to the research questions.  
The target population for this study was initially intended to encompass a more 
statistically meaningful number of participants, which necessarily required 
multiple informants from each responding organisation. However, personal 
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communications (Gray 2017; Lewis 2017) advised that port authorities typically 
place restrictions on the number of managers who are authorised to respond to 
external communications and permitted to speak on the ‘corporate view’. The 
port CEO (according to Lewis 2017) customarily delegates authority for signing 
and/or releasing external correspondence to members of the executive team, 
inclusive of surveys, where usually only the CEO might provide this ‘corporate 
view’ (Lewis 2017). Within this widely-adopted delegation policy, port 
organisations establish a correspondence delegation document, authorised by the 
Chairman, and the extent of authorisations for releasing external correspondence 
depends largely upon the organisation’s risk appetite (Lewis 2017).  
6.3.3. Sample size 
The sampling plan describes how this research approached the matter of selecting 
a sample from the port senior management population, what sample size was 
deemed to be adequate, and how the survey was administered (Glasow 2005). 
Bartlett, Kotrlik and Higgins (2001, p. 43) describe how inadequate or 
inappropriate sample size might adversely affect research quality, reliability and 
accuracy. They describe sample size as a factor that can either assist or impede 
researcher capabilities in detecting ‘…significant differences, relationships or 
interactions’ within the research population’. Cochran (1977) argues that an 
unnecessarily large sample is wasteful, a minimalist sample size reduces quality of 
results, and somewhere in between, the sample size is just right. With these 
factors in mind, researchers generally calculate a minimum sample size to avoid 
having to work with too few responses, an outcome unsuited to statistical 
calculations and/or unfit for generalisability (Bartlett, Kotrlik & Higgins 2001).  
Consideration towards sample size took considerable time to resolve, in 
recognition of Marshall et al. (2013, p. 11) advice that: 
Other than selecting a research topic and appropriate research design, no 
other research task is more fundamental to creating credible research than 
obtaining an adequate sample. 
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A problem for this research is that the Australian port management population 
could not provide a sample size that remains useful for generalisability. Fowler 
(2014) notes that there is no commonly accepted minimum survey response rate 
but advises that levels of non-response should be clearly explained should the 
number of completed responses be low. This implies that sample size is a matter 
for researcher judgement, as argued by Hoinville and Jowell (1985, p. 73):  
In practice, the complexity of the competing factors of resources and 
accuracy means that the decision on sample size tends to be based on 
experience and good judgement rather than relying on a strict mathematical 
formula. 
The mixed method approach employed in this thesis envisaged a primarily 
quantitative analysis of survey responses, hence the concern for attaining a 
sample size sufficient for statistical soundness (Pallant 2016). Regardless of any 
mathematically derived ideal figure for survey respondents, the sampling was 
restricted to those managers to whom email access was available, and who were 
both authorised and willing to respond. Homogeneity of the senior executive 
levels of port management excluded the requirement for stratification and 
clustering, and so a smaller sample size was judged to become more acceptable. 
A further and important consideration towards sample size is the purposive 
selection of survey participants.  
For completeness of sample size estimates, the researcher reviewed qualitative 
sampling techniques. Within mixed method research the quantitative sample size 
is commonly much larger than the qualitative segment (Teddlie & Tashakkori 
2009). Academic advice that purposive mixed method sample size is typically of 30 
respondents aligns with the findings of Marshall et al. (2013) whose literature 
review examines 83 qualitative studies from five top ranking journals to establish 
sample size rigor in qualitative data generation. Few of these studies justified their 
sample size, but from those that did, Marshall et al. (2013) conclude that grounded 
theory qualitative studies should aim towards 20-30 respondents. 
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Recognition was made early in this thesis that the survey response rate would 
likely be low, not only because response rates are progressively declining (Petroni 
et al. 2004; Curtin, Presser & Singer 2005; Wagner 2008) but because a major 
limitation on respondent numbers is imposed by the small size of the Australian 
senior port management executive population, reduced further by limitations on 
the number of managers who are authorised to become organisational 
spokespersons (Lewis 2017).   Within the academic literature, emphasis is placed 
upon gaining high response numbers to a survey by expanding the population, 
however this is a factor related to the statistical rigour of studies. Rarely addressed 
is another component of research probity, which is to gain quality in results, rather 
than quantity. For example, Rice and Trepte (2012) undertook a port resilience 
survey and expanded their global survey population to include shippers, carriers, 
services providers, freight forwarders and other third parties not directly involved 
in port emergency management and resilience capabilities. Of the 525 
respondents to their survey, only 44 were representatives of port authorities. 
Potentially, the Rice and Trepte (2012) survey findings were exposed to selection 
bias (respondents not representative of the population of interest) or ignorance 
bias (respondents knowing little about the subject under survey) which suggests 
that bigger is not always better. 
For this thesis research, the size of the senior port executive population limits the 
potential number of respondents, but a restricted sample size is not regarded as 
an indicator of poor data quality – rather it is recognised as a limitation of 
statistical relevance.  
6.3.3.1. Sampling methodologies in other port resilience studies 
The literature review indicated a paucity of Australian port resilience studies, 
other than discussions on the relationships between port resilience and climate 
change. Of interest, an aviation-oriented study by Wood, Dannatt and Marshall 
(2006) investigating airline resilience on behalf of the Australian Transport Safety 
Bureau found that their resilience research problem lacked previous research 
precedents. This led them to select data gathering and analysis methodology 
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suited to ‘real organisations with real and relevant issues’ (p. 7). Their sampling 
frame was small, consisting of eleven airlines and thirty-two managers authorised 
to speak from a corporate perspective. Based on the preliminary findings and 
assumptions arising from their literature review, the researchers employed a 
modified case study approach, which they analysed using qualitative and 
quantitative software programs. Thirty-two interviewees contributed to the 
primary sequential qualitative phase, and eleven participants from these 
qualitative interviews formed the quantitative phase sample. Acknowledged 
limitations of this first exploratory Australian airline resilience study included low 
levels of representativeness and generalisability. The small quantitative phase 
sample size (n = 11) was partially attributed to the ‘…often highly confidential 
nature of the data’ plus respondents’ concerns for protecting their corporate 
reputation for safety (Wood, Dannat & Marshall 2006, p. 8). A possibility arises 
that similar but unreported confidentiality and reputational concerns may 
influence this thesis research. 
As discussed in Subsection 6.3.3, a web-based global survey with a similar research 
problem to this study was conducted by Rice and Trepte (2012). The research was 
conducted from a port resilience perspective for the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) Center for Transportation and Logistics and comprised a 
literature review followed by a web-based survey of managers related to ports. 
The MIT research aim was to gather a general understanding of managers’ port 
disruption experiences, and to gauge their opinions on operationalising port 
resilience. Rice and Trepte (2012) employed multiple data analysis techniques, 
including Structural Equation Modelling (Kline 2016; Hox, Moerbeek & van de 
Schoot 2017) and the use of exploratory factor analysis. Rice and Trepte (2012) 
collected 525 survey responses from non-probability convenience-based 
sampling, and their management respondents include port authorities, terminal 
operators, shippers, carriers, services providers, freight forwarders, consultants 
and other third parties.  
The Rice and Trepte (2012) survey response exceeds the minimum survey sample 
size of 100 respondents recommended by Kline (2016) for SEM. Some factors from 
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the Rice and Trepte (2012) study were examined for usefulness in formulating 
survey questions for this thesis, however, the small sampling frame represented 
by Australian port managers (Ports 2017) impedes the use of an SEM research 
approach.  
This thesis focuses upon port authority managers’ risk management and resilience 
abilities to cope with disruption. The port’s intermodal business continuity is more 
directly associated with port authority management and staff than with external 
third-party shippers, carriers and freight forwarders for emergency management 
planning, responses, controls and competency measures (Bichou, Bell & Evans 
2014; Burns 2015). Rice and Trepte (2012) recognise this jurisdictional issue, in 
questioning whether port resilience is a matter of port authority or terminal 
operator responsibility, or whether port resilience is a responsibility of the wider 
port operations community.  Rice and Trepte (2012, p. 8) circumvent this issue by 
researching resilience of the broader ‘port environment’, which they define to 
mean as either ‘…an individual port, a regional set of ports, the ports in a single 
state, or the collective ports across the country’. Nevertheless, their findings 
constitute a useful foundational study for further, more focussed port resilience 
research. 
The American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) endorsed a study towards 
creating a port resilience index (Morris & Sempier 2016). Their data collection 
methodology consists of a Delphi Method evaluation of expert opinions (n = 13) 
which is then assessed by qualitative means. The findings from this research were 
tested in three pilot studies and then in subsequent case studies involving three 
Gulf of Mexico ports. The subsequent self-test resilience index became a standard 
for the AAPA ports. 
Omer (2013) addresses the research question: How can the resilience of 
networked infrastructure systems be measured? Omer (2013) investigates 
multiple segments of global critical infrastructure systems, including a maritime 
transportation segment that involves two Pacific ports. The research employs a 
case study approach with qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques to 
establish port resilience indicators from a shippers’ perspective. However, the 
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port-centric component of Omer’s research is small, and Omer’s greater 
contribution is towards a wider study of global transportation and logistics. 
Examples of contemporary port resilience studies include Achuthan (University 
College, London) who is investigating simulation models to assess the resilience of 
port systems (Shaw, Grainger & Achuthan 2017), and Morris (Louisiana State 
University) who recently completed a study to develop a qualitative resilience 
assessment tool for US Gulf ports (Morris 2017).   
6.4. Theoretical framework 
In approaching this research within a largely unexplored field of interest, and to 
better understand the research dynamics, the researcher examined the literature 
for thoughts, concepts, assumptions and beliefs that are related to the research 
questions. The findings are arranged into a cohesive order by means of conceptual 
port risk and resilience frameworks (Figures 4-1 and 5-3), and port risk and 
resilience maturity models (Figures 4-3 and 5-4). These tools were created from 
multiple academic sources, to illustrate the types of strategies, plans, processes 
and techniques that are considered necessary to support port risk and resilience 
management.  
Theoretical frameworks, according to Ravitch and Riggan (2016) are foundational 
to drafting the research questions, where constructing a bounded framework 
assists in reducing extraneous data that might impede the analysis, while retaining 
factors that might benefit from data comparison. The theoretical frameworks 
created to guide this thesis’ empirical research are firmly grounded in the 
literature review findings (Maxwell 2013). The surveyed literature is founded upon 
multiple theories and approaches not always related to port risk management, to 
ascertain whether new connections or concepts might be established. Conceptual 
models can be employed as an organising planning tool in empirical research 
involving working hypotheses in exploratory research (Shields & Rangarajan 2013). 
For example, Kasperson et al. (1988) employ a conceptual model in systematically 
linking a technical assessment of risk with organisational and societal perspectives 
of risk perception and risk-related behaviour. From the perspective of this thesis, 
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Kasperson et al. (1988) present an argument that the differences between 
technical/objective (evidence-based) perceptions of risk) and subjective/societal 
(values-based) perceptions of risk can lead to disproportionate response to minor 
risks of low consequence following subjective evaluations, while major risks might 
go unremarked. The design of an effective conceptual port risk management 
framework should therefore take this possibility of societal bias into 
consideration.  
The advice of Dewey (1938) although dated, authoritatively argues that 
exploratory research requires direction in its data collection and analysis phases 
through what he interchangeably describes as ‘working hypotheses’, ‘blueprints’, 
‘maps’, and ‘conceptual frameworks’. Dewey (1938, p. 169) argues that ‘blueprints 
and maps are propositions and they exemplify what is to be propositional’. 
Mapping hypothetical interrelationships between concepts and statements 
enables the researcher to demonstrate how his/her investigation dovetails with 
the existing field of theory and research, and how the research might contribute 
to knowledge (Creswell & Creswell 2017; Ary et al. 2018).  
This research builds upon findings from the literature review to make logical sense 
of how ports might manage disruptions, what processes and outcomes result 
when these adverse events occur, and how disruption consequences are modified 
by systemic resilience. Whether the port can maintain its required operational 
capabilities consequent to disruption (or be able to recover within a tolerable 
time) is hypothesised to be dependent upon port risk management and resilience 
effectiveness, and port business continuity closely coupled with similar attributes 
from crucial goods and services providers. The consequences of a disruption might 
impact and ripple across the port system, and its effects ultimately felt outside the 
port (for example, by supply chains, government, regional businesses and 
community). Minimisation of disruption consequences and cascading potential is 
hypothesised to be dependent upon the port system’s risk management and 
resilience competencies, as described in the literature review. The actual state of 
competencies for Australian ports is unknown, which lends direction and 
importance to this research and its methods. 
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6.5.  Research methods 
Research can be performed within either quantitative, qualitative or combined 
approaches, depending upon which format works best. Quantitative research 
assumes a narrow field of focus, assuming a Descartian approach of reducing 
complex phenomena into manageable pieces for study and eventual reassembly 
into the whole, and for engaging in sequential and complete steps in the research 
process (Garber 2005; Cohen, Manion & Morrison 2013). Research emphasis is 
placed on the collection and analysis of numerical data, and Best and Kahn (2006, 
p. 118) argue that such findings might reveal: 
Conditions or relationships that exist; practices that prevail; beliefs, points 
of views, or attitudes that are held; processes that are going on; effects that 
are being felt; or trends that are developing. 
Alternatively, qualitative research adheres to a variety of interpretive research 
methodologies in developing theory and explaining human interactions from data 
analysis, an approach that leads more to understanding the phenomena rather 
than explanation (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Charmaz 2006; Creswell 2009). Theory is 
grounded in the data and emerges from the data analysis (Lincoln & Guba 1985). 
In this context, researcher influences upon the study outcomes, rather than 
forming a study limitation, are regarded as holistic knowledge inputs towards 
analysis and exploration of the phenomenon (phenomenology). The researcher 
attempts to gain richer access to the knowledge and understanding than may be 
possible through alternative narrow and calculated empirical findings. This 
process is abetted by the researcher’s understanding that a scientific reason for 
an event or outcome might differ from a real world ‘practical’ reason (Ormston et 
al. 2014; Nardi 2018).  
In considering what methodology and techniques to undertake for this study, the 
researcher assessed multiple approaches including case studies, qualitative 
immersion, and surveys in their various forms. Case studies are often employed in 
disaster-related investigations (Coleman 2004) - for example the Bali bombings 
(Royds, Lewis & Taylor 2005); Hurricane impacts on the US eastern seaboard 
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(Becker et al. 2015; Haraguchi & Kim 2014); seaport resilience assessments (Liu 
2014; Becker & Caldwell 2015); and, disasters of human causality (Chernov & 
Sornette 2016). Persuasive outcomes from case study methodology require 
investigations of port risk management attributes within a variety of contexts, or 
more beneficially, observations involving the port in either managing, or 
simulating a specific disruption scenario (Yin 2013; Bryman 2015). Case studies 
share some aspects of mixed methods research, in analysing both qualitative and 
quantitative data from in-depth interviews and questionnaires (Christensen, 
Johnson & Turner 2015). Hodkinson and Hodkinson (2001) argue that case studies 
demonstrate some important limitations, for example, inapplicability to many 
research questions, potential for researcher subjectivity, typically small sample 
sizes, constraints in quantifying the findings, poor generalisability, time consuming 
and expensive, and eventual findings are easy to dismiss if research outcomes are 
unfavourable.  For this thesis, other research methods were considered to find 
techniques that avoid the restraints imposed by case study methodology. 
Narrow ethnographic observations of a few selected ports, their management 
activities and processes at work, work-place interviews and focus groups were 
considered for deriving insights into managers’ understandings of the phenomena, 
and for indications of their risk-related behaviour (Bryman 2015). The primary 
consideration against ethnographic observations related to potentially wider 
benefits in investigating multiple ports for diversities of opinion, and to source 
research data from multiple geographic regions with varying climatic hazards. A 
secondary limitation of ethnographic observations is that like case studies, these 
achieve deep understandings of a few management teams under observation, at 
the expense of gaining a more holistic perspective. 
Survey methodology (for example web-based surveys or telephone interviews) is 
a further means of gathering data, following the pragmatic argument of Goodwin 
(2010, p. 463) that: 
Survey research is based on the simple idea that if you want to find out what 
people think about some topic, just ask them. That is, a survey is a structured 
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set of questions or statements given to a group of people to measure their 
attitudes, beliefs, values, or tendencies to act. 
Survey types in a social research context are described by de Vaus (2014) as face-
to-face, phone, postal, email, disk by mail questionnaires, and web-based self-
administered questionnaires. As explained in the following section, after due 
consideration this research employed self-administered web-based survey 
methodology. Phone surveys were considered, but the researcher had extensive 
personal acquaintances within the potential respondent population and a 
possibility existed for surveyor bias to be introduced. 
6.6. Data gathering and analysis considerations 
As this research is regarded as a preliminary investigation into Australian port 
resilience, where research is immature, and the field is largely under-studied, data 
gathering becomes an exploratory process. Beins and McCarthy (2012) advise that 
surveys are a widely used and accepted form of data gathering in contemporary 
social science and business research, and this technique is adaptable to 
explanatory, descriptive, and exploratory research approaches (Neuman 2014). 
Analysis of data can be performed quantitatively, qualitatively or by the process 
of exploratory mixed method research design (Creswell 2013). Mixed methods 
research involves a ‘…combination of quantitative and qualitative research 
techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004). It is an inclusive process, which incorporates 
inductive (identification of patterns), deductive (testing of hypotheses) and 
abductive (finding a ‘best fit’ for explanations of results).  
6.6.1. Mixed method approach 
Data analysis using mixed method research was considered due to its properties 
in potentially contributing new knowledge and perspectives on the research topic 
through the concurrent and sequential use of words and numbers (Zikmund et al. 
2013; Bazely 2009). The advantages are iterated by Marshall and Rossman (2014) 
who argue that a mixed methods approach increases validity for a topic that is 
little explored, as is the case with this research problem, and provides opportunity 
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to reflect the participants’ context and points of view. Driscoll et al. (2007) argue 
that mixed methods research designs are a pragmatic solution to complex 
exploratory research, where qualitative data leads to a deep understanding of 
survey responses, while statistical investigation reveals patterns within the 
responses.  
Mixed methodology (quantitative/qualitative) is useful for comparing and 
combining parallel information from diverse sources, discovering new insights 
from or discarding paradoxes and contradictions, and sourcing complementary 
and contrasting information between source types to explain a set of phenomena, 
even if separately, each item of information is only minimally useful (Bazely 2017). 
Mixed method studies are also useful in exploratory investigations for which 
robust conceptual and empirical foundations are immature (Brannen 2017). This 
approach permits both inductive and deductive reasoning, and the investigation 
of multiple types of data (Bryman 2015; Sekaran & Bougie 2016). When a 
qualitative phase begins first as a subordinate process in providing useful 
knowledge towards the research topic, it aids the drafting of the quantitative 
survey and later understanding of the survey data (Harrison 2013; Creswell & 
Creswell 2017). Employment of multiple methods within a single research study 
facilitates the inclusiveness and generalisability of quantitative data and increases 
the analytic contextual nature of qualitative findings (Sekaran & Bougie 2016; 
Creswell 2014).  
Limitations of a mixed methods approach (Driscoll et al. 2007) are that 
amalgamating qualitative and quantitative data for analysis and assessment can 
be time consuming. Care must be taken in maximising sample size, and 
respondents’ time should be respected in the interviewing process. A mixed 
methods approach adds complexity to the research design, and the guidance of 
theoretical frameworks as discussed earlier in this chapter aid in gaining a clear 
understanding and integration of investigatory concepts (Bryman 2015; Sekaran & 




a) the need to avoid a mind-set that becomes biased towards either 
quantitative or qualitative philosophical tenets (Ritchie & Lewis 2013);  
b) additional time for two approaches rather than one, and potentially, added 
expense of a dual approach (Fraenkel, Wallen & Hyun 2012); and,  
c) a mixed methods approach requires a broader scope of research 
knowledge and expertise than a purely quantitative or qualitative study 
(Creswell & Creswell 2017).  
Within this thesis, the limitations of mixed methods research were recognised, and 
the negative aspects partially minimised by ensuring that qualitative components 
of this research were fewer than quantitative. The literature review provided 
guidance on what qualitative questions to ask within a primarily quantitative 
survey questionnaire.  The survey and its questionnaire were designed as a single-
phase project, to permit concurrent qualitative and quantitative research 
questions, where one set of questions was not contingent on the other (Creswell 
2014; Creswell & Creswell 2017).  
6.6.2. Survey research techniques 
Beins and McCarthy (2012) advise that surveys are a widely used and accepted 
form of data gathering in contemporary social science and business research. 
Survey research has its foundational roots in a positivist investigation approach, 
and this technique is adaptable to explanatory, descriptive, and exploratory 
research approaches (Neuman 2014).  
Web-based surveys are increasingly utilised by researchers due to a growth in the 
population of professionals going online, technological advances that facilitate 
survey design, relatively low costs in administration, speed in data collection, an 
ability to monitor ongoing responses and response rates, ease of distributing 
reminders to non-respondents, media richness, and compatibility with analysis 
software (Simsek & Veiga 2001; Schutt 2012; Callegaro, Manfreda & Vehovar 
2015). A surveyor can coordinate an e-mail message to participants (along with 
ethics-related information) to provide a direct link to the survey website 
(Callegaro, Manfreda & Vehovar 2015; Hewson & Stewart 2016).  
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Web-based surveys have inherent advantages compared with other survey 
modes. They can be deployed quickly at little cost, can shorten data-gathering 
times, and lead to faster survey results (Couper & Miller 2008; de Vaus 2014). 
These internet surveys do not unduly interfere with respondents’ work 
responsibilities and commitments since the surveys can be completed at the 
respondents’ convenience on either office or home computers. The researcher 
conducts a web-based survey at arm’s length and avoids bias from interviewer 
effects, for example those related to telephone or face-to-face interviews. With 
the use of contemporary software, completed surveys might be immediately 
logged, partially analysed and available to the researcher for further processing. 
Statistical analysis processing is aided by ability export survey data to the selected 
statistical or coding software (McPeake, Bateson & O’Neill 2014).   
Also, with continual internet oversight of the survey, the surveyor will know with 
some certainty when follow-up reminder emails need to be sent, which may not 
be the case with postal surveys. The researcher will learn useful para-data 
information with web-based surveys, including how many respondents did or did 
not open the survey, those who completed all questions, those who partially 
completed the survey, and those who required reminders to respond. Telephone 
survey methodology will produce similar survey administration data but not to the 
same degree of detail and accuracy. 
Although web-based surveys are easy and flexible for respondents to complete 
and can allow them to break from the survey process and return later, the use of 
this methodology does not necessarily lead to higher response rates (Couper & 
Miller 2008). The surveyor might not have an accurate email address list for 
potential participants, some potential respondents might have several email 
addresses and rarely check one or more of these for messages, and managers 
might have moved to another organisation and hence become ineligible to 
participate in the survey (Bryman & Bell 2015). McPeake, Bateson and O’Neill 
(2014) suggest that from a contact list compiled over the past twelve months, up 
to 10% of email invitations to participate might be returned as undeliverable. With 
web-based surveys that seek access to the general population, there would be 
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concern regarding non-response rates or inability to contact potential participants 
with useful information, but who do not have access to a computer or are 
computer illiterate (Bryman 2015). However, port senior executives are unlikely 
to fit this respondent category, and in weighing the advantages and disadvantages 
of web-based surveys, judgement was made to proceed with this approach. 
The web-based research format chosen for this study searched for plausible 
answers to the research questions by:  
a) utilising focused survey questions;  
b) comparing the opinions of segmented demographic groups;  
c) comparing port capabilities, capacities and risk management culture 
(ensuring confidentialities);  
d) ascertaining whether understanding differences occur between different 
segments of port management, and,  
e) testing the survey findings for potential utilisation by academic, regulatory 
and commercial audiences.   
The online survey tool SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey.com) was utilised to create 
the survey questionnaire which was emailed to specific respondents. As described 
by Creswell (2009), the survey results were returned to the researcher for analysis 
in the form of descriptive statistics. SurveyMonkey is widely used by university 
researchers and journal authors, and its validity and reliability of scores is deemed 
sufficiently trustworthy to correlate with results gleaned by other methodologies 
(Symonds 2011; Wissman, Stone & Schuster 2012). Other online survey publishing 
tools were considered, such as Instant Survey however SurveyMonkey appeared 
to enjoy much wider scientific usage and acceptance. 
6.7. Questionnaire design, testing and administration 
A questionnaire is a respondent self-report data collection instrument for 
measuring individuals’ opinions, attitudes, perceptions, knowledge and 
behaviour, plus ancillary demographic or other relevant data (Jupp 2006; 
Christensen, Johnson & Turner 2015). Questionnaire design was formatted around 
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the four research questions and the schematic followed within the literature 
review, namely: 
a. the port risk environment;  
b. port vulnerabilities to disruption;  
c. port disruption management capabilities; and  
d. the port’s resilience capabilities.  
Survey questions were designed by a process of moving from the broad concepts 
of the research questions, and the risk management and resilience concepts 
gathered from the literature review, to a more specific perspective of port risk 
management and resilience (de Vauss 2014). This process was aided by the 
previously discussed risk management and resilience frameworks and capability 
models (Chapters 4 and 5) which in turn gave rise to port risk management and 
resilience indicators around which the survey questions were drafted. 
The questionnaire design comprised a self-administered web-based survey, a 
process where the survey instruments physically reside on a network server 
(Survey Monkey), and accessed through participants’ Web browsers (Jansen, 
Corley & Jansen 2007). The survey design was framed against a mixed method, 
primarily quantitative, single mode approach in keeping with the population 
demographics analysis, plus interpretive uncertainties and ‘unknown unknowns’ 
of the research topic. Steps taken to improve data reliability include multiple-
question formats (open and closed), direct connectivity of answers to the data 
base, ongoing electronic response checking, all contributing towards maintaining 
a level of confidentiality beyond that of face-to-face or telephone interviews, and 
paper surveys (Zikmund et al. 2013; Jansen, Corley & Jansen 2007). The study 
employed both monadic and comparative data scales and was based upon an 
organisational resilience survey tool developed by Lee, Vargo and Saville (2013). 
This survey tool was previously tested within New Zealand post-earthquake 
scenarios (Rotimi 2010; Jones 2015) and was shown to have capabilities for 
identifying resilience strengths and weaknesses, present resilience levels, and 
areas of strategic change towards resilience improvement. 
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Survey questions were arranged in a sequential flow to maintain interest (Brace 
2018; Nardi 2018). The question sequence was aligned with those of the 
conceptual frameworks and models at Chapter 4 (port risk management) and 
Chapter 5 (port resilience). Questions were formatted in the following categories: 
a) port manager demographics;  
b) port disruptions;  
c) disruption preparedness;  
d) business continuity;  
e) organisational resilience capabilities;  
f) port resilience practices;  
g) operationalising port resilience; and,  
h) opportunity to provide additional comments.  
6.7.1. Types of questions 
Closed questions gave respondents either opportunity to choose among several 
potential answers, answer categories, or, according to either a frequency, 
importance or agreement scale (Siniscalco & Auriat 2005). Advantages of closed 
questions include fewer answer possibilities and therefore more quantifiable 
responses, easier and faster to answer, and more variables can be tested within a 
given time than with open-ended questions (Siniscalco & Auriat 2005; Bryman & 
Bell 2015; Brace 2018). Disadvantages include bias through ‘guiding’ respondents 
towards answers they might not have thought of, or respondents tending to tick 
the same numbered responses all the way through the survey (Siniscalco & Auriat 
2005). The limited number of answers restrict in-depth answers and preclude 
respondent innovation or originality (Siniscalco & Auriat 2005), and, suggested 
answers might not match respondent opinions (Dawson 2009). In this thesis’ 
questionnaire, bias was minimised by formatting closed questions differently to 
avoid repetitious patterns of answering, and creativity was encouraged by 
including comment boxes or an open-ended invitation for more detail (Siniscalco 
& Auriat 2005; Dillman, Smyth & Christian 2014; Brace 2018). Also, a ‘don’t know’ 
or ‘unsure’ option was included to avoid participants providing artificial answer 
patterns if they did not know the answer (Dawson 2010). 
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Open-ended questions permitted free-form responses, in as much detail as the 
participant was prepared to give. Resulting in added richness of detail, deeper 
investigation and possibilities for sourcing new information, while disadvantages 
include the longer time taken to answer, greater thought required in the response, 
and researcher difficulties in coding or quantifying (Siniscalco & Auriat 2005; 
Dawson 2010). The questionnaire contains 36 questions and 71 sub-questions 
comprising 19 closed-ended questions, and 16 open-ended response boxes 
prompting free-form information or explanations intended to explore thoughts 
and concepts that might otherwise have been missed (Glasow 2005). Table 6-1 
shows a breakdown of question types and numbers. 
Survey category Question types and number of related questions 
Closed-ended  Open-ended Ranking 
Demographics 3 0 0 
Disruptions – past and 
future 
3 4 0 
Disruption 
preparedness 
3 4 0 
Disruption responses 3 3 0 
Disruption resilience 
capabilities 
2 2 1 
Resilience 
management 
3 0 0 
Operationalising 
resilience 
2 2 0 
Additional comments 0 1 0 
Totals 19 16 1 
Table 6-1: Disposition of question types within the survey (Author). 
One question involved ranking responses in order. Question formats were varied 
across multiple choice, checkbox, rating scale, and ranking types, and where Likert 
Scale questions were used, respondents were given a choice of five answers, with 
an additional option of either ‘not applicable’ or ‘unsure’. 
6.7.2. Pretesting and units of analysis 
This research investigates the phenomena of organisational resilience as it might 
be found in Australian ports, and hence the unit of analysis is port managers’ 
perceptions as related to the research problem. To avoid the error of ecological 
fallacy (Jupp 2006) in making inferences about the entire organisation from one 
manager’s response, the pool of participants is widened as far as the limited email 
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address database allowed. The pool of participants involved senior port risk 
management decision-makers, who are perceived to be capable and empowered 
to speak at a high level on the ‘corporate view’ (Pateman 2015). Recognition is 
made that these opinions will likely be shaded by differing port risk environments, 
plus individual manager’s learnings and experiences (Rubin & Rubin 2005). Survey 
pretesting involved personnel from differing academic and practitioner 
backgrounds. Pretesting also assessed the survey question suitability in addressing 
the research questions and hypotheses, as shown in Table 6-2.  
Links Independent variable Dependent variable Related survey 
questions 
PRQ - H1 Self-reported 
effectiveness of risk 
management behaviour 
Ability to cope with 
disruptions 
4, 9, 10, 14, 15 
PRQ – H2 Recent encounters with 
disruptions 
Increased acceptance 
of resilience concepts 
5, 6, 9 




9, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18 
SQ1 – H4 Risk environment 
mindfulness 
Preparedness for new 
and emerging risks 
11, 12, 13 
SQ1 – H5 Vulnerability awareness Reduction of 
uncertainty 
4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13 





7, 8, 11, 12 
SQ2 – H7 Leadership and 
collaboration 
Resilience capabilities 14, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25 





SQ2 – H9 Transformational 
learning behaviour 
Adaptiveness to change 4, 14, 15, 21, 23, 26 
SQ2 – H10 Understanding drivers 




8, 11, 12, 22 
SQ3 – H11 Turbulent port risk 
environment 
Reduced ability to 
operationalise 
resilience learnings  
5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12 




of theory to 
management 
capabilities 
19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27 
SQ3 – H13 Resilience advocacy in 










26, 27, 28 
Table 6-2: Links between research questions, hypotheses and survey questions (Author).  
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6.8. Survey pretesting outcomes 
Survey pretesting is a process recommended to evaluate whether a questionnaire 
has potential to create problems for interviewers or respondents (Presser et al. 
2004; Dillman et al. 2014). The purposes of pretesting (Dawson 2010) include: 
a) discovery of ethical issues previously overlooked;  
b) question appropriateness to the research problem;  
c) a check that measurement levels in questions are appropriate;  
d) assists in population and sampling decisions; and, 
e) provides a guide to questionnaire length and response times.  
Accordingly, the survey instrument underwent pretesting as a precursor for the 
Ethics Committee submission and involved assistance from a panel of four 
academics and three high level industry participants known to be familiar with 
port crisis management through research network contacts, inclusive of academia. 
The pre-test group was requested to comment on whether the questions were 
clear, reasonable, logical, interesting and appropriate (Siniscalco & Auriat 2005; 
Dawson 2010). They were also asked whether the instructions were clear, relevant 
and logical. Comments were received on survey design and completeness, 
question inclusivity and suitability, the survey framework, and the panel members’ 
impressions on the survey user-friendliness (Presser et al. 2004; Krosnick 2018). 
Results of pretesting were regarded as preliminary outcomes, garnered primarily 
to assist in modifying (if necessary) the design of the ultimate study. Prior to 
pretesting, a fellow researcher working in an allied resilience field provided a 
welcome sounding board for revising an early draft version of the questionnaire.  
An informed consent form was inserted into the online survey questionnaire 
(Appendix C) and participants could only perform the survey if they clicked the ‘I 
agree’ icon to acknowledge the informed consent conditions. The survey was 
expected to take approximately 30 minutes to complete, as indicated during the 
pretesting phase and in the event, average completion time was 22 minutes and 
5 seconds. However, this average completion time incorporated foreshortened 
and partially completed returns. 
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Feedback from the pre-test panel indicated that the SurveyMonkey instrument 
was easy to use, and no technical problems were encountered. The lengthy 
preamble was discussed; however, the preamble contents were required to 
comply with ethical standards and could not be shortened. One respondent later 
commented that he skipped ‘the fine print’. This pretesting phase was beneficial 
to survey quality, with panel members providing essential feedback about the 
clarity, completeness, and appropriateness of the survey proforma and processes. 
Feedback responses indicated that with revision in some areas:  
a. the questionnaire was suitable and appropriate for investigating the 
research problem;  
b. that survey completion time was 30 minutes or less;  
c. some rewording was required; and,  
d. two further questions were required for completeness.  
Changes also included rewording of two headings, shortening the initial 
questionnaire, and compliance with the pre-test panel’s suggestions that several 
ambiguous or superfluous questions be removed (these actions accord with the 
advantages of pretesting reported by Siniscalco and Auriat, 2005, and, Dawson, 
2010). Layout design and end of each section wording were adjusted to make the 
survey more user-friendly and to better encourage participants to respond 
through until completion (Rogelberg & Stanton 2007). A closed-ended question 
was found to have overlapping time categories, and these were altered to become 
mutually exclusive, while another question was amended to remove a double-
negative effect (Christensen, Johnson & Turner 2015). Following the pre-testing 
process, and receipt of University of Tasmania Ethics Committee approval, the 
survey questionnaire was deployed and the data gathering proceeded for a period 
of ten weeks. 
6.9. Survey analysis process 
The quantitative and qualitative data sets to be acquired from the survey 
questionnaire were processed in the context of a mixed methods study (Creswell 
2013). As suggested by Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2013) these processes 
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embodied data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing and verification. 
The survey framework lends itself to the use of Excel and SPSS assistance in 
assessing reliability, validity, and sensitivity. Comparative data analysis was 
applied to interpreting open ended questions and borrowed from learnings 
obtained during the literature review. 
Computer assisted data management and interpretation were employed to assist 
in research reliability and replication capability (Ott & Longnecker 2016; Bazely 
2017). Computer usage is increasingly relevant to scientific research and software 
advances provide improved visualisation of data in the form of graphs and charts, 
increased flexibility in coding and grouping decision making, and provide the 
researcher with vastly increased data storage and access capabilities (Rademaker, 
Grace & Curda 2012; Bazely 2017). According to Bazely (2017) qualitative data can 
readily be converted in a quantitative format with the use of off-the-shelf 
software, a procedure sometimes known as ‘quantifying’ (Ward 2007; Shemmings 
& Ellingsen 2012). This technique also lends itself to this thesis’ data analysis 
processes.  
6.9.1. Qualitative data analysis – Dedoose web-based software  
The qualitative empirical research employed the generically named Computer 
Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) computer software to assist in 
qualitative data analysis. Several of the many QDAS programs that assist in 
qualitative data analysis and code-based theory building include NU*DIST, NVivo, 
Atlas.ti, Hyper-Research, and Dedoose. These software applications provide a 
contextual means of organising, filing and utilising large quantities of text-based 
data, usually by point and click coding, text search and storage, rapid cataloguing 
and indexing, and ready retrieval (Weitzman & Miles 1995; Bryman 2015). 
Importantly however, computer assisted data analysis requires a human 
contribution to perform the interpretive and intuitive assessments and decision 
making that are crucial to qualitative analytic research (Weitzman 1999). The 




Nielsen (2012) investigates the attributes of four QDAS programs as shown in 
Table 6-3. The online software application Dedoose was seen to possess 
comparative advantages that might contribute more rigour to PHD research, 
however as suggested by Weitzman (1999) there did not appear to be any one 
best program that might guide selection. Davidson and Gregorio (2011) note, 
however, that Dedoose is easy to learn, benefits from ongoing on-line software 
upgrades and patches, and is potentially adaptable for Cloud computing. 
Capability  NVivo Atlas.ti Hyper-
Research 
Dedoose 










Authority Simple Simple None Elaborate 
Interleaved coding File sharing File sharing File sharing Server-based 
Simultaneous 
coding 
None None None Synchronisation 
Learning curve Steep Steep Gentle Medium 
Table 6-3: A comparison of mainstream project data management software (Nielsen 2012). 
Dedoose is also useful for its inherent mixed methods analysis capability, plus the 
application is a web-based data management tool, thereby offering cheaper, more 
powerful capabilities and less chance of performance degradation than a program 
downloaded onto a home or office computer. Dedoose projects can also be made 
available on the Web to authorised multiple users, which potentially facilitates 
easy repeatability and traceability of information analysis. Dedoose was chosen 
primarily for the research project’s qualitative data management, and quantitative 
work was performed with statistical software package, SPSS. In retrospect the use 
of Dedoose program might have been useful during the literature review chapters, 
wherein a large quantity of journal articles and texts were manually searched, 
catalogued, indexed and then cross-referred towards the relevant topics. 
6.9.2. Quantitative data analysis 
Numerous statistical software packages are available for home or office machines, 
with some requiring online or cloud-based access, and these packages are either 
open-sourced, free or commercially marketed. Cavaliere (2015) notes that at least 
50 statistical software packages are available for research users, and that the top 
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ten in this list have very little to differentiate one from another. However, within 
the literature, researchers are often seen to make use of programs R, SAS, Matlab, 
Statistica, Minitab, Statgraph and SPSS (Ertuğ & Girginer 2014; Bergtold, Pokharel 
& Featherstone 2015). For this research, SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences) was chosen due to its affordable price within an educational package for 
students, its ability to perform the required analyses and data outcomes, its 
popularity with fellow students, and the ready availability of user manuals on 
campus. 
Selection of statistical data analysis techniques was limited by the small 
population of Australian port managers, which, for example precludes the use of 
factor analysis where typically, sample size needs to be closer to 100 (Urdan 2017). 
The use of inferential statistics was also constrained by the small potential number 
of participants. The primarily ordinal (non-parametric) nature of the quantitative 
question design and data characteristics effectively steered the analysis selection 
process (Pallant 2016). 
The treatment and analysis of quantitative data were performed with the 
following techniques, according to how the questions were asked, the format of 
the gathered information, and the relationships to be explored (Pallant 2016): 
a) the Mann–Whitney u test (a non-parametric equivalent of the 
independent t test);  
b) the Chi-square test of independence – (to explore the relationship 
between two categorical variables); 
c) the Spearman rho and phi coefficients (for measuring the direction and 
strength in corresponding relationships between variables); 
d) Kendall’s tau – b (while interpretations of Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s tau 
are similar, b enables a direct interpretation of the probabilities of 
observing the agreeable (concordant) and non-agreeable (discordant) 
pairs, but is less sensitive than Spearman’s rho); and, 




Both descriptive and inferential statistical techniques were employed in analysing 
and describing the data, and results were presented by means of tables and 
graphs.  
6.9.3. Reliability and validity 
Research reliability refers to repeatability, whereby research results remain 
consistent over time, and are seen to accurately represent the total population 
under study (Golafshani 2003). To optimise reliability the researcher must ensure 
the internal accuracy and reliability of test scores (Golafshani 2003). In this thesis, 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was used to assess the internal consistency of the 
survey instrument scale used for measuring risk and resilience management 
capabilities and capacities (Vacha-Haase & Thompson 2011; Dunn, Baguley & 
Brunsden 2014).  There was recognition that some questions contained fewer than 
ten items, and the data analysis was planned for a Cronbach level of greater than 
.5 (Gliem & Gliem 2003). Further efforts to increase internal reliability included 
clear item writing and expression within the survey to maximise variability in 
responses (Clark & Watson 1995). 
Judgement is required, in when to use the ‘Alpha if item deleted’ facility available 
in the SPSS software, which might enable the researcher to gain a higher reliability 
figure (Pallant 2016). This facility to manipulate item reliability evaluation assumes 
that equal error variance exists across all items being examined. However, 
recognition was made that if an item with the smallest variance is deleted, it might 
carry less error than the remaining items, be more representative of the 
population value, and consequently make the instrument scale a more reliable 
measure of the data under examination (Dunn, Baguley & Brunsden 2014). Care 
was taken to enhance content validity, by ensuring so far as possible that the 
survey instrument was entirely relevant to the research problem under 
investigation and aligned with the factors discussed and identified within the 
literature review chapters.  
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6.10. Survey administration 
Consideration was given to the quality of data to be collected by the web-based 
survey, and to the precision of inferences made about the studied population of 
port managers.  An early component of the survey administration was to evaluate 
contributing factors to survey errors, and consideration of control measures to 
minimise error potential. Considerable time was expended in compiling a list of 
recent email addresses to minimise potential for undeliverable surveys. 
6.10.1. Documentation 
Participant recruitment primarily involved a proforma letter (Appendix A) sent as 
a custom email invitation attachment to the targeted managers. The managers’ 
responses were to be tracked to see if they have taken the survey. As a preliminary 
step, high level sector promotional assistance towards the survey was sought from 
the ports’ peak body group Ports Australia, in an endeavour to reduce the 
possibility of managers or their email systems rejecting the invitation to 
participate as spam, as sometimes occurs when email invitations are distributed 
(Koo & Skinner 2005). This assistance was requested by means of a formal letter 
once University of Tasmania Ethics Committee approval for the research was 
received (Appendix B). It was possible, but considered unlikely that promotional 
assistance from sector peer groups might lead to unexpected participation of 
respondents outside of the mail-out list, a phenomenon that Marcus et al.  (2017) 
describe as a ‘snowball’ effect that potentially brings unwanted biases. Further, 
the introduction of any aspect of open-ended recruitment might reduce control 
over the makeup and size of the participant pool, which is why attempts were 
made to avoid the possibility of a snowball process. Plans were made to send an 
initial reminder to potential participants in two weeks from deploying the survey 
(Appendix A). 
An online consent form accompanied the survey, and this was inserted into the 
online survey questionnaire. Participants could only perform the survey if they 
clicked the ‘I agree’ icon to acknowledge the informed consent conditions. Real 
names of respondents were collected, and these were matched with pseudonyms 
that will thereafter be the only form in which identities are referenced. Only the 
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researchers will ever see the linked names/pseudonymic codes and these were 
stored separately from the rest of the data. To further safeguard the conduct of 
the survey, the researcher and supervisors planned to meet fortnightly in the early 
stages of the research project, and following confirmation that the process is 
proceeding satisfactorily, to then revert these meetings to monthly events. 
Arrangements were also made that should an urgent problem occur that requires 
the attention of all researchers, then an immediate meeting would be arranged 
via a telephone linkup in the first instance. Arrangements were made for all raw 
data to be kept under lock and key, and for electronic documentation to be 
password protected where considered necessary. 
6.10.2. Bias management and control measures 
The Oxford Dictionary of English defines bias as a systematic distortion of a 
statistical result due to a factor not allowed for in its derivation (Simpson 2018). 
Some degree of bias is regarded as almost inevitable within a research project, and 
there is a possibility that bias might occur in the thesis preplanning and design 
stages, data collection and analysis, and when relating the findings and 
conclusions (Pannucci & Wilkins 2010). Bias can also arise, for example, when 
systematic error takes place in sampling or testing through selection of one 
outcome or answer above all others (Pannucci & Wilkins 2010; Creswell & Creswell 
2017).  
Potential arises within web-based surveys for sample frame and nonresponse bias 
(Fleming & Bowden 2009; de Vaus 2014). Sample frame bias occurs when a 
sample fails to represent the population that it is required to represent (de Vaus 
2014). A control measure when defining the population is to establish an unbiased 
sampling frame from the population, however the sampling frame was made 
somewhat inflexible by the Australian port authorities general policy of only 
permitting designated spokespersons to respond to surveys (Gray 2017; Lewis 
2017). These designated managers are senior executives who are authorised to 
speak from the corporate perspective, and include CEO’s, Harbourmasters and 
heads of department within their port organisations (Lewis 2017). These 
spokespersons are likely to provide representative information concerning their 
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port’s risk management and resilience processes because they are influential 
decision-makers in these areas. Specific bias potential and some control measures 
that are observed within this thesis are shown in Table 6-4. 
Bias categories Bias controls 
Selection bias: May result in the subjects in the 
sample being unrepresentative of the 
population of interest – it occurs when the 
groups to be compared are different. 
Take rigorous care to ensure that participants 
are chosen from the same general population 
Measurement biases: Issues that are related 
to how the outcome of interest was measured. 
Can arise from multiple sources. 
Careful wording of the questions and 
unobtrusive redundancies that permit the 
researcher to determine whether internal 
inconsistencies exist. 
Respondent bias (Acquiescence and 
Habituation): Respondents either tend to 
choose answer that represent their 
organisation favourably, or tick ‘down the line’ 
using the same answers to finish the survey 
quickly. 
Design questions that focus on garnering the 
respondent’s true point of view. Maintain 
respondent interest with engaging survey 
design. 
Vary question wording, types of questions, 
and order of answers within questions.  
Confirmation bias: Researcher frames survey 
questions in such a way to confirm the 
researcher’s hypothesis or concepts. 
Continually revaluate impressions of 
respondents and challenge pre-existing 
assumptions and hypotheses 
Question order bias: leading questions, and 
where the answer to one question suggest 
how the next question might be answered. 
Careful wording and arrangement of 
questions, for example a general question on 
a subject before a specific question. 
Ignorance bias: Researcher not knowing which 
statistical test to apply. Also applies to 
respondents knowing little about the subject 
under survey. 
Conduct tests to assess the suitability of the 
data for the relevant process. 
Taking care in selecting potential participants 
in the survey. 
Non-response bias: Respondent failure to 
answer one or more questions, or the entire 
survey.  
Reminders, industry support, and survey 
design where progress to the next group of 
questions requires answers to the previous 
questions. 
Table 6-4: Potential web-based survey biases and control measures (Adapted from Lavrakas 
2008, and Biffignandi & Bethlehem, 2012). 
Pretesting the survey played a prominent role in minimising survey errors and in 
reducing bias. Researcher bias was minimised by observing ethical guidelines 
which are now discussed.  
6.10.3. Compliance with ethical guidelines 
When designing the questionnaire, care was taken to ensure that participants 
were not exposed to unfair or unethical demands, and that the researcher 
observed ethical guidelines as approved by the University of Tasmania Ethics 
Committee. Ethical considerations included privacy, confidentiality, anonymity, 
research integrity and quality, and in the web-based survey context, maintaining 
the online confidentiality of respondents’ identities within the survey instrument, 
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and in avoiding potential situations where research quotes from responses to 
open-ended questions might be searchable with online search engines (Schutt 
2012). 
To comply with the ethical dictum not to cause harm, the research interview and 
surveys were firstly submitted to supervisors for approval, and then tried out in 
the form of pilot studies involving other students. Informed consent as required 
was obtained only after the researcher observed the ethical obligations for 
maintaining respect in research communications, and to fully advise interview and 
survey participants of the project’s nature, their right to refuse participation, the 
researcher’s responsibilities, and any risks or benefits that the participant might 
expect from the study (Polit & Beck 2004). As previously discussed, an online 
consent form accompanied the survey, and respondents were unable to access 
the survey without clicking on the ‘consent’ icon.  
The first section of the survey questionnaire established the demographic 
segments within the population, whereby causal factors might relate to 
differences in responses and understandings. The second section sought 
information on disruption types and causalities, and the third section investigated 
how and with what means managers responded to and managed disruptions over 
the past five years.  The fourth section explored port management capabilities for 
maintaining operational services following a high consequences disruption. Port 
organisational resilience capabilities, leadership and governance, inclusive of 
stakeholder collaboration are then investigated to assess how far resilience might 
be embedded within Australian ports, what impediments might stand in the way 
of increasing resilience levels, and the potential for operationalising port 
resilience.  
A minimal risk application was completed in consultation with supervisors and 
forwarded to the University of Tasmania Ethics Committee, with associated 
documentation inclusive of the draft survey questionnaire and accompanying 
emails and letters, which are attached to this study as Appendices A-D, and the 
subsequent Ethics Committee approval is attached as Appendix B. 
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6.11. Summary  
Chapter 6 provided an explanation of decision-making processes and rationale 
employed for the research methods, data collection and analysis techniques of 
this study. A web-based survey of Australian port senior executives was designed 
from a mixed methods approach to address the research gaps and questions 
identified from the literature review (Chapters 2-5). The quantitative findings were 
to be explored in greater depth and triangulated where possible with qualitative 
analysis. Data analysis was planned around the use of SPSS software for 
quantitative data, and the Dedoose online software was selected for qualitative 
data analysis. Results of these analyses will be presented in Chapter 7 (risk 
management findings) and Chapter 8 (resilience findings). Two data analysis 
chapters were planned because the analysis process in this case is lengthy and 
shorter chapters make the reader’s task easier. Further, assigning individual 
chapters to the risk and resilience data sets was useful in avoiding the possibility 












Chapter 7: Data analysis and interpretation of findings 
7.1. Introduction 
Chapter 7 investigates and interprets the risk management data gathered from 
the exploratory survey process, and where judged beneficial to the research 
objectives, links these findings with those gathered from secondary sources. This 
data investigation involves analyses of both quantitative and qualitative data, with 
the findings from the initial quantitative phases both informing and guiding the 
qualitative phases (Onwuegbuzie & Combs 2011). The data analysis is geared 
towards addressing the primary research objective of understanding how 
Australian ports manage the risks and outcomes of regional disruptions. The data 
also provides interpretations of port disruption categories, how managers have 
coped with disruptions, port risk management effectiveness, predictions of future 
risks and management preparations for these future risks. 
7.2. Chapter processes 
The first three sections of this chapter encapsulate the entire data analysis process 
in the form of a general overview. Chapter 7 then goes on to discuss the port risk 
environment and continues with the analysis of risk management responses for 
the remainder of the chapter. Chapters 7 and 8 employ elements of both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis, and where quantitative analysis might be 
additionally informed from qualitative findings, a mixed methods analysis process. 
Some qualitative information is quantified when processing freeform answers that 
amplified or explained primarily quantitative responses. Data analysis in each area 
of investigation sequentially follows the order of survey questions. As detailed 
within Chapter 6 research methodology, the coding, sorting, entering into the 
computer and subsequent processing employed a combination of Excel, SPSS and 
Dedoose software.  
7.3. Response rate 
One hundred and thirty-one invitations to participate in the survey were sent to 
Australian port managers, with 50 surveys returned. The rate of return reflects the 
relatively small pool of port managers employed at senior levels across twenty-
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seven port authority and government entities tasked with responsibilities for 
managing Australian ports. While conducting the survey, advice was received from 
a Ports Australia Board member (Lewis 2017) that Australian port authorities 
typically authorise only one or two of the most senior executives to participate in 
surveys that sought information on a corporate view, so that the potential pool of 
respondents was re-assessed to be 54. A power calculation established that with 
a population of 54, a confidence level of 95% and a margin for error (confidence 
interval) of +/- 5, then 47 respondents are required (Denscombe 2014). Thirty-
seven respondents fully completed the survey, which from an aspirational 
confidence level of 95% resulted in a +/- 9% survey margin of error. Statistically, 
this indicates that if 50% of the sample provides an answer then of the entire 
population between 41% (50 - 9) and 59% (50 + 9) might provide a similar answer. 
However, 37 respondents do not provide a sufficiently large sample to be 
statistically significant, and the research cannot demonstrate internal 
significance/reliability from such a small sample.  
Meterko et al. (2015) study response rates for surveys involving senior level 
executives and conclude that survey results ‘should be considered on their merits 
even if based on relatively “low” response rates’. Researcher confidence in the 
sample size and wider applicability of the research findings is also enhanced by the 
relative homogeneity of the respondents in terms of their management functions. 
Respondents are senior port executives vested by their Boards and State 
governments with similar authoritative decision-making roles, duties 
responsibilities, and compliance functions. Generally, respondent demographics 
show that the respondents have more than three years’ experience in their 
present positions.  
Denscombe (2014) argues that studies of small organisations will likely result in 
small sample sizes, and that so long as the sample is larger than 30, and that 
statistical limitations are acknowledged and considered, then the study findings 
might remain both informative and valid. In this research the respondents are 
authorised spokespersons and lead decision-makers for their organisations and 
capable of providing accurate and high-quality information about organisational 
 180 
 
risk management strategies, behaviour, processes and intentions. Further, the 
survey questions probe deeply into multiple aspects of port risk management and 
resilience, and according to Denscombe (2014) investigating in depth serves to 
further study integrity.  For these reasons the absence of statistical significance 
resulting from sample quantity is somewhat masked by sample quality, and the 
argument that respondent homogeneity tends to characterise the respondents as 
representative of the Australian senior port manager population. 
Of the 50 responses, 37 were useable and seven were partly useable, but in 
calculating response rate only the 37 completed responses were considered valid 
overall. With a senior management pool of 54 accessible to this survey across 27 
port management agencies, then a response rate of 37 effective surveys is 
calculated to be 68.5%, which is higher than a typical level of return from senior 
executives for web-based surveys (Simsek & Veiga 2001; Rogelberg & Stanton 
2007; Stephenson 2010a).  
A global decline in survey response rates is noted by Rindfuss et al. (2015) and 
particularly so for telephone surveys (one reason why this research opted for a 
web-based survey). For whatever reasons, senior executives appear least likely 
within an organisational context to respond to internet surveys, with some studies 
reporting senior executive response rates as low as 7% (Simsek & Vega 2001). 
Conjectural reasons for relatively small response numbers might include 
practitioners limited organisational resilience understandings (Stephenson 2010a; 
White & O’Hare 2014). Further, a possibility exists that some port managers are 
unfamiliar with organisational resilience and resultantly uncomfortable with 
providing their opinions. Response rates fell from the initial 51 (94%) who began 
the survey, and only 37 (68.5%) fully completed the questionnaire. Thirteen (24%) 
filled out the questionnaire’s initial demographics section but left further 
questions blank.  
Three waves of emailed letter reminders were sent (Meterko et al. 2015), and the 
researcher avoided antagonising managers with further reminders. Non-response 
error had been minimised so far as possible, and the number of non-responses 
and partial responses suggests that important information regarding port 
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managers with a low level of risk management and resilience understanding was 
not gathered. This non-response bias could mean that data findings are biased 
towards the more resilience-conversant port organisations. Whereas the recorded 
response rate minimises statistical generalisability of research findings to the 
wider Australian port management population, the data quality relating to the 
high level of port executives who participated in this research lends importance to 
the information obtained.  
Rindfuss et al. (2015) suggest that low response rates do not invariably indicate 
biased results or necessarily equate to low data quality, particularly if relationships 
between the variables are examined within a multivariate rather than univariate 
distribution model. Multivariate data analysis enables the simultaneous 
investigation of multiple variables to better understand their relationships, 
generally in the form of either exploratory data analysis or regression analysis 
(Anderson 2003; Swarbrick 2012; Pallant 2016) or where required, as numerical 
taxonomy - the sorting and categorising of cases into like kinds (Jupp 2006). 
Information gathered from survey respondents was provided in forms suited to 
both parametric and non-parametric analysis, with the high number of Likert type 
questions emphasising the use of non-parametric correlation coefficient 
measurement - primarily Spearman’s rank order correlation, and Kendall’s tau-b 
measure of probability. 
7.4. Survey participant demographics 
Descriptive statistics were used to analyse demographic factors. The survey 
questionnaire was distributed to potential participants whose email addresses 
were publicly available, from a thorough online search of port-related data bases. 
Fully completed surveys were returned by 37 respondents (5 CEO’s, 2 Managing 
Directors, 8 Harbourmasters and 22 senior executives = 75% of the 49 in total 
responses). Survey returns are shown in Figure 7-1, and an explanation was 
considered towards the 25% partial completion rate for returned surveys, where 
respondents clicked upon the ‘completed’ icon despite not fully filling out the 
form. Within this context, Bosnjak and Tuten (2001) explore the web-based survey 
partial completion phenomena and suggest that reasons for partial completion 
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might include either lack of respondent motivation, lack of opportunity or 
cognisant ability, and/or being uncomfortable in answering certain questions.  
 
Figure 7-1: Response rate demographics (Author). 
Within this survey, almost all partial completions involved respondents filling out 
the initial and compulsory demographics section, and then reading through the 
online survey form until logging out. Bosnjak and Tuten (2001) describe this 
participant behaviour as Item non-responding drop-outs whereby a participant 
views some or all questions but only answers some and then terminates the 
survey. Bosnjak and Tuten (2001) suggest that this is quite typical survey 
behaviour. Intuitively, further drop-out rationale in this research might occur from 
participant sensitivities in discussing port vulnerabilities and emergency 
management capabilities in a post-9/11 threat environment. 
Demographics included tenure within the management roles, as shown in Figure 
7-2. Eight senior managers were female (16%). One executive had served for less 
than one year (2.7%); five for less than three years (13.5%); ten had served for 
between three and five years (27%); and, twenty-one had served in their roles for 
more than five years (56.8%). These demographics indicate that senior Australian 
port management positions are predominated by male executives with more than 
three years’ experience in their roles.  


















Figure 7-2: Australian senior port managers experience in roles (Author). 
Four senior managers with nil risk management qualifications had between three 
and five years in their roles, and four exceeded five years seniority. Eight 
managers, including three CEO’s, experienced all risk management training in-
house; one had less than three years’ experience in the job, one between three 
and five years, and six exceeded five years seniority. The remaining managers held 
multiple risk management qualifications as shown in Table 7-1. 
Qualification CEO/General 
Managers (7) 
Harbourmasters (8) Senior executives 
(22) 
Nil held 2 0 3 
Course module 
within a professional 
degree 
2 2 10 
Certificate level 0 2 4 




0 5 10 
Commercial course 
qualification 
0 0 4 
In-house training 3 4 11 
Table 7-1: Survey respondents risk management qualifications (Author). 
Lansdale (2012) describes how the Harbourmaster or port operations manager is 
assigned to manage port operational activities and, in many cases, to also 
command an emergency operation centre in the event of a port disruption. In the 
event of a disruption, a senior executive is appointed to speak on behalf of the 
organisation and handle media enquiries. This port emergency operations centre 
media spokesperson is likely to be the CEO or equivalent person in charge (Lewis 
2017). The literature review findings suggest that competency in both command 
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and control roles in business-as-usual circumstances, and in emergency 
management roles requires risk management knowledge and leadership skills 
(Lansdale 2012; Burns 2015) and a lack of formal risk management qualifications 
or training might be a competency handicap. 
7.5. The port risk environment 
Eleven hazards with potential to cause port disruptions were selected for testing 
as shown in Figure 7-3. These hazards were selected from an extensive literature 
review and expanded to incorporate suggestions made during the survey testing 
phase. Climate change might more accurately be termed a threat if considered to 
be an actualised hazard resulting in increasingly severe weather events, higher 
daily temperatures and expanded tropical disease vectors (Kelly-Hope, Purdie & 
Kay 2004; Maunsell 2008; Russel et al. 2009; Ng et al. 2013a; Naish et al. 2014; 
WEF 2018).  
 
Figure 7-3: Port disruption categories for testing (Author). 
7.5.1. Number of disruptions 
In response to how many disruptions respondents had experienced during 1) the 
past twelve months, and, 2) the past 1-5 years, thirty-four answered this question. 
Where managers had served less than five years or more in their roles (see Table 
7-1), their corporate memory of recent disruptions would have been expanded 
during annual risk management evaluation and brainstorming sessions (Srikanth 
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& Venkataraman 2013; Bichou, Bell & Evans 2014; Burns 2015). The respondents’ 
collective answers to this question are shown in Figure 7-4. 
 
Figure 7-4: Disruption experiences over short and medium time frames (Author). 
Figure 7-4 shows that shows that 19 respondents experienced port disruptions 
during the past twelve months and of these, nine (26%) experienced single 
disruptions, and ten (29%) experienced multiple disruptions (nine encountered 2-
5 disruptions that year, and one experienced more than 10). During the four years 
prior to these twelve-month figures, 20 respondents (64%) experienced port 
disruptions, and 20 respondents (59%) experienced multiple disruptions over the 
four years. In total, thirteen managers experienced nil disruptions during the five-
year period (35%). 
Eleven respondents experienced 2-5 disruptions, two experienced 6-10 
disruptions and four respondents experienced more than ten throughout that 
period. These findings indicate that Australian port managers experienced a higher 
proportion of nil or single disruptions during the past year than during the previous 
four years period. However, cognisance is made that the annual numbers of 
disruption occurrence are influenced by short and long-term cyclical patterns and 
occurrences which might serve to average the ‘nil disruption’ level lower over time 
(Grinin, Korotayev & Tausch 2016). Examples of these cycles include the onset of 
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level states (Rey 2015), and climatic variabilities resulting in droughts, bushfires or 
floods (Kiem et al. 2016; Ummenhofer & Meehl 2017). 
7.5.2. Predicted risks 
Risks previously experienced by port managers and those predicted for the coming 
years are shown in Figure 7-5, which is a composite of respondent experiences 
with disruptions of the past five years, and their expectations of what might 
challenge them during the next five years. Adverse natural events are the highest 
future risk (12 predictions), followed by financial constraints (11 predictions) and 
then socio-political risk (9 predictions). Increasingly severe weather patterns were 
a primary concern within respondent free-form responses, possibly influenced by 
increasingly severe storms and floods affecting both Australian and global ports 
(Elsner, Kossin & Jagger 2008; McBride 2012; Wakeman 2013; Tracey 2011).  
 
Figure 7-5: Comparison of port disruption typologies – composite of past vs. predicted (Author). 
Free-form responses reflect a concern for political interventions that associate 
problems involving infrastructure failure, socio-political issues, and financial 
constraints – both analysed later in this chapter. Financial concerns relate to port 
inability to maintain or replace infrastructure and plant at a time when State and 
territory governments (the port owners) experience public sector financial deficits 
(ABS 2017). Ports pay annual dividends to their State government, usually 65%of 
0 10 20 30 40
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net profits (Evans 2015) but with the present levels of State government financial 
stress, ports are required to pay higher dividends to their governments. For 
example, the Western Australian State Budget (2017) increases government 
business agency dividend rates, whereby multiple port authorities contribute 
some 90% of their net profits. Uncertainty also stems from port management 
knowledge of State government considerations towards asset sales in reducing 
State deficits and funding other infrastructure, inclusive of marketing ports and 
port property. This concern is consistent with findings from Chen, Pateman and 
Sakalayen (2017).  
Twenty-eight respondents expressed in free-form answers why they identify their 
most likely port risks for the next five years, and their insights contribute to the 
primary research question (how Australian port managers manage the risks of high 
consequence disruptions). From these qualitative rationales an unexpected, 
different pattern and order of disruption emerges to that of the closed-ended 
data. Patton (2015) describes providing quantitative and qualitative aspects of the 
one question as opportunities for comparative analysis between the two 
techniques, and for increased understanding by focussing on areas of 
convergence. In this case, researcher understanding is clouded by areas of 
divergence between the quantitative and qualitative data. However, the two types 
of analyses produce similar lists of future risks, but at differing levels of likelihood. 
7.5.3. Associations between past and predicted disruption occurrences 
Past disruption types were compared in Table 7-2 with respondents’ expectations 
for port disruptions during the coming five years. This shows that respondents 
expect fewer port disruptions to occur in the near-term future. However, 
disruptions of human causality, cyber-threats and socio-political hazards opposed 
this trend. Despite 35% (13 respondents) having experienced nil disruptions during 
the past five years, only one respondent expected circumstances of nil disruptions 
for the coming five years. For the remainder of disruption categories listed, 
managers expected fewer occurrences in the future and nil recurrence of 
communications failure, environmental pollution and failure of crucial goods and 




Disruption Typologies (each column shows 
number of respondent nominations for each 
typology) 
Past 5 Years 
(actual) 
Predictions for 
Next 5 Years  
No disruption 10 1  
Operational - equipment failure or ship accident 15 6 
Human causality - deliberate or error 3 3 
Cyber security/ criminality 3 5 
Adverse natural event 19 12 
Socio-political intervention or restriction 1 9 
Financial constraint 1 11 
Communications failure or loss of critical data 2 0 
Infrastructure failure 11 6 
Environmental pollution or project delays, dredging 
constraints 
5 0 
Crucial goods and services supply constraints 2 0 
Table 7-2: Port disruption contingency table – comparison past five years (actual) with port 
predictions for next five years (Author). 
Respondents’ expectations of fewer disruptions in the future from previously 
experienced causalities appear to be inconsistent with the literature and 
intuitively, somewhat illogical (Guha-Sapir, Hoyois & Below 2014; Blaikie et al. 
2014; Arouri, Nguyen Youssef 2015; WEF 2018). Further, respondents overlook 
altogether the potential of future risks involving port communications, data 
management security and cloud system failure. Also overlooked is future potential 
for adverse environmental events, and the failure of crucial goods and services 
supply. To test whether inconsistencies exit between examples of past and future 
disruptions (categorical variables) a cross-tabulation test was performed.  
A limitation of cross-tabulation testing of Table 7-2 disruptions is that only three 
categories of disruption provide reported nominal values of five and over (shaded) 
and these involve operational, adverse natural event and infrastructure failure. 
Cyber-threat (also shaded) was added to this testing list despite its low levels of 
occurrence, because technology is increasingly important to critical infrastructure 
business continuity, inclusive of port operations (Meyer-Larsen & Müller 2018; 
Paté-Cornell et al. 2018). Further, the literature indicates that cyber-threat is a 
source of risk to port operations (Roth & Nakashima 2017; Tucci 2017).  
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A chi-square (χ2) test for independence compared four of the 37 respondents’ 
reported port disruptions, with the number of these disruption categories that 
they expected during the near-term future. The purpose of the test was to 
establish if evidence of a relationship exists between the observed numbers of 
disruptions and prediction numbers. The null hypothesis is that there is no 
significant relationship between past and future categories of disruption. Testing 
results are shown in Table 7-3, using one degree of freedom, 2X 2 tests of 
independence, and Phi (McDonald 2014). Yates correction was not used as this 
gives a high p-value for tests of independence. To make increased sense of data 
findings, McDonald (2014) suggests pooling variables with multiple categories 
containing few numbers, as is the case for seven of the port disruption hazards. 
This technique was added to the test, by pooling hazards of human causality, 
socio-political, financial, environmental, crucial goods and services failure under 
the heading of ‘other’. The null hypothesis (Ho) is that no relationship exists 
between past observances of the hazard categories, and predicted occurrences – 
that is, the evidence indicates that the two categorical variables are not related 
(Pallant 2016) 












5.385 .020 .038 .190 .270; .020 Weak 
Cyber-threat .561 .454 .711 .355 -.087; .454 Weak 
Adverse natural 
event 
2.72 .099 .157 .078 .192; .099 Strong 
Infrastructure 
failure 
1.909 .167 .269 .134 .161; .167 Nil 
Other 6.618 .010 .019 .009 -.299; .010 Nil 
Table 7-3: Chi-square test for independence between past disruptions and predictions (Author). 
Except for adverse natural event hazards, there is minimal relationship between 
the number of observed disruptions within specific categories and the predicted 
likelihood of similar disruptions occurring in the future. Further, the SPSS 
‘expected count’ figure for predicted hazard occurrences generally shows more 
than respondent predictions. An exception occurs with pooled hazards under the 
heading of ‘other’ where respondent concerns regarding perceptions of increasing 
likelihood for socio-political and financial constraints weights the outcome 
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towards future risks. In the case of these ‘other’ hazards, past occurrences of 
disruption were 27% less than what might be expected, whereas predicted 
occurrences for the near-term future were 21% higher than what might be 
expected. The disparity between the types and numbers of disruption experienced 
in the past, and general expectations for fewer of these disruptions in the short-
term future appears to be illogical, and perhaps worthy of further research. 
Whereas port managers’ self-reports of disruption causality in the past are likely 
to be verifiable, their predictions for the future are qualitative and subjective, and 
outcomes can only be verified at some time in the future. What can be shown is 
that predictions of future disruption occurrences are generally less than what 
might be expected based upon the numbers of previous events. The disparity 
might be partially explained by the concept that port managers are likely to 
conceptualise multiple, subjective, sometimes contradictory but equally plausible 
perspectives of future risk (Stirling 2007). The impact of an incorrect estimate of 
future risks and port vulnerabilities assumes importance when port managers 
conduct their operational risk assessments. An inadequate risk assessment 
process potentially results in less priority given to risks that deserve higher levels 
of treatment, or alternatively, of higher priority being afforded to less probable 
risks (Suter 2016). These possibilities are examined more closely in the next 
section. 
7.6. Port disruption management  
The process of assessing respondents’ self-reported performance capabilities 
against high consequence disruptions requires an understanding of risk 
management behaviour with past events, and how well these were managed, 
coupled with an estimation of whether similar risks might reoccur (Haimes 2016). 
For this reason, the survey questioned past emergency management capabilities 
and capacities, and sought forward-looking information related to port potential 
in treating and managing an uncertain risk environment. Managers were 
presented with a total of ten port-related hazard categories that were identified 
from the literature (including Jüttner, Peck & Christopher 2003; Ronza et al. 2003; 
Darbra & Casal 2004; Handfield 2007; Alderton 2013; Mazaheri et al. 2014; Burns 
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2015; Bichou 2018). Port management self-reports on their abilities to cope with 
these disruptions were analysed for relationships and commonalities and 
evaluated for factors indicative of their risk management capabilities and 
capacities. Respondents (n = 39) reported coping capabilities under the headings 
of either ‘coped, barely coped, unable to cope, somewhat unable to cope (external 
assistance required), unsure, or not applicable’. Their responses were coded and 
tested for internal consistency and reliability, with Cronbach alpha of .7330, n = 10 
items.  
The findings suggest that risk management analysis is not necessarily a cut and 
dried process of ranking the greatest number of respondents affected by the 
greatest number of disruptions. Some disruption categories might be managed 
relatively quickly and effectively, whereas managers might struggle to cope with 
others, or even need to call upon external assistance. A further limitation of this 
assessment is that hazard impacts and consequences might vary in severity and 
closeness, so that a minor category one cyclone, for example, might approach the 
port closer than a more severe weather event which is managed with less port 
downtime. 
Australian port abilities to cope with the hazards under consideration were 
assessed from self-reported disruption management information (Q10 of the 
survey questionnaire). In some instances, port managers held no recent 
experience with one or other categories of disruption and entered a ‘not 
applicable’ response. These not applicable reports were removed from 
calculations to leave a pool of managers who coped, those who barely coped, 
those who required external assistance to cope, and those who reported being 
unsure of their abilities to cope with various categories of disruption. Percentages 
were calculated for the pool of remaining participants, with the total for each 
category of disruption response at Figures 7-6 and 7-7 rounded up to 100%. 
Port disruptions were defined within the survey questionnaire as unexpected or 
unforeseen events that result in major impairment to a port’s operations for one 
day or longer. This time consideration served to filter a multitude of minor 
impairments to port operations, for example increasingly common experiences 
 192 
 
with short-term technology or equipment failures (Burns 2015). Only one 
respondent reported ‘unable to cope’ with a past disruption, and this related to 
third-party socio-political constraints against dredging, which was a matter 
possibly beyond the port’s capacity to redress.  
 
Figure 7-6: Respondent abilities to manage and recover from disruption categories (Author). 
Respondent abilities to manage and recover from disruptions vary in effectiveness 
according to disruption categories, as shown in Figure 7-7. Respondents who 
coped with disruptions are grouped into two levels – those who self-reported 
effective responses, and those who struggled to manage and recover, albeit 
successfully. Levels of effective response for those who managed effectively varied 
widely between 56-80% of respondent numbers, with lowest levels of 
effectiveness recorded against security breaches and the failure of crucial goods 
and service supply. The highest percentages of effective responses were recorded 
against hazards derived from human causality, adverse natural events, operational 
plant and equipment failure, and ship incident. For respondents who experienced 
difficulties in coping, most challenging hazards were noted as infrastructure 
failure, adverse natural events, and adverse socio-political events. However, the 
pattern graphed at previous Figure 7-6 shows that the two levels of coping abilities 
are associated, that is where the percentage of effective management is highest, 



























Figure 7-7 reflects self-reports of risk management limitations, where port 
managers either cannot manage a hazard unaided, or are doubtful of their coping 
abilities against specific disruptions. These reports provide indicators of both risk 
management capabilities and vulnerabilities to risk. Respondents involved in these 
reports need to engage in remedial action against the possibility of similar hazard 
categories reoccurring, and in improving relevant risk treatment capabilities 
(Leveson 2015). The three highest levels of hard to treat threat are the failure of 
crucial goods and service supply, adverse natural events, and security breaches.  
 
Figure 7 7: Respondent experiences with difficult port risk problems (Author). 
Few comparable benchmarks were found with which to compare these self-
reported levels of risk management competencies. Studies on US ports’ disaster 
planning and recovery (GAO 2007; Trepte & Rice 2014) have findings consistent 
with this research, in establishing that some US port authorities have difficulties 
in effectively coping with disruptions. Trepte and Rice (2014) note that these US 
port managers struggle to manage damage to critical infrastructure; in 
maintaining critical goods and services supplies, communicating with external 
stakeholders, port personnel and critical goods and services suppliers; and with 
engaging in interagency coordination and collaboration. These factors are also 
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A variable pattern of Australian port effectiveness against individual categories of 
disruption is also indicated in Figure 7-7, where managers appear to fare best 
when disruptions involve physical manifestations of consequences. Disruptions 
related to more intangible or covert causalities (for example cyber-threat) appear 
to be more difficult to manage, and respondent effectiveness in treating intangible 
risks is markedly less than for those of more tangible causality. The findings 
indicate four levels of port risk management outcomes, where port managers: 
a) respond, manage and recover from disruptions; 
b) respond, manage and recover from disruptions, but with difficulties; 
c) respond, manage and recover from disruptions with external assistance; 
or, 
d)  are unsure whether they can respond, manage and recover from these 
categories of disruption. 
These findings suggest that gaps exist in Australian port abilities to cope with high 
consequence disruptions, and that where these gaps exist, risk and security 
management improvements would be beneficial. 
7.7. Insurance and insurability 
Collier (2008) questions when the growth and increasingly adverse consequences 
of catastrophic risks (for example terrorism, natural adverse disasters and 
technological failures) might compel insurers to reconsider their levels of client 
coverage in some risk sectors. An adverse endpoint of such a review might be 
cessation of coverage (uninsurability), and reduced use of insurance for risk 
mitigation (Collier 2008). Insurability is a relevant consideration for port managers 
challenged by new and emerging risks of the 21st Century. Port 
authorities/corporations are, in general terms, insured by their State 
governments. For example, Western Australia’s RiskCover organisation insures 
against certain port risks, but places limitations and restrictions on the cover 
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provided2 to ports because the government categorises port authorities as ‘non-
inner budget sector agencies’. Q9 explores whether port managers employ 
insurance as a means of risk transfer and examines the roles of insurance in port 
disruption recoveries across eight categories of operational risk. The academic 
literature is largely silent on the use of insurance within Australian port risk 
management and resilience, however the Australian Critical Infrastructure 
Resilience Strategy (AG 2015, p. 13) appears to argue that insurance is not an 
acceptable answer to risk, and that more needs to be done in other areas: 
Other organisations are able to take out insurance or put in place other 
‘hedging’ arrangements to manage risk…(and) make a decision to 
discontinue normal operations until the threat dissipated, or things returned 
to normal. (For) critical infrastructure organisations, this approach is not 
appropriate and the Government has a role to assist critical infrastructure 
organisations enhance their ability to manage unforeseen or unexpected 
hazards. 
This suggests that infrastructure operators (inclusive of ports) should concentrate 
on strengthening their resilience capabilities to remain operating in disruptive 
conditions, rather than look to insurance as either a risk transfer opportunity or a 
source of financial assistance in disruption recovery (AG 2015). Additionally, port 
managers are reminded by Clark and Hakim (2017) that insurance might cover 
certain critical infrastructure risks (for only certain aspects of risk), but will not 
cover intangible losses, for example losing port customers or reduced reputation 
or goodwill. O’Hare, White and Connelly (2016) suggest that reliance upon 
insurance is counterproductive because this reliance engenders a mindset that 
more readily accepts risky behaviour and resists change after crises. They argue 
that reliance upon insurance and is more attuned to an organisational return to 
the status-quo rather than adaptive reconfiguration of risk management 
                                                     
 
2 See web site:  https://www.icwa.wa.gov.au/riskcover/what-is-covered  
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behaviour. However, with ports’ increasing exposure to multiple hazards (Lam & 
Lassa 2017), then insurance appears to be important in financing a port recovery 
from disruption.  
The research assesses port managers’ opinions on insurance cover as a partial 
means of mitigating or transferring a level of risk to another party. Port managers 
express both a high level of uncertainty and a lack of knowledge regarding 
insurability of a range of disruption risk drawn from the literature review. This 
mindset is consistent with other studies, which find that respondents experience 
ambiguity and uncertainty concerning organisational disruption insurance (Brown, 
Seville & Vargo 2013; Verdon-Kidd, Kiem & Willgoose 2016). The global Business 
Continuity Institute (Alcantara, Riglietti & Aguada 2017) establishes that while 65% 
of its surveyed supply chain members incurred at least one disruption to their 
operations during 2017, most of these disruptions were not insured.  
Q9 comprises two exploratory components – reliance upon insurance in lieu of 
employing mitigation measures, and port managers’ opinions about the extent 
and likelihood of insurance assistance for disruption recovery. In considering 
whether ports might rely upon insurance as a substitute for in-house mitigation 
measures for managing disruption risks, only 15% gave credence to this possibility 
(n = 34). Figure 7-8 shows respondent opinions on the reliability of insurance in 
covering multiple aspects of risks, suggestive that overall, few port managers are 





Figure 7-8: Port expectations on insurance coverage likelihood (Author). 
The best-case scenarios are that half the respondents expect insurance to cover 
them for the consequences of severe weather events and fire. The least likely 
disruption types to be covered by insurance are cyber-attack, unplanned 
shutdowns, and industrial strife - with a lowest level expectation of 4.9% for 
unplanned shutdowns. 
7.7.1. Insurance against individual disruption categories 
Port dependencies upon ICT technologies for their operations, systems, 
equipment and records create in-depth vulnerabilities to cyber-threats and 
malware (DiRenzo, Goward & Roberts 2015; Newberry 2015). Increased exposure 
to these risk categories is negatively associated with dependability of insurance 
cover, with only seven of thirty-six respondents expressing confidence that 
insurance will cover unexpected/unforeseen and cyber risks. Managers’ 
expectations for insurance against cyber-threat might improve in the short term, 
once insurance companies begin to provide specific policies that cover the 
consequences of cyber-attack (Brasington & Park 2016). 
The rapidly evolving nature of emerging technologies and growth in technology-
based risks means that ports are severely challenged timewise in identifying, 
assessing and preparing for these risks (WEF 2018). This ‘unknowable’ challenge 
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also affects insurers, who, when unable to identify and estimate the likelihood, 
consequences and costs of cyber-attack and related risks, are unlikely to offer 
cover for this ambiguous category of risk, or to compensate for its consequences 
(Diebold, Doherty & Herring 2010). Whereas cyber-risk is a new and emerging risk 
that is likely to grow, ports encounter difficulties in obtaining adequate insurance 
cover for reasons of: 1) capped maximum policy value; 2) multiple policy 
exclusions; 3) indirect losses not covered; and, 4) policy complexities (Biener, Eling 
& Wirfs 2015).  
Port infrastructure insurance has three primary foci (Rinaldi 2004; Nasiruzzaman, 
Pota & Islam 2011; Marsh 2014):  
a) physical aspects of the damage involving clean-up and removal costs of non-
repairable material, and subsequent repair and replacement;  
b) reduced revenue stream and a consequential possibility of permanently 
losing customers and market share while either the port area is 
incapacitated, or port operations halt due to reliance upon incapacitated 
regional infrastructures (for example electrical power grid); and,  
c) potential claims upon the port for liability compensation, including injury 
and/or damage, corporate liabilities, pollution cleanup, or industrial relations 
claims for workers compensation.   
Critical infrastructure failure involving property damage or damage to plant and 
equipment are relatively common forms of insurable risk items (Rose & Huyck 
2016) and from an insurer’s perspective, the insurability process is relatively easy 
to identify and quantify (Kunreuther & Pauly 2009). In this research, respondents 
appear to be confident of insurance meeting recovery needs in consequence of 
infrastructure, plant and equipment damage or loss. Unplanned port shutdowns 
differ from shutdowns for planned maintenance reasons, because with the 
former, port managers and port users typically have very little or nil notice of the 
disruptive event that precipitates shutdown. Lam and Su (2015) establish that 
southern Asian and east Asian ports incur an increasing number of shutdowns 
from both natural disasters and labour stoppages from industrial strife. The effects 
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of a port shutdown might affect the adjoining regional economy, while the port is 
potentially exposed to financial losses, loss of business, and demurrage payments 
for ship delays (Mandaraka-Sheppard 2014; Rose & Wei 2013). Of note, port 
managers’ expectations that their State-provided insurance would not cover an 
unplanned shutdown (Figure 7-8) is inconsistent with industry at large, which 
employs business interruption insurance against financial losses from issues with 
plant and equipment, failure of critical goods and services suppliers, or port-
centric supply chain impediments (Rose & Huyck 2016).  
The correlation coefficients between respondents’ expectations for insurance 
coverage for differing risk categories are calculated to be primarily weak to 
moderate (for example .191 -> .493 using Kendall’s TAU-b and Spearman’s rho) 
and this variability and inconsistency suggests that their existing insurance 
coverages are not framed within a single pool of port authorities. An insurance 
pool consists of multiple similarly insured cases exposed to a common hazard, 
which permits insurers to control their level of exposure. They are enabled to do 
this through ability to predictively calculate the mean frequency and mean 
severity of potential losses (Dorfman & Cather 2012). Dorfman and Cather (2012) 
describe how organisations might consider paying an increased premium as a 
specified risk grows, but as the cost correspondingly escalates then organisations 
begin to drop out of the pool - particularly if they consider that a risk is of low 
probability.  
Australian ports are geographically spread across seven State jurisdictions and 
insurance schemes, and individual states might not contemplate covering the risks 
of another state’s ports.  Also, whereas insurance pooling might be beneficial to 
Australian ports, Biener, Eling and Wirfs (2015) note in the context of insurable 
and uninsurable risks that incongruent risk characteristics preclude efficient 
insurer pooling. This is particularly so with small risk pools and dynamic hazards 
whose nature cannot be readily quantified. If this uninsured or uninsurable 
situation is the case with Australian ports, then in the absence of insurance the 
ports need to establish focused and effective mitigation strategies and risk 
management capabilities. As the Australian government suggests, insurance may 
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not be an entirely acceptable solution for critical infrastructure risk management 
problems (AG 2015). 
7.7.2. Other studies on insurance coverage 
In composite, port managers have mixed expectations of insurance coverage for 
the consequences of disruption, as shown in Figure 7-9. The reported least likely 
categories to be covered by insurance are unplanned shutdowns and industrial 
strife, and McNab (2015) describes these as common events in Australian ports. 
Risk characteristics and insurability of unplanned port shutdowns and industrial 
strife are examined by Lam and Su (2015) who conclude that insurance policies 
against major disruptions may be prohibitively expensive, if obtainable. 
Similarities exist between the impact and consequences of unplanned port 
shutdowns and the uncertainties of industrial strife - both are random disruptive 
events with unexpected occurrence (Gurning & Cahoon 2009; Lam & Su 2015).  
7.8. Port hazards 
Previously identified port hazards are reviewed from the perspectives of senior 
port executives, and these perspectives provide some insights into Australian port 
risk identification and vulnerability assessment processes. Multiple port hazards 
involve human causality from either an accidental or deliberate perspective, which 
leads the anthropogenic factor to become of multi-hazard/multi-risk concern for 
port managers (Kappes 2012; Gallina et al. 2016). The anthropogenic impact on 
the port risk environment is common to operations failure, security incidents, 
socio-political incidents, activism, financial risk, and crucial goods and services 
supplier failures. For these reasons, the human causality category of risk is 
discussed below within the context of its individual risks, rather than from a more 
challenging and complex multi-hazard and multi- level analysis perspective (Liu et 
al. 2015; Gimenez, Labaka & Hernantes 2017). 
7.8.1. Operations failure – equipment, technology, ship accident 
Port operations are dependent upon equipment, technology and systems 
employed by the ship or shore side of port operations (Burns 2015). One 
respondent comments that inhouse ability to cope with disruption is impaired 
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when the failure is related to ‘critical services provided by external providers - 
maintenance that has been outsourced, IT services, outsourced HR recruitment’. 
This reliance on external providers and consequent vulnerability possibly relates 
to an external assistance requirement reported by five other respondents. 
Another respondent reported difficulty in managing disruptions that originates 
outside port-controlled land or waters, but with consequences that impact upon 
port operations. Again, this relates to vulnerability involving external parties and 
critical goods and services supply and a side issue relates to bringing specialist 
assistance to site. Delays in repairing failed or damaged equipment in remote 
areas was an issue noted by another port, whereby ‘remote locality and limited 
access to sufficient technical expertise results in exacerbated delays’.  
7.8.2. Security breaches  
Security breaches, inclusive of sabotage, criminality, or cyber-attack are an 
increasing feature of 21st Century risk management and intuitively, this category 
is associated with disruptions of human causality (Rubin 1998; WEF 2018; AG 
2017). When risks are viewed in order of coping difficulties, ‘security’ disruptions 
reportedly affect the least number of respondents, but conversely, the findings 
indicate that security breaches represent the most difficult type of risk to manage. 
Since the 2001 attacks upon US soil by Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda, security 
became an increasingly specific focus of national and international critical 
infrastructure risk management (Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly & Jarvis 2015). This 
focus eventually resulted in the formation of an Australian Department of 
Homeland Security (Viellaris & Osborne 2017). Other studies link counter-
terrorism/radicalism hazards with those capable of harming ICT systems and 
operational/business dependencies upon cyber systems (Alcaraz & Zeadally 2015). 
This broadening of security focus incorporates Cloud data storage, computer 
usage, and data integrity, which researchers regard as crucial to the effectiveness 
of critical infrastructure operations and the utilisation of associated systems and 
equipment (Sookhak et al. 2017; Tucci 2017). 
Sixty-five percent of respondents (n = 38, 65% = 25) experienced security breaches 
during the past five years, sufficient to affect the reliability of their port 
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operations, resources, capabilities and infrastructure. Forty percent (10) of these 
25 respondents reported difficulties in coping with security breaches. These 
outcomes are addressed in non-parametric testing that found significant 
correlation and covariance when port risk management performance against 
security breaches is compared against the nine other disruption hazards reviewed. 
7.8.3. Adverse natural events 
Increasingly severe weather events, plus resultant storm surge and floods pose a 
seasonal threat to Australian port operations. Ports in northern Australia are 
subject to cyclones, while southern ports are vulnerable to storm fronts, southerly 
lows, hail and electrical storms (Ng et al. 2013a; Allen, Karoly & Walsh 2014; Walsh 
et al. 2016). Respondents report on their abilities to manage adverse natural 
events during the past five years (n = 39). Seven were unable to cope when a 
disruption overwhelmed their response capabilities, for example a cyclone that 
impacted north Queensland closed multiple ports until severe flooding receded 
and repairs became possible (Tracey 2011). Twenty-seven respondents reported 
that they effectively managed all adverse weather events. Five others reported 
that they had not experienced adverse natural events during the past five years. 
Some port managers acknowledge the inevitability of harm arising from natural 
events, and pre-emptive port closure action is taken by managers accustomed to 
cyclonic weather patterns. This weather-related port shut-down process is 
adaptable to ports outside the cyclone zone, for example Flinders Ports in South 
Australia employed pre-emptive port closure in managing the onset of a severe 
storm (Kavina 2017, np): 
When long-range weather forecasts showed that a super-storm was heading 
for South Australia, Flinders Ports activated its safety management plan for 
adverse weather. The storm posed a major hazard to people and assets, so 
Flinders Ports took the unprecedented step of closing all seven of its ports 
for 48-hours, when the storm battered the State at the end of September… 
No-one was injured and there was no major damage to our assets or 
equipment at any of our ports. Being prepared and making safety the top 
priority was the key to a positive outcome. 
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7.8.3.1. Climate change - a multi-risk assessment approach 
Respondents appear to have low expectations of climate change hazards for the 
future; quantitative data indicates that climate change consequences are of least 
concern to port managers, with only seven of thirty-eight acknowledging such 
disruptions as very likely, and five as somewhat likely. Qualitatively, even weaker 
opinion emerges, when from two separate questions only one respondent reports 
climate change as a likely hazard. The impact and manifestation of climate change 
consequences is said to exacerbate the severity of adverse natural events – for 
example storms, floods and droughts (Gallina et al. 2016). Climate change is 
regarded as either a multi-hazard risk or a multi-risk concept that encompasses 
the total risk from multiple hazards (Kappes et al. 2012; Garcia-Aristizabal & 
Marzocchi 2015; Gallina et al. 2016). Kappes et al. (2012) describe the multi-
hazard challenges and complexities in visualising and ranking the large quantity of 
information related to natural hazards or risks. For these reason, Gallina et al. 
(2016, p. 123) argue that: 
Usually a hazard by hazard approach is considered for evaluating the 
consequences of individual natural and climate related hazards (e.g. heavy 
precipitation events, droughts, floods, debris flows, landslides, storm 
surges) on vulnerable systems. 
From a multi-risk perspective, climate change within this thesis is regarded as a 
generic risk, or category of risk rather than a specific risk event. A detailed multi-
hazards study of climate change and its influences upon Australian ports is beyond 
the scope of this study. For this reason, climate change was disregarded from the 
analysis. 
7.8.4. Socio-political disruptions 
Socio-political risks have far-reaching potential to impact organisations, systems, 
and risk management thinking and behaviour. This category of risk might arise 
from multiple sources, for example, government intervention, public and local 
community anti-industry sentiment, environmental activists, corruption, and 
deliberate harmful acts (Bekefi & Epstein 2006; Connor 2012). Organisational 
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abilities to identify and assess these social and political hazards can be shaped by 
how managers perceive risks and uncertainties (Assmuth, Hildén & Benighaus 
2010; Strang, Korstanje & Vajjhala 2018).  Australian ports are subject to diverse 
socio-political risks and disruptions related to their onshore and offshore 
operational interests, including changes in political decisions, community 
opposition, strikes, protests, radicalism, seabed boundary disputes, ocean 
resource disputes, radicalisation of disaffected persons (Paton, Kelly & Doherty 
2006; Guild 2009; Dauvergne & LeBaron 2014; Kaye 2015; Anton 2017; Boin, ‘t 
Hart, Stern & Sundelius 2017). Respondents reported that political reforms, 
changes and interventions were of increasing concern now and for the future, 
particularly in relation to port reform, regulation and privatisation. Self-reported 

















or IR issues 
18= 46.2% 7= 17.9% 1= 2.6% 0 3= 7.7% 10= 25.6% 
Table 7-4: Port abilities for coping with socio-political disruptions (Author). 
Twenty-nine respondents encountered socio-political disruptions and of these 
seven barely coped, three were unsure about how well their situations were 
resolved, and one organisation was unable to cope. In trying to understand the 
reasons for the difficulties in managing this risk, the research turned to Everett 
(2003) who argues that State government port owners might apply informal 
political interference (Ministerial and departmental) in port management. Bailey 
and Peetz (2014) describe industrial relations situations at some Australian 
resource export ports as ‘volatile’ and port managers are known to be frequently 
challenged by industrial relations, social activism and port reform risks (Pigna 
2014; Davidson 2016; Toscano 2016). Other studies indicate that improvements in 
this aspect of hazard management might arise with better understandings of 
human motivation for engaging in deliberate adverse acts, sabotage, criminality, 
terrorism, activism, threatening behaviour, and issue-oriented violence 
(Vanderheiden 2008; Borum & Neer 2017). In the case of ports, such an 
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understanding might motivate the preparation of hazard-specific mitigation and 
response strategies and techniques.  
7.8.5. Financial risk 
Port financial risks, as with other organisations, might arise from cost overspend, 
fraud, theft, data theft, record keeping and storage safety, financial instability, 
banking transaction failure, or financial information discrepancies (Shiller 2009). 
Financial disruption might also be consequential to disruptions involving other 
factors with potential to impact port business or customers. Findings of this 
research indicate that the possibility of financial disruption can be associated with 
that of commercial and political risk - not surprisingly so, since Australian port 
finances are derived from commercial transactions and capital expenditure 
requires State government approvals (Birrell 2016). Of thirty-nine respondents, 27 
reported experiencing financial problems during the past five years, with 20.5% 
(8) not coping well, and a further two ports required external assistance. Sufficient 
qualitative information from thirteen of thirty-nine respondents establishes an 
association between financial risk, socio-political and commercial risk. Survey 
respondents reported in open-ended answers that: 
1) ‘There is a challenging economic outlook’;  
2) ‘Access to capital has become more difficult due to the State Government's 
budget challenges. I expect pressure will only increase in coming years’;  
3) ‘Lack of budget by State government’;  
4) ‘Trade is unreliable, funding is hard to come by or have committed due to 
the unreliable trade’;  
5) Loss of business due to shipping industry downturns’;  
6) ‘Revenue reduction – supply chains seeking diversification of services 
products (and) sourcing new markets for services’; and, 
7) ‘The industry has been going through a difficult downturn over the last 3 
years’. 
Financial disruption whether as a singular risk, or as the consequence of other 




7.8.6. Information communications and technology 
Business continuity management requires port data backup capabilities plus 
availability of an alternate communications, data and records system that is 
regularly updated from daily records. The Business Continuity Institute (BCI 2008, 
Section 3, p. 5) argues the necessity for ensuring that: 
Electronic and other records are duplicated at another geographically 
separated location in a form that allows them to be accessible and recovered 
for use within business-defined timescales. 
Port communications in their many forms are crucial to the success or failure of 
multiple processes. These include ongoing operations, business relationships and 
contractual arrangements, enablement of critical goods and services, emergency 
management, and community engagement (Cahoon 2004). The port’s information 
and communications systems enable ports to monitor frontline and support 
processes, plus the external supply chain environment, for potential points of 
failure or inefficient practices (Cahoon 2004). Weick and Sutcliffe (2015) describe 
this process as ‘organisational mindfulness’ towards early warning against 
unexpected disruptions. Disruption to the port’s communications system carries 
broad adverse implications for all aspects of intermodal operations, and the 
respondents’ ability to cope with past disruption to communications systems and 















21= 53.8% 5= 12.8% 4= 10.3%  4= 10.3% 4= 10.3% 
Table 7-5: Abilities to cope with communications systems and/or services failure (Author).  
The port is reliant on externally located critical goods and services providers for its 
telecommunications, internet services and ICT infrastructure. Respondents 
acknowledge that disruption to these providers readily impacts port operations, 
for example loss of ability to transact electronic documentation or to arrange 
shipping operations with ship agents and freight forwarders (Cahoon 2004). 
Internal communication systems, and potential for silo management were also 
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problematic to port managers, where ‘it is not so much an issue with not being 
able to cope with a particular event, we find issues around communication to be 
our biggest hindrance (related to people's training and preparedness)’. 
Information and communications technology systems (ICT) are additionally at risk 
to deliberate harmful intent involved with cyber-threats, an increasingly likely risk 
for port operations (Renn 2014; WEF 2018). ICT equipment and systems form part 
of a port’s infrastructure and superstructure, inclusive of dedicated computer 
systems that are drivers and controllers of port plant and equipment (Burns 2015). 
According to one respondent, Australian port ICT systems reliability is viewed ‘not 
only as a technological process, human involvement can be an exacerbating issue’.  
7.8.7. Infrastructure failure 
Port vulnerabilities arising from infrastructure failure might have multiple causes 
(Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru 2009; Urlainis et al. 2014; Pescaroli & Alexander 2016). 
This thesis finds that port infrastructure disruption has extensivey challenged 
respondents, with 28.3% either barely coping, requiring external assistance, or 
being unsure of how effective eventual recovery was to normal operations, as 
shown in Table 7-6. Qualitative responses reveal that concern is felt about the 
reliability of external infrastructure upon which external goods and services 
suppliers are reliant. Infrastructure reliability requires frequent maintenance, 
repair and replacement (Tsinker 2004) and several of the respondents express 
their concerns about State government constraints in the use of operational and 
capital expenditure on these works. Port authority managers are, to varying 
extents, reliant upon State government approval to spend money on 
infrastructure repair and maintenance. They are also controlled by State 
government fee regulations in what they can charge port users to utilise this 
infrastructure, for example harbour dues and wharfage (Everett 2007; Bandara & 
Nguyen 2015). The financing of port infrastructure disruption recovery may also 
























1= 2.6% 4= 10.3% 0 4= 10.3% 
Table 7-6: Ability of respondents to cope with Infrastructure failure: n= 39. 
Recovery from infrastructure failure is also made complex because replacing key 
items like gantry cranes at a container port involves long lead times, due to 
sourcing from overseas. Notteboom (2007) notes that the Chinese manufacturer 
ZPMC is the predominant global gantry crane supplier and typically carries full 
order books. As previously discussed, respondents are unsure whether insurance 
will cover the repair or replacement costs of damage to port-centric infrastructure. 
Qualitative data gathered in Q6 provides a degree of association between port 
management concerns about economic stress, aging infrastructure, insufficient 
funds for infrastructure maintenance, plus a decreasing ability of State 
governments to assist in capital funding requirements.  
7.8.8. Environmental disruptions 
Port managers are challenged in their environmental management and 
sustainability capabilities and capacities, due to the multitude of port users, 
leaseholders, service providers and community recreational users whose 
interactions with port processes and activities add to the cumulative port risks of 
environmental harm (Rondinelli & Berry 2000; Dinwoodie, Tuck & Knowles 2012; 
Lam & Lai 2015). These challenges contribute to Australian port managers’ past 
















26= 66.7% 2= 
5.1% 
2= 5.1% 3= 7.7% 0 6= 15.4% 
Table 7-7: Ability of respondents to cope with environmental disruption to operations. 
Environmental disruptions are relatively commonplace, with eighty four percent 
of respondents experiencing environmental incidents at their ports during the past 
five years. Environmental incidents are heavily regulated with a proliferation of 
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State and national government regulatory measures, industry codes of conduct, 
plus public and private sector pressures for increased environmental sustainability 
within the port industry (Acciaro et al. 2014; Puig, Wooldridge & Darbra 2014; Di 
Vaio & Varriale 2018). Arguably, port management capabilities in managing 
environmental issues become a public ‘face’ of the port, and from a sustainability 
perspective, port managers need to consider the impact and image of port 
operations upon the local community and wider society. Respondents comment 
upon environmental activist risk, and an important risk management 
consideration might be towards prevention and mitigation of environmental 
problems, to minimise potential for socio-political consequences and reputational 
harm.  
Unexpectedly, the qualitative data gathered from this survey provides little 
evidence of port management concern about future ‘environmental’ and ‘adverse 
natural event’ risks whereas the quantitative data indicates otherwise.  
7.8.9. Crucial goods and services supplier failure 
This section examines Australian port capabilities and capacities in managing 
critical goods and services provider downtime, with port coping experiences 
shown in Table 7-8 (n = 39). Crucial goods and services suppliers are a key element 
in maintaining port operations business continuity and the effectiveness of port 
operational performance (Waidringer & Lumsden 1998; Gurning & Cahoon 2011a; 
Thai & Chen 2011; MacKenzie 2012). When Cyclone Debbie floods severely 
impacted critical supporting infrastructure of Queensland ports, the ports lost 
hinterland road and rail connectivity, plus their access to goods and services 
suppliers and customers (Lam 2017; Reynolds 2017). Consequently, ports waited 
upon recoveries of crucial goods and services suppliers’ infrastructure and 
superstructure before port operations could resume (Reynolds 2017). A similar 
event and recovery delay while waiting on external stakeholder recoveries was 
experienced by the US Port of NYNJ following the consequences of Hurricane 

















19= 48.7% 5= 12.8% 3= 7.7% 4= 10.3% 8= 20.5% 
Table 7-8: Port effectiveness in coping with critical goods and services provider failure (Author). 
The survey revealed that across all categories of port disruption management, loss 
of crucial goods and services supply demonstrated the highest requirement for 
external assistance. This might be expected since crucial goods and services 
suppliers are primarily organisations located external to the port, and replacement 
of these providers requires managers to source alternative external suppliers (if 
available).  
7.9. Identifying future hazards 
A comparison was performed earlier in this chapter between port managers 
perceptions of past disruptions and their expectations for these disruption 
categories to recur in the future (S 7.4.3.). The association between these 
categorical variables was evaluated by a Chi-square test for independence and is 
now evaluated through qualitative means. 
7.9.1. Qualitative analysis of future risk predictions 
Respondents’ expectations of risks to arise during the next five years are acquired 
in free-form format from Q7 (n= 38) and Q12 (n= 31), and qualitative analysis 
performed with Dedoose software as shown in Figure 7-9. As with the quantitative 
data acquired from closed questions, socio-political risk figures prominently, 
followed by financial, technology changes and commercial risks. The scale of 
response is colour coded to establish the relative strengths of co-occurrence 




Figure 7-9: Qualitative comparative analysis of respondent predictions for future risks (Author). 
Multiple respondents to Q12 expressed their concern about the impacts of port 
reform and privatisation upon port management, concurrent consequences of 
reducing finances, and a loss of control and authority in their regulatory tasks. This 
occurs concurrently with national and State governments increasing port 
regulatory roles, responsibilities and complexities (Chen & Everett 2014). Port 
management responsibilities for maintaining ageing infrastructure, plant and 
equipment in an era of financial constraints was of widespread respondent 
concern. The rapid pace of technology change gives rise to potential future 
problems in coping with increasing vessel sizes, and one manager raised the 
possibility of having to finance the provision of LNG fuel bunkering facilities for 
new construction vessels. Internal staff abilities to cope with rapid technology 
change was questioned by five respondents, and a common concern was raised 
that in a time of personnel downsizing, the rate of data throughput and complexity 
of operations within ports are increasing. The possibility of automation to perform 
pilotage and towage tasks and/or leading towards crewless vessels was raised as 
a potential source of concern by six respondents, but without discussion of any 
likely consequences of failure.   
Concerns about political influences upon port management functions and ‘further 
changes to Port Authorities roles and responsibilities’ are revealing, for example 
one respondent comment is that:  
Fragmentation of emergency responsibilities between multiple government 
departments and authorities may inhibit an effective co-ordinated 
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emergency response. Our organisation is too small to fill that potential 
response void.  
Another respondent observed that ‘increasing governance and external control is 
introducing bureaucracy that a medium sized company has limited resources to 
support’ while another noted that ‘Government changes introduce uncertainty in 
emergency management procedures and command and control arrangements’. 
Steele, Hussey and Dovers (2017) argue that apportioning risk management roles 
and responsibilities across partially government/partially private sector critical 
infrastructure agencies is problematic, and particularly so in dealing with the risks 
of new and emerging hazard events.  
Respondent concerns about government risk management change initiatives 
might arise from Australian government efforts to break down ‘established, and 
sometimes entrenched, boundaries between agencies, sectors and levels of 
operation’ that might impede an increase in critical infrastructure resilience 
(Rogers 2011, p. 55). At this comparatively early phase of critical infrastructure 
resilience planning (AG 2017), potential exists for some port managers to be 
unaware of government resilience plans and intentions, while government 
planners might not be cognisant of port management risk management capability 
limitations, or of any port management unawareness of national resilience plans 
and inaugurating processes. 
In summation, the findings suggest that port managers are aware of new and 
emerging risk challenges, and that these new challenges might arise within 
operational, socio-political, technology, commercial and financial contexts.  
7.9.2. Business continuity preparedness 
Q13 employs a Yes/No format to ascertain whether respondents (n= 38) have 
instigated five business continuity preparedness factors identified by Hiles (2011). 
The findings (Figure 7-10) suggest that respondents are generally aware of what 
core operational capabilities are necessary for effective business continuity. They 
are less cognisant of the longest tolerable period of operational downtime they 
might have for disruption recovery, or of how effective their emergency 
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operations centre might be in the absence of normal operational premises and 
systems. 
 
Figure 7-10: Preparedness for port business continuity (Author). 
Few respondents (13: 34.2%) have established a real-time risk monitoring system, 
despite key risk indicators, like key performance indicators, being a well-
established tool to establish the effectiveness of operational risk management 
performance (Scandizzo 2005; Gaudenzi & Borghesi 2006). Only twenty-one 
respondents (55%) had implemented such a system and mapped their key risk 
indicators. 
7.9.3. Transition from ‘business as usual’ to disruption management mode 
Q14 qualitatively explores how management prepares port employees to switch 
quickly from 'business as usual' to a disruption management mode of operations 
(n = 35). Table 7-9 illustrates that five respondents acknowledge significant 
deficiencies within their business continuity preparations, while others report low 
levels of disruption management preparedness. Four reports on insufficiency of 
employee training and exercises include:  
a) ‘The port should conduct sufficient contingency trials and exercises. 
however, the terminal operator does not have the expertise or desire 
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b) ‘We run desk top exercises, but we need to run more on the ground 
exercises’;  
c) From a port reform perspective one respondent reports that: ‘We no 
longer have port employees’; and, more succinctly,  
d) ‘We don’t’.  
Business continuity factor Respondent reports 
Acknowledged business continuity inadequacies 5 
Training and exercises 23 
Strategies and plans in place or in progress 19 
Engaged workforce 4 
Communications and leadership 3 
Dedicated business continuity team 3 
Collaboration with external entities 3 
Business resilience program in progress 1 
Ongoing vulnerability assessments 1 
Total reports: 62 
Table 7-9: Port business continuity preparedness measures (Author). 
Twenty-three respondents describe their training and exercise regimes, which 
vary from desktop drills through to onsite scenario-based exercises. The survey 
questionnaire apparently reached one manager at a time when the port was 
reviewing its disruption management program; the manager comments that:  
Part of our new framework that will be rolled out in the next few months - 
we have an extensive training and exercising program being established. We 
have also developed port continuity plans (which will) assist with quick 
decision making by providing matrices to pre-evaluated scenarios. We are 
also working with our stakeholders to ensure infrastructure is suited to meet 
their requirements in the event of a disruption. 
Port managers’ training and exercise programs encompass key disruption 
management components of response, management and recovery with one 
respondent noting that staff undertake: ‘Training in incident management, 
business continuity and crisis management, (provided by) drills and practice’. 
Others note the importance of: ‘Training and empowering’; ‘Training and drills for 
emergency response plans’; and, more emphatically, ‘Training exercises, and more 
training exercises’. Signs of a positive risk management culture emerge with 
comments of: ‘Training and good leadership’; ‘Training and empowering’; ‘In-
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house emergency response training combined with ports current can do attitude’; 
‘Good communications and leadership’; ‘Good procedures and regular exercises’; 
‘An engaged workforce’; and, ‘Procedures and responsibilities for tasks required 
to keep the business running or to get it back up and running are documented, 
discussed and tested’. 
7.9.4. Small ports’ disruption management preparedness 
The marine publication Guide to Port Entry (Witherby 2018) indicates that at least 
twenty single operator ports, terminals and installations are located either on the 
Australian mainland, at Australian territorial or external territory islands, or at 
offshore installations within Australia’s exclusive economic zone. Little is known 
about the disruption management capabilities of these smaller Australian port 
organisations, consisting of single operator ports, terminals or offshore 
installations. One respondent noting that a terminal operator ‘…does not have the 
expertise or desire to undertake these necessary activities’ is suggestive of a safety 
culture mindset that regards risk management as someone else’s responsibility. 
Two of Australia’s largest port fires and hydrocarbon releases occurred at single 
operator offshore facilities, and both incidents required extensive external 
disruption management assistance (Bower-White 2012). A comparison between 
small port risk management processes and those of large ports appears to be 
worthy of future research but is beyond the scope of this study. 
7.9.5. Scheduling emergency management training, drills and exercises 
Australia’s national security and emergency management preparedness is based 
upon the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015:2030, and 
Emergency Management Australia (EMA) is a division within the national 
Attorney-General’s Department with responsibilities for national security and 
emergency management capability. The Australian Emergency Planning Manual 
43 (EMA 2004) notes that emergency management training and exercises perform 
an important role in testing plans and capabilities, and in maintaining 
organisational awareness of risk throughout extended periods of minimal crisis. 
Further, emergency and business continuity exercises are essential to testing plans 
following changes affecting either staffing, operations, or the risk environment. 
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Other reasons for training, drills and exercises include enhancing managers’ 
communications, coordination and collaboration skills on an internal basis, and 
externally, to test management skills, capabilities, capacities and resources 
sharing with regional emergency management entities under simulated 
emergency conditions. Respondents indicate that their emergency management 
preparedness generally evolve around a framework that reflects EMA guidelines. 
Port emergency management teams also participate in national strategic and 
operational oil spill training exercises, for example Exercise Westwind in 2015 and 
Exercise van Diemen in 2016 (AMSA 2018). A sequential emergency preparedness 
framework is prepared from an interpretation of respondent reports as shown in 
Figure 7-11.  
 
Figure 7-11: Port emergency preparedness framework (Author). 
One port’s contingency training follows a formal framework:  
Emergency response is conducted at least monthly, crisis management at 
least twice a year, (and) desktop exercises at least monthly.  
Another respondent reports a ‘bottom up’ training format that potentially might 
be improved with top-down participation:  
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Operationally - emergency response exercises, fire, and oil, and security 
drills partially address leading edges of disruption but there has been no 
full disruption training involving the full executive and or Board.  
The reported frequency of emergency management and business continuity 
training (n= 37) provides interesting information on the dichotomy between 
managers reporting nil disruption training (6= 16.2%) and those who schedule 
training sessions quarterly or more (10= 27%).  The response spread is shown in 
Figure 7-12. One outlier respondent reported that their port conducted disruption 
training at three-yearly intervals but gave no reason for this frequency. Drills and 
exercises are part of the port training system, in which drills are practised regularly 
to test specific emergency capabilities or functions (firefighting, first aid, security 
response) whereas exercises are held at longer intervals to test and review 
knowledge, capabilities, capacities, personnel availability, and adequacy of 
resources (Haddow, Bullock & Coppola 2017). In summation, annual disruption 
response training is preferred by the largest group of port managers (14= 37.8%) 
however a slightly larger group adheres to a more rigorous training routine of 
multiple sessions each year (17= 45.9%). The minority group reporting nil 
disruption training is suggestive of an Australian critical infrastructure 
vulnerability. Mindset change towards such training potentially offers opportunity 
for a low-cost improvement to port sector risk management effectiveness. 
 




















With port authorities increasingly managing multiple ports (either under direct 
government departmental auspices or because of port reform and amalgamation) 
one respondent noted that the number and types of disruption response training 
varies from port to port under the port authority’s regulatory control.  
7.10. Disruption responses 
This section of the data analysis explores port perceptions about maintaining 
operational services during and following a disruptive event from Questions 16, 
17 and 18 which provide quantitative and qualitative data related to questions 
arising from the literature review.  
7.10.1. Assets and services 
Respondents’ opinions in Q16 (n = 36) were tested with a frequency analysis 
(outputs shown in Figure 7-13) for importance of port assets and services in 
support of business continuity. The port’s core business continuity reliance rests 
internally with its plant and equipment, ICT systems, electrical power and key 
personnel. External support inputs (reported as lower albeit essential priorities) 
are: 1) transportation services, 2) water and waste water services, 3) critical goods 
and services supply, and 4) fuel. 
 
Figure 7-13: Port assets and services critical to operational business continuity (Author). 
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Respondents free-form notes accompanying Q16 include acknowledgement that 
port assets and services ‘are not just important, but crucial’ to business continuity, 
and that other essential services include ‘internet, phone network (mobile or land 
line), wharf infrastructure and stevedoring staff’.  
7.10.2. Maintaining business continuity 
This section investigates port risk management preparedness, and particularly 
management capabilities and capacities towards maintaining business continuity. 
Some factors crucial to global port operations were identified from the literature 
(Alderton 2013; Burns 2015; Bichou 2018) and these were tested against 
management responses to evaluate their relevance to Australian port 
requirements. Results are shown in Figure 7-14, indicating the value of respondent 
concerns for the continued availability of plant and equipment, key personnel and 
ICT systems. From an internal perspective, if the port has these three factors in 
service then in the short term at least, they continue to be capable of working 
cargo and port systems. In the longer term, the non-availability of other crucial 
inputs to port operations might constrain intermodal operations continuity. This 
issue is explored in the next section which evaluates the respondents’ regard for 
the availability of other assets and services. 
 
Figure 7-14:Port  business continuity reliance on logistics and transportation inputs (Author). 
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Port vulnerability assessments within an intermodal business continuity context 
involve identification of key capabilities and enabling requirements (Hsieh, Tai & 
Lee 2014; Pitilakis et al. 2016). Managers must identify actors, assets, resources 
and infrastructure that are crucial to the port operations task, and what 
requirements are necessary to maintain these primary support capabilities 
(Schnaubelt, Larson & Boyer 2014). To maintain port business continuity, 
managers need to identify what underpins their operations in the short and longer 
terms and to prepare against these crucial requirements becoming failure points. 
These crucial requirements include assets and services, and respondents’ concern 
for some aspects of this area of operations is shown in Figure 7-15. 
Maintaining contact lists for emergency agency contacts was the most highly 
regarded factor, suggestive that managers are primarily motivated towards what 
is needed at the onset of a disruption, and less concerned for measures (albeit still 
important) to be called in at a later stage of business continuity response.  
 
Figure 7-15: Port business continuity regard for assets and services (Author). 
Eleven respondents provided free-form indications of risk management qualities 
of importance to business continuity, inclusive of flexibility, adaptiveness, and 
preparedness which accord with the primary attributes of critical infrastructure 
resilience (ISO 22316: 2017; Wei, Chen & Rose 2017). Respondent reports on 
business continuity requirements include:  
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a) (We have) three ports and city corporate office, there is sufficient 
redundancy for alternative operating premises. That said we have 
alternative sites earmarked;  
b) Ensuring all personnel are familiar with emergency management 
protocols and procedures. Ensuring Key Personnel remain current in 
contemporary emergency management assessment processes and 
procedures;  
c) Ability to work from anywhere; and,  
d) Ensuring all personnel are familiar with emergency management 
protocols and procedures. Ensuring Key Personnel remain current in 
contemporary emergency management assessment processes and 
procedures. 
Figure 7-16 is a composite of respondent qualitative responses enabled by 
Dedoose software, to indicate that highest qualitative regard towards business 
continuity capabilities is for availability of apparatus: backup generators; 
oil/chemical spill response items; firefighting equipment; and command, control 
and communications items; and, an ICT system backup battery. Essential supplies 
were next priority, with requirements for onsite water and fuel reserves, and 
rescue/medical items and equipment. Third priority was for trailer mounted tower 
lights for emergency illumination. Minor priority was regarded to offsite or cloud 
data backup, and somewhat surprisingly, for staff preparedness - which might be 
expected to have higher priority given the importance attached to key personnel 




Figure 7-16: Respondents free-form responses regarding business continuity support (Author). 
7.11. Summary of port risk management findings 
Within the testing sample (n = 37), senior Australian port executives are generally 
experienced in their roles with 84% having more than three years tenure. Five of 
these managers lack risk management qualifications, whereas others held 
multiple combinations of academic and commercial risk management 
certifications (Section 7.4.). Thirteen managers had not experienced port 
disruptions, however twenty-eight reported that their ports held periodical drills 
and major emergency management exercises (Section 7.9.5.) Risks that concern 
port managers most are reported as adverse natural events; business-oriented 
risk, with loss of customers and competition; financial constraints, socio-political 
interventions or restrictions; and, disruptions of human causality. 
The primary research question is partially addressed by respondent reporting their 
experiences in managing disruptions during the past five years in terms of 
responding, managing and recovering from disruptions (Section 7.5.).  
Australian port risk management capabilities and competencies are uneven, and 
the evidence suggests that port risk and security management improvements 
would be beneficial. The research findings on port abilities to cope with 
disruptions (Sections 7.5.; 7.6.) suggest in general that:  
a) Australian ports demonstrate mixed levels of effectiveness in managing 




b) Australian port disruption management capabilities appear, in general, to 
be based on sound risk management principles as evidenced by 
management abilities to cope.   
c) Australian ports appear to be better prepared to manage physically 
manifested disruptions, for example storms, oil and chemical spills, and 
infrastructure damage than less tangible hazards, for example security 
breaches, cyber-threat, criminality, and socio-political acts. 
d) Ports vary widely in their capacity and willingness to train for and prepare 
for disruptions, with one port reportedly ignoring this practice, and 
another lacking the personnel to undertake emergency management 
processes. Multiple ports demonstrate a strong and comprehensive 
commitment to risk management and emergency management training 
(Subsections 8.3.2.; 7.9.5.). 
e) Port reform and asset sale processes are reported to decrease port 
management controls over port land and infrastructure usage, plus reduce 
economic viabilities and staff numbers, which together act to diminish 
disruption management capabilities (Subsections 7.9.1.; 7.9.3.).  
The literature provides little in the way of a port disruption management 
performance benchmark, against which this study’s findings might be compared. 
Additionally, disruption severities and port circumstances will likely vary from port 
to port to such an extent that benchmarking might only be an approximate 
measure.  In the absence of other studies to provide a suitable benchmark for 
comparison, there is little to say on whether Australian ports presently fare better 
or worse in this regard than their global counterparts. As discussed in Section 7.6., 
the findings suggest that some Australian ports have potential for improvement in 
managing future port hazards associated with high levels of uncertainty, 
unpredictability and indeterminate levels of severity.  
Port managers indicate their beliefs that the frequency of disruptions will decrease 
in the future, whereas a body of research and global surveys indicates that the 
opposite is more likely (Subsection 7.5.1.). Port managers’ reports of past 
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disruptions and the frequencies of their expectations for future disruptions are 
statistically different, and three potential explanations (or a combination of these 
explanations) might contribute to this finding. Either the pattern of disruption 
types is changing, risk mitigation or avoidance of risks is becoming effective, or a 
possibility exists that port managers understanding of future risk frequencies is 
flawed – for example from lack of knowledge or deliberate risk myopia. If 
managers translate their understanding of a reduced risk environment into the 
risk assessment process, then a possibility exists that some Australian ports may 
be under-prepared when responding to future disruption events. From a strategic 
perspective, if port managers wrongly believe that certain hazards are less likely 
in the future, then a possibility exists that risk management resources and assets 
are mistakenly being allocated to other areas. 
Managers have concerns about ageing infrastructure and budgetary constraints 
upon maintenance and capital works (Section 7.5.). This suggests that port 
infrastructure failure may become a more common hazard, with respondents 
indicating that they are currently experiencing difficulties in managing the 
consequences of reduced infrastructure maintenance (Subsection 7.8.7.).  
As port abilities to accumulate cash reserves and precautionary savings towards 
infrastructure failure or disruption recovery become constrained (Subsection 
7.8.5.) then the role of insurance becomes more important. Port managers report 
that while insurance is an effective means of transferring risk, they are unlikely to 
utilise insurance to the partial exclusion of other risk mitigation strategies and 
processes (Section 7.7.). They recognise that insurance cover does not obviate 
their roles and responsibilities for monitoring, mitigating and managing the risk 
event. When port managers take up insurance, port risk insurability represents 
risks that insurers regard as tangible and measurable, and premiums that ports 
can afford. Respondents note, however, that as disruption categories and 
consequences become more unclear and uncertain, port risk insurability reduces 
as insurer reluctance increases. If a category of risk becomes uninsurable then port 
managers will need to strengthen their preparedness to treat that vulnerability. 
Freeman (2017) finds from academic and practitioner perspectives that decision-
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makers operating in a risk-prone environment are inevitably exposed to 
uninsurable risks, and that this experience serves to heighten organisational risk 
aversion. 
Australian port managers’ uncertainties about managing future risks (Subsection 
7.5.2.; Section 7.6.; Section 7.8.) potentially impedes their preparedness for 
managing the risks and consequences of low probability/high consequence 
disruptions. Their vulnerability assessments have difficulty in conceptualising 
external party interventions, either intentional (as with socio-political or 
criminality risks) or unintended (potential failure of critical goods and services 
supply). However, port managers do recognise that the risk environment is 
changing, and that new and emerging port risks, plus increasingly severe natural 
events, increase their vulnerabilities to business continuity failures (Section 7.8.). 
7.12. An integrated and systematic approach to managing risk 
An important finding from the risk management component of the survey is that 
the current risk management state reflects a 69.24% (statistical mean) of 
Australian ports that are effectively coping with disruptions across all categories 
of risk (see previous Figures 7-6 and 7-7). This suggestion that 30% of ports are not 
effectively coping in their disruption responses provides a clear conceptual signal 
that opportunities exist for ports to redesign and reconfigure their risk-oriented 
strategies, skills and processes to more effective models.  
Australian port authorities must comply with their respective State legislation that 
requires them to develop and implement risk management plans (see DoT-WA 
2018). For example, the Port of Melbourne (POM 2018, p. 4) complies with the 
legislative requirement by ‘implementing measures and strategies… to prevent or 
reduce hazards and risks associated with the operation of the port’ in alignment 
with AS/NZS ISO 31000:2018 Risk Management Principles and Guidelines. Port risk 
management systems are generally reviewed on an annual basis and incorporated 
into a port authority’s progressive strategic development plan. Srikanth and 
Venkataraman (2013) argue that an effective strategic risk management process 
can provide the port and its stakeholders with marked competitive advantage, and 
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their argument resonates with the transformational and potentially unifying 
concepts of dynamic capabilities and business performance thinking (Teece 2007, 
2017). 
The survey finds that Australian ports respond in differing ways and with differing 
levels of effectiveness to a dynamic risk environment (Section 7.5), despite their 
presumed general alignment with ISO 31000:2018 risk management guidelines. 
From a strategic management perspective, implementation of a dynamic 
capabilities approach might better enable Australian port authorities to develop 
strategic and operational responses to an uncertain risk environment, and for 
them to facilitate any necessary risk management changes through internal 
organisational transformation and adaptation (Teece, Pisano & Shuen 1997). 
Further discussion on seizing this opportunity to more effectively manage port 
threats is taken up in the body of Chapter 8, which also contains the port resilience 




Chapter Eight: Resilience data analysis 
8.1. Introduction 
Chapter 7 reported the data analysis and findings on Australian port risk 
management capabilities, abilities and competencies within a dynamic risk 
environment. This chapter now turns to respondent opinions on port 
resilience, which are explored though an organisational dynamic capabilities 
theoretical lens. The data and literature findings are analysed to ascertain what 
catalysts might prompt port management to engage in transformational 
resilience change, what organisational strategies are employed in transforming 
and enhancing resilience capabilities, and to identify challenges and issues 
around what Teece (2018) describes as ‘seizing’ resilience. Chapter 8 begins by 
revisiting some key principals of dynamic capability theory within a port 
management context, as outlined in the proposed model in Figure 5-3 at 
Chapter 5. 
8.2. Port resilience through a Dynamic Capability lens 
Resilience from a dynamic capability perspective arises from transformational 
and reconfigured capabilities (Teece 2017a, 2018) that port managers develop 
and deploy to meet the unexpected, uncertain and unforeseen challenges of a 
changing and turbulent risk environment (WEF 2018). An analysis of Australian 
port managers’ perspectives on organisational resilience and transformation 
towards strategic advantage follows a pathway that is suggested by Teece 
2007) and shown in Figure 8-1. Whereas Figure 5-3 attempts to explain the 
relationships between dynamic capabilities and resilience theories, Figure 8-1 
is a modified version that instead proposes a logic pathway for conceptualising 
how port resilience is managed. The value of such a resilience measurement 
pathway is outlined by Teece (2007, p. 1319) towards establishing clarity in 
how the organisation:  
a) ‘senses and shapes opportunities and threats; 
b) seizes opportunities; and 
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c) maintains competitiveness through enhancing, combining, protecting, 
and when necessary, reconfiguring the business enterprise’s intangible 
and tangible assets.’ 
 
Figure 8-1: A proposed model for port resilience data analysis (Adapted from Teece 2007). 
The survey data analysis and findings are framed in alignment with the pathway 
model at Figure 8-1. 
8.3. Sensing 
From Teece (2007) the port’s organisational dynamic capabilities towards a 
future resilient state begin with a process involving corporate agility and a port 
management capacity to understand, sense and shape opportunities and 
threats. 
8.3.1. Resilience understandings 
Thirty-six respondents viewed six alternative perceptions of port resilience 
(arising from the literature review) and selected one that best matched their 
understanding of port resilience. They were also provided opportunity to 
report their own preferred definition in free-form response, but this option was 




Definitions of port resilience Responses 
The port's ability to deal with both foreseeable and unforeseen risks, 
respond to any disruptive event, and capacity to (re)position itself for 
advantage after disruptions occur  
36.11% 
(13)  
The port's ability to withstand a major disruption within acceptable 




Port management ability to maintain awareness of evolving threats, to 
recognise threat implications ahead of time, and to anticipate and defend 
against disruption before adverse consequences occur  
19.44% 
(7)  
The port's capacity to maintain safe operations when challenged by 
unexpected threats or hazards from all sources  
11.11% 
(4)  
The port's ability to reduce the impacts of disruptions and absorb disruptive 
consequences, while continuing to maintain freight throughput  
5.56% 
(2)  
A port's ability to bounce back to business as usual following a disruption  2.78% (1)  
Other: Business Resilience is the development, implementation and 
maintenance of policies, strategies and programs to assist an organisation in 
preventing, preparing for, responding to, managing and recovering from the 




Table 8-1: Respondents’ preferred definitions of port resilience (Author).  
The first three definitions attracted three quarters of management responses, 
and an approximate port management understanding of resilience was derived 
through amalgamating definitional commonalities. These commonalities 
include port management abilities for mindfulness, initial response, coping and 
recovery. Weighting of these factors gave precedence to management abilities 
for coping with disruption, followed by mindfulness, in being able to recognise 
the onset or potential onset of disruption; organisational initial response and 
recovery were third placed definition factors. From this process, a composite 
understanding of port resilience from the respondents’ preferred definitions is 
suggested as: 
Establishment of conditions within the port that facilitate organisational 
abilities for mindfulness and evaluation of potential disruptive risks, 
coping effectively with disruption consequences, and frequent review of 
strategies and processes for timely and efficient disruption responses and 
recoveries. 
One respondent’s final comments on port risk management and resilience 
provide a singular but interesting perspective upon the topic: 
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Good risk and disruption management is not a box-ticking exercise. 
Resilience can only be achieved through good leadership at all levels of 
management (Board, administration and operational). Resilience can 
only take place within a well understood framework; it is difficult to 
measure and monitor. It is usually easier to identify a lack of good risk 
and disruption management through real time failures or near misses. 
The lack of any incidents does not necessarily indicate good risk 
management. 
8.3.2. Analysing port resilience resources and capabilities  
The Australian government (AG 2017) regards resilience as highly relevant to 
the security and ongoing capabilities of critical infrastructure, inclusive of ports. 
Within this context, thirty-one of thirty-six respondents regarded resilience as 
important to their port operations (86.11%), two regarded resilience as 
somewhat relevant (5.56%), while three (8.34%) regarded resilience as 
unimportant. The respondents advised what they regarded as important 
resources and capabilities in strengthening port resilience, as shown in Table 
8-2.  
The literature confirms some aspects of what port managers indicate is 
required in port resilience capabilities and resources: 
a) understanding the risk environment and resultant port vulnerabilities 
(essential to the detection of potentially disruptive events – Burnard 
and Bhamra, 2011); 
b)  effective risk management planning processes (the port’s capacity for 
response – Gallopin, 2006); 
c) risk management competencies and experience (the process of 
strengthening resilience is reliant upon the enablement of multiple risk 
management options for treating diverse sources of risk – Mitchell & 
Harris, 2012); 
d) redundancies, back-up resources and capabilities (dynamic capabilities 
and resources that support adaptiveness - Norris et al. 2008); and  
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e) effective governance (leading to organisational stability and sub-system 
stability domains – Burnard & Bhamra, 2011). 
Port management opinions on port resilience components (n= 34) 
Redundancy in Port access (land/sea), 
communications, power in case of 
failure/obstructions 
Understanding the key threats and having 
mitigation and recovery measures in place 
Fit for purpose assets, master planning, 
recovery planning 
Establishing the credible, critical issues.  
 
Policy and procedures  Planning and training 
Its ability to rapidly recover from an adverse 
impact or disaster 
Training, up to date risk management plans 
and good leadership 
Planning and drills/exercises IT systems contingency plans 
Having managers understand that 
overarching all port activities is the belief 
that the ports role is to manage risk 
appropriately. 
Having redundancy in the key assets or 
requirements to continue vessel cargo 
operations 
Co-operation between all companies and 
port towards the same goal.  
Planning and attention  
 
Management expertise and experience to 
mitigate disruptions where possible but also 
to manage post disruption in circumstances 
such as a cyclonic event which cannot be 
prevented - only planned for.  
Establishing a risk management framework 
that ensures the organisation-wide 
systematic identification, assessment and 
management of key risks that could prevent 
the organisation from achieving its key 
objectives. 
Understanding the risk  Understanding the risks and developing 
backup solutions in advance. 
Thorough understanding of port operations 
and inter dependencies. Detailed 
engineering and site plans available 
remotely. Having critical spares available and 
a comprehensive and up to date list of 
resources that can be called upon at short 
notice 
Understanding implications of "beyond the 
port boundary" impacts of disruption e.g. 
Channel closure affecting national fuel 
supplies 
Ensure that sufficient experienced personnel 
are employed by the port 
Flexible staff, good systems, collaboration 
internally and with external customers and 
agencies. 
Preparing for events, training for events, 
learning from events and sharing 
experiences to continue to improve. 
Understanding the ports business and how 
this fits into the needs of the State. Good 
BCMP plans. Good management. Good staff 
engagement  
Having disruption plans developed, known 
and trained in advance  
 
Vulnerability assessment - initial, periodic 
and on shift in influences. Maintenance of a 
Risk Register to identify known threats.  
Competency and management. Identify risks.  
Workshops, formal procedures, training and 
drills, learn and repeat 
Redundancy - resources - preparedness 
Identification and management of 
risks/hazards 
Risk assessment and management, business 
impact assessment, incident / emergency 
management, crisis management, business 
continuity plans, training and testing 
Business continuity planning and being 
aware of new threats to service delivery 
Pre-planning, constant reassessing, training 
and exercising 




Figure 8-2 presents port management opinions on what is required to respond 
more effectively to disruptive challenges. The ‘sensing’ requirement to 
understand the risk environment and vulnerabilities attracted most responses. 
 
 
Figure 8-2: Management opinions on factors that strengthen port resilience (Author). 
8.3.3. Establishing the current resilience state 
Measurement of existing states of resilience appears to be a nebulous process; 
Coaffee and Clarke (2017) cannot find evidence of an agreed approach for 
measuring critical infrastructure resilience, but they do ascertain reasons why 
means of measurement should exist. These include being able to identify an 
organisation’s resilience characteristics and level of capability, to identify 
where changes might strengthen resilience, to substantiate what resources 
should be allocated towards resilience, and to monitor resilience performance 
and effectiveness (Coaffee & Clarke 2017). Other proposed reasons include 
being able to demonstrate resilience progress, a need to assess leading 
indicators of resilience, ability to associate resilience improvements with 
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competitiveness, and to furnish justification for resilience expenditures (Lee, 
Vargo & Saville 2013). 
The survey question of how to measure the port’s level of resilience was 
answered by respondents (n = 31) who provided opinions shown in Table 8-3.  
Report Port manager suggestions for measuring current internal resilience  
1  Duration of ports business returning to normal after disruption 
2  Audit of emergency response capability for the most likely disruption scenarios. 
3  Extended disruption times Degradation beyond expectation Complete closure of Port 
4  By who's at risk due to reliance failure, board members, CEO, department head etc. 
5  
Number of unplanned disruptive or partially disruptive incidents. Time between incident and 
implementation of effective mitigating strategy and time to normal operation from incident 
full recovery normal operations. 
6  Organisations ability to cope/recover from an event 
7  A key measure will be loss of business or increased P&I insurance premiums 
8  Lost revenue; Cost of incident management; Community concerns/outrage (environmental and safety) 
9  
Key Performance Indicators; Customer\stakeholder surveys; Board referral of high and 
extreme risks; Maintaining a robust risk management framework and reporting mechanism 
focused on key risks and treatment action plans - performing risk assessments quarterly. 
10  Customer feedback 
11  Unplanned downtime hours and feedback from port users during unplanned downtime 
12  History 
13  
This can only be measured in the aftermath of a disruption. Subjective estimates can be made 
of gains through resilience improvements, but the nature of disruptions means that 
comparisons between improved and unimproved resilience are difficult or impossible. 
14  Safety, productivity, customer review, financial 
15  Don't know 
16  Financial loss, loss of reputation. 
17  Loss of revenue; risk of life 
18  Poor response to minor disruptions 
19  Risk management techniques 
20  Not sure how one might measure the consequences of poor resilience. 
21  Extended time taken to return to normal operations to meet fiscal benchmarks 
22  Lengthy disaster recovery, LTI's, loss of trade 
23  A little hard to quantify as it will depend upon the scenario/ nature of the disruption (be it an environmental issue, or ship/ channel blockage or a Cyber interruption) 
24  Demurrage bills, reduced margin on product 
25  
1. Establishment of port operational and management (fiscal) metrics 
2. Collection of ongoing data relating to 1  
3. Desktop analysis (war-gaming) of various future paths that affect the metrics at 
1 with expected outcomes on 2. 
26  Time taken to re-establish operations after event; Impact on port users; Reputational damage; Financial impact (including if insurance coverage is inadequate); Regulatory breaches 
27  Risk Tables using accepted consequences. 
28  Interruption to services / downtime - inability to resume operations within MAO periods 
29  Customer feedback; Port services outages. 
30  1. Recovery time 2. Financial impact 3. Reputation impact 
31  A long period of downtime after an unforeseen disruption. 
Table 8-3: Respondent proposed indicators for measuring resilience (Author). 
These opinions are diverse, showing that there is either lack of consensus or 
understanding, ranging from management ‘not knowing’ to submission of 
multiple concepts from individual managers. Management capabilities and 
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expertise for speaking to this issue are unknown, other than by the level of 
formal risk management qualifications listed in management demographics 
(Section 7.3). Also unknown is the extent (if any) that port managers rely on 
external experts for advice on the use of resilience as a beneficial operational 
concept.  
To better understand these port management constructs of resilience, and to 
identify the extent of commonalities in these perceptions of resilience states, 
items are coded within nine themes and shown in Figure 8-3.  
 
Figure 8-3: Port manager concepts of how to measure states of resilience (Author). 
Responses that appear to have minimal association with resilience theory, and 
respondent lack of resilience knowledge suggests that much work is needed to 
broaden the take-up of resilience at Australian ports. For resilience to move 
from a minimally observed capability to a mature management capability, 
managers would need to construct and implement a strategic plan for 
progressively building port resilience (Gibson & Tarrant 2010; Bititci et al. 2012; 
Crawford, Langston & Bajracharya 2012).  Performance measurement and 
management of resilience becomes an important practitioner concept, in 
providing a means for monitoring and measuring performance, control and 
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cost effectiveness, and in benchmarking organisational performance against 
desired standards and objectives (Melnyk et al. 2013). Figure 8-3 also indicates 
that the highest-ranking perceptions of resilience measurement indicators are 
associated with the commercial aspects of port losses and downtime. These 
are disruption outputs, whereas key risk management and emergency 
response capabilities are likely to be regarded as inputs that promote and 
contribute to resilience.   
One respondent suggested that monitoring insurance industry risk tables might 
assist port managers to gain a realistic perception of their risk status from the 
potentially more conservative viewpoints of that port’s insurer. Assessing 
community feedback was also suggested to gain another perspective of the 
port disruption management performance through either direct means 
(receiving written or spoken communications, or feedback access on a web 
site) or indirect (monitoring mainstream or social media). Monitoring social 
media feedback from activist organisations who either watch over port 
activities and report their observations on social media or take direct protest 
action can also be a form of monitoring for risk challenges (Marshall 2016). The 
final respondent indicator to be considered is that of assessing past disruption 
consequences for indications of whether the port’s resilience level against that 
type of disruption has changed for better or worse, and if worse, then a need 
for transformational resilience change is indicated. 
8.3.4. Drivers of transformational resilience change 
Respondents expect fewer major disruptions in coming years (Subsection 
7.5.2.). However, the literature review suggests that ports will become 
increasingly challenged by unknown and unpredictable adverse risks within a 
progressively more volatile risk environment, with higher severity natural 
hazards in the short-term future (Gajjar, McLeod & Wakeman 2013; Accenture 
2015; Christopher & Hollweg 2017; Lam & Lassa 2017; WEF 2018). Regardless 
of how many disruptions port managers might experience, they will continue 
to be tested by changes involving new and rapidly changing technology, new 
sources of risk, and a need for transformation and adaptiveness if they wish to 
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maintain their port’s business continuity (Onyeji, Bazilian & Bronk 2014; Teece, 
Peteraf & Leih 2016).  
Normal port operations are tolerant of a certain amount of change as 
demonstrated by ongoing adjustments to port operations methodology 
following globalisation, increased security requirements post 9/11, and the 
impacts of technology changes, increasing ship sizes and changing markets 
(Burns 2015). However, at some point an increasing or sudden intensity of 
change may require port managers to review and strengthen their resilience 
capabilities. From this perspective, respondents were shown a list of twelve 
drivers for strengthening port resilience. These drivers were sourced from the 
literature, for example Coaffee and Clarke (2017). Port managers were asked 
to rank these drivers in order of importance from one to twelve, and results 
are shown in Figure 8-4. These drivers are potential incentives for motivating 
resilience change, and reasons why port managers might wish to outlay time, 
effort and budget upon resilience (Seager et al. 2016). 
 
Figure 8-4: Drivers of transformational resilience change: * represents nil consideration 
(Author). 
Cyber-threats and terrorism increasingly affect global transportations systems 
(Harris-Hogan 2017; Lawrence et al. 2017). The Maritime Transport and 
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enhance their maritime security processes and defences. Recent ICT system 
breaches have been damaging and costly - the Wanna-Cry security attack alone 
resulted in estimated global losses of US$8 billion and the Petya virus caused 
estimated losses of US$850 million (Wirth 2017).  Despite these influences, the 
findings indicate that the respondents overlook terrorism, cyber-crime and 
malware as important drivers towards strengthening resilience. Also 
overlooked are climate change hazards despite a relationship with resilience 
being identified by academic research (McEvoy & Mullett 2013; Yang et al. 
2015). This finding is inconsistent with other studies that explore increased 
levels of resilience towards mitigating the consequences of climate change (for 
example, Becker et al. 2015; Chhetri et al. 2015; McEvoy & Mullett 2015). Also, 
because port managers acknowledged earlier in the survey the growing 
likelihood of increasingly severe natural events (Subsection 7.5.2), then their 
rationale for ranking climate change as an unimportant driver for resilience 
enhancement remains unclear.  
Motivation for resilience change and reconfiguration might arise as senior 
managers become increasingly involved with the Australian government’s 
Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) critical infrastructure working 
groups and committees (TISN 2016). Much of Australian critical infrastructure 
is privately owned and operated, and the national government promotes 
private sector critical infrastructure resilience ‘by encouraging a business 
model that incorporates a focus on organisational resilience’ (O’Donnell 2013, 
p. 25). However, port authorities while deeply involved with commerce are not 
part of the private sector. They are corporatised government business agencies 
with limited autonomy, and their State government owners have potential to 
prevail over port ‘managerial and decision-making autonomy’ (Brooks, 
Cullinane & Pallis 2017, p. 6). This suggests that if State governments wish their 
ports to increase resilience levels, then this might be achieved either by formal 
regulatory directions, or informal measures taken by the relevant Ministers to 
encourage transformational change.  
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The findings on drivers of transformational resilience change suggest that 
Australian government work in promoting critical infrastructure resilience is 
making inroads. Respondents rate government resilient initiatives as their third 
highest motivating factor. 
8.3.5. Transformational resilience learning practices 
Respondents acknowledged the role of learning in strengthening port 
resilience.  A common perception is that learning from experience, coupled 
with training, drills and exercises are important foundations for sensing the 
need for change and maintaining preparedness against the risk environment. 
The literature provides evidence that systemic complexity and multiple sources 
of vulnerability lends importance to port risk managers developing analytic risk 
management, collaboration and communication skills of a high order (Pallis & 
Kladaki 2016). In this context, the role of education appears to be increasingly 
important for port managers’ analyses of the risk environment and port 
vulnerabilities to risk (Hopkin 2017). According to Kayes (2015) learning from 
experience is a key organisational resilience enabler, and in the absence of 
ongoing formal and experiential learnings, the organisation becomes more 
vulnerable. Figure 8-1 (resilience pathways) shows a return loop from 
‘managing threats’ back to the ‘sensing’ and monitoring phase of managing 
resilience. 
8.4. Seizing opportunities from transformational resilience change 
Following the identification and analytic processes involved in assessing 
internal and external threat (sensing), according to Teece (2017b) the dynamic 
capabilities model next addresses how resources, assets and capabilities might 
be deployed to best address these threats and to capture value if possible 
within transformational change (seizing). From an organisational resilience 
context, the seizing process entails the use of concepts, resources and assets 
that senior management deems to be most suited and likely to achieve success 
(Teece 2017b). Senior management commitment towards transformational 
change and building resilience are potentially driven most in the presence of 
major threats to their organisation (Teece 2017b). 
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8.4.1. Management support for port resilience 
Management leadership and advocacy for port resilience are crucial factors in 
enhancing organisational resilience (Southwick et al. 2017). Managers were 
asked their opinions on what aspects of resilience support were important to 
their organisations. These factors were adapted from the literature, including 
Stephenson (2010), Fiksel (2015) and AG (2016). Responses to questions (n=36) 
related to management inputs to resilience are shown in Table 8-4. Most 
respondents treated all factors involving management support of resilience 
concepts as important. 
Management support of resilience Important Unimportant Neutral/unsure 
Encouraging greater initiative and flexibility 35 1 0 
Empowering decision-making based on 
incomplete information 
34 2 0 
Empowering improvised solutions 35 0 1 
Constructive performance reviews and feedback 35 1 0 
External collaboration  34 1 1 
Inter-organisational resource sharing 34 0 2 
Collaboration with emergency response 
agencies 
35 0 1 
Transparent and available succession 
management plans 
32 4 0 
Discouraging management and data silos 30 4 2 
Deferment to expertise and experience over 
rank 
29 4 3 
Understanding of what core operational 
objectives enable business continuity 
34 1 1 
Regular management briefings on the risk 
environment 
32 3 1 
Table 8-4: Resilience support and leadership (Author). 
Two heads of department and two Harbourmasters regarded as unimportant 
the concept of relaxing managerial control over availability of succession 
management plans, the deferment of expertise and experience over rank, and 
discouragement of management and data silos. Additionally, two managers 
(Harbourmaster and head of department) were unsure about the value of 
discouraging silo management, while three managers (CEO, Harbourmaster 
and head of department) were uncertain about deferment to expertise over 
rank during disruptive circumstances. 
8.4.2. Factors in building resilience 
Respondents were asked for their opinions on what management initiatives 
were crucial in building resilience at Australian ports, based on a list compiled 
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from the literature review. The composite responses are shown in Figure 8-5. 
The respondents (n = 33) demonstrated a high level of agreement for these 
initiatives, and most respondents recognised the value of senior management 
support for resilience management programs.  
 
Figure 8-5: Factors for building port resilience (Author). 
Opportunity was provided for free-form responses with respondents being 
asked what other management initiatives or factors might be crucial to 
increasing port resilience levels. Free-form replies included:  
a) ‘Inculcation of initiative and problem-solving (as distinct from problem-
identifying) across and throughout the organisation’; and 
b) ‘Sufficient experienced and flexible personnel’. 
These two responses align with resilience governance principles that are at the 
heart of socio-ecological system resilience. Berkes (2017) argues that resilience 
and adaptive behaviour benefit from a collaborative approach across the whole 
system, whereby personnel at all levels have opportunity to contribute to 
disruption response and employ their knowledge and skills to organisational 
benefit. Empowerment of staff initiative and problem-solving at an individual 
level is therefore important in employee engagement and decision-making. 
Having sufficient experienced and flexible personnel across the organisation 
capable of making these contributions is equally important. 
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8.4.3. Aids and impediments to change 
Everett (2003a) and Pettitt (2014) describe Australian port authorities as 
conservative and bureaucratic in outlook, with these restraining influences 
flowing over into port performance efficiencies. Q28 investigates Australian 
port managers (n = 36) mindsets towards acceptance or rejections of 
operational resilience concepts, and finds (Figure 8-6) that conceptually, 
respondents are generally in favour of embracing resilience concepts, but when 
commercial implications are considered then fewer are in favour (16 agree; 16 
disagree). 
 
Figure 8-6: Attitudes to resilience change (Author). 
The data reveals that half of the respondents to this question were not 
intending to change from their conventional risk management practises and 
processes, and they perceive a range of limitations against them adopting 
resilience concepts and capabilities within their port organisation. In advising 
whether their existing risk management systems sufficed, respondents were 
effectively crystallising their acceptance or non-acceptance of resilience. If 
resilience is primarily perceived as a conceptual topic, then managers appear 
to be accepting of resilience concepts. However, when the practical processes 
0 10 20 30 40
Resilience is not our responsibility
Resilience  too complex to implement
Resilience offers few tangible gains
Not ready to implement changes of such
magnitude
Confidentiality and criminality risk in conveying
sensitive resilience information to many…
Potential IR issues if employees tasked with added
resilience-related duties
Resilience processes too expensive
Resilience offers few competitive advantages
Yet to consider resilience as a business continuity
option






and consequences of implementation (or lack of tangible benefits to the port) 
become considered and evaluated within open-ended responses, then 
resilience is viewed less favourably. Impediments include increased costs, 
minimal perceptions of competitive or business continuity advantages, and 
belief that existing risk management system/s suffice. As discussed in more 
detail within the conclusions chapter, these findings provide evidence that a 
stronger catalyst for resilience change is needed for Australian government 
critical infrastructure resilience initiatives to take further hold in national ports.  
Respondents provided qualitative information on impediments to increasing 
port resilience, including socio-political influences and constraints (Subsection 
8.4.3.). Examples provided by respondents include tighter government controls 
over port expenditures as governments increase port dividend payments as 
part of balancing State budgets. Other impediments are primarily related to 
commercial considerations, including increased costs, minimal perceptions of 
competitive or business continuity advantages, and beliefs that existing risk 
management system/s suffice in lieu of change. 
8.5. Managing threats – resilience transformation 
Teece (2017b) argues that a transformation process may require the 
organisation to selectively change its operating models, methods, culture and 
its lines of communication. Integral to this process is recognition of what 
existing capabilities, practices and resources are relevant to emerging 
transformational resilience strategies, and what additional capabilities are 
needed (Teece 2017a). The gathered data provides evidence of existing port 
management resilience understandings, beliefs, and capabilities.  
8.5.1. Resilience governance  
In response to Q26, 91.67% of senior managers soundly recognise the 
importance of Board and senior management buy-in and endorsement for a 
resilience program. Their perspectives of resilience governance extend to 
agreement that managers should be permitted to exercise an extended degree 
of initiative, flexibility, improvisation and decision-making made in their 
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disruption management responses (Q23 responses). There was no mention in 
the ‘additional comments’ section of the survey in relation to the degree of 
autonomy that managers at differing levels might be permitted to exercise 
during emergency management and business continuity response events. 
8.5.2. Aligning existing capabilities 
Data analysed within the port risk management reports furnishes evidence that 
existing capabilities for managing threats are of variable performance levels, 
and particularly so for the more intangible or covert causalities (for example 
cyber-threat). These findings group existing capabilities in four levels of port 
risk management outcomes, where port managers: 
e) respond, manage and recover from disruptions; 
f) respond, manage and recover from disruptions, but with difficulties; 
g) respond, manage and recover from disruptions, with external 
assistance; or, 
h)  are unsure whether they can respond, manage and recover from these 
categories of disruption. 
These findings suggest that gaps exist in Australian port abilities to cope with 
high consequence disruptions carrying potential to close ports, and that where 
these gaps exist, transformational resilience change would be beneficial. 
8.5.3. Resilience resources 
Respondents also note a need for change in improving internal and external 
communications, collaboration and preplanning with external agencies.  This is 
to assist when the disruption recovery process requires external assistance. A 
requirement for external assistance is associated with either accessing extra 
resources as with the case of an oil spill, or for regional emergency responders. 
One respondent noted that a complete disruption management capability 
involves: ‘reliance on emergency response agencies (i.e. Police, Fire)’. In such a 
case the port might initially barely cope or be unable to cope without this 
external assistance. Another respondent noted quality issues in disruption 
management when personnel are recruited through outsourced recruiting 
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agencies, and managers are unsure of what emergency skills these personnel 
possess. Two respondents reported that they were unsure of how well their 
organisation managed to cope with disruptions of human causality, which may 
relate to a requirement for a benchmark study. 
Respondent opinions of necessary changes in port practices to improve 
resilience (Subsections 8.3.4.; 8.3.5.) include the development of flexibility, 
adaptiveness, and disruption preparedness. First physical component priority 
is enablement of backup generators; oil/chemical spill response items; 
firefighting equipment; command, control and communications systems and 
stores; and, ICT system backup batteries. Essential supplies are next listed 
priority, with requirements for onsite water and fuel reserves, and 
rescue/medical items and equipment. Third priority is for trailer mounted 
tower lights for emergency illumination. Surprisingly, minor priority is afforded 
to offsite or cloud data backup of data, applications and services, which might 
otherwise be construed as an essential component of disruption recovery 
strategy (Langer 2017).  
8.5.4. Gaps in port resilience capabilities and competencies 
Where resilience exists in Australian ports, then intuitively it is most likely to 
exist within the ports that most capably manage disruptions. However, the 
evidence gathered in this research provides mixed evidence of port resilience 
mindsets and intentions. Whereas port managers can be assessed for their 
levels of risk management understandings, experience, qualifications and 
capabilities, difficulty arises in identifying the extent of their resilience 
capabilities and competencies. Brodsky et al. (2011) describe resilience 
behaviour as ‘superior performance’ but from a research perspective there is 
little within the literature to enable measurement of resilience capabilities and 
capacities, rather, researchers are more likely to ascertain whether 
organisational culture and conditions are favourable or otherwise for 
encouraging resilience-oriented behaviour and mindsets.  
The data shows that thirty-one of thirty-six respondents regard resilience as 
important to their port operations (86.11%) and are generally in favour of 
 245 
 
embracing resilience concepts (Subsection 8.4.1.). Nonetheless, half of the 
survey respondents are not intending to amend their conventional risk 
management practises and processes by adopting resilience concepts and 
capabilities (Subsection 8.4.3.). Respondents consider that the strongest likely 
influences for change and for them to strengthen their levels of resilience are; 
a) customer and societal pressures for higher levels of resilience; 
b) if non-compliance with resilience concepts resulted in their port losing 
income or business; and/or  
c) macro-government initiatives require them to comply with resilience 
legislation or guidelines (Subsection 8.4.2.). 
Eighty six percent of managers regard resilience as important to their 
organisation (Subsection 8.4.1.) however, a need for mindset change becomes 
apparent when resilience becomes considered within a commercial context, 
and managers react negatively to the likely costs and effort involved 
(Subsection 8.4.3.). Data results show that respondents become less disposed 
towards resilience implementation when commercial ramifications are 
considered.   
Despite a body of research that identifies cyber-threats, terrorism and 
extremism as major future threats to global transportation systems (Harris-
Hogan 2017; Lawrence et al. 2017), these hazards were ignored by the survey 
respondents as drivers for strengthening port resilience (Subsection 8.3.4.). 
Also overlooked are the risks of climate change hazards, despite well-
established relationships between climate change, extreme weather events, 
and the importance of resilience capabilities within academic and business 
research (Downing, Olsthoorn & Tol 2002; McEvoy & Mullett 2013; Yang et al. 
2015; Ng et al. 2016; Henderson et al. 2017).  
Respondents also note a need for change in improving internal and external 
communications, collaboration and preplanning with external agencies.  This is 
to assist when the disruption recovery process requires external assistance. A 
requirement for external assistance is associated with either accessing extra 
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resources as with the case of an oil spill, or for regional emergency responders. 
One respondent noted that a complete disruption management capability 
involves: ‘reliance on emergency response agencies (i.e. Police, Fire)’. In such a 
case the port might initially barely cope or be unable to cope without this 
external assistance. Another respondent noted quality issues in disruption 
management when personnel are recruited through outsourced recruiting 
agencies, and managers are unsure of what emergency skills these personnel 
possess. Two respondents reported that they were unsure of how well their 
organisation managed to cope with disruptions of human causality, which may 
relate to a requirement for a benchmark study. 
Respondent opinions of necessary changes in port practices to improve 
resilience (Subsection 8.3.4.; Subsection 8.4.2.; Subsection 8.4.3.) include the 
development of flexibility, adaptiveness, and disruption preparedness. First 
physical component priority is enablement of backup generators; oil/chemical 
spill response items; firefighting equipment; command, control and 
communications systems and stores; and, ICT system backup batteries. 
Essential supplies are next listed priority, with requirements for onsite water 
and fuel reserves, and rescue/medical items and equipment. Third priority is 
for trailer mounted tower lights for emergency illumination. Surprisingly, minor 
priority is afforded to offsite or cloud data backup of data, applications and 
services, which might otherwise be construed as an essential component of 
disruption recovery strategy (Langer 2017).  
8.6. Summary 
From a dynamic capabilities perspective, Australian port resilience appears to 
be at an immature stage of implementation. In general, the port managers 
indicate that their existing capabilities and competencies for managing threats 
are not coping well. Prior to aligning existing organisational risk and 
vulnerability management practices with resilience concepts, the data 
indicates that in general, Australian port risk management foundational 
resources, practices and knowledge should be improved before any resilience 
configuration takes place. The data also indicates a reluctance by port 
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managers to adopt resilience concepts in preference to their existing risk 
management practices. 
For resilience to be operationalised either as port managers understand the 
concept, or in another form, the hardest hurdle to overcome appears to be 
changing port management culture. Australian port authorities have been 
described as conservative and bureaucratic in outlook (Everett 2003a; Pettitt 
2014), and possibly these restraining influences contribute towards a 
reluctance for change. The research indicates that port motivation to 
operationalise resilience is most likely to eventuate from the endorsement and 
advocacy of Board and senior port executives. The survey found that other 
potential resilience enablers include: 
a. commercial dictates,  
b. political promotion and imperatives,  
c. potential for reputational harm, and  
d. regulatory compulsion to enhance critical infrastructure 
resilience capabilities.  
The following Chapter 9 recapitulates the research problem, presents the 
research conclusions, and recapitulates the importance of these findings to 











Chapter 9: Conclusions 
9.1. Introduction 
This study set out to determine how Australian ports might manage a changing 
risk environment that brings new and unexpected categories of hazards, and 
increasingly severe natural hazards. A further objective was to assess how 
resilience might be operationalised within an Australian port risk management 
setting. The research addresses a difficult and complex topic, and endeavours to 
provide clearer understandings to knowledge areas for which the literature is 
incomplete.   This final chapter summarises the most important research findings 
and potential value to the knowledge, and other findings are summarised at each 
chapter. Potential limitations of the study are outlined and discussed in terms of 
the findings application and generalisation to the wider port population and other 
transportation settings. Implications of the study for current theory and the 
development of future research are proposed. The research findings are 
summarised firstly within a literature review context, and then the empirical study 
findings are presented. The chapter begins with a reiteration of the study purpose. 
9.2. Managing port risks  
The study title ‘Safe ports for the 21st Century: Australian port resilience’ relates 
to the purpose and operational workings of a port, which enable a ship to 
approach, enter, use and depart the port without undue incident (Chong 1992; 
Girvin 2017). This thesis explores and assesses the underlying risk management 
concepts, practices and business continuity measures that contribute to the port’s 
intermodal effectiveness and efficiencies. To gain this understanding, the 
literature review and empiric research address the following research questions: 
PRQ: How does the port manage risks and consequences arising from low 
probability/high consequence disruptions? 
SRQ1: How do ports currently manage risks and unknown unknowns 
arising from disruptive events? 
SRQ2: What do ports need to change in their practices to become more 
resilient? and  
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SRQ3: How might ports operationalise resilience to best 
manage/overcome risks and unknown unknowns arising from disruptive 
events? 
The research findings suggest in general that a desirable operational state for ports 
to achieve is one in which managers minimise the port’s exposure and 
vulnerabilities to new and existing hazards, and in parallel, optimise the port’s 
capabilities and capacities to anticipate, respond to, and recover from the impacts 
and consequences of these hazards (Aitsi-Selmi et al. 2015). 
9.3. Addressing the research questions 
The primary research question leads to an investigation of how Australian ports 
manage risks and consequences arising from low probability/high consequence 
disruptions. This thesis investigated the primary research question from a narrow 
intermodal business continuity focus, while acknowledging that port managers 
have a broader mandate to manage risks and safety to avoid injuries and death, 
protect the environment, to avoid or minimise financial loss, and maintain the 
port’s reputation for sound corporate governance. Effectiveness in one area of risk 
might reduce effectiveness in another - for example increased operational 
effectiveness leading to higher productivity might arguably expose the port to 
larger potential for environmental risks.  
Despite a comprehensive investigation of the literature, the researcher found no 
evidence of any criterion that indicates what constitutes an acceptable level of risk 
management effectiveness for Australian ports. As discussed in Chapter 4, port 
decision-making concerning what levels of risk management effectiveness should 
be attained, and in what areas of port activities, is largely a matter for individual 
port risk governance strategies and policies, coupled with the influences of 
internal/external auditing and regulatory compliance oversight. The investigation 
sought answers to the research questions from the port-centric risk and resilience 
literature, which then informed the empirical research. Conclusions from these 




9.4. Findings from the literature  
Australian ports are highly valuable critical infrastructure whose characteristics 
have transformed over the years into regionalised complex systems of interrelated 
and interdependent logistics, resource and transportation actors. Ports are 
recognised by the Australian government as vital to national trade, economic well-
being and national prosperity (NTC 2011). However, the extended nature of the 
port’s own supply chain and support organisation renders it increasingly 
vulnerable to disruptions that might either impact the port directly, or through the 
consequences of failure involving second or third parties of critical importance to 
port operations.  
Critical areas of vulnerability arise where port intermodal operations rely upon 
tangible and intangible port management resources (Madani 2018), its physical 
attributes and infrastructure (Trujillo & Nombela 1999; Hsieh, Tai & Lee 2014; 
Black et al. 2018), human capital and management systems (Rose, Wei & Paul 
2017; Madani 2018), and, its technological support (Paté-Cornell et al. 2018). The 
literature shows that port vulnerabilities alter over time, which means that port 
risk management processes and procedures should also undergo review and 
modification. Ports are dynamic critical infrastructure whose characteristics 
undergo multiple planned and unplanned transformational changes arising from 
changes in ship size and designs, new cargo types and handling methods, 
globalisation, port privatisation, growth in trade volumes, the rapid pace of 
technology change, expansion in the number of industry participants and resulting 
complexity, plus competition with other ports. 
The comprehensive literature review finds few examples of research, theory and 
guidance of direct relevance to Australian port vulnerabilities to their risk 
environment, and consequent emergency management capabilities. One study 
(Rice & Trepte 2012) examines US port resilience within the context of 
management’s abilities to react to and manage unexpected disruptions, and to 
effectively and efficiently restore normal port intermodal operations. They found 
that while the studied ports might demonstrate resilience to minor day-to-day 
incidents, the port resilience effectiveness deteriorates against major disruptions. 
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Their approach aligns with that of this thesis, and one of their general findings was 
that the surveyed US port managers had little understanding, interest or regard 
for the concept of port resilience. Little evidence is found of US port managers 
consciously incorporating resilience concepts within their disruption management 
strategies and decision-making protocols. They also find that multiple US port 
managers and port stakeholders are insufficiently prepared to cope with high 
consequence disruptions, particularly if major damage results to infrastructure 
and superstructure. Their recommendations for how to build resilience include 
increased capital expenditure to provide redundancies in these physical aspects of 
port intermodal operations, and conceptually, for a greater resilience focus on 
port business continuity plans. Resilience growth is argued to be impeded by the 
perceived fragmentation and lack of coordination between port-centric 
stakeholder networks and their freight task activities. Port resilience levels can be 
increased, according to the Rice and Trepte (2012) study, following improved 
integration, collaboration and communication across the breadth of port 
stakeholder networks. Rice and Trepte (2012) conclude that their studied ports 
are resilient but not resilient enough, and port managers need to improve their 
resilience focus and competencies.  Their findings confirm those of this thesis. 
9.4.1. Port management competencies 
The literature suggests that effective port risk managers require an understanding 
of increasingly complex concepts and terminology, analysis processes and 
knowledgeable risk management leadership. Contemporary risk governance 
towards complex risks, according to De Marchi (2015, p. 162) requires managers 
and academics to recognise that such complexities exist, and to realise that risk 
complexities can be neither ‘be fully understood nor managed with traditional risk 
assessment tools’. Decision-maker competencies to understand advanced risk 
management tools may be needed soon, because increasingly, Australian port 
managers conduct their operations within dynamic and complex operating 
environments, with vulnerability sensitivities to diverse risks both within their 
ports, and within their external networks of crucial goods and services providers. 
Port management preparedness to meet these systemic complexity challenges 
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requires strong and informed risk management leadership (Hellingrath et al. 
2015).  
9.4.2. Port risks and vulnerabilities 
The literature shows that the Australian port risk environment is shaped by three 
categories of risk (Robinson, Francis & Hurley 2013; Hopkin 2017):  
a) hazards with negative consequences (pure risks);  
b) uncertainties and unknowns (control risks); and,  
c) legislative, regulatory or code of practice requirements for hazard 
management (compliance risks). 
The literature findings in Chapter 4 show that external risks require organisational 
mindfulness for early recognition, preparedness to respond, and capabilities for 
minimising and recovering from the risk consequences. Alternatively, 
organisational compliance risks are largely avoidable through establishing 
complying systems and conditions, and monitoring and guiding personnel 
behaviour. Risks involving uncertainties and unknowns require preparedness in 
the form of encouraging an adaptive and innovative mindset and generic response 
capabilities and resources. The literature also informs practitioners of emerging 
new millennium risks (WEF 2018), some of which have potential to substantially 
affect the conduct of Australian port operations. These are external risks whose 
causalities are beyond port management abilities to control. The World Economic 
Forum (WEF 2018, p. 3) presents its expected ten most likely millennium risks for 
the short term, as shown in Table 9-1.  
Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological 















   
 Failure of climate-
change mitigation 
and adaptation 
   
Table 9-1: Top ten most likely risks to global institutions (Adapted from WEF 2018). 
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The thesis survey established that Australian port managers are mindful of these 
risk types, and port managers reported already experiencing adverse 
consequences from some disruption types and provide their expectations for 
future occurrences. In meeting diverse risk types and categories, port risk 
governance systems must encompass strategic and tactical planning, decision-
making, and risk treatments aligned with the objective of achieving strategic and 
operational objectives (Lark 2015; ISO 31000:2018). Within this thesis, whereas 
survey respondents appear to be aware of differing risk categories at an abstract 
level, they provide little evidence of modifying their risk management processes 
to treat differing risk categories with separate methodologies or higher-level 
capabilities. 
Port managers must manage vulnerabilities related to the risks of routine failures, 
human error, cyber-attack, physical security, rapid advances in technology, the 
vagaries of weather, and the integrity of their electrical supplies (Section 2.3.). 
Typically, Australian port authority risk and vulnerability identification takes place 
within annual brainstorming sessions (Srikanth & Venkataraman 2013). The 
literature review suggests a potential new direction and a more structured 
approach to how port managers perform their risk identification and vulnerability 
assessments, by use of a military technique (Schnaubelt, Larson & Boyer 2014). 
This technique takes the preliminary step of conducting vulnerability identification 
and assessment, rather than first identifying a hazard and then assessing how the 
port might be vulnerable. This technique provides a defence-in-depth evaluation 
of operational susceptibilities by ranking port weaknesses and vulnerabilities in 
order of: 
a) critical capabilities essential to achieving port logistical and transportation 
objectives;  
b) critical requirements in support of critical capabilities, in terms of 
management, assets and infrastructure resources coupled with relevant 
knowledge, plans, policies and strategies; and  
c) critical vulnerabilities - whereby critical requirements, or second party 
contributors to these requirements, are insufficiently prepared or assessed 
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as being incapable of responding to or managing disruptions and their 
consequences. 
9.4.3. Australian port risk management  
Port risk management and governance characteristics vary from port to port in 
complex multiple aspects, driven by differing port needs and interests, and varying 
elements of uncertainty and complexity associated with whichever risks affect 
each port (De Marchi 2015). Australian port managers have access to a diverse 
range of guides, techniques and approaches to assist them in developing their risk 
management capabilities and capacities as outlined in Chapter 4. Their primary 
guide is the ISO 31000:2018 Risk management -- Guidelines standard, which the 
Australian State government port owners advocate for port management use.  
Port managers might have difficulty in absorbing and making sense of the many 
documents that comprise the risk management and resilience standard families, 
and which narrowly address specific aspects of risk, resilience and business 
continuity.    
The researcher adapted from literature sources a port risk management maturity 
model to assist in better understanding the progressive path of port risk 
management effectiveness. The proposed risk management maturity model as 
explained in Section 4-8 is presented for convenience in Figure 9-1. The model 
combines the features of other models (Chapman 2011; Andrews 2017; 
Kolomiyets 2017) with the addition of a percentage effectiveness scale on the y-
axis to provide an ability for quantification. The model is also constructed to show 
how conventional enterprise risk management processes and procedures form the 
basis for port resilience, which indicates that preceding levels of risk management 
capability should be attained before resilience becomes fully effective. Based on 
the empirical findings, Australian port capabilities appear for the most part to fit 
within the level four column, in which risk management expertise and 








9.4.4. Higher level risk management 
Conventional risk management strategies and techniques, practised for many 
years, enable port managers to directly prepare for and treat known hazards and 
associated risks (Blades 2017). For unknown risks and hazards, port managers 
require generic risk management solutions to cope with unpredictable risks, and 
these solutions might be strengthened with acquired abilities for adaptive, 
innovative and improvisational responses at all levels of management. The 
literature advises that additional and enhanced risk management capabilities 
involve the design and incorporation of resilience frameworks and models into 
port management practices. This evolution towards higher level risk management 
better prepares port managers for responding to unknown, unanticipated, and 
otherwise unmanageable new and emerging risks (Linkov et al. 2014; WEF 2018).  
Resilience frameworks as described in ISO 22316:2017, Security and resilience - 
Organizational resilience - Principles and Attributes necessarily differ between 
organisations, with specific objectives and initiatives incorporated within each 
framework to suit individual organisational needs. The major components of a 
resilience framework as outlined within the resilience standard and elsewhere I 
the literature include an identification and understanding of the organisation, an 
analysis of current capabilities and vulnerabilities, setting objective and 
requirements, identification of internal and external resources and stakeholder 
dependencies, and formulating the strategies and methodologies for 
implementing and enhancing resilience capacities (Linkov et al. 2014; Häring et al. 
2017; ISO 22316:2017). Multiple examples of resilience frameworks were found in 
the literature from both social-ecological and engineering resilience approaches, 
including those just cited, however there was minimal evidence of a generic port 
resilience framework that provides a non-complex overview of how higher levels 
of port resilience might be engendered.  
The researcher developed from the resilience literature sources (for example ISO 
22316:2017) a resilience management framework to assist academics and port 
managers in better understanding the stages involved in the evolution, 
implementation and maintenance of these resilience management practices in a 
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port context. The proposed framework (as explained in S 5-5) is presented for 
convenience in Figure 9-2, as a pragmatic blueprint overview of how resilience 
concepts are transformed into port practice. The framework aims to advance port 
resilience knowledge but leaves processual gaps in understanding what each step 
entails. The thesis accordingly turned to the literature for a model that explains in 
more detail how ports might operationalise resilience. 
 
Figure 9-2: Conceptual port resilience implementation framework (Adapted from ISO 
22316:2017 concepts). 
9.4.4.1. Understanding how to operationalise port resilience  
The research set out to establish how resilience might be operationalised at 
Australian ports and the inherent challenge with this task is that resilience is 
regarded as a port management intangible resource (Hall 1993) and as such is not 
directly detectable or measurable. Rather, proxy indicators (Brown, Seville & 
Vargo 2017) are used to detect organisational preparedness to implement 
resilient responses to either day-to-day emergencies or major crises (McManus et 
al. 2008). McManus et al. (2008, p. 81) argue that enablement of resilience 
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requires ‘situation awareness, management of keystone vulnerabilities, and 
adaptive capacity.’ Consequently, if resilience is an intangible resource that cannot 
be seen or measured, then how can it be operationalised, analysed, documented 
and aligned with existing risk management capabilities? Whereas the literature 
provides some answers regarding what organisational resilience and its values to 
the organisation might be, there is less evidence from a business model 
perspective of how an organisation might operationalise resilience at the required 
level, what motivates it to do so, how existing resources and capabilities are 
realigned, and what new capabilities are needed. To narrow this evidence gap, the 
researcher explored organisational theories for a suitable model to explain how 
managerial risk management cognition and abilities might transform towards a 
functional and cultural resilience capabilities mindset.  
This type of problem solution resonates with the dynamic capabilities concepts of 
value creation and capture (Teece 2017). Dynamic capabilities theory particularly 
lends itself to studies involving middle management’s bottom-up innovation in 
transforming new knowledge or methodology into regular use (Teece 2018) which 
in this thesis refers to operationalising resilience concepts. Dynamic capabilities 
theory (Teece, Pisano & Shuen 1997) was found in the literature survey to have 
much in common with resilience concepts (for example, flexibility, complexity, 
innovation, adaptiveness, improvisation, transformation, learning, coping with 
threats and sudden change, managing uncertainty, systemic change, situational 
awareness, dynamic processes, governance and leadership (Teece, Pisano & 
Shuen 1997; Teece 2007; Teece 2017; Teece 2018). A port organisational resilience 
dynamic capabilities model was developed from the literature, to assist in 
understanding how port resilience might be operationalised, and to identify where 
empirical investigation is needed to address gaps within the knowledge. The 
proposed model as explained in Section 5-2 is presented for convenience in Figure 
9-3 as part of the literature findings, and then its individual components are 
examined and aligned with the empirical research findings in Section 9.6, to 





Figure 9-3: Dynamic capabilities model for transforming and reconfiguring organisational resilience (Adapted from Teece 2017). 
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9.5. Findings from the empirical research 
This empirical research focuses on establishing a clearer understanding of how 
the dynamics of disruptive change are managed within the contemporary 
Australian port’s risk management capabilities and processes (Davidson et al. 
2016; Haraguchi, Lall & Watanabe 2016). The investigation explores the extent 
and capabilities of risk management knowledge, capabilities and capacities of 
senior executives charged with managing port authorities and government 
instrumentalities overseeing Australia’s 70 larger ports (Ports Australia 2017).  
In general answer to the primary research question, the empirical research 
showed that port risk management processes appear to be based on sound 
management principles. Australian ports cope best against physically 
manifested disruptions (storms, oil and chemical spills, infrastructure damage), 
but their effectiveness levels reduce markedly against the more intangible 
disruptions arising from deliberate human interventions such as security 
breaches, cyber-threat, criminality, and socio-political acts. In general, 
Australian ports demonstrate mixed levels of competencies in managing the 
risks and consequences arising from low probability/high consequence 
disruptions as will now be discussed. 
9.5.1. Risk management competencies 
The primary research question asks how the ports manage risks and 
consequences arising from low probability/high consequence disruptions, and 
this question encompasses port risk management processes, procedures and 
resources, and the primary resource consists of the management complement 
and their competencies. The findings indicate that Australian ports effectively 
manage physically manifested disruptions (storms, oil and chemical spills, 
infrastructure damage) but effectiveness levels reduce when challenged by 
deliberate human interventions (security breaches, cyber-threat, criminality, 
socio-political acts). This effectiveness variance is shown by the surveyed port 
managers reporting between 56-80% effectiveness in managing individual 
categories of disruption, with lowest levels of effectiveness recorded against 
security breaches and the failure of crucial goods and service supply (Section 
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7.6). The highest numbers of effective responses were recorded against 
hazards derived from human causality, adverse natural events, operational 
plant and equipment failure, and ship incidents. Respondents who reported 
difficulties in coping found their most challenging hazards to be infrastructure 
failure, adverse natural events, and adverse socio-political events. The lowest 
level of disruption management effectiveness (31%) was experienced against 
security breaches.  
The research did not find significant associations between levels of risk 
management competency and the levels of risk management qualifications.  
Not all senior port executives hold risk management qualifications, despite 
their important risk management decision-making roles. The literature 
provides scant information on port managers without formal risk management 
qualifications, including port procedures for risk management professional 
development, the quality of in-house training programs, and the levels of 
reliability and adequacy of risk management strategies, plans and policies 
produced by managers without risk management qualifications. Workplace 
experience and training is necessary for the full development of port 
management leadership capabilities, but further competence would likely arise 
from ‘continuously implemented and empowered’ formal training to provide 
currency in underlying technical skills (Manuti et al. 2015, p. 1).  
9.5.2. Port vulnerabilities 
The research found that port managers’ highest-ranked reason for developing 
resilience capabilities was to gain a better understanding of the risk 
environment and resultant port vulnerabilities, and to thereby enable 
improved detection of potentially disruptive events (Subsections 8.3.2.; 8.3.4.). 
Port managers indicate in their survey responses that they were mindful and 
aware of their risk environment and of the types and regularity of disruptions 
experienced during the past five years. They expect fewer port disruptions to 
occur across most known categories of risk during the next five years, and only 
three risk types to increase: cyber-threats, socio-political issues and financial 
risks. Conversely, deep uncertainties are reported by these managers 
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concerning their port vulnerabilities to new and emerging risks, whose 
causalities and potential disruption consequences are yet unknown.  
Where experience of disruptions might be expected to shape managers’ 
expectations of future port vulnerabilities, this was not apparent from the 
survey. Figure 9-4 (reconfigured from previous Figure 7-5) compares the types 
and numbers of disruptions previously experienced by respondents with what 
these port managers predict for the short-term future. Previously, three types 
of occurrence predominated - operational or equipment failure, adverse 
natural event, and infrastructure/superstructure failure. However, 
approximately half of respondents discounted the likelihood of these adverse 
events reoccurring in the near term. Alternatively, socio-political and financial 
risks are elevated beyond past low-level occurrences. This leads to a possibility 
that if management assumptions about types and likelihood of future risks are 
incorrect, then their scope of controls and responses might be inappropriate. 
 
Figure 9-4:   Comparison between historic and predicted port disruptions (Author).  
The research also assessed how much reliance port managers might place on 
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experiences that port operators should concentrate on strengthening their risk 
management capabilities, rather than look to insurance as either a risk transfer 
opportunity or a source of financial assistance towards disruption recovery. 
O’Hare, White and Connelly (2016) suggest that reliance upon insurance is a 
counterproductive resilience measure in that it creates a mindset that more 
readily accepts risky behaviour and resists change after crises. White and 
Connelly argue that a reliance upon insurance is more attuned to an 
organisational return to the status-quo rather than organisational adaptive 
reconfiguration. Nonetheless, with ports’ increasing exposure to multiple 
hazards, insurance remains an important resilience technique in financing a 
port recovery within some categories of risk (Lam & Lassa 2017), 
9.5.3. Operationalising resilience 
The findings from Section 8.4 demonstrate respondents acknowledgement 
that resilience: 
a) is their responsibility; 
b) is not too complex to implement and offers business continuity 
benefits; 
c) offers tangible gains and competitive advantages; 
d) is not too expensive to implement; and 
e) implementation is not impeded by change management, 
confidentiality or industrial relations barriers. 
However, the reality is that 50% of the respondents believe that they can 
adequately cope with future disruptions by employing current risk 
management practices, whereas the situation actualities suggest that they 
cannot. The remaining 50% recognise that risk management change is 
required.  
Respondents reported that the most important driver for resilience change at 
their ports would be the Board and senior management championing the 
concept. Few respondents believe that climate change is a feasible driver for 
resilience change, which is inconsistent with the many climate change studies 
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that explore resilience as a means of risk mitigation (for example, Becker et al. 
2015; Chhetri et al. 2015; McEvoy & Mullett 2015). Port managers generally 
acknowledge the possibility of increasingly severe natural events, so that their 
rationale for ranking climate change as an unimportant driver for resilience 
enhancement remains unclear. Drivers for resilience change only initiate the 
operationalising process and so the research investigated how progress could 
be made in achieving transformational resilience change. Requisite steps 
towards operationalising resilience through transformation and 
reconfiguration are now explained with the assistance of the proposed 
dynamic capabilities model from the literature survey findings highlighted in 
Subsection 9.4.4.1  
9.6. Transforming and reconfiguring port resilience capabilities 
The purposes of the current study included an assessment of what ports need 
to change in their practices to become more resilient (secondary research 
question two), and this assessment provides insights towards a pragmatic and 
practical understanding of what port managers must undertake to achieve 
transformational resilience change, and how they might proceed through the 
sense, seize and transform process as a workable management systems 
strategy (Teece, Pisano & Shuen 1997; Teece 2018). This explanation is 
undertaken firstly by examining the individual components of the dynamic 
capabilities model developed from the literature review (Subsection 9.4.4.1) 
and then fitting the empirical findings to the model. 
9.6.1. Sensing drivers for transformational resilience change 
The data provides evidence that what port managers recognise as catalysts for 
resilience change precipitates an organisational shift towards a strengthened 
resilience state. This aspect of the dynamic capabilities model is shown in 
Figure 9-5. In the event of port management ‘sensing’ the need for resilience 
change, then this motivation is related to possible opportunities to be derived 
from the process, because if there was to be no gain and with no regulatory 
compliance to enforce the process, then there is little rationale for change. As 
described by Winter (2003, p. 994):  
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If opportunities for competitively significant change are sparse enough or 
expensive enough to realize, then the added cost of dynamic capabilities 
will not be matched by corresponding benefits. 
 
Figure 9-5: The process of sensing opportunities for transformational port resilience change 
(Adapted from Teece 2017). 
Drivers for port resilience change are regarded as catalysts for the process, and 
the derived opportunities form part of the outcomes. Enhanced port resilience 
leads towards safer ports, within the charter party ‘safe port’ definition (Girvin 
2017). Safer ports arise through management achieving a lower frequency of 
disruptions, faster recovery times from disruptions, and a reduced likelihood of 
delays for visiting ships. This also equates to increased productivity through 
reduced port downtime, increased cargo throughput, and a more effective use 
of resources. Increased port productivity is a sign of port efficiencies, and Girvin 
(2017) notes the commercial benefits of a safer port by quoting (p. 2) ‘a well-
worn truism: time is money’. In 2016-17 Australia exported 818 million tonnes 
of iron ore at an average US$68 per tonne (Culley 2018). A productivity increase 
of one day per year by each iron ore export port could potentially increase the 
export volume by two million tonnes. Port resilience and derived efficiencies 
also potentially offers competitive advantage against ports of other nations, 
which also vie for opportunities to ship natural resources (for example iron ore 
and coal) to Asia (Reynolds 2010). In short, port managers might feasibly 
‘sense’ competitive advantages in seizing opportunities to become more 
resilient (Reynolds 2010; Piening 2013; Teece 2017). 
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This thesis finds that ample scope exists for Australian port managers to derive 
opportunities from transformational resilience change. Respondents to the 
empirical research acknowledge that their risk environment severely 
challenges existing risk competencies, and as discussed in S 7.6, port managers’ 
effectiveness in managing all disruption categories is self-reported to vary 
widely. Up to 29% of ports required external assistance in managing these 
categories of disruptions, and depending on the disruption type, up to 28% of 
respondents are unsure of their capabilities and capacities to respond and 
manage. The port risk environment is predicted to become more challenging 
with new and increasingly severe hazards (WEF 2018). However, there appears 
to be limited likelihood of port transformational change arising specifically 
from perceptions of a changing risk environment. Respondents   generally 
predict fewer disruptions to arise in the future, and considerably so for crucial 
goods and services supplier failures (Figure 9-4). A major challenge for port 
industry resilience change, as identified from the research, is that 50% of 
respondents reject the need to amend or divert from their current risk 
management practices, despite some reportedly low levels of risk management 
effectiveness.  
Respondent sensing capabilities are likely in need of focused education 
towards improved risk identification and analysis capabilities. The research 
demographics (Section 7.4) identify that 13.5% of port senior executives within 
the survey do not hold any risk management qualifications, and 48% of 
respondents have gained their risk management expertise from workplace 
experience and/or in-house training. Overcoming this high level of resistance 
to resilience change might begin with an increased industry focus on risk 
management education and training. The sensing process also incorporates 
identification of drivers for resilience change. As discussed, the respondents 
identified ample reasons for change in the form of tangible gains, enhanced 
business continuity, competitive advances and low costs to achieve the ensuing 
benefits. If transformation and reconfiguration is to occur, then respondents 
sense that influential drivers to initiate this process will likely include customer 
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pressures and the threat of financial loss or market share, government 
encouragement of change, and societal demands for safer operations.  
A final step in the sensing process is an accurate identification of the current 
state of port risk management capabilities, vulnerabilities and awareness of the 
risk environment. If some managers are either unable or unwilling to accurately 
articulate what their current resilience state might be, then their abilities to 
identify what needs to be changed is undoubtedly questionable. The empirical 
data clearly shows that 50% of the respondents do not accept the need for 
change, and yet even the best performing ports are achieving a maximum 80% 
level of effectiveness against disruptions. The respondents fail to demonstrate 
uniformity and in their risk identification and vulnerability processes, with the 
possibility of some respondents demonstrating a risk myopia outlook towards 
future risks, an outlook that appears to sit comfortably with a reluctance for 
change. The port industry has access to a peak industry body which has 
previously developed safety and risk management guidelines for the ports, and 
regularly convenes representative working groups to address risk in all major 
areas of port activities (Ports Australia 2018). A useful and in-house approach 
to identifying the current port resilience state might commence with a peak 
body working group study.  Once the sensing process that identifies the need 
for transformational change is completed, then the processes involved for 
reconfiguration need to be identified.  
9.6.2. Seizing the means for reconfiguring resilience strategies 
To gain the benefits of a dynamic capabilities seizing process (Teece 2018) port 
managers must identify the necessary skills, processes and routines to enable 
resilience change; to strategise what organisational structural changes become 
necessary and what resources might assist the processes, and to explore what 
impediments must be overcome, as shown in Figure 9-6. This is an ongoing 
process, because the port and its operations are continually evolving and 
adapting, and these changes create new sources of vulnerability. All 
respondents to the research agree that the impetus to configure skills, 
processes and routines to enable resilience change is driven by top-down 
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advocacy and oversight, however before this process can be effectively 
implemented the Board and senior executives must become sufficiently 
cognisant of what is required and how best to initiate the enabling processes. 
 
Figure 9-6: Seizing capabilities for resilience transformation and reconfiguration (Adapted 
from Teece 2017). 
Restructuring the port organisation likely involves evaluating the extent of 
bureaucratic command and control constraints within the port’s strategies, 
plans and policies as discussed in Section 5.7. Some bureaucratic management 
restructuring and reconfiguration may be found necessary to delegate 
sufficient authority, autonomy and flexibility to responders who operate within 
the emergency management framework (Section 5.7). Further, resilience must 
be set as a corporate objective to empower and maintain the reconfiguration 
process, and for a future resilient state to be achieved, then enabling strategies 
must be assigned towards this corporate aim. The port management policies 
and culture may need to be modified to ensure that strategic, tactical and 
operational level capabilities exist for resilient day-to-day operations, plus a 
resilient response and recovery capability in reserve to deal with crises 
situations as outlined in Section 7.8. The literature advises that resilient 
organisation structure is based upon the creation of flexible, adaptive and 
joined-up teams, with emphasis given to developing the leadership strengths 
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and capabilities of frontline response teams who must operate closely in 
emergencies largely independently of senior management (Worboys 2015; 
Hayes & Owen 2017). However, seven respondents reported that their present 
organisation structure is dependent upon external services providers and 
internal contactors for the provision of key services such as IT. These 
respondents find difficulties in communicating with and controlling these 
external and internal services providers, who demonstrate differing levels of 
risk management training and perspectives on risk management to the port 
employees (Sections 7.8.6.; 7.8.9.). If these independent services providers 
constitute a source of vulnerability to the port’s business continuity 
effectiveness, then ports should consider the feasibility of engaging personnel 
in-house to provide these key resources and capabilities.  
IT management is potentially a case in point for port organisational 
restructuring if the port does not already employ an IT professional. A port IT 
professional requires knowledge and skills associated with the implementation 
of ISO/IEC 27031:2011 (IT business continuity), and ISO/IEC 27032:2012 (cyber-
security) in operational environments. With cyber-threats an increasingly 
threatening issue for ports, as experienced by the Maersk organisation in its 
global port operations (Roth & Nakashima 2017; Meyer-Larsen & Müller 2018) 
then engaging a competent in-house IT professional may change from being a 
costly extravagance to a necessity if future resilience is sought. The study shows 
that 65% of respondents (n = 38, 65% = 25) experienced security breaches 
during the past five years, sufficient to affect the reliability of their port 
operations, resources, capabilities and infrastructure. Forty percent (10) of 
these 25 respondents reported difficulties in coping with these security 
breaches. Accordingly, and with Australian businesses coming under increased 
regulatory, public and socio-political oversight (Hooper et al. 2018), ports might 
consider the engagement of a dedicated risk management officer. A further 
benefit with in-house specialists working alongside and assisting other 
managers is that a measure of these specialists’ knowledge and skills might 
gradually spread across the wider management structure.  
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9.6.2.1. Reconfiguring competencies and organisational structure  
The future practice of port risk management is challenged by a continually 
evolving risk environment that creates increasingly sophisticated and 
numerous risks (WEF 2018) as with cyber-threats (Hopkin 2017; Meyer-Larsen 
& Müller 2018). Preparedness to treat new, emerging and unforeseen risks, 
which might impact quickly and unexpectedly, requires increasingly far sighted 
and sophisticated micro-foundations for developing effective risk management 
capabilities and capacities. Port managers who just a decade ago might have 
employed risk management primarily against financial and legal liability are 
now addressing strategic and operational risks within much wider skill sets. 
Accordingly, this thesis concludes that port managers must become 
increasingly familiar with multiple risk management artefacts, inclusive of 
safety planning and process, emergency response, risk mitigation, disruption 
management, business continuity, and corporate adaptability.  
Port risk management and resilience is not just the province of a specific risk 
manager or Chief Risk Officer, rather, ports have a holistic need for risk-based 
process by all managers in all departments within every aspect of management 
(Haimes 2016). Effective risk-oriented port decision-making processes are likely 
to become dependent upon all managers acquiring risk management 
awareness, professional risk management knowledge, and a culture of 
continuous risk management improvement. Learning and continuous 
improvement are important, because the risk environment is not a static 
problem. The dynamic nature of port risk ultimately requires periodic 
reconfiguration of risk management competencies, which involves an 
understanding of which elements must be changed for successful 
transformation to occur. The micro-foundations of this process at Table 9-2 
conceptually describe these elements, and outline the management skill-sets, 
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Table 9-2: Conceptual management competencies and organisational capabilities for future safe-port management (Adapted from Teece 2007; Hopkin 2017).
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Additionally, structural changes may be required across the port’s physical 
resources to better meet the challenges of an increasingly adverse risk 
environment. Stronger storm events, storm surges and possibilities of tsunami 
waves might necessitate redesign and strengthening of wharves and ship 
mooring devices to withstand increased loads on fenders and mooring line 
bollards and hooks (Tsinker 2004, 2014). Operator control areas in buildings 
and machinery such as cranes may need to be airconditioned if increasingly 
warmer temperatures create workplace stress. 
Ports also need to look towards potential impediments for resilience change, 
and from the empirical research, the chief impediment appears to be 
unwillingness for change, with 50% of respondents preferring to persist with 
existing risk management processes and techniques rather than 
reconfiguration towards strengthened resilience (Subsection 8.4.3). For 
resilience change to become essential for such a high proportion of 
respondents, a possibility exists that either legislative compliance measures are 
needed, or the occurrence of a disruption that becomes a focusing event for 
change. A focusing event is described by Birkland and Warnement (2017) as a 
crisis, disaster or catastrophe that is disruptive, sudden, unexpected, 
geographically centred, and widely noticed and reported across public and 
private domains. Focusing events with relevance to global port risk and security 
management changes arguably include the 9/11 terrorist attack, the 2008 
financial crisis, hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and large oil spills resulting from 
the Exxon Valdez and Sea Empress groundings. Given that Australian ports are 
ready to transform and reconfigure their existing risk management culture, 
structures and practices towards enhanced resilience concepts, then the 
transformation process needs to be understood. 
9.6.3. Transformation towards enhanced port resilience 
Transformational change may be difficult for the port bureaucratic mindset 
(Everett 2003a; Pettitt 2014) because port managers may prefer a known, 
stable and predictable operating environment rather than a reconfigured, 
more flexible and adaptive organisational structure with a culture of 
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continuous resilience renewal (Piening 2013; Teece 2017). Australian port 
authorities as corporatised state government entities can engage in 
transformational change, with Boards of Directors empowered to determine 
the policies and control the affairs of the port authority (see for example 
Division 2, S 8 of the Western Australia Port Authorities Act 1999 (DoT-WA 
1999). The Board will likely keep the Minister informed of any major changes 
that are planned and might choose to outline the intended activities within the 
port authority’s annual statement of corporate intent. Conceptual managerial 
transformation towards a port resilience culture is shown in Figure 9-8. A key 
aspect of implementing dynamic capabilities theory towards future resilience 
is that existing tangible and intangible capabilities, assets and resources should 
be maintained, and where necessary enhanced (Teece, Pisano & Shuen 1997; 
Teece 2017). 
 
Figure 9-8: Organisational transformation (Adapted from Teece 2007). 
This thesis survey found that Australian port risk management concepts are 
generally based on the ISO 31000:2018 risk management standard. However, 
port risk managers’ execution of these capabilities seemingly requires 
attention, as borne out by the wide variance (56-80%) in effective port risk 
management outcomes across a range of risk environment hazards (Section 
7.6). Within a dynamic capabilities context, transformation of the port 
structure and culture towards resilience concepts is assumed to be constructed 
upon the existing risk management foundation, and in the case of some 
Australian ports these foundations need reinforcing. Accordingly, a necessary 
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precursor activity within the transformation process should be to optimise port 
risk management competencies. An early improvement might be enabled 
through increased managerial understandings of the various risk, resilience and 
business continuity standards.  
In assessing what additional port capabilities are required to achieve future 
resilience, port managers know what risk management capabilities, capacities 
and resources exist and have it within their power to modify these capabilities. 
The survey respondents reported diverse proficiencies in risk management 
knowledge, capabilities and competencies, and so there is little likelihood of a 
‘one-size-fits-all resolution of the resilience transformation process. Instead, 
Chapters 4 and 5 provide academic and practitioner guidance to the state of 
the knowledge, and frameworks and maturity models by which to gauge where 
each port sits within risk and resilience management evolution. From these 
guides, port managers are assisted in assessing what is needed to take their 
next steps towards resilience capability transformation and reconfiguration.  
In summation, evidence exists that much remains to be addressed within an 
investigation of port disruption management and the operationalisation of 
resilience concepts into mainstream port practices. The tentative contributions 
that this research makes to the knowledge are outlined in the next section. 
9.7. Contributions to knowledge 
This study has found that Australian ports have difficulties in managing a 
changing risk environment that is characterised by new and unexpected 
categories of hazards, and increasingly severe natural hazards. The second 
major finding is that while port managers have the foundational capabilities to 
operationalise resilience, they are unclear about the processes and procedures 
required for progression to a higher resilience state. The study investigates 
Australian port risk and resilience competencies from two directions, namely 
how port managers presently manage low probability, high consequence 
disruptions, and how they might manage future risks that are characterised by 
uncertainties, unexpectedness and unknowns. The latter investigation focuses 
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upon the operationalisation of resilience, and in relation to port managers’ 
difficulties in understanding resilience transformation processes, a 
contribution to the knowledge is made by adapting Dynamic Capabilities theory 
towards this investigation. 
The thesis approaches port resilience differently, by examining the processes 
that enable future port resilience, and how existing port management 
capabilities and competencies alone are insufficient to achieve this goal. The 
thesis proposes that capabilities are not so much the issue in the port transition 
towards a higher level of resilience. Instead, port managers’ capabilities for 
reconfiguring towards a future resilience state are dependent on their ability 
to engage in the processes for sensing and seizing the opportunities for 
transformation. Accordingly, the contribution of this research is to recognise 
the building of port resilience as a process that is supported by port 
management capabilities. 
This thesis also shows that dynamic capabilities theory (Teece, Pisano & Shuen 
1997; Teece 2007, 2017, 2018) and systems theory have inter-relationships 
with resilience concepts (for example, flexibility, complexity, innovation, 
adaptiveness, improvisation, transformation, learning, coping with threats and 
sudden change, managing uncertainty, systemic change, situational 
awareness, dynamic processes, governance and leadership). Lesser theoretical 
contributions include the development of proposed descriptive models for a 
port risk management framework, a port resilience framework, a port risk 
management capabilities maturity model, and a port resilience 
implementation model. These models were adapted from other fields of 
research and reconfigured within a specific port-centric context to help 
understand and answer the relevant aspects of research questions. 
9.7.1. Implications of safe ports and resilience  
This thesis takes an adaptive conceptual approach towards understanding how 
resilience might be operationalised from a pragmatic port management 
perspective. An analysis of Australian port managers’ perspectives on 
organisational resilience and transformation for strategic advantage follows an 
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investigative pathway that is suggested by Teece (2007). This pathway was 
used in developing a port-oriented resilience management framework to assist 
academics and port managers in better understanding the evolution, 
implementation and maintenance of resilience management practices. The 
value of such an approach is outlined by Teece (2007, p. 1319) as a means of 
establishing clarity in how an organisation:  
a) ‘senses and shapes opportunities and threats; 
b) seizes opportunities; and 
c) maintains competitiveness through enhancing, combining, protecting, 
and when necessary, reconfiguring the business enterprise’s intangible 
and tangible assets.’ 
The title of this thesis is ‘Safe Ports for the 21st Century: Australian port 
resilience’. From a port management perspective, the notion or need of a ‘safe 
port’ is driven by the charter party legal agreement between the charterer and 
the shipowner (Girvin 2017). Port managers have long been peripheral to ‘safe 
port’ discussions (and ensuing legal arguments) as described by Astle (1996) 
and Mandaraka-Sheppard (2014). However, there is no guarantee that port 
managers will continue to be a largely silent participant in safe port arbitration, 
and if legal intervention occurs then a possibility exists that multiple aspects of 
providing a safe port will become port management compliance risks. Where 
supply chains have experienced ship traffic congestion following Australian 
port disruptions, the cost to global trade has been high, with lost sales 
reportedly costing up to US$100 million per day for larger ports (Loh & Thai 
2015). According to the World Economic Forum (WEF 2018), future hazards 
inclusive of cyber-threats, adverse natural events, financial and climate change 
disruptions are likely to increase in frequency, which will likely exacerbate ship 
delays at ports. If an increased frequency of disruptions instigates supply chain 
pressure on the Australian government and port private sector interests to do 
more to make port operations more resilient, then the port risk management 
task will change. Consequential or proactive measures to make port operations 
more effective within a ship visit context would require a reconfiguration of 
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intangible assets, routines and resources to enable compliance. Port 
management critical thinking and risk analysis is a necessary component of 
‘sensing ‘potential changes in the wind, as outlined in the following section. 
9.7.2. Management implications 
This thesis contributes to academic and practitioner understandings of the 
internal and external risk environment and future threats to future port 
business continuity. The external risk environment is explained to include the 
potential for systemic risks to affect crucial goods, services and infrastructure 
within a port’s onshore and offshore regional areas. The thesis stresses the 
importance of resilience not only in port management responses to crises but 
also in day-to-day emergency situations for achieving maritime logistics and 
transportation competitive advantage. The research underlines how resilience 
has multiple dimensions and capabilities (for example, flexibility, complexity, 
innovation, adaptiveness, and improvisation) that become either individual or 
combined risk management tools in a port’s disruption management 
repository. A Dynamic Capabilities approach to risk and resilience management 
provides practitioners with a readily understood blueprint for understanding 
and formulating what needs to be done for managing and responding to new 
and emerging risks and uncertainties. The macro-findings from the 
employment of a dynamic capabilities approach suggest that a similar 
approach may be useful in other areas of critical infrastructure and 
transportation resilience research. 
Importantly, the findings suggest that port managers are insufficiently 
proactive in managing risk and achieving increased resilience. Remedial steps 
would involve auditing the port against risk management and resilience 
provisions of ISO 31000:2018 and ISO 22316:2017, and upon receipt of the 
findings, assess the capability gaps and rectify the perceived shortfalls. This 
may include adding new skill sets to the management team, for example 
engaging an IT professional to manage the risk of cyber-threats. A review of 
predicted risks and the potential transmuting of port risks from climate change 
(for example higher temperatures, new diseases, stronger winds, worse floods, 
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higher storm surges) leads to the need for new emergency response plans, 
changed work practices, and revision of occupational safety, health and 
environmental protection plans, policies and practices. Several high-level 
managers lack risk management training and qualifications, and Boards of 
Directors should address this shortfall because it leaves the directors without 
evidence-based information that they require to make correct risk and 
resilience management governance and policy decisions. Directors are 
responsible for establishing the port’s tolerance and attitude to risk, and with 
some ports reporting a disruption management efficiency of less than 60% then 
the relevant ports’ risk and audit committees should re-evaluate management 
competencies and performance in the areas of contingency management and 
business continuity. These are all indications that sufficient risk management 
activity is carried out in Australian ports to ensure that port managers meet 
their levels of regulatory compliance and have mandatory systems in place, but 
there is no surveillance to ensure that port risk management outcomes meet 
the lowest levels of international standards.  
An implication of this research for port managers is that they should assign 
greater emphasis towards managing and coping with conceptual risks and their 
consequences. Australian port managers are more aware and proactive in 
monitoring and managing the risks of those hazards with physical and 
measurable attributes, for example storms associated with adverse natural 
events. Conceptual risks are those that manifest from non-tangible hazards, 
whose risks often emerge unexpectedly – for example port hazards involving 
security breaches, cyber-threats, criminality and socio-political acts.  
Port managers agree on the value of resilience to their organisations but half 
of those surveyed intend remaining with their existing risk management 
processes and procedures, which potentially leaves them under prepared to 
manage unknown risks and deep uncertainty. New and emerging hazards that 
are associated with unknown risks and deep uncertainty require innovative, 
adaptive and flexible responses inherent with resilience, and these response 
characteristics cannot be provided by traditional risk management. Port 
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managers can gain further competencies in managing new and unexpected 
risks through familiarization with, and subsequent implementation of Dynamic 
Capabilities Theory. Dynamic capabilities can assist organisations towards 
transforming and reconfiguring their risk management capabilities towards 
organisational resilience (Teece 2017a, 2018). Enhancing port management 
competencies and organisational capabilities is part of this transformation and 
reconfiguration process. 
Other findings of this thesis are listed in the preceding chapters. 
9.8. Study limitations 
The sample size is a limitation that would caution against generalisability to the 
wider international port management community. Further, the research is 
integrated in systems thinking, resilience and dynamic capabilities theory 
(Vogus & Sutcliffe 2007; Teece 2017) and differing outcomes might arise, or 
important factors within this thesis become overlooked, if the study were to be 
grounded in another research approach. However, due care was taken to 
minimise the influence of extraneous variables to ensure that research results 
were internally valid and replicable. It was assumed that responses to the 
research survey questionnaire were honest and accurate, however recognition 
is made that respondent self-reports reflect the potentially subjective nature 
of their risk management and resilience environment interpretations.  
The scope of the study embraces Australian port managers associated with 27 
port authorities and State government port management departments 
geographically spread around the Australian coastline. This narrowing of the 
study population is intended to make the research aims more feasible and 
manageable, however this geographical focus on Australia limits the number 
of managers available to the survey processes and inhibits the generalisability 
of findings to global ports. A possibility exists that non-respondents to the 
survey possess knowledge or exhibit risk management behaviour that differs 
from respondents and is not reflected in the data, and thereby constitutes a 
limitation of the study.  
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The sample size affected the researcher’s ability to conduct some quantitative 
data analysis tests, the statistical significance of some findings, and the internal 
consistency of some survey questions. Question responses or components of 
responses with a low Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient were either revised 
or discarded (Tavakol & Dennick 2011).  
An early higher degree by research challenge involving this supervised research 
project arose from initially relying on the scholar-practitioner’s 30-years of 
experience and deep knowledge of port management practices, as opposed to 
investigating practical aspects of port operations within the academic 
literature. This demonstrated at an early stage the importance of an evidence-
based rather than values-based approach to research (Short & Shindell 2009). 
Initially the control method resulted in over-correction, with too many 
references being employed. A further challenge was revealed when time came 
to choose research methodology, because the researcher’s extensive 
relationships with Australia’s senior port managers suggested that potential 
existed for either surveyor bias or respondent bias if telephone or face-to-face 
surveys were employed. Instead the researcher chose a web-based survey 
research technique. 
9.9. Implications for future research and practice 
The research findings tentatively outline a different perspective of port 
resilience thinking, behaviour and conceptualisations than what are provided 
by current theories and Australian government resilience viewpoints (TISN 
2016). Instead, port managers demonstrate a more pragmatic and non-
theoretical viewpoint of resilience implementation and its value to them, and 
some express their resistance to the prospect of resilience changes. To some 
extent these research findings mirror those from a study of US port risk 
management practices (Rice & Trepte 2012). Confirmation of these tentative 
findings suggests the need for a deeper and more vigorous gathering of data, 
extending to case studies and workshops, and further study to either modify, 
expand or reject the present findings.   
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New findings from this thesis appear to take the port risk management domain 
in new directions to existing theory and practice, and potentially creating 
possibilities for further investigation. Future research might advantageously 
identify areas of professional education where theory might be translated into 
useful practical knowledge, and disruption preparedness. There is much within 
this research field that is both challenging and relevant to Australian 
government initiatives in promoting resilience as critical infrastructure 
protection. The topic is also potentially relevant an academic companion to the 
work of the newly instituted Australian Department of Home Security. Much 
remains to be researched within this field, but the researcher was cognisant of 
keeping the task to a manageable size within time and resources constraints. 
However, opportunity was taken during the thesis journey to produce journal 
articles, conference papers and a book chapter related to interesting and 
associated findings along the way, closely related to the thesis topic. 
Resilience capability maturity modelling might be furthered by investigators in 
the following forms: 
a) identifying further or alternative inputs to the model from best 
practices/standards/expert knowledge;  
b) considering whether a port resilience maturity model might be best 
managed with a software system;  
c) Employing Bayes theorem to extend the research in this field, 
particularly in relation to known unknowns and path dependency; and, 
d) whether from a governance and ethics perspective, maturity model 
designs and achievement measurements should be performed in-house 
or by a third-party assessor (Carralli, Knight & Montgomery 2012).  
9.9.1. Future research agenda 
Opportunities for future research arise from this study. Future studies that 
increase port resilience knowledge are likely to benefit both academics and 
practitioners. Translations of improved risk management and resilience theory 
into practical concepts have potential to benefit port reliability, supply chain 
competitiveness and regional economies. Port managers’ lack of encounters 
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with some disruption categories during the past five years is of specific interest 
as a basis for further study, within the contexts of: 
a) Does a lack of experience with managing unfamiliar risks leaves the port 
more vulnerable should such an event arise;  
b) If an Australian port is in a geographical area where some hydro-
meteorological hazards might not normally exist, then might the effects 
of climate change make such hazards more likely, and how might the 
port prepare – for example, to address new risks of tropical cyclones 
and tropical diseases that might ultimately impact more southerly 
ports; or,  
c) Whether a source of disruption (for example cyber-attack) that is yet to 
occur might lead to port risk complacency regarding relevant disruption 
preparedness.  
Further research might investigate whether an association exists between 
senior port managers without formal risk management qualifications, and the 
effectiveness of port disruption management outcomes. The research could 
also determine the implications of managers without formal risk management 
qualifications having responsibilities for authorising and arranging the 
organisational risk management professional development and in-house 
training programs for others. The suggested exploration might also assess the 
reliability and adequacy of risk management strategies, plans and policies 
produced by managers without risk management qualifications.  
Post-doctoral studies to advance the knowledge might benefit from deeper 
immersion into individual port authority disruption records, for example 
emergency operations logs where decision-maker activities, actions and some 
indications of informed decision-making are detailed (Lansdale 2012; DoT-WA 
2015). Each State has legislative requirements for their ports to raise and retain 
records to cover multiple aspects of significant port incidents (QSA 2013; DoT-
WA 2015) and access to such documents would undoubtedly provide more 
detailed evidence of port resilience behaviour. 
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Whereas the present research employed a mixed methods technique in 
exploring, confirming and generating risk management and resilience theory, 
future research might consider an expanded research project by employing 
either quantitative or qualitative approaches.   
Future research might also investigate why half of the management 
respondents consider that existing risk management practices suffice for their 
needs, despite evidence that existing risk management plans and strategies fail 
to produce effective outcomes against certain disruption categories. A 
focussed exploratory emphasis could be directed towards examining why such 
an attitude exists, why it is so widely demonstrated, what realities prompt 
these managerial assumptions, what real costs and effort are required to 
strengthen resilience levels in Australian ports, and what potential benefits 
might accrue from such a research program to the ports, their region, and to 
the national economy.  
Australian port managers are shown to be optimistic in predicting fewer 
disruptions for the short-term future than they have experienced during the 
past five years, and consequent research might seek to validate or disprove 
these practitioner expectations.  
Future research that benefits the understanding and practice of port 
management is a worthwhile process, to the Australian economy and to global 
trade, with ports enabling the export of AU$208 billion in energy and resource 
commodities in 2016-17. Academic studies in areas like risk management and 
resilience pave the way for increased practitioner understandings, and 
potentially contribute to port efficiencies, effectiveness and competences. If 
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Appendix A:  Survey Questionnaire Correspondence 
Information Sheet 
 
The CEO        7 June 2017 
Southeast Port Authority 
PO Box 123 
Erehwon 4567 
 
Dear Senior Manager 
Research Project ‘Safe Ports for the 21st century:  Australian port 
resilience’ – Invitation to Participate 
 
1) Invitation 
My name is Captain Vic Justice and I am a PhD candidate at the University of 
Tasmania’s Australian Maritime College. I am engaged in a major research study 
that examines Australian strategies in elevating resilience levels across the port’s 
operations and disruption preparedness.  
 
You are invited to take part in this research study. 
 
2) The Research Project  
My supervisors in this important research project are Associate Professor Stephen 
Cahoon, Director Sense-T, and Associate Professor Benjamin Brooks at the 
National Centre for Ports and Shipping, Australian Maritime College, University of 
Tasmania. 
 
This research is topical, observing that the Australian Government is creating a 
public-private partnership intended to advance Australian levels of critical 
infrastructure resilience, inclusive of ports. The research objective is to source 
answers towards the broad question of ‘How does the port manage the risks and 
outcomes arising from low-probability/high consequence disruptions?’ 
 
To answer this question, a web-based survey has been designed to investigate port 
organisational resilience, in the context of business continuity when challenged by 
disruptive threats.  
 
3) Why have I been asked to participate in this study? 
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You have been invited to participate because of your experience as a senior risk 
manager in a critical infrastructure organisation. Your opinions will contribute 
significantly to this study. 
 
Please note that your involvement with this study is entirely voluntary. There are 
no consequences if you choose not to participate and this will not affect your 
relationship with the Australian Maritime College and the University of Tasmania. 
 
4) What will I be asked to do? 
Completing the web-based questionnaire will require approximately 30 minutes 
of your time. This internet survey involves a self-administered questionnaire that 
is posted on a web site. You will be asked to provide answers to questions 
displayed on the screen by you either highlighting a phrase, clicking an icon, or 
typing in an answer. The software program is in common use and considered to 
be user friendly.  
 
5) Are there any possible benefits from participating in this study? 
The study is intended to provide potential risk management benefits in suggesting 
ways to manage low probability/high consequence disruptions. The research is 
intended to provide a snapshot of current port resilience practices, and to identify 
strategies and operational capabilities that enable port managers to respond to 
and recover from unexpected/unforeseen disruptions.  
 
The end results of this study will provide you with an opportunity to benchmark 
your own organisation’s resilience capabilities against other Australian ports. You 
may also acquire knowledge of new and innovative practices to assist the 
strengthening of your own organisation’s risk management and resilience 
strategies. 
 
6) Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
There are no foreseeable risks anticipated with participation in this study. 
 
7) What if I change my mind after forwarding the study? 
You can withdraw your participation from this study prior to 31 August 2017 
without providing an explanation. All data relevant to your participation will be 
destroyed upon this request. Specifically, electronic files will be deleted from 
computer hard-drives and servers, computer ‘rubbish bins’ emptied, and paper 
records shredded. 
 
8) How will my confidentiality and anonymity be maintained? 
All information will be treated in a confidential manner and your name will not be 
used in any publication arising out of this research unless with your express 
agreement. In the final report, you will be referred to by a numeric pseudonym. 
Any reference to personal information that might allow someone to guess your 
identity or organisation will be removed. This means that your name and contact 
details will be kept in a password-protected computer file separate from any 
information that you provide. 
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9) What happens after the study?
This study will conclude by the end of August 2017 and will supply the primary
information and data for the student investigator’s doctoral thesis. The findings
may later be presented or published at conferences and other academic arenas
including journals. Copies of such publications can be supplied upon request to
any participant in the study.
Upon completion, a summary of the findings of this doctoral thesis study will be 
emailed to you upon request.  
10) Who do I contact if I have any questions about this study?
If you would like to discuss any aspects of this study, then please contact the
student investigator or either of the chief investigators:
Chief Investigator:  Co-Investigator:  
A/Professor Stephen Cahoon A/Professor Benjamin Brooks 
Director, Sense-T  Research Fellow AMC 
Student Investigator:  
Captain Vic Justice  
Ph: 04           . 
vjustice@utas.edu.au Ph: 03 6324 9769  Ph: 03 6324 9637 
stephen.cahoon@utas.edu.au Benjamin.Brooks@utas.edu.au 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research 
Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this 
study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on 
(03)62266254 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au.
The Executive Officer is the person nominated to receive complaints from research 
participants. Please quote ethics reference number H16636.  
Thank you for taking the time to consider this study, and we look forward to your 
participation in the survey. 
The survey can be accessed at 
Yours sincerely 
Captain Vic Justice 
Student Investigator 
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Request for Sector Promotion 
7 June 2017 
<Mr. John Smith>  
Chief Executive 
<Sector Peer Group> 
<Level 21, 13 Easy Street> 
<Erehwon NSW 2222> 
Dear <Mr. Smith> 
Request for Support in Sector Promotion of Research Project: ‘Safe Ports for the 21st 
century - Australian port resilience’ 
My name is Captain Vic Justice and I am a PhD candidate at the University of Tasmania’s 
Australian Maritime College. I am engaged in a major research study that examines 
Australian strategies in elevating resilience levels across the port’s regional critical 
infrastructure relationships and interdependencies.  
My supervisors in this important research project are Associate Professor Stephen 
Cahoon, Director Sense-T, and Associate Professor Benjamin Brooks from the National 
Centre for Ports and Shipping, Australian Maritime College, University of Tasmania. 
This research is topical, observing that the Australian Government is creating a public-
private partnership intended to advance Australian levels of CI resilience, inclusive of 
ports. It also appears to be central to Ports Australia’s objectives towards the 
development of ‘…strategic issues central to the efficient development, and 
management of Australia’s ports and maritime facilities’. 
The research aims to source answers towards the broad question of ‘How does the port 
manage risks and consequences arising from low probability/high consequence 
disruptions? To answer this question, a web-based survey has been designed to 
investigate port organisational resilience, in the context of business continuity when 
challenged by disruptive threats.  
We would be extremely grateful if you could advise your member CEO’s that they will 
shortly receive an email that requests their participation in this survey. This will reduce 
the possibility of them treating the survey invitation email as spam and help to increase 
the rate of participation. 
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Potential benefits from their involvement will include the development of risk 
management knowledge with direct relevance to managing low probability/high 
consequence disruptions. In particular, the research is intended provide a snapshot of 
current port resilience practices, and to identify strategies and operational capabilities 
that enable port managers to respond to and recover from unexpected disruptions.  
The results of this study will provide port managers with an opportunity to benchmark 
their own organisation’s resilience capabilities against other Australian ports. They may 
also acquire knowledge of new and innovative practices to assist the strengthening of 
their port’s risk management and resilience strategies. 
If you would like to discuss any aspects of this study, then please contact the student 
investigator or either of the chief investigators:  
Student Investigator:    Chief Investigator:         C0-Investigator:  
Captain Vic Justice        A/Professor Stephen Cahoon   A/Professor Benjamin Brooks 
Phone: 04           .    Director, Sense-T    Research Fellow AMC 
vjustice@utas.edu.au  Ph: 03 6324 9769  Ph: 03 6324 9637 
 stephen.cahoon@utas.edu.au Benjamin.Brooks@utas.edu.au 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research Ethics 
Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study, please 
contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on (03)62266254 or email 
human.ethics@utas.edu.au.  
Thank you for taking the time to consider this matter, and we look forward to your 
support in promoting this survey. 
The survey is available by clicking on the link button below. 
Yours sincerely 
Captain Vic Justice 
Student Investigator 
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Email Reminder to Survey Non-respondents 
Address: 




<Insert email address>  
Critical Infrastructure Resilience Survey Reminder 
Dear <Insert name/title> 
Recently we sent you a request to participate in an important 
survey regarding A Research Project: ‘Safe Ports for the 21st 
century - Australian port resilience’.   
Thank you if you have already responded, because to make this 
research optimally meaningful and worthwhile we need as many 
respondents as possible. 
If you have not had a chance to respond, could you please 
consider completing the survey to add your feedback to this 
important and topical research? 
Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary. Your 
responses to the questionnaire indicate your consent to 
participate (please read the “Survey Information Sheet” on the 
survey website for more information). 
Thank you again for participating in this important survey. 
The website for the survey is: <INSERT SURVEY LINK> Simply click 
on this address to go directly to the survey. If this does not work, 
"copy and paste" this address into the address bar of your 
Internet Browser. 
Sincerely, 
Student Investigator:   
Captain Vic Justice  
Australian Maritime College 
Phone: 04            .  
vjustice@utas.edu.au
367 



















































































































Appendix D: Publications stemming from the research 
 
 
Justice, V., Bhaskar, P. R., Pateman, H., Cain, P. A. & Cahoon, S. C. Unknown Unknowns: US container port 
resilience in the new Panama Canal expansion era [Refereed Conference Paper].  2014 International 
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proceedings, 1-20. 
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[Refereed Conference Paper].  7th International Conference of Asian Shipping and Logistics (ICASL 
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Association of Maritime Universities, 310-320. 
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Perth, WA: Pilbara Ports Authority. 
 
Justice, V., Cahoon, S. & Brooks, B. 2018. Understanding Australian Port Resilience and the Development of 
a Port Resilience Framework. In: PETTIT, S. J. & BERESFORD, A. K. C. (eds.) Port Management: Cases 




Appendix E: Resilience terms and concepts in this study  




The ability of a system or actors to prepare for, 
mitigate or prevent negative impacts, using 
predetermined coping responses to preserve and 
restore essential basic structures and functions. This 
includes coping mechanisms used during periods of 
shock. 
Connell, S. D., & 
Ghedini, G. (2015); 
Davidson et al 
(2016); DFID (2016) 
Adaptive capacity Ability of actors (individuals, communities, 
governments) to adjust to a disturbance, moderate 
potential damage, take advantage of opportunities 
and cope with the consequences of a change. 
Walker et al. (2004); 
O’Connell et al. 
(2015); Davidson et 




The strategic and tactical capability of the 
organization to plan for and respond to incidents 
and business disruptions to continue business 
operations at an acceptable predefined level. 
Bird (2011); Caselli 




A holistic management process that identifies 
potential threats to an organization and the impacts 
to business operations that those threats—if 
realized—might cause, and which provides a 
framework for building organizational resilience 
with the capability for an effective response that 
safeguards the interests of its key stakeholders, 




Systems of people and nature in which complexity 
emerges from a small set of critical processes that 
create and maintain the self-organizing properties 
of the system. 
Levin (2012); Holling 





A group of individuals responsible for developing 
and implementing a comprehensive plan for 
responding to a disruptive incident. The team 
consists of a core group of decision-makers trained 
in incident management and prepared to respond to 
any situation. 
Wooten & James 
(2008); Bird (2011). 
Critical activities Those mission critical activities which must be 
performed to deliver the key products and services, 
and which enable an organization to meet the most 




Vital functions without which an organization will 
either not survive or will lose the capability to 
effectively achieve its critical objectives. 
A critical business function can comprise a single 
process or several processes contributing to a final 
definable output. A critical business function may 
involve a single structural unit of the organisation or 





Disaster  A physical event which interrupts business 
processes sufficiently to threaten the viability of the 
organization. 
Bird (2011). 
Disaster resilience Ability of countries, communities and households to 
manage change, by maintaining or transforming 
living standards in the face of shocks or stresses – 
such as earthquakes, droughts or violent conflict – 




The systematic process of using administrative 
directives, organizations, and operational skills and 
capacities to implement strategies, policies and 
improved coping capacities to lessen the adverse 
impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster.  
Involves strategies for prevention, preparedness 
and response to disasters and the recovery of 
essential post-disaster services. 
Bird (2011); UNISDR 
(2013); DFID (2016) 
Disruption An adverse event that interrupts normal business, 
functions, operations, or processes, whether 
anticipated (e.g. hurricane, political unrest) or 
unanticipated (e.g. a blackout, terror attack, 





ERM includes the methods and processes used by 
organizations to manage risks and seize 
opportunities related to the achievement of their 
objectives. ERM provides a framework for risk 
management, which typically involves identifying 
events or circumstances relevant to the 
organization's objectives (risks and opportunities), 
assessing them in terms of likelihood and magnitude 
of impact, determining a response strategy, and 
monitoring progress. By identifying and proactively 
addressing risks and opportunities, business 
enterprises protect and create value for their 
stakeholders, including owners, employees, 
customers, regulators, and society overall. 
Bird (2011). 
Essential services Infrastructure services without which a building or 
area would be considered disabled and unable to 
provide normal operating services; typically includes 
utilities (water, gas, electricity, 
telecommunications), and may also include standby 
power systems or environmental control systems. 
Bird (2011). 
Hazard A potential cause of an unwanted incident, which 
may result in harm to individuals, assets, a system 
or organization, the environment, or the 
community. 
The words ‘threat’s and ‘hazards’ are often 
interchangeable. Threats such as natural disasters 
or extreme weather conditions are more typically 
referred to as “Hazards” 
Bird (2011); Modica 
& Zoboli (2016). 
Incident An event that has the capacity to lead to loss of or a 
disruption to an organization’s operations, services, 




or functions – which, if not managed, can escalate 
into an emergency, crisis, or disaster. 
Innovation An important response mechanism in times of 
system crisis, renewal and when transformational 
change is needed; integral to the reorganization 
phase of the adaptive cycle. 
Bristow & Healy 
(2014); Foster et al. 
(2015); Davidson et 
al (2016). 
Maximum 
acceptable outage  
The duration after which an organization’s viability 
will be threatened if an IT system or operational 
service cannot be resumed. 
Bird (2011). 
Maximum 
tolerable period of 
disruption 
The duration after which an organization’s viability 
will be seriously threatened if a product or service 
delivery cannot be resumed. 
Bird (2011); Tjoa 
(2012) 
Mitigation Limitation of any negative consequence of an 
incident. 
McDaniels et al. 
(2008); Bird (2011) 
Operational 
resilience 
Ability of an organization, staff, system, 
telecommunications network, activity or process to 
absorb the impact of a business interruption, 
disruption or loss and continue to provide an 
acceptable level of service. 
Caralli, Allen & 




Complementary aspects referring to the amount of 
external pressure that it takes to disturb a system. 
Some systems persist because they are resistant to 
external disturbance. 








Davidson et al 
(2016). 
Recovery to stable 
or previous state 
The assumption that systems will bounce back to 
their previous stable state after disturbance. 
Zollie & Healy 
(2012); Davidson et 
al (2016). 
Renewal via self- / 
reorganization 
The capacity for renewal in complex adaptive 
systems experiencing disturbance through internal 
self-directed structural change. 
Folke et al. (2005); 
Folke (2006); 
Davidson et al 
(2016). 
Resilience building Fostering development of those elements that will 
enable social-ecological systems to absorb and/or 
adapt to unforeseen change and deal with 
uncertainties - learning to live with change, 
maintaining diversity (natural, cultural, social, 
economic, institutional) to increase options, 
combining different types of knowledge for 
learning, and providing opportunities for self-
organization. 
Newman & Dale 
(2005); Paton 
(2006); Davidson et 
al (2016). 
Stakeholder Individual or group having an interest in the 
performance or success of an organization e.g., 
customers, partners, employees, shareholders, 
owners, the local community, first responders, 




Refers to retention of system function, structure 
and feedbacks despite experiencing disturbance. 
Folke et al. (2010); 
Cumming (2011); 
389 




Improving capacity to withstand and cope with 
hazards, reducing the impact of hazards, and 
reducing general risk causes. 
Berkes (2007); 
Davidson et al 
(2016). 
